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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I question whether social phenomena exist. Since social groups are perhaps the 
most widely recognised category of social phenomena, I focus my discussion on social groups. 
First I elucidate our common-sense intuitions about social groups. Thereafter, I distinguish 
between two problems: specifying the relation among the members of a social group (the 
individual-individual problem), and specifying the relation between social groups and their 
members (the social-individual problem). I argue that the individual-individual and social-
individual problems comprise the core concerns of social ontology, at least insofar as social 
ontology is applied to social groups. 
I then examine a number of possible solutions to the individual-individual problem, and argue 
that none of these positions convincingly captures our common-sense intuitions about social 
groups. I divide these solutions into Objectivist and Subjectivist accounts. Objectivist accounts 
of social groups exclude reference to the reflexive mental states of the individuals underlying 
the group, and focus instead on the patterns of interactions among group members, observable 
from a non-member’s perspective. I argue that Objectivist accounts, including Elster’s 
transactional account, the organic account, and the teleological account of social groups, are 
unable to capture adequately the distinction between a mere aggregate and a social group 
because they exclude reference to reflexive mental states, rendering the accounts vulnerable to 
a number of counterexamples. By contrast, Subjectivist positions, including Sartre’s account, 
Gilbert’s plural subject theory, and Searle’s constructionism, hold that reflexive mental states 
provide the principle that unifies a collection of individuals into a social group. Subjectivists, 
however, are unable to account for the importance of the history of social phenomena. 
Thereafter I consider affirmative solutions to the social-individual problem, or positions that 
hold that social groups exist. These positions are divided into non-reductive and reductive 
accounts. Non-reductive accounts, including Social Dualism and Non-Reductive 
Individualism, hold that social groups are logically or conceptually distinct from the individuals 
that comprise them. Social Dualists posit that social groups and their members are distinct 
entities, while Non-Reductive Individualists hold that social properties are distinct from 
individualistic properties. I argue that Social Dualism problematically reifies the social, while 
Non-Reductive Individualism is unable to maintain the dependence of the social on the 
individual without collapsing into a reductive account. Reductionists hold that social groups are 
identical with their members, or with the intra-relations among their members. Logical 
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
iii 
Individualists hold that this identity is conceptual: the concept of a social group is the concept 
of a collection of individuals. Type Individualists claims that types of social groups are identical 
with types of members (or types of member intra-relations). And Social Functionalists hold that 
social groups are just phenomena with a certain function, and those functional phenomena are 
in turn instantiated by individuals. I argue that none of the reductive accounts are successful, 
however: Logical Individualism cannot account for the holism of the social, Type Individualism 
faces the problem of multiple realisation, and Social Functionalists cannot adequately 
individuate groups diachronically. 
Finally, I tentatively support an alternative, negative solution to the individual-individual and 
social-individual problems: Eliminative Individualism. Eliminative Individualism is the 
position that social phenomena do not exist, that Folk Sociology is a radically false and 
misleading theory, and that social terms have no referent. I discuss a number of strategies for 
eliminating social phenomena, ultimately providing a psychological and neurological 
explanation that I argue might be used to explain away the appearance of social groups. That 
is, I make a case for the possibility that we can explain away beliefs in social groups the way 
we explain away paranormal, or errant religious beliefs. Finally, I argue that “thick” social 
phenomena, such as the wisdom of the crowds and the unintended consequences of intended 
action, may be explained using reason-based, statistical and possibly network-based 
explanations. 
I conclude that Eliminative Individualism, although it faces certain challenges, is worthy of 
serious attention as a contender to affirmative social ontologies in the literature. 
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political climate in South Africa, then there is a radical political youth party that occupies the 
same space as the collective. 
C3``  It is necessary that for any collection of individuals who relate in an R-manner, if the 
collective is in the current political climate in South Africa, then there is a radical political 
youth party that occupies the same space as the collective. 
C3```  It is necessary that for any social chess club, if it has multiple members, then there is a legal 
entity that occupies the same space as the social chess club. 
Interpretations of the Knights of War case: 
Int-1 The interpretation of the Knights of War case which states that the Knights of War exists at 
t1, at t2, and at t3. 
Int-2 The interpretation of the Knights of War case which states that the Knights of War exists at 
t1, ceases to exist at t2, and then returns to existence at t3. 
Int-3 The interpretation of the Knights of War case which states that the Knights of War exists at 
t1, ceases to exist at t2, and a numerically distinct chess club (i.e. not the Knights of War) 
comes into existence at t3. 
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Type Individualism: 
CSM Central State Materialism 
MR-1s If Type Individualism is true, then every social kind is identical with an individualistic kind. 
MR-2s Some social kinds can be realised by individualistic entities belonging to distinct 
individualistic kinds. 
MR-1m If CSM is true, then every mental kind is identical with a bodily kind. 
MR-2m Some mental kinds can be realised by bodily structures belonging to distinct bodily kinds. 
Social Functionalism: 
SFde re  Any given social group is identical with a specific function F. 
SFde dicto  Any given social group is identical with a function, whatever that function is. 
SFdiachronic  Social group G1 with function F1 at time t1 is identical with G2 which has F2 at t2 iff G1 and 
G2 are functionally continuous. 
Questions concerning functional continuity: 
Q3 What does it mean for two groups to be functionally continuous? 
Q4 Does functional continuity (whatever functional continuity is) provide the correct principle 
for the diachronic individuation of social groups? 
Where F1 and F2 are the respective functions of G1 at t1 and G2 at t2: 
FC-1 G1 and G2 are functionally continuous iff F1 resembles F2 more than F1 resembles the 
function of any other social group existing at t2. 
FC-2 G1 and G2 are functionally continuous iff F2 causally depends upon G1 to a greater degree 
than F2 depends upon any other social group existing at t1. 
FC-3 G1 and G2 are functionally continuous iff there is an overlapping “goal-progression chain” 
between F1 and F2. 
In Nozick’s Closest Continuer Schema, G1 is identical with G2 iff CC-1 through CC-4 obtain: 
CC-1 G2 is the closest continuer of G1. 
CC-2 G1 is the closest predecessor of G2. 
CC-3 G2 is close enough to G1. 
CC-4 The degree to which G2 is close to G1 is significantly greater than the degree to which any 
other group G3 is close to G1 
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Section D. Eliminative Individualism (pp. 188-248) 
Claims considered or dismissed in the formulation of Eliminative Individualism: 
EI-1 Social phenomena do not exist. 
EI-2 Folk sociology is useful. 
EI-3 Folk Sociology is a radically false and misleading theory. 
EI-3a Folk Sociology is a theory. 
EI-3b Folk Sociology is radically false. 
EI3-c Folk Sociology is radically misleading. 
EI-4 Social terms have no referent. 
In a Kemeny-Oppenheim reduction, for any two theories (or sets of theories) T1 and T2, T2 can be replaced by, and hence 
eliminated in favour of, T1 if all of the following conditions are met:  
KO-1 T2 cannot be Nagel-reduced to T1. 
KO-2 All observations that can be explained by T2 can be fully explained by T1. 
KO-3 T2 is at least as simple as T1 after T2 has explained all observations made by T1. 
Types of explanatory claims: 
S-1 Every instance of paranormal activity (e.g. stigmata, poltergeists, ESP, alien abduction, etc.) 
can be explained scientifically. 
S-2 The hardness of diamonds can be explained by chemistry. 
S-3 The death of Mrs Smith can be explained by the burglar firing his gun. 
Ways of construing Token Explanatory Methodological Individualism: 
TEMIeliminative  Any given token social phenomenon can be explained away as a misperception by citing a 
token set of individualistic phenomena. 
TEMIconstitutive The underlying nature of any given token social phenomenon can be explained fully by citing 
the token set of individualistic phenomena that comprise it. 
TEMIcausal  The cause of any given token social phenomenon can be fully specified by citing a token set 
of individualistic phenomena. 
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Discussion of evolutionary-perception-inference: 
EPI Evolutionary-perception-inference: because a given perceptual apparatus PA provided 
humanity with a crucial survival advantage, PA represents reality accurately most of the time. 
EPIconcrete-concrete  Because using Gestalt principles to organise experiences of concrete objects provided 
humanity with a crucial survival advantage, the Gestalt principles represent concrete reality 
accurately most of the time. 
EPIsocial-concrete  Because using Gestalt principles to organise experiences of aggregates into social groups 
provided humanity with a crucial survival advantage, the Gestalt principles represent concrete 
reality accurately most of the time. 
EPIconcrete-social  Because using Gestalt principles to organise experiences of concrete objects provided 
humanity with a crucial survival advantage, the Gestalt principles represent social reality 
accurately most of the time. 
EPIsocial-social  Because using Gestalt principles to organise experiences of aggregates into social groups 
provided humanity with a crucial survival advantage, the Gestalt principles represent social 
reality accurately most of the time. 
P-1 Using Gestalt principles to organise experiences of aggregates into social groups provided 
humanity with a crucial survival advantage. 
Ichikawa and explaining away: 
I Intuition to be explained away. 
E Explanans offered to explain away the intuition I. 
p The probability with which E predicts I. 
i E is true. 
ii (ii) E predicts I. 
iii (iii) It is not the case that: if I is incorrect, then E is false (or highly improbable). 
iv p is the same whether I is correct or incorrect. 
Hempel’s characteristic features of theories: 
F-1 Theories are introduced to explain a set of apparent regularities. 
F-2 Theories use laws or generalisations in their explanations. 
F-3 Theories posit underlying theoretical entities in their explanations 
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F-4 Theories predict new regularities using the laws (or generalisation) and theoretical entities 
introduced in F-2 and F-3. 
Discussion of EI-3: 
RF-1 The theoretical entities posited by a theory do not exist. 
RF-2 The apparent regularities for which a theory is introduced to explain do not in fact occur. 
RF-3 A significant number of the generalisations utilised by a theory are false. 
RF-4 The generalisations utilised by a theory do not explain adequately the apparent regularities 
for which the theory is introduced to explain. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
A.1. THE PROBLEM 
Suppose there were an ancient alien being whose entire existence has been spent in solitude. 
The alien lives out its days exploring the universe, and, until now, has never come across 
another living being (of its own species or any other). But today its perambulating spaceship 
comes across earth, and it lands in Wits Central Block concourse, a bustling square at the heart 
of the South African university.1 
Fortunately, the alien is both rational, and a skilled learner. It realises not only that we are alive, 
but that we are attempting to communicate with it. After some months of discussion, the alien 
learns enough about our language to converse, and begins to ask about the constituent elements 
of our world. During our explanation about how our society works, we explain to the alien that 
our lives and identities are hugely influenced by social groups. We grow up in a family, attend 
a school, participate in the rites and rituals of a culture, find a place in our society, work for a 
greedy corporation, support Bafana Bafana, vote for our favoured political party, and love our 
country. Unaccustomed to a plurality of beings, the alien appears perplexed, and asks to see one 
of these “social groups”. 
So, we point to the concourse. We explain that on an ordinary weekday, the square contains a 
number of individuals. Some might be eating lunch, while others are walking through to get to 
their lectures. These individuals, we explain, do not together comprise a social group – they are 
a mere aggregate2 of individuals. However, later that day, the individuals on the concourse 
begin to chant in unison about the fee increases this year, all holding ANC youth-league 
(ANCYL) flags and banners.3 Seizing the opportunity, we tell the alien that now the chanting 
individuals in the concourse together comprise a social group. But the alien still does not 
understand. “What,” it asks, “is it that distinguishes the first case [the lunch-eaters and class-
                                                 
1 I constructed this thought experiment from a combination of Mandelbaum’s (1955 [1973]) Martian and Rorty’s 
(1979) Antipodeans.  
2 Note that here, and throughout the thesis, I use the phrase “mere aggregate” to refer to a collection of individuals 
that does not amount to a social group. Thus, I do not use the phrase “mere aggregate” in any technical sense, for 
example, as Sheehy (2006a, ch. 1) uses the term to refer to a mereological sum.  
3 The ANC youth-league (ANCYL) is the youth branch of the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC is 
presently the ruling party in South Africa. 
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goers], from the second [the ANCYL members] that allows us to call the latter a social group4, 
but not the former? That is, what distinguishes a mere aggregate of individuals from a social 
group?” 
After some thought a member of the sociology department answers that the most significant 
common-sense intuition we have about social groups is that they can (i) act: the ANCYL can 
protest, chant and demand. Moreover, groups are capable of acting morally or immorally, and 
are (ii) responsible for their actions. Should the group of ANC youth-leaguers break university 
property during their protest, or harm other students, they can be held liable. Related to the 
responsibility of groups, they also have (iii) value. Members of the league are proud of their 
allegiance to a group they believe performs meritorious actions. Or, using a different example, 
there seems to be something worthwhile in preserving the lost artefacts of an ancient 
civilisation. But, unlike the ANC youth-leaguers, the aggregate of lunch-eaters and class-goers 
does not possess group agency, responsibility or value. Finally, groups seem to (iv) persist 
through time in a way that mere aggregates of individuals do not. When the lunch-eaters and 
class-goers leave the concourse, this aggregate ceases to exist. However, the ANCYL continues 
to exist even after its members disperse from the concourse and go home. 
Still dissatisfied, the alien says that although it sees how an individual can possess capacities 
(i) through (iv), it does not understand how a group of individuals has the capacity for these 
four features. Fortunately, the philosophy department is present in these talks, and answers that 
the agency, responsibility, value and persistence of social groups are grounded in the agency, 
responsibility, value and persistence of their individual members. 
Pondering the importance of individuals for the groups they together comprise, the alien presses 
us further, asking two questions: 
Q1. What relationships obtain among the members of a social group that do not obtain 
among the individuals in a mere aggregate? (e.g. how do the ANC youth-leaguers 
relate differently with each other compared with the lunch-eaters and class-goers?) 
                                                 
4 Strictly speaking, the chanting individuals do not together comprise the ANCYL – merely a sub-section of the 
ANCYL. Nevertheless, we think that, at the very least, the chanting individuals together act as members of a social 
group in a way that the individuals walking along the concourse previously in the day did not. 
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Q2. What is the relation between a social group and its members? (e.g. are the ANC 
youth-leaguers the same as or distinct from the ANC youth-league?) 
A.2. THE LITERATURE 
Q1 and Q2 are located within the debates that surround the notion of individualism, but more 
specifically, within a branch of philosophy called “social ontology”. In what follows I outline 
the various types of individualism that have been discussed in the literature, with the goal of 
highlighting the relevance of these debates for Q1 and Q2. Thereafter, I locate Q1 and Q2 within 
social ontology specifically. I argue that Q1 and Q2 are instances of two widely discussed 
questions within social ontology, namely, the configuration problem and the macro-micro link 
problem. However, these two problems are damagingly ambiguous, and as a result, it is unclear 
what the core concerns of social ontology are. To resolve this problem I will argue that Q1 and 
Q2 are instances of what might be called the “individual-individual problem” and the “social-
individual problem” respectively. These two problems should be understood as the correct 
disambiguations of the configuration and macro-micro link problem respectively, and that 
together they comprise the core concerns of social ontology. 
A.2.a. Types of individualism 
In this dissertation I favour a controversial version of individualism that I later label 
“Eliminative Individualism”, which claims that social groups do not exist. Eliminative 
Individualism provides negative answers to both Q1 and Q2: there is no relation among 
individuals sufficient to distinguish group membership from membership in a mere aggregate, 
and there is no relation specifiable between a social group and its members. To place Q1, Q2 
and Eliminative Individualism within the existing literature, a good place to start is to discuss 
the different debates around individualism. 
The term “individualism” has been used in distinct debates within numerous fields of inquiry, 
including (i) psychology, (ii) sociology, (iii) philosophy of mind, (iv) epistemology, (v) 
ethics, (vi) political philosophy, (vii) economics, (viii) philosophy of social science, and (ix) 
social ontology. Debates in fields (i) through (vi) are largely excluded from (although not 
unrelated to) the discussion I will have around individualism in this dissertation – I will outline 
these debates now, only to put them aside as tangential to my purposes. (vii) is more important, 
as it will be raised at the end of the dissertation, when I consider the implications of Eliminative 
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Individualism. However, (viii) and (ix) are central to my purpose, and so, I will discuss them at 
length.  
Briefly, within (i) psychology, individualism takes the form of arguing over whether 
individuals construct their sense of self with or without reference to other people – i.e. whether 
we have a social or individualistic self – and whether this differs between societies (Chen & 
Lie, 2005; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). This psychological debate will become 
relevant later, when I argue in favour of Eliminative Individualism by providing a case for 
explaining away the experience of social phenomena. I argue that one reason we might believe 
there are social groups is that (we believe that) groups satisfy important psychological needs 
we have. 
The structure-agency debate among (ii) sociologists concerns whether the behaviour of 
individuals is primarily determined by social structures (the “structure” position) or by the 
individual’s psychological makeup and free choices (the “agency” position). In this context, 
proponents of the agency position, also called “abstract individualism” (Lukes, 1973), would 
often be coined as individualists (Giddens, 1987; Scott & Marshall, 2009). Eliminative 
Individualism would decide in favour of the agency position in this debate (since non-existent 
social structures have no causal power), and so, the structure position could be viewed as one 
of a number of positions targeted by Eliminative Individualism. I will later label this 
conjunction of social positions, “Folk Sociology”. 
Individualists, or internalists, within (iii) philosophy of mind argue that the content of any 
given intentional5 mental state (e.g. a desire or belief) depends entirely on intrinsic properties 
of the individual who possesses that mental state. By contrast, externalists argue that the content 
of our beliefs and desires is at least partly determined by factors external to us (Lau, 2010). In 
section D.4.a. Burge’s account of content (p. 230), I discuss Burge’s (1979) brand of 
externalism which, if true, would imply that Eliminative Individualism is false. 
(iv) Social epistemologists argue that the classical, “individualist” approach to knowledge, 
which stresses the individual as an interchangeable, anonymous subject of knowledge, is 
fundamentally flawed. Instead we should adopt a social concept of knowledge, which views the 
subject of knowledge either as a “situated knower” (a specific, concrete individual in relation 
                                                 
5 An intentional mental state is any mental state that is about, or directed at, an object. 
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to other individuals) or as a community (see Goldman, 2006). Eliminative Individualists would 
obviously deny the social account of knowledge, and adopt an individualistic account. 
Within (v) ethics, “individualism” has been used to refer to at least three controversial positions. 
First, “individualism” has been understood as the view that the individual human being has 
ultimate intrinsic value (e.g. Matthew, p. 25:40). Kant (1785 [1998]) used this claim to ground 
his Formula of Humanity, or the doctrine that an action is right just in case it treats every person 
involved with dignity, or as an end in herself. Second, “individualism” has been used to refer 
to psychological egoism, or the position that individuals act purely in their own self-interest 
(e.g. Hobbes, 1651 [2001]). Third, “individualism” might be understood as moral egoism: the 
claim that an action A performed by an agent S is right if and only if A maximises or promotes 
the happiness or well-being of S (e.g. Kalin, 1970 [2001]). The truth of Eliminative 
Individualism, or any of the answers to Q1 and Q2, is independent of the truth of Kant’s 
Formula of Humanity, psychological egoism, and moral egoism, and so, the ethical debate is 
irrelevant to my purposes here. 
(vi) Political philosophy contains a long-standing debate about the legitimacy of authority and 
the obligations of subjects to obey the state’s commands. In this context, “individualism” has 
been used to refer to a variety of positions (see Blackburn, 2008a), specifically, positions that 
(a) encourage civil disobedience (see Crowder, 1998), (b) are “soft” on the obligations of 
subjects (e.g. Wolff, 1998), (c) require the consent of subjects for legitimate authority (e.g. 
Locke, 1690 [1966]), and (d) stress the rights and liberty of individuals as more important than 
the authority of the state (e.g. Mill, 1869). It is an interesting question whether Eliminative 
Individualism implies any of these positions, but unfortunately it is beyond the scope of the 
thesis to consider this.  
Finally, within (vii) economics, “economic individualism” refers to doctrines that justify and 
espouse “economic liberty”, or the view that the economy should be formed as a spontaneous, 
competitive market, in which the means of production are privately owned (e.g. Hayek, 1946). 
However, what is more important for my purposes than the doctrine of economic liberty, is its 
most influential justification, namely, Smith’s “invisible hand” argument. Smith (1759) argues 
that economic liberty provides a self-regulating system, in which, as if by an invisible hand, the 
self-interested actions of its individuals create an economy which best satisfies the interests of 
society as a whole. Smith’s argument provides an example of what Flew (1985) describes as 
“the unintended consequences of intended action”, involving an apparent pattern in the way 
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groups interact, and patterns that seem to emerge as a result of this, despite these patterns being 
unintended by the individuals involved. Folk Sociologists argue that without a social 
explanation, such patterns would be inexplicable, and therefore, these unintended patterns 
highlight a crucial explanatory gap in Eliminative Individualism. Towards the end of the thesis, 
I respond to this important objection to Eliminative Individualism. 
A.2.a.i. Philosophy of social science 
While debates (i) through (vii) have limited relevance to my purposes here, the debates within 
(viii) philosophy of social science and (ix) social ontology are far more important. Within 
philosophy of social science, the concept of individualism takes the form of “Methodological 
Individualism”, often discussed in opposition to “Methodological Holism”, or simply 
“Holism”. Just what Methodological Individualism is, though, is itself hotly contested. The 
confusion starts when one notices that generally accepted practice involves labelling 
philosophers who never used the phrase “Methodological Individualism” as core proponents or 
progenitors of the position. For example, Udehn, whose work on the history of Methodological 
Individualism is authoritative, writes: 
The founder of Austrian economics, Carl Menger, was also the main pioneer of methodological 
individualism. He did not use the term himself, but there is little doubt that his “atomistic method” 
is the main source of the doctrine later called “methodological individualism.” (2002, p. 484)6 
Similarly, Lukes (1973, p. 119) labels Hobbes and Mill as influential Methodological 
Individualists, even though the phrase was first used by Schumpeter decades later (see Heath, 
2007). Now, this practice (of labelling un-self-proclaimed philosophers as Methodological 
Individualists) would not be problematic, except for the fact that there is very little agreement 
on the definition of “Methodological Individualism” among those who do use the phrase. 
“Methodological Individualism” has been used to describe various (often conflicting) 
                                                 
6 One might defend Udehn by arguing that he merely ascribes to Menger the role of providing that thesis (atomism) 
from which Methodological Individualism originates, rather than labelling Menger a Methodological Individualist. 
However, Udehn is clear that in his view, Menger’s atomism is a form of Methodological Individualism: “he 
[Menger]… formulated the first ambitious program of methodological individualism, or “atomism”, in the history 
of the social sciences” (2002, p. 484). 
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ontological7, metaphysical8, epistemological9, explanatory10, and topic-delimiting11 claims 
within the philosophy of the social sciences. Thus, “Methodological Individualism” is generally 
used as a catch-all phrase for any position that places greater importance on individuals than on 
social phenomena in the philosophy of the social sciences. In what follows, I attempt to 
delineate the various accounts of Methodological Individualism provided by its (commonly 
proclaimed) core proponent, Weber, with the goal of showing how a variety of solutions to Q1 
and Q2 arise from these accounts.12 
Weber provides what is generally considered to be the seminal account of Methodological 
Individualism, stating that: 
…it may on the other hand be convenient or even indispensable to treat social collectivities, such as 
states, associations, business corporations, foundations, as if they were individual persons…. But 
for the subjective interpretation of action in sociological work these collectivities must be treated as 
solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons, since 
these alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable action. (1922 [1978], 
p. 13) 
This passage might be (and has been) understood as asserting any or all of the following claims: 
MI-1) All social phenomena can be explained purely in terms of the individualistic 
phenomena that comprise them. 
MI-2)  Social phenomena can be understood only in terms of the individualistic phenomena 
that comprise them. 
MI-3) The proper subject matter of Sociology concerns “the resultants and modes of 
organisation” of individualistic phenomena. 
MI-4) There are no entities other than individualist entities. 
MI-5)  Social phenomena are nothing but individualistic phenomena. 
It is no wonder, then, why there is such confusion over the central thesis of Methodological 
Individualism. MI-1 makes a claim about social explanation; MI-2 is an epistemological thesis 
                                                 
7 An ontological claim is a claim about what does or does not exist. 
8 A metaphysical claim about x concerns the nature of x. 
9 An epistemological claim concerns the nature of knowledge. 
10 An explanatory claim, in this context, is a claim about the nature of social explanation. 
11 A topic-delimiting claim concerning an area of inquiry A is a claim about which topics A should take as its 
subject of inquiry. 
12 Note that I will follow the trend of ascribing Methodological Individualism to commonly considered, yet un-
self-proclaimed, Methodological Individualists. The reason for this is that I am less concerned here with what 
Methodological Individualism is, and more concerned with how some of the versions of Methodological 
Individualism provided in the literature could be understood as answers to Q1 and Q2. 
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about how social phenomena can be understood, or known; MI-3 is a topic-delimiting claim 
about the proper subject matter of sociological inquiry; MI-4 is an ontological doctrine; and 
finally, MI-5 is a metaphysical claim about the nature of social phenomena. 
To make matters worse, in the following two pages, Weber writes: 
When reference is made in a Sociological context to a state, a nation, a corporation, a family, or an 
army corps, or to similar collectivities, what is meant is… a certain kind of development of actual 
or possible social actions of individual persons. Though extremely pedantic and cumbersome, it 
would be possible, if purposes of sociological terminology alone were involved, to eliminate such 
[social] terms entirely, and substitute newly-coined words. (1922 [1978], p. 14) 
Thirdly, it is the method of the so-called "organic" school of sociology… to attempt to understand 
social interaction by using as a point of departure the "whole" within which the individual acts. His 
action and behavior are then interpreted somewhat in the way that a physiologist would treat the role 
of an organ of the body in the "economy" of the organism, that is from the point of view of the 
survival of the latter…. For purposes of sociological analysis… if its [i.e. the organic view’s] 
cognitive value is overestimated and its concepts illegitimately "reified," it can be highly dangerous. 
(Weber, 1922 [1978], p. 15) 
These two passages, respectively, suggest the following claims: 
MI-6)  The concept of a social phenomenon is identical to the concept of a collection of 
individualistic phenomena. 
MI-7)  It is not the case that the members of social groups act as component parts of an 
organism. 
MI-6 is a claim about the meaning of social terms, while MI-7 concerns the relations among 
the members of a social group. 
Philosophers have argued vociferously over which of these seven claims “truly” defines 
Methodological Individualism [as an example, see the Watkins (1952, 1952 [1973], 1958, 
1959a, 1959b) vs Goldstein (1956, 1958, 1959) debate; also, see Udehn (2002) for an excellent 
summary]. For my purposes in this dissertation, I am primarily interested in individualism 
understood as an ontological and metaphysical claim, since Q1 and Q2 are metaphysical 
questions, while Eliminative Individualism is an ontological claim with metaphysical 
implications for Q1 and Q2. Thus, my discussion will involve MI-4 and MI-5 as important 
components. Specifically, MI-4 (later labelled “Ontological Individualism”) and MI-5 form the 
ontological basis for Non-Reductive Individualism (p. 124), Logical Individualism (p. 154), 
Type Individualism (p. 159), and Eliminative Individualism (p. 188), all of which are solutions 
to Q2. This is not to say, though, that the other versions of Methodological Individualism are 
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irrelevant to my purposes. Indeed, MI-1 is used as an argument for Type Individualism, MI-6 
is the central claim of Logical Individualism, and MI-7 is the denial of the organic account of 
social groups presented as a possible solution to Q1 (p. 40). 
Thus, (viii) philosophy of social science, in offering Methodological Individualism in its 
various versions, provides the ground for many of the solutions I later present to Q1 and Q2. 
However, Q1 and Q2, as questions, belong within (ix) social ontology.  
A.2.b. Social ontology 
Gittler was the first to define the phrase “social ontology”: 
It is the contention of this paper that sociologists tend to overlook one of the prime criteria for 
defining concepts; that this criterion involves the consideration of the nature of social reality (social 
ontology)…. We are employing the term social ontology to refer to the ultimate social “stuff,” the 
basic generic social reality that has to be taken into account in defining social objects or the concepts 
that refer to them. (Gittler, 1950, p. 8; emphasis added) 
On a rough paraphrase of Gittler’s usage, which I will assume for the remainder of this 
dissertation, social ontology is the study or investigation of the nature and existence of social 
phenomena. Social “ontology”, then, is both the ontological and metaphysical investigation of 
social reality. Gittler is silent, however, on precisely how social ontologists should go about 
“taking into account” social reality: what questions would a successful social ontology, or 
account of social phenomena, need to answer?13 A consideration of the more influential social 
ontologies (Elster, 1989; Gilbert, 1989; Lewis, 1969; Sawyer, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004; Searle, 
1995, 1998, 2010; R. Tuomela, 1983, 1989b, 1990, 2003) yields two plausible candidate 
questions, namely, the configuration problem and the macro-micro-link problem:14 
Configuration problem: which configurations of individualistic phenomena underlie the 
various sorts of social phenomena? 
Macro-micro link problem: what is the link, or relation, between social phenomena and 
the individualistic phenomena that underlie them? 
                                                 
13 I use the phrases “an account of social phenomena”, “an account of social reality” and “a social ontology” 
interchangeably.  
14 One might read Searle as providing a distinct problem from the configuration and macro-micro-link problems. 
I consider this view in section A.2.b.iv. Pluralism and gaps in the literature (p. 29).  
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
10 
Interestingly, these two questions are, respectively, similar to Q1 and Q2: the questions asked 
by our alien interlocutor at the start of this dissertation. Recall that Q1 asks us to specify the 
relation among (i.e. the configuration of) the members of a social group that does not occur 
among the individuals in a mere aggregate, while Q2 concerns the relation (i.e. the link) between 
a social group and its members.  
However, I will argue that, as they stand, the configuration and macro-micro link problems are 
damagingly ambiguous, for two reasons: because they permit versions of the problems (and 
hence some solutions) that do not belong within social ontology; and because the ambiguity 
obfuscates the points of agreement and departure among the various accounts on offer. 
Moreover, little attention has been given as to how these two problems are related. As a result, 
it is unclear exactly what common underlying question(s) these social ontologies seek, or should 
seek, to answer. Put differently, there seems little agreement over answering the question: what 
do social ontologists do? 
In what follows I attempt to resolve these problems, by arguing that the individual-individual 
and social-individual problems, of which Q1 and Q2 are respective instances, should be 
considered the correct disambiguations of the configuration and macro-micro-link problems. 
That is, I will argue that the individual-individual and social-individual problems together 
comprise the core concerns of social ontology. Thereafter, I discuss the relationship between 
these two problems, first by providing a taxonomy of solutions to each, and then by relating 
these two taxonomies. 
A.2.b.i. The configuration problem and the individual-individual problem 
Which configurations of individualistic phenomena underlie the various sorts of social 
phenomena? Social ontologists discussing this question have focused their efforts on 
understanding collective preferences (see, e.g., Condorcet, 1785; Downs, 1957), cooperation 
(Axelrod, 1984; Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982; Schelling, 1960), convention 
(Lewis, 1969), collective feelings (Gilbert, 1997, 2005, 2006a; Konzelmann Ziv, 2007), 
collective agency (Bratman, 1987, 2009; Elster, 1989; Gilbert, 2002; Holmstroem-Hintikka & 
Tuomela, 1997; S. Miller, 1992, 2001, 2010; Pettit, 2007; Searle, 1990; R. Tuomela, 1989a, 
1994), and social groups and institutions (Elster, 1989; Gilbert, 1989; Searle, 1995, 2010; 
Simmel, 1910-1911 [1971]; R. Tuomela, 2003). However, these accounts engage with the 
configuration problem in distinct ways, which I will argue suggests an underlying ambiguity in 
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the problem. I focus here on three Rational Choice accounts in the literature (Condorcet’s 
Paradox, Schelling’s account of cooperation, and Lewis’s account of convention), and argue 
that these three accounts together suggest a four-way ambiguity in the configuration problem. 
Yet only one of these four disambiguations, I will argue, is a suitable candidate for being a core 
concern of social ontology. 
Rational Choice Theorists understand the configuration problem to be the challenge of 
specifying how social phenomena arise from configurations of rational, self-interested 
preferences of individuals. Consider first Condorect’s Paradox (1785), which provides us with 
a necessary condition for the configuration of individualistic preferences underlying a 
collective preference. The paradox is often discussed in terms of the issues raised for democratic 
voting (e.g. Cudd, 2002). Consider the following scenario. Let a group G consist of individuals 
A, B and C. Suppose their voting preferences in the South African 2009 general elections are: 
 A prefers ANC to DA, and DA to COPE. 
 B prefers DA to COPE, and COPE to ANC. 
 C prefers COPE to ANC, and ANC to DA. 
If we attempt to aggregate these three preferences into a single preference for G, we arrive at: 
G prefers ANC to DA (since both A and C hold this preference), DA to COPE (held by A and 
B), and COPE to ANC (held by B and C). This is clearly problematic, since these three 
preferences together are intransitive, and so, create a contradiction: there is no determinate 
(rational) group preference in this scenario. Hence, the conclusion of Condorcet’s paradox 
could be stated as: the individualistic preferences underlying a (rational) collective preference 
must be non-cyclical, or there must be fewer than three individuals voting, or there must be 
fewer than three options from which the individuals choose. (The challenge raised for 
democracy is that, arguably, it is almost never the case that any of these three disjuncts is 
satisfied in a democratic election). 
By contrast, consider Schelling and Lewis’s accounts of cooperation. Both accounts stem from 
a discussion of how rational players should act in various coordination games. First, consider 
the following example, which I call Game 1. I lived on a farm with a narrow access road, and 
so drivers tended to drive in the middle of the road. Suppose that while driving this road, I 
noticed another car, also driving in the middle of the road, but driving towards me. Suppose 
that it was impossible to stop in time to avoid the collision (the road was wet), so either I should 
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have veered to my left while he veered to his left, or I should have veered to my right while he 
veered to his right. Now, let “Strategy1” and “Strategy2” be, respectively, the choice to veer to 
the left and to the right, and let he and I be, respectively, players A and B. Then the payoff 
matrix for this scenario is described by Figure 1 (assume that each of us prefers an outcome 
described by a lower number – i.e. “1” is preferable to “2”, and that an outcome of the form x,y 
indicates an outcome of x and y for A and B respectively): 
  B 
  Strategy1 Strategy2 
A 
Strategy1 1,1 2,2 
Strategy2 2,2 1,1 
Figure 1: Game 1 
In Game 1, cooperation or coordination occurs if both players choose the same strategy, whether 
this be Strategy1 or Strategy2 (top-left or bottom-right cells). Thus, the challenge faced by each 
player is that he must somehow predict which strategy his opponent will choose, and act 
similarly. Since this challenge concerns a lack of information, Lewis and Schelling attempt to 
solve this problem by finding ways to provide the players with relevant information about their 
opponent. I consider Schelling’s solution first. 
Schelling argues that even if there is no communication possible between the players, the 
players can with fairly reasonable accuracy assume certain helpful information about the other 
player, based upon the assumption that the other player is like them. These assumptions can be 
made because of certain common “focal points” shared by the players. For example (see Hardin, 
1998), player A might by default choose Strategy1 because A is an English-speaker, who is 
accustomed to reading from top left to bottom right. Similarly, A could with greater than a 50% 
chance of being correct assume that because player B is an English-speaker, he will do the 
same. In this case, the top-left cell operates as a focal point, and therefore allows for 
coordination, and hence, for cooperation. 
Unlike Condorcet’s paradox, Schelling’s solution does not provide us with a necessary 
condition for social phenomena: focal points are not necessary for cooperation – the two players 
might purely by chance (in Game 1, a 50% chance) happen upon a common strategy. Rather, 
Schelling provides a causal condition for cooperation: focal points enable, or cause, each player 
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to predict with greater certainty the other player’s strategy, and so, cooperate. Lewis, however, 
provides something stronger than either a necessary or causal condition for cooperation. 
Lewis’s solution is to point out that, as they apply to real-world social scenarios, games like 
Game 1 are iterative, or repeated over time. Every time the game is repeated, the players gain 
further information about their opponent’s strategy, since these iterations are – or as Lewis 
(1969, p. 36) describes it, “the force of precedent” is – likely to produce repeated choices, or 
patterns of choices, of strategies (especially if these strategies result in cooperation). This 
information then allows each player to act accordingly, and so resolve the coordination problem 
successfully. This repeated successful solution to a game problem is, roughly, what Lewis calls 
a “convention”.15, 16 
For example, I have driven this road and many others in South Africa, and in almost all cases 
where there is an approaching car, we each keep to our respective left. Thus, in this instance of 
Game 1, I had justified grounds for believing that you would veer to your left, and so, I chose 
to veer to my left as well, thereby avoiding the collision. By repeatedly avoiding collisions in 
this way, South Africans form a convention to drive on the left-hand side of the road.  
By definition, then, acting on, or in accordance with, convention is sufficient for cooperation. 
However, Lewis’s account offers us something more important than just a sufficient condition 
for cooperation: Lewis intends to provide what Gilbert (1989) calls a principle of unity. 
Roughly, a principle of unity transforms a mere aggregate of individualistic phenomena into a 
social phenomenon. The principle of unity for a given social phenomenon S is the glue [or 
“cement”, as Elster (1989) would call it] that combines the individualistic phenomena 
underlying S – without that principle of unity, S would be a mere aggregate of individualistic 
phenomena, and not a social phenomenon.  
On Lewis’s account, every time a player acts in accordance with convention, he is more likely 
to act that way in future. That is, the convention is self-sustaining. Evolutionary game theorists 
explain this by drawing an analogy between the Darwinian notion of the survival and evolution 
of the fittest animals over successive generations, and the establishment of conventions (or 
                                                 
15 A solution to a game is successful just in case it results in cooperation between the players, and the outcome for 
each player is the best possible outcome obtainable given that they cooperate.  
16 This simplified version of Lewis’s account of convention suits my purposes here. See Lewis (1969, pp. 78-79) 
for a fuller statement of the account.   
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sustained successful strategies) over successive rounds in a tournament of reiterated games (see 
Guala, 2007). To use a simplified example, suppose there were a multitude of sets of players 
playing Game 2 (described in Figure 2) in a tournament: 
  B 
  Strategy1 Strategy2 
A 
Strategy1 2,2 2,2 
Strategy2 2,2 1,1 
Figure 2: Game 2 
In this scenario, any player who chooses Strategy1 will receive a worse outcome than a player 
who chooses Strategy2, and so, only players who choose Strategy2 will be permitted to proceed 
to the next round of the tournament. That is, Strategy2 will “survive”, or “evolve” as a 
convention, and cooperation will therefore result. On this understanding, convention is more 
than just an aid to cooperation – it is intrinsic to cooperation. During the course of many 
iterations of game play, cooperation becomes convention. (This fits with our common linguistic 
usage: “it is conventional to cooperate”). 
This is even more evident when one compares the scenario of a tournament of reiterated games 
with a once-off game. Suppose Game 2 is played only once, between two players. The focal 
point of choosing the top-left cell used to resolve Game 1 will not help here. If cooperation does 
occur, it will be merely coincidental or lucky – i.e. cooperation (or perhaps mere convergence?) 
here is unintentional. By contrast, in an iterative game scenario, players will learn that Strategy2 
is the only way to achieve a reward, and so, will intentionally cooperate by choosing Strategy2. 
Thus, the convention of choosing Strategy2 transforms merely coincidental convergence into 
intentional cooperation. Therefore, for Lewis, convention provides the principle of unity that 
underlies social cooperation. 
We are now in a position to elucidate the ambiguity in the configuration problem. The three 
accounts considered (Condorcet’s paradox, Schelling’s focal points, and Lewis’s conventions) 
might each be understood as answering one or more of the following distinct disambiguations 
of the configuration problem: what are the individualistic phenomena 
1. that cause social phenomena? (Schelling) 
2. necessary for social phenomena? (Condorcet) 
3. sufficient for social phenomena? (Lewis) 
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4. that provide a principle of unity for social phenomena? (Lewis) 
This four-way ambiguity is problematic because not all of these disambiguations belong within 
social ontology. Recall that social ontology investigates the nature of social phenomena. Social 
ontology is therefore not in the business of providing causal conditions for (i.e. explaining) 
social phenomena – that is the realm of the social sciences. Put otherwise, the cause of a 
phenomenon is not a part of its nature, and so, version 1 of the configuration problem lies 
outside of social ontology. 
Moreover, versions 2 and 3 are also non-central concerns for social ontologists: the necessary 
and sufficient individualistic conditions for a given social phenomenon do not necessarily form 
part of its principle of unity. That is, conditions that are necessary or sufficient for a social 
phenomenon need not be constitutive of that phenomenon. For example, a necessary condition 
for collective action is that the individuals involved must be alive, yet being alive is not 
intuitively part of what transforms individual actions into a collective action – it does not form 
part of the principle of unity for collective action. Consider a second example. Elster (1989) 
has pointed out that if a collection of individuals interacts frequently enough, those individuals 
comprise a social group. Intuitively, however, the mere frequency of interaction among 
individuals does not seem to be the principle of unity for social groups (the quality of interaction 
seems to play a role here too).17 Thus, although, at best, Elster may provide a sufficient condition 
for social group membership (I doubt he has though), it does not seem to form part of the 
principle of unity for social groups. 
Now if the necessary and sufficient conditions for a social phenomenon do not form part of its 
principle of unity, they will not provide us with information about the nature of that 
phenomenon. Ultimately, then, versions 2 and 3 of the configuration problem enter into social 
ontology only insofar as they inform our investigation of version 4: version 4 is the proper 
subject matter of social ontology. Version 4 asks us to specify the constitutive conditions for 
social phenomena.18 To emphasise its importance, and to distinguish version 4 from versions 1 
through 3, I call version 4 the individual-individual problem. 
                                                 
17 This is a simplified version of Elster’s account – for a more lengthy elucidation of the account, see section B.2.a. 
Elster’s transaction account (p. 43). 
18 Specifying the constitutive conditions for social phenomena may involve specifying necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions for those phenomena. But those constitutive necessary and/or sufficient conditions will not be 
accidental to those phenomena, while they may be accidental in versions 2 and 3 of the configuration problem. 
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A.2.b.ii. The macro-micro-link problem and the social-individual problem 
Even if we accept that the individual-individual problem is a core concern of social ontology, 
this does not imply that it exhausts the concerns of social ontology. The macro-micro-link 
problem is another important candidate: what is the link, or relation, between social 
phenomena and the individualistic phenomena that underlie them? 
Unfortunately, like the configuration problem, the macro-micro-link problem is problematically 
ambiguous, since it has been understood in three ways, not all of which properly belong within 
social ontology. First, and traditionally, the problem of specifying the macro-micro link is often 
understood as a problem of explanation: can social phenomena be fully explained in purely 
individualistic terms? This is the debate between methodological individualists and 
methodological holists discussed above (p. 6). However, again, the explanation for a social 
phenomenon does not form part of its nature, and so, questions about the nature of social 
explanation belong within philosophy of social science, rather than within social ontology.19 
Second, the macro-micro-link problem has been understood as a question about the causal role 
of social phenomena: do individual actions affect (or impact) social phenomena, and do 
social phenomena impact individual actions? In the social sciences, this puzzle is discussed 
in terms of the structure-agency debate (p. 3). Proponents of the agency position deny the 
existence of “downward” causation of social phenomena upon individual agents, while the 
structure proponents affirm this downward causation. It is plausible that this causal version of 
the macro-micro-link problem belongs within social ontology: investigating whether or not 
social phenomena are capable of downward causation seems relevant for understanding the 
nature of social phenomena (Sawyer, 2003). Nevertheless, this does not appear to be a core 
concern for social ontologists: there is more to the study of the nature of social phenomena than 
studying their causal capacity. Rather, this causal-role version of the problem should be 
understood as a question which stems from, and hence will be answered in the course of 
investigating, the third version of the problem – discussed now. 
The third version of the macro-micro-link problem is a question of identity: are social 
phenomena identical with or distinct from the individualistic phenomena underlying 
them? If they are identical, should we understand this identity in terms of token-token identity, 
                                                 
19 This is not to say that Methodological Individualism is irrelevant to Social Ontologists, since Methodological 
Individualism is used to support Type Individualism [see section C.3.b. Type Individualism (p. 159)]. 
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type-type identity, or some other relation? And if social and individualistic phenomena are 
distinct, is this a distinction of properties, or of entities? Traditionally, this version of the macro-
micro link problem, which I call the social-individual problem, has been put aside as 
unimportant. For example, Ryan (1970, p. 181) dismisses the problem as that problem which 
“worries students more than it ought to”. There seem to be a number of reasons for adopting 
Ryan’s view, namely, that the social-individual problem is: (a) interchangeable with the 
individual-individual problem; (b) reducible to the individual-individual problem, and hence, 
resolved once the individual-individual problem is resolved; (c) an instance of the whole-part 
problem; (d) analogous to the mind-body problem; (e) outside the boundaries of social 
ontology; or (f) easy to resolve. I argue, however, that claims (a) through (f) are false, and 
therefore, that the social-individual problem remains a plausible candidate for being a core 
concern of social ontology. 
I object to (a) and (b) in section A.2.b.iii. Relating the individual-individual and social-
individual problems (p. 19), under my consideration of Assimilation and Upward Reduction 
respectively. Consider now (c), or the claim that the social-individual problem is an instance of 
a far more widely discussed problem, namely, how to relate a whole to its parts. Proponents for 
this position, such as Mellor (1982, pp. 63-65) and Quinton (1975-76, p. 5), suggest that the 
social-individual problem has already received long-standing attention, albeit in a different 
form (e.g. discussions about Theseus’s ship), and so, the social-individual problem does not 
merit separate attention. 
The difficulty with this position, however, is that even if the social-individual problem is an 
instance of the whole-part problem, there is still much to investigate, since it is unclear precisely 
what the parts of social phenomena are. For example, are the parts of which social groups are 
composed their members, or the intra-relations among their members? To add to the complexity 
here, Mandelbaum (1955 [1973], p. 115) correctly points out that individualistic phenomena 
are not the only parts of social phenomena. Rather, the social is holistic, in that social 
phenomena have as some of their parts other social phenomena: part of being a bank is having 
a relationship with the government, reserve bank, clients, etc.; and part of being the ANCYL is 
being the youth branch of the ANC, and being in opposition to other political parties. This 
holism of the social is not paralleled by a “holism” of material objects – tables do not have as 
their parts other tables. Thus, even if the social-individual problem is an instance of the whole-
part problem, the social-individual problem is more complex than the whole-part problem as 
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applied to material objects. Hence, the social-individual problem is a legitimate problem, 
distinct from the whole-part problem as traditionally construed.20 
The fourth reason one might adopt Ryan’s position on the unimportance of the social-individual 
problem is that (d) the social-individual problem is analogous to the far more carefully 
considered mind-body problem (see, e.g., Horgan, 1993; Sawyer, 2001, 2002, 2003), or the 
question: is the mind distinct from or identical with the body? One might then infer that 
answering the mind-body problem will provide a corresponding answer to the social-individual 
problem; and therefore, we should concentrate our efforts on the mind-body problem, rather 
than on the social-individual problem. 
Now, it is correct that the two problems are analogous in certain important respects: specifically, 
I argue in section A.2.b.iii. Relating the individual-individual and social-individual 
problems (p. 19) that the two problems should receive analogous taxonomies for their various 
solutions. However, solutions to the social-individual problem face challenges that their 
corresponding solutions to the mind-body problem do not. For instance, a supervenience 
account of the social suffers from problems that a supervenience account of the mental does not 
[see section C.2.b.ii. Regional supervenience (p. 133)]. Moreover, in section C.3.b. Type 
Individualism (p. 159) I argue that Type Individualism lacks resources, which Central State 
Materialism has at its disposal, to respond to the objection from multiple realisation. Further, I 
argue that Social Functionalism, a position that parallels Mental Functionalism, faces issues 
that the corresponding mental account does not [see  section C.3.c.ii. The analogy between 
cognitive states and social groups (p. 174)].21 
Finally, consider (e) and (f), or the claims that the social-individual problem is external to the 
concerns of social ontologists, and that it is easy to resolve. It should be clear, given the 
analogies between the social-individual problem and the whole-part and mind-body problems, 
that since the latter two problems are crucial metaphysical problems, so is the former. That is, 
the identity or distinction between any given object or property x and its underlying parts seems 
to be a part of the nature of x, whether x is a ship, a mental state, or a social phenomenon. 
Moreover, given the obvious complexity and difficulty of the whole-part and mind-body 
                                                 
20 For a more extensive discussion of the holism of the social, see section C.3.a. Logical Individualism (p. 154). 
21 I define supervenience, Type Individualism, Central State Materialism, Social Functionalism and Mental 
Functionalism in the next section. 
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problems and their similarity to the social-individual problem, it would be unwise to presume 
that the social-individual problem is easily resolved. 
I take it, therefore, that the social-individual problem is the correct disambiguation of the macro-
micro link problem. Moreover, we should understand Q2 as an instance of the social-individual 
problem. Thus, Q2 is the question: are social phenomena identical with or distinct from 
their members? If they are identical, should we understand this identity in terms of token-
token identity, type-type identity or some other relation? And if social groups and their 
members are distinct, are they distinct substances, or, rather, are group’s properties distinct 
from their members’ properties? 
A.2.b.iii. Relating the individual-individual and social-individual problems 
So far I have argued that the social ontology literature is confusing because two important 
questions underlying the literature (the configuration and macro-micro-link problems) are 
problematically ambiguous. However, even once these two questions have been disambiguated 
appropriately, as the individual-individual and social-individual problems respectively, 
confusion remains, since the relationship between the two questions has never been explored 
explicitly or fully. In the remainder of the introduction, I will investigate the relationship 
between the two problems by providing a taxonomy of the possible answers to the individual-
individual problem, a taxonomy of solutions to the social-individual problem, and then 
highlight the implications of the one taxonomy for the other. 
The literature on the individual-individual problem is perhaps best divided along two 
dimensions. First, the proposed solutions to the individual-individual problem might be divided 
into Subjectivist and Objectivist accounts. Subjectivist accounts of a given type of social 
phenomenon S cite the mental states of the persons underlying S as providing a principle for 
the unity of S. By contrast, Objectivist accounts exclude reference to the mental states of the 
individuals underlying S, and focus instead on the patterns of interactions which these 
individuals have with one another. The distinction might be framed as a difference in 
perspective, or stance. Subjectivist accounts take an “internal” stance with regard to social 
phenomena, where the perspective of the individuals involved is crucial, whereas Objectivist 
accounts view social phenomena from the perspective of an all-seeing, external observer. 
For example, Gilbert (1989), following Simmel (1910-1911 [1971]), provides a Subjectivist 
account of social groups, in which groups are understood as a collective in which every member 
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thinks of himself, as well as the other members of the group, as a “we” or “us”. Thus, Gilbert 
holds that mental states (i.e. beliefs) of individuals underlying social phenomena are essential 
to the nature of those social phenomena. By contrast, Rational Choice accounts of social 
phenomena, such as Lewis’s (1969) account of convention and cooperation, are Objectivist 
accounts. For Lewis, it is the patterns of strategy choices made by individual agents in reiterated 
coordination games that produce convention and cooperation. Lewis’s account has spawned 
Objectivist, teleological accounts of collective action and group membership, which understand 
these concepts in terms of the teloi of the individuals involved. On these accounts, collective 
actions are actions performed by individuals in pursuit of a common telos, and social groups 
are collections of individuals capable of collective action (e.g. S. Miller, 2001, 2010; R. 
Tuomela, 1989a). These teleological accounts are Objectivist because they espouse that even if 
we do not know the beliefs of the individuals involved, we can, “from the outside” as it were, 
see that these individuals act towards a common goal, and this is why we should view these 
individuals as comprising a social group performing collective actions. 
Notice, though, that the Subjectivist-Objectivist distinction as it stands is problematic. 
Objectivist teleological accounts include the notion of working towards a common telos, which 
presupposes that the individuals involved have mental states – beliefs and desires. Thus, it 
seems both Subjectivists and Objectivists require that group members have mental states, and 
so, there is no distinction here. However, we might refine our distinction between Subjectivism 
and Objectivism as follows. Subjectivist accounts cite reflexive mental states in their account 
of social groups, whereas Objectivist accounts do not. A group member with “reflexive” mental 
states has mental states regarding his and the other members’ membership in the group. On 
Gilbert’s account, for example, group members believe that they together with the others are 
members of the group, or members of a plural subject. But Objectivist accounts do not require 
or posit that group members have this reflexivity – although they do require that group members 
have some mental states, such as preferences (on rational choice theory) or goals (on the 
teleological account). 
The second dimension along which solutions to the individual-individual problem might be 
classified is according to their strength: the principle of unity provided to account for a given 
social phenomenon S might be (i) sufficient but not necessary for the unity of S, (ii) necessary 
but not sufficient for the unity of S, or (iii) both necessary and sufficient for the unity of S. 
Returning to Gilbert’s (1989) account, for example, we might understand Gilbert as espousing 
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any one of the following three positions: that the beliefs of group members are necessary, 
sufficient, or both necessary and sufficient, for membership within the group. 
Thus, we now have a taxonomy for the individual-individual problem. Moreover, it is fruitful 
to taxonomise solutions to the social-individual analogously with the taxonomy already 
provided by accounts of the mind-body relation. These accounts of mind are perhaps best 
broken up into two broad types of accounts: affirmative and negative accounts. Affirmative 
accounts claim that mental states exist, while negative accounts deny this claim. We can further 
divide affirmative accounts into reductive and non-reductive accounts.22 
Non-reductive accounts hold that the mind and the body are distinct. However, different non-
reductive accounts understand this position in different ways – that is, they understand the 
emergence23 of mental states differently. Cartesian Dualists hold that the mind and the body are 
distinct substances: the mind and the body are made of different kinds of stuff, or, put otherwise, 
the mind and the body are two distinct types of entity (Descartes, 1641 [2009]). The only 
relation that obtains between the mental and the physical, on Descartes’ account, is causal: the 
mind has a causal impact on the body, and vice-versa. Cartesian Dualists posit a strong form of 
emergence of the mental. By contrast, Non-Reductive Materialists posit a weak form of 
emergence of the mental, denying that the mind and body are distinct substances, and holding 
instead that mental properties are distinct from physical properties (Davidson, 1970 [1980]). 
On this view, the mental supervenes upon the physical. That is, the mental is dependent on the 
physical, in the sense that a change in the physical requires a change in the mental; or, if the 
physical remains constant, so does the mental (Kim, 1984). This has been taken to be consistent 
with the claim that a single, or token, mental state is identical with a token physical state 
(Davidson, 1970 [1980]), and with the claim that the mental is constituted by the physical (L. 
R. Baker, 2000).24 
Reductive accounts deny the claim that the mind and the body are distinct, and hold instead that 
the mental can be reduced to the physical: that is, the mind and the body are identical.25 
                                                 
22 The term “realism” has been used to refer to both affirmative accounts, and to (non-eliminativist) non-reductive 
accounts. Because of this ambiguity, I won’t use this term in the thesis. 
23 I discuss emergence further (specifically, the emergence of social phenomena) in section C.2. Non-reduction 
(p. 118).  
24 For a discussion of constitution, see section C.2.b.iii. Constitution (p. 144). 
25 The term “reduction” might also refer to a relation between two theories. Roughly, to say that theory T1 can be 
reduced to theory T2 is to say that T1 can be replaced by T2. In this context, reductionists claim that psychology 
can be replaced by neurology. There is much debate here around exactly what “replacement” involves [see 
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Importantly, reductionists (in the sense intended here) should not be taken to deny the reality 
of the mind – i.e. reductionists affirm the existence of the mind, and so intend to conserve the 
mind in its reduction to the physical. Now although reductionists are unanimous that by identity 
they mean more than supervenience, token identity, or Baker’s constitution, they disagree on 
whether this identity is a conceptual relation between the mental and the physical, as in 
Philosophical Behaviourism (Ryle, 1949)26 and Common-sense Functionalism (Lewis, 1972)27, 
or an empirical connection between the mental and the physical, as espoused by Psycho-
functionalists (Putnam, 1981)28 and Central State Materialists (Place, 1956)29. Conceptual 
accounts hold that the reduction of the mental to the physical is a priori and necessary, while 
empirical accounts espouse an a posteriori, contingent reduction. 
Finally, returning to our initial distinction among accounts of mind, while both reductive and 
non-reductive accounts assume that mental states exist (since they are affirmative accounts), 
negative accounts deny this claim. There are two ways a proponent of a negative account might 
do this. Instrumentalists, like Dennett (1987), claim that while mental states are useful for 
explaining or predicting human behaviour, mental states do not exist – that is, mental states are 
useful fictions. Eliminative Materialists, however, such as Churchland (1981 [1991]) and P. M. 
Churchland (1986), take a more radical view: the sum of talk about mental states constitutes a 
radically misleading and false theory, called “Folk Psychology”. As such, Folk Psychology 
should be discarded, and replaced by the evolving neuro-scientific account. 
Similarly, we might attempt to construct a parallel taxonomy of accounts that seek to answer 
the social-individual problem. Accounts might be divided into affirmative and negative, with 
affirmative accounts affirming the existence of social phenomena, and negative accounts 
denying the existence of the social. Within affirmative accounts we could distinguish between 
reductive and non-reductive accounts. Non-reductive accounts would comprise Social Dualism 
                                                 
Batterman (2007) and section D.2.b. Models of elimination (p. 191) for a discussion of various types of inter-
theoretic replacement]. I am less interested here, however, in the status of psychology and its relation to neurology, 
and more interested in the relation between the mind and the body themselves – i.e. my focus is on metaphysics 
and ontology, rather than philosophy of science. 
26 Philosophical Behaviourists claim that the concept of a mental state is identical with the concept of a behavioural 
state. 
27 Common-sense Functionalism is the doctrine that the concept of a mental state is identical with the concept of 
a functional state. Functional states might be understood in terms of their typical causes and effects. 
28 Psycho-functionalists posit that psychologists will discover perfect bi-conditional correlations between types of 
mental states and types of functional states. 
29 Central State Materialists, such as Place, hold that types of mental states are identical with types of physical 
states, where this identity will be discovered empirically. 
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(Durkheim, 1895 [1982]; Sheehy, 2006a) and Non-Reductive Individualism (Sawyer, 2002, 
2003), which, respectively, claim a distinction at the level of substance and property between 
the social and the individual. On Social Dualism, social phenomena are strongly emergent, with 
merely a causal relation between the social and the individual; while on Non-Reductive 
Individualism, the social is weakly emergent, and supervenes upon the individual.30 
Moreover, reductive accounts might be divided into conceptual accounts (Logical 
Individualism and Common-sense Social Functionalism) and empirical accounts (Type 
Individualism and Empirical Social Functionalism). Logical Individualism holds  that social 
concepts are identical with individualistic concepts (Neurath, 1944; Quinton, 1975-76), while 
Common-sense Social Functionalism is the doctrine that social phenomena can be reduced 
conceptually to their function. On the other hand, Type Individualists and Empirical Social 
Functionalists posit that we will discover (empirically) that types of social phenomena are 
perfectly correlated with, respectively, types of individualistic phenomena and types of 
functions. 
And finally, “Social Instrumentalism” (R. Tuomela, 1983) and “Eliminative Individualism”  
(Schmitt, 2003; R. Tuomela, 1990) parallel the negative accounts of mind. These two doctrines 
claim, respectively, that social phenomena are useful fictions, and that “Folk Sociology” is a 
radically misleading and false theory, to be replaced by purely individualistic sciences. 
Thus, we arrive at Figure 3:31 
                                                 
30 Like the Non-Reductive Materialist account of mind, the Non-Reductive Individualist account of the social is 
consistent with the claim that token social phenomena are identical with token collections of individualistic 
phenomena, and that social phenomena are constituted by individualistic phenomena in Baker’s (2000) sense of 
constitution. 
31 Note that Figure 3 does not distinguish between the conceptual and empirical versions of mental and Social 
Functionalism, since this distinction does not impact (what is my ultimate interest in this section) the relation 
between the taxonomies for the individual-individual and social-individual problems. 
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What is interesting, partly because it has not been explored before (at least as the two problems 
are defined here), is how the taxonomies of solutions to the individual-individual and social-
individual problems impact each other. I suggest that there are at least four interactions between 
the two taxonomies.  
First, let TS be a given type of social phenomenon, and let TI be a type of individualistic 
phenomenon. Then if the social can be reduced to the individual, for every TS there is a TI that 
is identical with, and hence both necessary and sufficient for, TS.32 
Second, Non-Reductive Individualism involves the claim that the social supervenes upon, and 
hence is determined by, the individual. Thus, Non-Reductive Individualists are committed to 
the claim that where a given TS is instantiated by a given TI, TI is sufficient for TS. Moreover, 
                                                 
32 The claim that TI is identical with TS is stronger than the claim that TI is necessary and sufficient for TS. Thus, 
interestingly, it is not the case that if for every TS there is a necessary and sufficient TI, then every TS can be 
reduced to a TI. Nevertheless, the claim that TI is necessary and sufficient for TS does support the claim that TS 
can be reduced to TI. Specifically, Type Individualists utilise such bi-directional correlations, also called “bridge 
laws”, to support their reduction of TS to TI (Nagel, 1961). 
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Sawyer designed Non-Reductive Individualism so that it is consistent with the multiple 
realisation of the social: any given type of social phenomenon might be instantiated by distinct 
types of individualistic phenomena. Thus, Non-Reductive Individualists are committed to the 
claim that no TI is necessary for a given TS. Therefore, Non-Reductive Individualism implies 
that there are sufficient but not necessary individualistic phenomena specifiable for any given 
type of social phenomenon. 
Third, suppose that we find that we can provide only necessary but not sufficient 
individualistic conditions for social phenomena – i.e. for any given TS, we can specify TI such 
that TI is necessary but not sufficient for TS. Now, we might adopt either Social Dualism or a 
negative account, depending upon whether or not the necessary conditions specified are 
fulfilled – i.e. whether or not TI obtains. If TI does not obtain, then neither does TS (since TI is 
necessary for TS), and therefore, a negative account is correct. On the other hand, if we hold 
that social phenomena do exist, and if TI does obtain, we would most likely support a sort of 
Social Dualism. For if individualistic phenomena are necessary but not sufficient for social 
phenomena, then the social does not supervene upon the individual. So, it is possible for the 
very same set of individualistic phenomena to instantiate distinct social phenomena.  This 
implies that social phenomena are in an important sense undetermined by individualistic 
phenomena, and so, possess a strong independence from individualistic phenomena. This 
amounts to, or comes very close to amounting to, Social Dualism. 
And finally, if Social Functionalism is correct, then we can reduce any type of social 
phenomenon to a type of function. Book clubs, on this view, are just those social groups the 
goal of which is to meet to discuss books. This function, it seems, is something we can identify 
from an “external perspective”, without reference to the reflexive mental states of the 
individuals involved. Thus, Social Functionalism implies an Objectivist solution to the 
individual-individual problem, most likely a teleological account.33 
                                                 
33 It is an interesting question, however, whether Objectivist solutions to the individual-individual problem imply 
Social Functionalism. There are two popular Objectivist accounts: the organic account and the teleological 
account. Both of these accounts are “functionalist”, in that they posit that the members of a group relate in such a 
way that they promote some function associated with the group. For the organicist, that function is the 
reproduction, growth, and self-regulation of the group. On the teleological account, that function is a shared telos 
towards which the members of the group work. It would be understandable (and elegant), therefore, for a proponent 
of an Objectivist solution to the individual-individual problem to hold Social Functionalism as a solution to the 
social-individualism problem. Nevertheless, it is not the case that Objectivism implies Social Functionalism, for it 
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We now have a roadmap (Figure 4) for social ontologists. For any two accounts A1 and A2, 
let a solid line with an arrow pointing from A1 to A2 denote that A1 implies A2, and let a dotted 
line with an arrow pointing from A1 to A2 denote that A1 supports but does not imply A2: 
 
Figure 4: The individual-individual and social-individual problems 
Now that we have some idea of the relations among the respective solutions to the individual-
individual and social-individual problems, we are in a position to draw conclusions about the 
relation between the two problems themselves, and their positions as core concerns of social 
ontology. On the one hand, we might adopt any one of the following views which holds that 
social ontology has exactly one core concern: 
i. Assimilation: the individual-individual and social-individual problems are equivalent 
or interchangeable, and so, are in fact one problem (Sheehy, 2006a)34; 
                                                 
seems possible to hold the position (without contradiction) that group members relate to promote the function of 
a group, but that the group is distinct from its function. 
34 In Sheehy’s (2006a) survey of the various accounts of social groups, he regularly switches between discussing 
the individual-individual and social-individual problems without distinguishing them. For example, Sheehy 
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ii. Upward Reduction: answering the individual-individual problem answers the social-
individual problem (Gilbert, 1989)35; 
iii. Downward Reduction: answering the social-individual problem answers the 
individual-individual problem; or 
iv. Subsumption: the social-individual and individual-individual problems can be 
subsumed within a distinct, overarching question (Searle, 1995, 1998, 2010). 
Alternatively, one could adopt a plural position, specifically: 
v. Pluralism: there are two distinct core concerns of social ontology: the social-
individual problem and the individual-individual problem. 
Assimilation is implausible, for the two problems are prima facie distinct: while the individual-
individual problem asks us to specify the horizontal relation among individuals underlying 
social phenomena, the social-individual problem asks us to provide the vertical relation 
between social phenomena and their underlying individualistic parts. Moreover, Assimilation 
implies both Upward Reduction and Downward Reduction, and yet both of these are 
implausible positions, for reasons considered now. 
As a counterexample to Upward Reduction, assume that the correct solution to the individual-
individual problem provides both necessary and sufficient individualistic configurations for 
social phenomena. This account is consistent with more than one type of reductive account – 
Logical Individualism, Social Functionalism or Type Individualism. Thus, the solution to the 
individual-individual problem does not provide us with a complete answer to the social-
individual problem. Moreover, Downward Reduction is similarly problematic. For example, 
suppose we know that Non-Reductive Individualism is the correct solution to the social-
                                                 
considers Gilbert’s (1989) Subjectivist solution to the individual-individual problem in terms of the reduction – 
non-reduction debate. Moreover, he provides a Social Dualism meant to rival Gilbert’s solution to the individual-
individual problem, and yet, Social Dualism is an answer to the social-individual problem: how they compete is 
unclear. 
35 Gilbert (1989, p. 1) is interested in answering the question: “what precisely is a social group?”. This question 
seems to call for a complete account of social groups – i.e. solutions to both the individual-individual and social-
individual problems, at least as they apply to social groups. Gilbert acknowledges the importance of the social-
individual problem, since the first paragraph in her book discusses the Social Dualism of Durkheim, and the macro-
micro link. Yet, Gilbert attempts to answer her question by providing a Subjectivist solution to the individual-
individual problem, and no solution to the social individual-problem. This suggests that Gilbert is operating under 
the assumption that a solution to the individual-individual problem is all we require for a complete social ontology; 
and therefore, the social-individual problem, insofar as it is important to social ontology, is encompassed within, 
or can be reduced to, the individual-individual problem. 
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individual problem, and hence, that social phenomena supervene upon individualistic 
phenomena. We do not know, however, exactly what sort of individualistic phenomena these 
are: to know this we would need to answer the individual-individual problem. For example, 
Non-Reductive Individualism is consistent with both the claim that political parties supervene 
upon their members’ beliefs that they together constitute a “we” or “us”, and the claim that 
political parties supervene upon their members’ pursuit of a common telos. Thus, Non-
Reductive Individualism is consistent with both a Subjectivist and an Objectivist solution to the 
individual-individual problem. 
Finally, Searle (1995, 1998, 2010) might be taken to support a Subsumptive social ontology. 
Searle, who makes the dubious claim (1998, p. 143) that he is the progenitor of social ontology 
(dubious because Rational Choice Theorists have been practising social ontology long before 
Searle’s work on the subject), provides both a puzzle, and a Subjectivist, affirmative account 
of social reality to resolve that puzzle. Searle’s puzzle arises from the following sort of 
observation. Consider a tree, a rock or a building: they exist in objective reality. Likewise, social 
phenomena like governments, families and money, exist in objective reality. However, unlike 
trees, rocks and buildings, governments, families and money would not exist if nobody believed 
in their existence. Thus, social phenomena raise a question, or puzzle, that individualistic 
phenomena do not: how is it possible for it to be an objective fact that social phenomena 
exist, and yet these social phenomena depend for their existence upon subjective states?  
Searle’s solution is to argue that social phenomena should be understood as constructed through 
common agreement over what he calls “constitutive rules”. Briefly, constitutive rules take the 
form “X counts as Y in C”, where X is an individualistic phenomenon (or collection of 
individualistic phenomena), Y is a social phenomenon, and C is the context in which this rule 
is effective (Searle, 1995, pp. 27-29). Thus, a piece of paper (X) that Searle hands to a store 
clerk is money (Y), a phenomenon existing in the objective world, because there is common 
agreement that pieces of paper such as this one count as money in the United States of America 
(C).  
Now, we might understand Searle’s puzzle either as an overarching question that subsumes 
both the individual-individual and social-individual problems, or as an alternative core concern 
of social ontology, which replaces both the social-individual and individual-individual 
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problems.36 Yet Searle’s puzzle, it seems, is a poor candidate for being a core concern of social 
ontology (on either understanding), since it presupposes a subjectivist solution to the social-
individual problem, and an affirmative solution to the social-individual problem. Yet how can 
social ontologists entirely ignore both the Objectivist, Rational Choice theoretical solutions to 
the individual-individual problem, as well as negative solutions to the social-individual 
problem? Of course Searle might hold that the Objectivist and negative accounts are 
unsuccessful. But this is irrelevant: the point is that these accounts (Objectivism and negative 
accounts) fit within social ontology as a branch of philosophy (since they concern the nature 
and existence of social phenomena), but do not satisfy the presuppositions of Searle’s puzzle. 
A.2.b.iv. Pluralism and gaps in the literature 
The conclusion of this discussion is that Pluralism is correct, a position which has never been 
explicated explicitly or defended in the literature. To conclude this section, therefore, I wish to 
perform a brief explication of Pluralism. Initially, we should distinguish between two pluralist 
positions. Independent Pluralism asserts that the individual-individual and social-individual 
problems are independent, while Dependent Pluralism is the denial of Independent 
Pluralism. I have argued in the previous section that solutions to the two problems impact each 
other, and so, I take it that Independent Pluralism is false.  
Within Dependent Pluralism we might outline five broad social ontologies: 
 Identity: there are necessary and sufficient individualistic configurations for social 
phenomena, and the social can be reduced to the individual; 
 Supervenience: there are sufficient but not necessary individualistic configurations 
for social phenomena, and Non-Reductive Individualism is true; 
                                                 
36 To be fair to Searle, it is unclear whether Searle’s puzzle arises as a challenge for his constructionist 
understanding of social phenomena, or rather, whether he intends his constructionist account of social phenomena 
as an answer to his puzzle. I have assumed the second reading here. This assumption is not without support, 
however: Searle does after all consider himself the progenitor of social ontology, and the only question or concern 
he raises to guide this “new” field is his puzzle. 
On the first reading, Searle’s puzzle effectively asks the question: how is it possible for a given constitutive rule 
(R) to be successful merely because there is common agreement that R is correct? Here, Searle provides us with a 
challenge faced specifically by his constructionist account of social reality, rather than a challenge faced by all 
accounts of social reality – i.e. rather than a central concern of social ontology. This does not present a 
Subsumptive view of social ontology: merely a Subjectivist solution to the individual-individual problem, as well 
as an affirmative solution to the social-individual problem (since the account holds that social phenomena exist in 
the objective world). 
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 Dualism: there are necessary but not sufficient individualistic configurations for social 
phenomena, and Social Dualism is true; 
 Negative: there are necessary but not sufficient individualistic configurations for 
social phenomena, and a negative account is correct; and 
 Functionalism: an Objectivist solution to the individual-individual problem and 
Social Functionalism are correct. 
This taxonomy highlights at least two glaring deficiencies in the literature. First, Negative has 
been largely dismissed and ignored as a viable social ontology.37 Flew describes the reality of 
the social as “inexpugnable” (1985, p. 102), and Lukes declares the denial of the existence of 
social reality “absurd” (1968 [1973], p. 124). Sheehy (2006a, p. 16) writes that “it is difficult 
to identify any compelling reasons to endorse” Eliminative Individualism, while Roth (2010, 
sec. 1) points out that in the literature “it is hardly controversial” that the social exists. Yet a 
careful consideration of Negative should be conducted, especially given that its parallel 
position within the philosophy of mind (Eliminative Materialism38) is taken seriously. 
And secondly, Social Functionalism as a solution to the social-individual problem has received 
little direct treatment in the literature. Rather than engaging with Social Functionalism as a 
metaphysical or ontological claim, philosophers have focused upon the legitimacy of functional 
explanation in the social sciences (see, e.g., Dore, 1961 [1973]; Elster, 1994 [1995]; Hempel, 
1959 [1995], 1966; Hollis, 1994; Homans, 1964 [1973]; Kincaid, 1990 [1995]; Mayntz, 2004; 
Ryan, 1970; Steel, 2005).39 
In this thesis, I tentatively favour Negative, partly because the alternatives are problematic [see 
section A.3. Central argument (p. 31) for a summary of the central argument in this thesis]. 
Thus, I intend to address the first gap outlined above. Moreover, in arguing for Negative, I 
intend to provide a survey of the various solutions to Q1 and Q2, as outlined by the taxonomies 
                                                 
37 Tuomela (1983) does present an Instrumentalist account of the social, and Tuomela (1990) and Schmitt (2003) 
do briefly discuss Eliminative Individualism as an option. However, much more exploration is required: Tuomela’s 
Instrumentalism could be refined so that it better parallels Dennett’s Instrumentalist account of the mental, and 
Tuomela and Schmitt’s discussions of Eliminative Individualism are cursory at best. 
38 I discuss the similarities and relation between Eliminative Individualism and Eliminate Materialism in footnote 
144. 
39 Notable exceptions include Schmaus (1999) and Schwartz (1993). Nevertheless, given the extensive treatment 
of Functionalism as an account of mind, much more work is required for an adequate treatment of Social 
Functionalism. 
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discussed. As part of this survey, I discuss Social Functionalism, and so I also hope to go some 
way towards filling this second gap in the literature. 
A.2.c. Conclusion 
I hope to have shown thus far that Q1 and Q2 should be read as instances of the individual-
individual and social-individual problems respectively, and that these two related, but distinct 
problems together comprise the core concerns of social ontology. Hence, this thesis should be 
understood both as an investigation into the nature of social groups, as well as providing a 
blueprint for social ontology in general. 
However, before I begin surveying the potential solutions to Q1 and Q2, I wish to summarise 
and delimit the central argument in the thesis, clarify my methodology, and provide a working 
definition for the distinction between “social” and “individualistic” phenomena. 
A.3. CENTRAL ARGUMENT 
The core claim which I wish to support in this thesis is that it is not the case that Eliminative 
Individualism is clearly less plausible than the accounts with which it competes. If this 
claim is correct, then Eliminative Individualism is worthy of serious consideration, which it has 
not received in the past. 
In the thesis I argue for three premises that together support my core claim: 
(1) None of the solutions to the individual-individual problem (i.e. Q1) provide a clearly 
adequate principle of unity sufficient for social groups [see section B. The 
Individual-individual problem (Q1) (p. 40)].40 
                                                 
40 Premise (1) supports the second conjunct of the claim that there are necessary but not sufficient individualistic 
configurations for social groups. By itself, A-1 does not imply Eliminative Individualism. To infer deductively 
Eliminative Individualism from A-1 I would also need to support two additional claims, namely, that there are also 
necessary individualistic configurations for social groups, and second, that these necessary configurations are not 
instantiated. I will not pursue these two additional claims in this thesis. Nevertheless, although A-1 does not imply 
Eliminative Individualism, A-1 is nevertheless a necessary claim for an Eliminative Individualist to hold. For if 
there are sufficient conditions for social groups, and if these sufficient conditions are instantiated (presumably 
successful accounts of social groups will provide conditions which are instantiated), then social groups exist, and 
so, Eliminative Individualism is false. 
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(2) None of the solutions to the social-individual problem (i.e. Q2) provide a clearly 
adequate account of the relation between social groups and their underlying 
individualistic parts [see section C. The Social-individual problem (Q2) (p. 116)]. 
(3) The best objections to Eliminative Individualism are unconvincing [see section D. 
Eliminative Individualism (p. 188)]. 
There are, however, two important points to make concerning the scope of this argument. First, 
notice that (1) and (2) concern the individual-individual and social-individual problems as they 
apply to social groups, rather than to social phenomena in general. Thus, at best they imply the 
claim that Eliminative Individualism as it applies to social groups is plausible.41 Nevertheless, 
I take it that social groups are prototypical social phenomena. As such, if Eliminative 
Individualism as it applies to social groups is plausible, there is some inductive support for the 
claim that Eliminative Individualism broadly construed is plausible. Moreover, social groups 
play a central role in explanations provided in the social sciences, and so, if Eliminative 
Individualism about social groups is correct, this would deal a significant blow to Folk 
Sociology as a whole. In section D.2.a. Scope (p. 190) I discuss the inference from claims 
about social groups to claims about social phenomena more broadly. 
Second, (1) and (2) do not specify which types of social groups are under discussion, and as 
such, seem to presume that a clearly adequate solution to Q1 and Q2 provide a unified account 
of social groups – that is, an account which incorporates every type of social group. Beck (2011) 
suggests that this criterion for success is overly demanding, for it may be the case that there are 
different types of social groups, each of which might receive a distinct, successful account.42 
For example, we may find that small social groups can receive one account, while large social 
groups receive another. Call this view, the “multiple-account” view. 
There are two legitimate responses to the proponent of the multiple-account view. First, I could 
narrow my thesis to the discussion of a select type of social group, most probably groups like 
the ANCYL (let us call such groups, “organised-large-groups”). The disadvantage of this 
                                                 
41 Eliminative Individualism as it applies to social groups is the claim that social groups do not exist, and that the 
folk sociological claims concerning social groups comprise a radically misleading and false theory, and should be 
replaced by a purely individualistic study of collectives. Eliminative Individualism broadly construed is the claim 
that social phenomena do not exist, and that Folk Sociology is false and misleading, and should be replaced by 
purely individualistic sciences. 
42 See Brewer (2003), Giddens (1987, p. 134), Gilbert (2006b, ch. 6), Thalos (2008), and R. Tuomela (1989a, pp. 
476-477) for a delineation of distinct types of social groups. 
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approach is, of course, that it narrows my conclusion to the claim that Eliminative Individualism 
about organised-large-groups is plausible. This is an interesting conclusion, but is not as 
interesting as the conclusion that Eliminative Individualism about all social groups, or all social 
phenomena, is plausible. 
Thankfully, however, I am not forced to resort to this narrow conclusion, since I have available 
a second response, namely, to argue that my demand for a unified account of social groups is 
not too strong (e.g. Gilbert, 2006b, p. 94 accepts this demand), or at least, is not too strong in 
the context of the thesis. Recall that ultimately I am attempting to support the conclusion that 
Eliminative Individualism is not clearly implausible. To support this conclusion, I do not need 
to show that Eliminative Individualism’s rival accounts are false. Rather, I am required to show 
that there are legitimate doubts about the plausibility of these rival accounts. And there are two 
reasons why we might doubt the plausibility of the multiple-account view. First, the multiple-
account is an inelegant theory of the social. Now of course a theory may be both true and 
inelegant, but by Occam’s razor, we do not accept an inelegant theory without first considering 
the plausibility of competing theories. Thus, we should not accept the multiple-account without 
first considering whether Eliminative Individualism offers a more plausible view, since 
Eliminative Individualism is, at least prima facie, more elegant in that it posits not two accounts 
of social phenomena, but only one (that social phenomena do not exist). This consideration, 
together with premise (3), as well as my support for premise (3), should be enough to support 
the plausibility and attractiveness of Eliminative Individualism as an alternative to the multiple-
account view. 
The second reason one might find the multiple-account view implausible, or at least no more 
plausible than Eliminative Individualism, is that if different types of social groups require 
different accounts, this lends credence to the position that our Folk Sociological conception of 
small and large social groups as a single type of social phenomenon is false. But if Folk 
Sociology is false in at least one significant respect, it may be false in other respects too – at 
the very least, it is not the case that Folk Sociology is obviously true. And if it is not the case 
that Folk Sociology is obviously true, it is not the case that Eliminative Individualism is 
obviously false. But the claim that Eliminative Individualism is obviously false is the chief 
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objection to Eliminative Individualism. Thus, if we are willing to take seriously the multiple-
account view, we have already provided support for premise (3).43 
A.4. METHODOLOGY 
A.4.a. Analytic Philosophy 
In this thesis I employ the analytic philosophical method. Analytic philosophy is that method 
of inquiry which attempts to understand philosophical concepts and answer philosophical 
problems using analysis. Expanding on Beaney’s (2009) discussion of analysis, we might 
distinguish among four types of analysis: regressive, decompositional, interpretive and 
transformative.44 
Regressive analysis attempts to understand a problem or claim by demonstrating how it follows 
from first principles, thereby illuminating the problem or claim in question. Ancient Greek 
geometry exemplifies this approach. Consider, for example, the proof of Pythagoras’s theorem 
from Euclidian principles.45 
Decompositional analysis involves breaking down a concept into its component parts, often 
followed by subsequently synthesising those parts so as to understand better the original 
concept as well as the relationships among its parts. Kant’s project in the Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781 [1897]) to decompose experience into its component parts is prototypical of this 
sort of analysis. Importantly, decompositional analysis often, although not always, involves the 
specification of necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept under investigation. 
Interpretive analysis of a set of philosophical claims C involves the use of a set of intuitions or 
a conceptual framework to test the truth of C (or to guide a further decompositional or 
transformational analysis of C). Current approaches to ethics and value theory typify this 
                                                 
43 See section B.1. Criteria for success (p. 40) for a further discussion on types of groups and accounts that only 
characterise some types but not others. 
44 Beaney’s classification of the distinct types of analysis does not distinguish between transformative and 
interpretive analysis, whereas I do. 
45 Pythagoras’s theorem is the claim that the square of the length of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is 
equal to the sum of the squares of its other two sides. 
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method, since they use cases in which we have strong intuitions to falsify theories of right 
action, well-being, and the meaning of life (see, e.g. Metz, 2013; Williams & Smart, 1973). 
And last, transformative analysis translates the concept or statement under investigation into an 
alternative form so as to illuminate the concept or statement more clearly. Frege and Russell 
are considered the fathers of this approach, since they advocate understanding claims by 
translating them into their logical form (see Frege, 1893/1903 [1964]; Hager, 1994). 
In this dissertation I utilise all four types of analysis. The central problem in this dissertation is 
whether or not the social exists. My initial approach to understanding this problem is to 
understand how it is informed by, or can be regressed to, two prior questions, namely, the 
individual-individual and social-individual problems.46 
Thereafter, I use decompositional analysis to taxonomise the various solutions to the individual-
individual and social-individual problems. Moreover, in the tradition of decompositional 
analysis, my evaluation of these solutions, especially my evaluation of the solutions to the 
individual-individual problem, involves the consideration of whether these accounts provide 
adequate sufficient conditions for social groups.47 
Moreover, to establish whether or not the conditions provided by any given solution to the 
individual-individual problem are indeed sufficient for social groups, I assess whether they 
accommodate Folk Sociological intuitions. Interpretive analysis is therefore critical to my 
discussion. 
Finally, to aid in the clarification and assessment of the various solutions to the individual-
individual social-individual problems, I will translate the account, some of its claims, or some 
of its implications, into their logical form [see, e.g., section C.2.b.iii. Constitution (p. 144)]. 
                                                 
46 The social-individual and individual-individual problems are prior to the question of whether or not the social 
exists, since solutions to the individual-individual and social-individual problems will provide us with a full answer 
as to whether or not the social exists, but merely knowing whether or not the social exists will not provide us with 
full answers to the individual-individual and social-individual problems. 
47 However, parting with the traditional decompositional analytical tradition, I do not demand that adequate 
solutions to the individual-individual problem provide necessary conditions for social groups. 
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A.4.b. Intuition 
Recently, however, there has been growing controversy over the use of interpretive analysis, 
and specifically the use of intuitions, in philosophy. “Experimental philosophers”, such as 
Stich, point out that a good proportion of philosophy relies on interpretive analysis and intuition. 
However, so the argument goes, intuitions are culturally biased, and therefore, intuitions are an 
illegitimate methodological tool for philosophers. Hence, a good proportion of philosophy 
“belongs in the rubbish bin”: 
For 2500 years, philosophers have been relying on appeals to intuition. But the plausibility of this 
entire tradition rests on an unsubstantiated, and until recently unacknowledged, empirical 
hypothesis – the hypothesis that the philosophical intuitions of people in different cultural groups do 
not disagree…. [A] great deal of what goes on in contemporary philosophy, and a great deal of what 
has gone on in the past, belongs in the rubbish bin (Stich in Ichikawa, 2009, p. 110). 
This general eschewing of the use of intuition in philosophical inquiry is echoed by Guala 
within the field of social ontology: 
Indeed, one could even argue that a good fit with current linguistic practice is of secondary 
importance. In the end it may be more important to come up with a coherent new concept of 
convention, norm, etc., than trying to mirror a hopelessly muddled discourse [i.e. Folk Sociology]. 
(Guala, 2007, p. 14) 
Yet, my methodology for assessing accounts of Q1 and Q2 relies heavily on the use of Folk 
Sociological intuition: insofar as these accounts cannot accommodate common-sense intuitions 
about social groups, my thesis declares them inadequate as a clearly superior alternative to 
Eliminative Individualism. And therefore, an experimental philosopher would be unimpressed 
by my methodology. 
I have available three responses to the experimental philosopher’s objection. First, it is 
important to note that the objection to the use of intuition in philosophy is hardly shared by all 
philosophers. Indeed, many philosophers have vehemently disagreed with the experimental 
philosopher’s position (see, e.g., Grundmann, 2010; Hoffman, 2010; Ichikawa, 2009; Liao, 
2008; Ludwig, 2010; Spurett, 2010). Thus, at worst, my thesis sides with the large number of 
“armchair philosophers” who continue to maintain that the use of intuition is acceptable. 
Second, the more recent and more popular solutions to the individual-individual problem, such 
as Gilbert’s plural subject theory [see B.3.b. Plural subject theory (p. 70)] and Searle’s 
Constructionist Account [see section B.3.c. Searle’s constructionist account (p. 90)], are 
Subjectivist – that is, they claim that the reflexive beliefs of the individuals underlying social 
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phenomena are constitutive of those phenomena. But the reflexive beliefs (i.e. beliefs about 
group-hood) of the individuals underlying social phenomena are Folk Sociological, and so, an 
account of social phenomena (insofar as it conforms with the now popular Subjectivist 
approach) should accommodate those Folk Sociological intuitions. 
To put this point differently, it seems that types of social phenomena are not natural kinds. 
Consider H2O. H2O exists, and has the properties that it has, independently of what humans 
believe about H2O. That is, H2O does not depend upon, nor is it constituted by, our theories 
about H2O: H2O is a natural kind. By contrast, a social kind (i.e. a type of social phenomenon) 
does depend upon humans and their beliefs for its existence: our beliefs about a given social 
kind are constitutive of that kind (at least if Subjectivism is correct). For this reason, accounting 
for our intuitions (or Folk Sociology) is essential to an adequate social ontology. 
And finally, the ultimate conclusion of my dissertation is that Eliminative Individualism is 
worthy of serious consideration – not that Eliminative Individualism is true. One of the most 
important objections to this conclusion is the claim that Eliminative Individualism is highly 
counterintuitive, absurd. But if I can show that all the alternatives to Eliminative Individualism 
(i.e. the array of possible solutions to Q1 and Q2) are also counterintuitive, and yet it is generally 
accepted that these accounts are worthy of serious consideration, then Eliminative 
Individualism should not be dismissed merely because it is counterintuitive. Thus, if 
Eliminative Individualism is to be dismissed as unworthy of serious consideration, we will need 
additional objections to Eliminative Individualism that are clearly successful. 
Thus, when claiming that a solution to Q1 or Q2 is counterintuitive, I am claiming neither that 
the theory is false, nor that the theory should be dismissed. Rather, I am claiming that the theory 
is no better (or not a whole lot better) in this respect than Eliminative Individualism. That is, a 
counterintuitive solution to Q1 or Q2 is inadequate for the purpose of providing a solution 
clearly better than Eliminative Individualism. This weaker claim should be more palatable to 
the experimental philosopher. 
Of course the experimental philosopher could insist that “real” philosophy should not even 
consider whether a theory is counterintuitive – intuitions have no place at all in good 
philosophical inquiry. Thus, my objections to the solutions to Q1 and Q2 are irrelevant, since 
they often rely on whether the solutions accommodate intuitions about the social. However, in 
response, the claim that intuitions are irrelevant strikes both ways: Eliminative Individualism 
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is a whole lot easier to defend if its counter-intuitive nature is irrelevant to an evaluation of the 
account, since the primary objection to Eliminative Individualism (that it is counterintuitive) 
has then been resolved. Thus, extreme experimental philosophy supports my conclusion, even 
though it undermines my methodology for supporting that conclusion. This is a trade-off I am 
willing to accept, since the conclusion is ultimately what is important to me. 
A.5. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN “SOCIAL” AND “INDIVIDUALISTIC” 
PHENOMENA 
In this dissertation I take “social phenomena” to include:  
 social groups and institutions, such as countries (e.g. Kenya), religious groups 
(Muslims), political parties (the ANC), cultures and societies (Eskimos), and 
corporations and organisations (Standard Bank and Wits University); 
 social systems, such as economic systems (capitalism and money), systems of 
government (democracy), and administrative systems (bureaucracy); 
 collective mental states and behaviour (e.g. group intentions, group beliefs, and group 
actions); 
 roles (e.g. public servant), mores (circumcision), status (power) and social positions (the 
president); and 
 social relations among individuals (e.g. harmony and friendship) or between groups of 
individuals (war and peace). 
Moreover, by “individualistic phenomena” I mean: 
 individual persons, their mental states, dispositions and actions; 
 relations between individual persons;48 and 
 material objects and their parts.49 
                                                 
48 Of course, some of the relations between individuals are social, rather than individualistic, relations – e.g. power 
relations. However, I take it that any relation that can be specified individualistically (i.e. in terms of particular 
persons, their environment, and their psychological states) without loss of meaning may be considered an 
individualistic relation between persons. A good example of an individualistic relation would be that I am standing 
“to the right” of you. 
49 Sheehy (2006a) holds that social groups are material objects [see section C.2.a.ii. Social groups as material 
entities (p. 121)]. I am referring here, however, to material objects in the conventional sense, rather than in 
Sheehy’s idiosyncratic sense. 
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Note that I intend this distinction between “social phenomena” and “individualistic 
phenomena” to be completely exhaustive: there are no phenomena that are neither “social” nor 
“individualistic”. Thus, the definition I have provided for individualistic phenomena is meant 
to be as inclusive as possible, and indeed, I include some entities as individualistic that other 
theorists do not. For example, Epstein (2009, p. 213) holds that certain material objects, such 
as “parts of the physical environment that are not in anyone’s local vicinity, and that no one has 
even encountered, are not plausibly individualistic”. Instead, according to Epstein, these sorts 
of phenomena should be labelled “physicalist”, and excluded from both social and 
individualistic phenomena. Moreover, Guala (2007, p. 974) claims that instances of “physical 
technology”, such as a “hand-held micro-computer”, should not be classified as individualistic 
phenomena. 
However, for my purposes here, nothing is gained by distinguishing between individualistic 
and “physicalist” or “technological” phenomena. I am ultimately interested in whether or not 
social phenomena exist at all. Thus, if the sociologist can demonstrate that certain 
configurations of non-social phenomena (be they individualistic, physicalist or technological), 
are sufficient for social phenomena, or if he can demonstrate that social phenomena are 
constituted by, supervene upon or can be reduced to, any sort of non-social phenomena, then 
he has demonstrated that the social exists, and hence, that Eliminative Individualism is false. 
Thus, for ease of argument, in surveying the various solutions to Q1 and Q2, I will call any 
non-social phenomenon “individualistic”, but the reader can substitute another term if he 
wishes. 
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B. THE INDIVIDUAL-INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM (Q1) 
B.1. CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS 
We are ready now to begin our discussion of Q1, or the individual-individual problem as it 
applies to social-groups: what relationships among the members of a social group provide the 
principle of unity for that social group? I begin by specifying the criteria for a successful 
solution to this problem. 
Ultimately, I am interested in whether social groups exist. Thus, if the sociologist can show that 
there are sufficient unifying conditions for a collection of individuals to comprise a social group 
(or for an individual to be a member of a group), then so long as such a collection can be found, 
he has satisfied my curiosity. That is, if an account can provide adequate sufficient conditions 
for social group membership, then an affirmative answer to the individual-individual problem 
is correct, and so I concede that Eliminative Individualism is false. By contrast, if I can show, 
or go some way towards showing, that no account clearly provides adequate sufficient 
conditions for group membership, then we have reason to at least begin our discussion of 
Eliminative Individualism as an alternative to an affirmative solution to Q1. 
But what does it mean for an account to provide adequate sufficient conditions for group 
membership? I take it that such an account should satisfy three criteria. First, the account should 
capture a group’s “group-ness” (and so, a member’s “membership-ness”). Crudely put, 
Groupness asserts that all group members should be included as group members by the account. 
That is, for any social group g, for any individual x, if x is a member of g, then the account 
will imply that x is a member of g. Put formally, let a be a solution to Q1, and let Mgx mean 
that x is a member of g. Then Groupness asserts: 
Groupness: a  ((x)(g)((Mgx)  (a  Mgx))) 
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A second, Individuation criterion, states that the account should fail to include non-group 
members as group members.50 Thus, for any social group g, for any individual x, if x is not 
a member of g, the account will fail to imply that x is a member of g: 
Individuation: a  ((x)(g)((~Mgx)  ~(a  Mgx))) 
Perhaps the most severe failure to satisfy Individuation occurs when the collection of non-
members incorrectly ascribed to a social group by an account are themselves a distinct social 
group. In such cases, the account illegitimately agglomerates two distinct social groups. That 
is, the account fails to distinguish between distinct social groups G1 and G2, since the account 
incorrectly implies that all the members of G1 are members of G2, and that all the members of 
G2 are members of G1 [see, e.g. section B.2.c.iv. Broad telos (p. 59)]. 
And third, what I call the Aggregation criterion requires of the account that for any collection 
of individuals c, if c is a mere aggregate, it is not the case that the account implies that c is 
a social group. Let Ac mean that c is a mere aggregate, and let Gc denote that c is a social 
group. Then Aggregation is the claim: 
Aggregation: a  ((c)((Ac)  ~(a  Gc))) 
Fulfilling Aggregation is necessary (but not sufficient) for fulfilling Groupness, since an 
account that provides conditions which imply that a mere aggregate of individuals is a social 
group cannot utilise those same conditions to adequately capture the group-ness or 
membership-ness of legitimate social groups and their members. That is, an account that fails 
to satisfy Aggregation fails to provide a principle of unity for social groups, and so, cannot 
capture the group-ness of a group. Moreover, although they appear similar, Individuation and 
Aggregation are logically distinct. Individuation requires that an account does not ascribe non-
members to an existing social group, whereas Aggregation requires that mere aggregates are 
not classified as social groups. Thus Individuation applies only in cases where there is a social 
group, while Aggregation applies only in cases where there is not a social group. 
                                                 
50 Individuation is weaker than the requirement that the account should imply that non-members are not group 
members (i.e. the requirement that the account provides a necessary condition for group membership). That is, 
Individuation does not require the following: a  ((x)(g)((~Mgx)  (a  ~Mgx))) 
 
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
42 
There is, however, an important caveat to this discussion. In my formulation of Groupness, 
Individuation and Aggregation, I allow g to be “any” social group. Thus, Groupness and 
Individuation demand that the conditions specified by a successful solution to Q1 be sufficient 
for the membership of any type of social group. However, we might imagine that although an 
account may not characterise every type of social group, it may nevertheless characterise some 
social groups and still be valuable. Specifically, the second best case would be an account that 
provides a sufficient condition for comprising a prototypical group of any kind. Such an 
account, for example, would be adequate to characterise prototypes of both small and large 
groups, but would fail to characterise certain unusual examples. Our third choice of account is 
an account that provides sufficient conditions for a collection of individuals to comprise both 
prototypical and a-prototypical tokens of only a select few types of social groups (such as small 
groups), but not all types. The fourth-strongest account would furnish us with sufficient 
conditions for prototypes of only a select few types of social group – e.g. prototypical large 
groups. And the weakest type of account would merely provide sufficient conditions for 
individuals to comprise limited, rare or unusual instances of social groups. So, to summarise, 
from strongest to weakest, accounts can be rated as providing sufficient conditions that satisfy 
Groupness, Individuation and Aggregation, where g is a social group: 
S-1) of any type; 
S-2) that is prototypical for any given type; 
S-3) of a select few types (but not all types); 
S-4) that is prototypical of a select few types (but not all types); or 
S-5) that is one of a limited number of instances. 
Given my remarks in section A.3. Central argument (p. 31) above, I will assume that S-3, S-
4 and S-5 accounts are inadequate for the purposes of ruling out the possibility of Eliminative 
Individualism as a viable alternative to an affirmative solution to the individual-individual 
problem. Should a solution to Q1 be correctly classified as S-1 or S-2, however, this does pose 
a threat to the view that Eliminative Individualism deserves serious consideration. I will argue 
that a survey of solutions to Q1 yields the conclusion that no solution to Q1 provides a clearly 
S-1 or S-2 type solution to the problem. I begin by examining Objectivist accounts. 
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B.2. OBJECTIVE ACCOUNTS 
B.2.a. Elster’s transaction account 
I begin my discussion of objective accounts with what is perhaps the least plausible Objectivist 
account discussed in the literature. For Elster (1989, p. 248), social groups are “clusters of 
individuals who interact more strongly with each other than with people in other clusters.” 
Elster defines the strength of the interaction51 among individuals in terms of the number of 
transactions among them, and therefore, we can state his account as follows: 
Elster’s transaction account: For any set of individuals M1…Mn, Let Tinner 
be any transaction between at least two individuals in M1…Mn; and let Touter 
be any transaction between at least one of M1…Mn and an individual outside 
of M1…Mn. Then, M1…Mn relate in such a way that they comprise a social 
group if the total number of Tinner instances is greater than the total number 
of Touter instances. 
There are, however, two reasons we should think that Elster’s account fails to satisfy 
Groupness. First, even if the account does specify a sufficiency condition for what counts as 
intra-group interrelations, it seems that this is not the kind of condition that provides a principle 
of unity for group members – i.e. the account doesn’t tell us what the “group-ness” of groups 
is. For on Elster’s account, whether a set of relations within a set of individuals is sufficient to 
allow those individuals to comprise a group depends (partly) upon how those individuals 
interact with individuals outside of the group. So, on Elster’s account, what happens outside a 
group partly determines whether the group is, in fact, a group. Now it is true that what happens 
outside a group does impact on the specific goals or function of the group. For example, the 
ANCYL is a mainstream youth party in post-apartheid South Africa, but was a revolutionary 
organisation before the ANC came to power, and this change is due to factors external to the 
party. Yet, it seems that what happens outside of a group does not determine whether the group 
is a group at all. We cannot, for example, imagine a scenario in which the ANCYL members 
interact as they do, and yet they comprise a mere aggregate – i.e. not a social group. No matter 
how much interaction ANCYL members have with individuals outside of the group, they are 
                                                 
51 Unfortunately, Elster never explains what he means by an “interaction”, but I take it that an interaction is an 
exchange of, or an agreement to exchange, something (such as money, information, services, etc.). 
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still a group. So, at best Elster’s account provides a condition coextensive with intra-group 
relations, but it is not constitutive of intra-group relations. 
Moreover, there is a second reason we might think that Elster’s account fails to satisfy 
Groupness. Certain types of groups have members who hardly interact. Take, for example, 
committees. Committees meet infrequently – every few months, or annually in some cases. 
Committee members may therefore interact far more frequently with individuals with whom 
they do not share a group, than they do with other members of the committee. Consider that 
between two committee meetings, the committee members will have countless transactions 
with shop tellers, more than they will with other members of the committee. So, on Elster’s 
account, because committee members transact more frequently with shop tellers outside the 
committee than they do with the other members of the group, committees are not groups. But 
of course committees are groups (not mere aggregates), and so, Elster’s account does not 
account for all types of social groups – i.e. it is at best an S-3 account. 
In addition, it is not just committees that do not interact frequently. Any group of any type could, 
it seems, become dormant for a time, or at least interact very infrequently. So we should lower 
our assessment of Elster’s account further, since it will at best account for prototypes of certain 
types of groups – so it is an S-4 account. With this in mind, together with the initial objection 
(that the account does not provide an intuitively appealing constitutive principle of unity), I take 
it that Elster’s account is inadequate to rule out Eliminative Individualism as a plausible 
alternative. 
B.2.b. Organic account 
One way we might diagnose the problem with Elster’s account is to notice that although it takes 
into account the frequency of interactions among individuals, it ignores the quality, or character, 
of these interactions. As Elster (1989, p. 248) admits, “There is no presumption that a society 
in this sense [i.e. on Elster’s transaction account] is well ordered.” By contrast, functionalists 
attempt to capture the quality of the interactions among the members of a group by positing that 
group members function together to promote a certain state of affairs for the group as a whole. 
Thus, the functionalist’s social group is ordered. However, functionalists disagree on just which 
“states of affairs” group members promote, thereby spawning two distinct functionalist 
accounts: the organic account and the teleological account. I consider the organic account first. 
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B.2.b.i. The account 
Consider a termite colony.52 The colony comprises three types of termites: workers, soldiers 
and a queen. Now, if the colony is to survive, it must have the correct proportion of workers to 
soldiers (say, for example, one worker for every one soldier); but, unfortunately, external 
factors (such as hungry ant-eaters and other insects) may kill some of the termites such that the 
ratio of workers to soldiers is altered. After such a calamity, the queen, who rests deep in the 
bowels of the termite hive away from danger, changes her egg-laying habits to correct the 
disproportion. Thus, while the hive’s ratio of workers to soldiers is optimal, the queen will lay 
one worker egg for every one soldier egg; but, if, for example, a number of the soldier termites 
are eaten, such that there is now a 2:1 ratio between workers and soldiers, the queen will lay 
(for instance) two soldier eggs for every one worker egg until the disproportion is rectified. 
There is an established tradition among philosophers and social scientists, such as Hegel, Burke, 
and Durkheim, that involves viewing social groups as analogous to the termite colony, that is, 
as organic systems (see Ryan & Bohman, 1998 for a discussion of the organic tradition). More 
recently, Theiner and O'Connor (2010) have expressed sympathy for this view. These 
proponents point out that, like the termite colony that requires soldiers and workers to survive, 
social groups often have roles whose fulfilment is necessary for the survival of the group. For 
example, a company has a CEO, CFO, board of directors, etc., without which the company 
cannot continue. And, like the queen who fills her hive with the requisite termites, the company 
fills its posts when they become vacant – e.g. when the CFO resigns, the company hires a new 
employee (or promotes an existing employee) to fulfil this role. 
Such an organic account of social groups would read: 
Organic account: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that they 
comprise a social group if M1…Mn together operate as parts of an organic 
system. 
In the biological sciences, it is generally agreed that x is an organic system if and only if x is 
capable of reproduction, growth, and self-regulation (Martin & Hine: 2008). The problem 
with the organic account of social groups is that: (i) it is difficult to understand exactly what 
these three capacities mean when applied to social groups, and (ii) it is difficult to provide an 
                                                 
52 This example appears in Hollis (1994, p. 95). 
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understanding that satisfies the Aggregation criterion – i.e. that aids in distinguishing between 
mere aggregates and social groups. I consider each of the three capacities in turn. 
B.2.b.ii. The capacities of organisms and social groups 
 Reproduction 
In what sense does a social group reproduce? In the biological sphere, an organism reproduces 
by creating a new organism that has all or some of its genetic structure. So, to stretch the organic 
analogy, perhaps the “genetic structure” of a social group is its ethos, whatever that involves, 
be it the group’s goals, beliefs, or typical actions. Then the reproduction of a group would 
involve the creation of another group with a similar ethos. Indeed, this is what seems to happen 
with branches, or subsections, of some social groups: e.g. the increasing branches of a bank, 
church or political party. But the problem with this literal, numerical understanding of 
“reproduction” is that, first, many social groups do not reproduce in this sense. A book club, 
for example, may never, and need never, spawn another book club. Similarly, a cricket team, a 
marriage or a small-town school may never produce more of its type of social group.53 
Instead, the organicist might argue that we should understand the reproduction of a social group 
as the endurance of the group through time. Therefore, a group has the capacity to reproduce 
just in case it has the capacity to survive. However, this interpretation is also problematic, for 
two reasons. First, it is difficult to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a given 
group’s survival through time, for the group can undergo significant changes whilst remaining 
the same group. The group can change its membership [see section C.2.b.iii. Token-token 
identity (p. 138)], or its goals [see section C.3.c.iii. Diachronic identity (p. 175)], making it 
difficult to provide diachronic identity criteria for the group. 
Second, telling us that groups have the capacity to survive is not telling us anything that we did 
not know already. Part of the common-sense concept of groups is that they can persist through 
time [see section A.1. The problem (p. 1)]. Given this common-sense concept of social groups 
                                                 
53 Perhaps the notion of a numerically reproductive collective is more applicable to social institutions, rather than 
to social groups. If we consider the groups under discussion (clubs, cricket teams, marriages, schools) as instances 
of widely occurring social phenomena (rather than as individual social groups), then reproduction becomes a more 
intelligible feature. The number of clubs grows regularly, cricket is an expanding sport, and schools become more 
numerous as the number of children increase. But I am interested here in what unifies this particular group, and 
not what unifies the social institution of which this group may be an instance. 
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– thus, knowing already that groups have the capacity to persist through time – the individual-
individual problem arises. So, defining groups in terms of persistence helps us none at all in 
resolving the individual-individual problem. 
 Growth 
The organicist might define reproduction in terms of the second capacity of organic systems 
listed above: growth. Thus, a group reproduces just in case it grows. However, there are two 
problems with this definition. First, some types of groups do not possess the capacity for 
growth, since, by definition, they are fixed in size. Take for example a cricket team: a cricket 
team simply cannot grow to greater than the size of eleven, for then it would no longer be a 
cricket team. Thus, growth could at best contribute to an S-3 account of social groups. And 
second, mere aggregates can also grow: e.g. the number of class-goers and lunch-eaters on the 
central block concourse may increase in size. Thus, growth cannot aid us in distinguishing 
between social groups and mere aggregates. 
 Self-regulation 
Like reproduction, the capacity for self-regulation is also difficult to define in relation to social 
groups. In the biological sphere, self-regulation is the tendency in a system towards 
homeostasis; and in the case of biological organisms, homeostasis is relatively easy to define, 
as the tendency to return to a healthy or normal state. For example, there is an optimal 
temperature at which cold-blooded animals tend to maintain their body temperature, since it is 
only at this temperature that they can function optimally. Hence, this temperature is (partly 
constitutive of) the normal or healthy state of the animal. 
However, there are two problems with understanding self-regulation homeostatically when 
discussing groups. First, a homeostatic understanding of social groups as applied to 
governments and political groups is limited to characterising authoritarian, politically 
conservative groups (see S. Miller, 2011; Ryan & Bohman, 1998), since a government or 
political party that promotes change through radical policies (e.g. the ANCYL) does not aim to 
maintain a stable state. Thus, a homeostatic account would at best be characterised as an S-3 
account. 
The second problem with homeostatic accounts is that it is difficult to define what is meant by 
the “healthy” or “normal” state of a social group (Hempel, 1959 [1995], pp. 366-367). There 
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are two prima facie plausible ways in which the organicist might define the “normal state” of a 
social group. First, the normal state might be that state in which all of the essential roles of a 
group are filled, or instantiated, by members of the group. So, the organisation is in a normal 
state when it has a CEO, CFO, board of directors, etc. This definition, though, seems to collapse 
into the survival interpretation of reproduction, for it is obvious that if the essential roles of a 
social group are not filled, then the group will cease to exist – i.e. will not survive. But I have 
already objected to the claim that the capacity for survival contributes to a sufficient condition 
for social groups. 
Radcliffe-Brown provides a different interpretation of the homeostatic state of a social group, 
in terms of the “harmony” and “internal consistency” of its parts:  
…[group homeostasis is] a condition in which all parts of the social system work together with a 
sufficient degree of harmony or internal consistency, i.e., without producing conflicts which can 
neither be resolved or [sic] regulated. (Radcliffe Brown in Hempel, 1959 [1995], p. 366) 
Yet, this definition of normality just sets the problem one step back: what do we mean when 
we say that the parts of a social group operate in “harmony” or with “internal consistency”? If 
Radcliffe-Brown’s answer is that harmony is just that state which does not result in irreparable 
conflict, then we would need an account of which conflicts are irreparable, and which can be 
“regulated”. For it seems that for any given conflict, it is logically possible that the conflict 
could be resolved. So Radcliffe-Brown must have a different concept of possibility in mind 
here, but which concept? Is it psychological possibility? But again, it seems that although 
people may be stubborn, it is almost always possible for them to overcome their prejudices to 
the extent necessary to settle differences such that the group may continue – indeed, mediators 
facilitate precisely this outcome. The point is that it is not at all clear that we can give an 
adequate definition of the homeostatic state of a social group. 
The organicist might therefore abandon the homeostatic understanding of self-regulation, and 
instead understand self-regulation more robustly, as regulation through convention. The 
problem now, however, is understanding precisely what is meant by convention. There are three 
main accounts of convention discussed in the literature: 
First, for Lewis, a social group has a convention just in case the following three conditions are 
met: (i) the group has a “coordination problem”; (ii) members of the group attempt to resolve 
this problem by coordinating their behaviour in an appropriate fashion; and (iii) members of 
the group expect one another to attempt to resolve the problem (see Gilbert, 1989 ch. 6; 1998; 
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Lewis, 1969). A coordination problem for a social group arises iff the problem can be resolved 
only if multiple members of the group coordinate their behaviour. To cite a common example, 
a coordination problem arises when a cellphone connection between two callers (a small social 
group) is lost, for if both callers attempt to re-establish the connection simultaneously, or both 
callers wait, they will be unsuccessful in re-connecting the call. Rather, one caller must wait, 
while the other calls. 
Unfortunately, though, Lewis’s account of convention does not work as an account of self-
regulation in the context of the organic account. For if we were to adopt Lewis’s account, the 
revised organic account would state that a social group has Lewisian conventions. However, 
many social groups do not have coordination problems (and hence, lack Lewisian conventions), 
or at least, need not have them. What is the coordination problem of a religious group, for 
example? Perhaps they have the coordination problem of organising regular meetings. But such 
coordination problems seem to be incidental to the unification of the group. Thus, the account 
at best characterises some types of social groups (e.g. organisations and sports teams, which 
have obvious coordination problems) but not others – i.e. the account is an S-3 account.  
But more importantly, against a Lewisian understanding of self-regulation, it seems that 
individuals in mere aggregates may have coordination problems that satisfy features (i) through 
(iii). For example, the lunch-eaters and class-goers may communicate briefly with one another, 
and so, will face the coordination problem of who speaks and who listens. A further example is 
that the mere aggregate of lunch-eaters on the central-block concourse faces (i) the problem of 
coordinating who sits where, since without this coordination, the lunch eaters may sit one on 
top of the other. (ii) Each of the lunch-eaters solves this problem by observing the other lunch-
eaters, and then sitting in an unoccupied location. Moreover, (iii) each of the lunch-eaters 
expects the other lunch-eaters will do the same. Thus, because mere aggregates can have 
Lewisian conventions, the Lewisian organic account fails to satisfy Aggregation. 
Second, Gilbert defines a convention as a fiat that receives “joint agreement” among the 
members of the group (Gilbert, 1998). The members of a group jointly agree to a fiat just in 
case each agrees to the fiat, and each believes the other members of the group agree to the fiat. 
This understanding of convention suffers from the same problems as Gilbert’s earlier (1989) 
version of plural subject theory discussed in section B.3.b. Plural subject theory (p. 70). 
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And third, Miller argues that a social group possesses a convention just in case its members 
perform “joint actions” with a “collective end” (2011, p. 12). This would collapse the organic 
account into what I call the teleological account, which I consider in the following section. 
B.2.b.iii. Conclusion 
I have argued that none of the three capacities (reproduction, growth or self-regulation) posited 
by the organic account provide a convincing sufficient condition for distinguishing mere 
aggregate intra-relations from the intra-relations in social groups (assuming the account does 
not collapse into either Gilbert’s plural subject theory or Miller’s teleological account). The 
organic account, therefore, fails to satisfy Aggregation. 
B.2.c. Teleological account 
The strength of the organic account is that it recognises that the members of a social group 
operate together, or as a unit. This is cashed out in terms of reproduction, growth and self-
regulation, all of which are problematic when applied to social groups. But perhaps we can 
retain the intuition that social groups operate as a unit, but cash out this intuition in a different 
way. The teleological account of social groups attempts to do just this, by cashing out the unity 
intuition in terms of a common telos, or goal. 
B.2.c.i. The account 
Tuomela (2003; 2007) and S. Miller (2001) are the chief proponents of the teleological account 
of social groups: 
Teleological account: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that they 
comprise a social group just in case M1…Mn work towards a common telos 
(or goal). 
The difference between the teleological and organic accounts is that the teleologist, unlike the 
organicist, need not posit that the telos of every social group is its reproduction, growth or 
regulation. Rather, the telos of a social group will differ from group to group because the telos 
of a group will be comprised of the telos of its members, and the goals of the members of 
distinct social groups will be distinct. So, for example, the telos of the ANCYL will be distinct 
from the telos of a soccer team, because the ANCYL members have distinct goals from those 
of soccer players. 
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However, like the organic account, the teleological account is prima facie Objectivist, since it 
seems that an observant non-group member would be able to see whether or not M1…Mn work 
towards a common goal, much like an apiologist is able to observe a colony of bees working 
together to sustain and grow the hive. Nevertheless, some philosophers, such as Gilbert (1989, 
2006b), provide a Subjectivist version of the account, namely, that M1…Mn comprise a group 
if each believes that he, together with the others, work towards a common goal. Moreover, other 
teleologists hybridise the teleological account by appending Subjectivist elements to the 
teleological account as I have defined it here. R. Tuomela (2007, p. 1), for example, includes 
“affective elements (e.g. “we-feeling”)” in his account of social groups, and Miller appends the 
notion of mutual beliefs among group members to his list of conditions for social groups (see 
footnote 64). I am interested here, however, in purely Objectivist versions of the account. It 
may turn out that a purely Objectivist account is inadequate (and therefore, that a Subjectivist 
or hybrid account is required), but not enough work has been done in the literature to 
demonstrate this. I attempt to fill this gap by assessing the Objectivist teleological account 
against the Groupness and Individuation criteria. In section B.5. Hybrid solutions to Q1 (p. 
109) I consider whether hybrid accounts might fill these gaps. 
To begin this assessment, notice that, as it stands, the teleological account is unclear, or vague, 
in two ways. For one, there are three ways one might specify or characterise the telos of a given 
social group. First, one might specify the telos of a group narrowly. This involves 
characterising the telos of a group in detail, and often in relation to its contingent relations with 
other social groups or phenomena. For example, we might define the telos of the ANCYL as 
the combination of the following goals: nationalising the mining industry in South Africa, 
providing a mechanism for the majority of black South African youth to live a more politically 
and financially equitable existence, and for providing new and fresh ideas that will eventually 
become the policies of its parent organisation, the ANC. 
Second, one could specify the telos of groups broadly. This would involve specifying certain 
overarching, core ideals or purposes that a group has – roughly, Tuomela (2003, p. 100) calls 
this the “ethos” of the group.54 For example, while the ANCYL may change its views on 
nationalisation, it seems that the ANC would never be a group geared towards the furthering of 
                                                 
54 Tuomela (2003, p. 100) includes, in addition to goals, “central… beliefs, standards, and norms” within the ethos 
of the group. Including these phenomena within the broad telos of a group does not alter the objection I provide to 
the broad teleological account in sections B.2.c.iv. Broad telos (p. 59) and B.2.c.v. Standard-broad (p. 62). 
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the goals of white upper-class males. Thus, the broad telos of the ANCYL would be something 
like promoting the rights of black youth in South Africa.55 
Finally, we might specify the telos of a group analytically. Both the narrow and broad accounts 
of a group’s telos involve specifying the group’s goals synthetically. That is, it is not part of the 
concept of the ANCYL that it supports nationalisation, nor that it supports the rights of black 
youth in South Africa. Specifying the telos of a group analytically, by contrast, involves a 
conceptual analysis of the terms used to refer to that group. So, for example, the analytic telos 
of the ANCYL is to provide a youth branch for the African National Congress.  
The second manner in which the account is unclear is that it is not obvious what it means for a 
collection of individuals to “work” towards a goal. Following Tuomela (2003, p. 97), I use the 
term “work” in a neutral sense: it could refer to either collective action or personal action.56 
Thus, roughly, M1…Mn “work towards” a common goal if either (i) each individual in 
M1…Mn acts in some way that aids that goal, or (ii), M1…Mn together perform a collective 
action that brings about, or aims to bring about, that goal. In Tuomela’s terminology, (i) and 
(ii) involve acting as a group member in a “weak” and “standard” sense, respectively (2007, p. 
13). Tuomela labels groups that are unified by virtue of members acting weakly towards a 
common goal, “I-mode” groups, while groups that are unified in the standard sense, “we-mode” 
groups. 
Consider, for example, two people moving a piano. If they carry the piano simultaneously, 
coordinating their moment-to-moment movements, they are performing a collective action, and 
would be considered a we-mode group (assuming they are a group). On the other hand, if the 
two individuals each, at different times, pushes the piano half the way to its destination (perhaps 
while the other person is not around), they are each performing personal actions with a common 
goal, but not a collective action. Thus, if these individuals comprise a group, they comprise an 
I-mode group.57 
                                                 
55 The bifurcation between the narrow and broad conceptions of the telos of a group should not be considered a 
categorical division: it is likely that there is a continuum between narrow and broad conceptions of the telos of a 
group. The narrower the conception of the telos, the more specific the details provided concerning the policies, 
ethos, and activities of the group. As more of these details are omitted, and more generic features inserted, the 
conception of the group’s telos becomes broader. 
56 Miller (2001, p. 5) labels those actions I call personal actions towards a common goal, “interpersonal” actions. 
57 Different teleologists understand the notion of collective action differently. Miller (2001, p. 4) holds that 
collective action (what he calls “joint action”) is always reducible to the individual actions that underlie it, while 
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The result of this discussion is that are at least six distinct teleological accounts, determined by 
whether one characterises the telos of a group narrowly, broadly or analytically, and by whether 
one understands “working” towards a common goal in the weak or standard sense: Weak-
narrow, Weak-broad, Weak-analytic, Standard-narrow, Standard-broad, or Standard-
analytic. My discussion of the six versions of the teleological account begins with a discussion 
of the analytic accounts, followed by the narrow and broad accounts. 
B.2.c.ii. Analytic telos 
Both of the analytic accounts (Weak-analytic and Standard-analytic) suffer from two obvious 
problems. First, the analytic telos of a given group will be a goal which has been achieved upon 
formation of the group, and so, is a poor candidate for sustaining on-going and new membership 
in the group. What does it mean, for example, to say that the members of the ANCYL work 
towards the goal of “providing a youth-branch for the ANC”? It seems strange to say that this 
is a goal at all, since this goal has already been achieved through the mere existence of the 
ANCYL. That is, if the youth-league exists then, by definition, the goal of having a youth-
branch of the ANC has already been fulfilled. 
So, the only goal that the ANCYL (or any group for that matter) actually has, on the analytic 
account, is the group’s continued survival.58 This account, however, violates the Individuation 
criterion, for it implies the dubious claim that every individual who has the goal of sustaining 
the existence of a particular group G is a member of G. But, of course, non-members of a group 
may work towards the continued survival of the group. The anthropologist may see value and 
beauty in a New Guinea tribe, and may help the members of the tribe in their continued battle 
to survive in a swiftly modernising world; yet the anthropologist is not a member of the tribe. 
The president of a country may value and respect the diversity of religious groups in his country, 
                                                 
Tuomela (2007, pp. 5, 11), by contrast, holds that there are collective actions that are irreducible to individual 
actions. One way to understand Miller’s position, or a position like Miller’s, is to see it as espousing that the 
standard mode is reducible to the weak mode (see, e.g., S. Miller, 2001, p. 6; but see p. 56 for the denial of this 
view). If this is the case, then the teleological account can be no better than Weak-broad, as objected to in section 
B.2.c.iv. Broad telos (p. 59). On behalf of the teleologist, therefore, I assume that the standard mode of collective 
action is irreducible to the weak mode, since this provides the teleologist with more options to escape the objections 
presented against Weak-broad. 
58 The analytic teleologist might claim that this is an uncharitable interpretation of the account. Perhaps the goal 
of the group members is not to maintain the survival of the group, but to perform the daily activities of the group. 
This account of social groups, however, collapses into either the narrow or broad account, depending on the detail 
provided concerning the daily activities of the group. 
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and so work towards giving those groups every opportunity to prosper; yet the president may 
be an atheist, and so fail to be a member of any of the religious groups he works to maintain. 
Moreover, there is a second serious objection to the analytic account. Only a limited number of 
groups, specifically what might be called derivative groups, have an analytic telos, and so the 
account is at best an S-5 account. Take for example, the ANCYL. Here it is clear what the 
analytic telos of the group is: to provide a youth league for the ANC. We know the analytic 
telos of the ANCYL because its telos is derived from the fact that it is a child of its parent group. 
But what is the analytic telos of non-derivative (or parent) groups, such as the ANC? Here it is 
not so clear. The best answer we can furnish is that the function of the ANC is to provide an 
African National Congress. This, however, seems disappointingly vague. Just what sort of 
congress is meant here? Are all Africans involved, or just South Africans? What is the agenda 
of this congress? The point is that the meaning of the terms we use to refer to our social groups 
will not, in many cases, provide us with anything more than an inadequately vague 
understanding of the telos of a group. And a vague telos will fail to satisfy either Groupness or 
Individuation. 
B.2.c.iii. Narrow telos 
The narrow accounts (Weak-narrow and Standard-narrow) suffer from a different problem. 
On the teleological account, every member must work towards the group’s telos (since working 
towards the common telos determines any given member’s membership); yet, it is not the case 
that every member of the group works towards the group’s telos specified narrowly (or so I will 
argue). And so, the narrow accounts fail to fulfil the Groupness criterion. Specifically, there are 
two sorts of problem cases: group members who do not know the narrow goals of the group, 
and group members who purposely act contrary to the group’s narrow telos so as to alter the 
narrow goals of the group. I consider these two cases in turn. 
Consider ignorant group members. It is unlikely that the majority, never mind all, of the 
ANCYL members know what all of the ANCYL’s narrow goals are: many of the league’s 
members may not know what nationalisation is, for example, nor whether they want it. But if 
they do not know what the youth-league’s goals (narrowly construed) are, it seems dubious to 
claim that these youth-league members are working towards these goals. Thus, the narrow 
account fails to satisfy Groupness at least in the case of large groups, since members in many 
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large groups (such as the ANCYL) will lack knowledge of the group’s goals, and so, will not 
be characterised by the narrow teleological account. 
Perhaps the narrow teleologist would insist that it is possible for group members to work 
towards a common goal, even if many of those members lack knowledge of what that goal is. 
Tuomela seems to adopt this view: 
The descriptions under which the members take themselves and others to be members of the group 
might be vague, as long as the group is still able to function in the right way as a group. (2007, p. 
18) 
Now this may be true, in some extremely weak sense of “functioning as a group” or “working 
towards” a common goal. For example, ignorant ANCYL members (members who do not know 
what nationalisation is or have no opinion on the matter), may nevertheless join their fellow 
members in a march against private mining in South Africa (without knowing what the march 
is about). Or, we might say that the ignorant league members support the league’s project of 
nationalisation because every member pays a membership fee (assume they do), and this 
membership fee is used to promote the nationalisation campaign in some way. Yet in these 
cases, intuition suggests that it is not the ignorant member’s (very weak) working towards the 
common goal of nationalisation that unifies him as a member of the youth league, but rather, 
some other feature or activity of the individual. For how could it be that I am a member of a 
group because I unknowingly aid some goal that I know nothing about? Of course, as a group 
member I may aid a goal of which I am ignorant, but this, it seems, is not constitutive of my 
membership in the group: I would be a member of the group in virtue of some other feature or 
event.59 
The narrow teleologist may respond by arguing that there are other, clearer cases where it seems 
intuitive that a group’s unity and at least some of the members’ membership, is constituted by 
those members working towards a goal of which they are ignorant. Consider the child soldier, 
who knows nothing of the goals of the army for which he fights. He has no wish to support the 
dictator that leads this army, nor to support the goals of this dictator – indeed, he may not know 
                                                 
59 Tuomela (2007, p. 18) recognises this problem, and so, appends to the account a Subjectivist requirement, 
namely that the members “must believe (or be disposed to believe) that they are members of the group (under 
some description of membership) and also that the other group members (noncircularly characterized) belong to 
the group.” Tuomela therefore suggests hybridising the account to resolve the objection, borrowing from Gilbert’s 
(1989) Subjectivist account. I discuss hybrid accounts in section B.5. Hybrid solutions to Q1 (p. 109). 
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who the dictator is. And yet, he is a member of the army because he fights in a way that supports 
the goals of the dictator, and hence, the goals of the army. 
The counterexample, however, suffers from the fallacy of ambiguity. Notice that the narrow 
teleologist seeks to provide cases in which the following three conditions obtain: 
(i) there are members [M] of a certain social group g; 
(ii)  [M] are unaware of the goals of g; and 
(iii)  the best explanation for why [M] are members of g is that [M] work towards the 
goals of g. 
Now, there seems little doubt that the child soldier is a member of some social group. For the 
child does not act alone – he fights alongside others. But, of just which group is he a member? 
I can see two options. First, we might think that the child is a member of the Army, ruled by the 
dictator. But, second, the child might be considered a member of a smaller group, perhaps a 
collection composed of him and other children he considers his friends, who together go around 
shooting at people. Call this small group Friends. Now, suppose we substitute Friends for g, 
then although (i) is plausible, (ii) is false, since the goal of the small group of friends is simple 
and open to all the children involved: run around shooting at people. On the other hand, we 
might substitute Army for g. Then, although (ii) is true, my intuition is that (i) is false. That is, 
the narrow teleologist’s labelling the child a “soldier” is a misleading way to describe the case. 
In addition to the fact that the child does not know who the leadership of the army is, and does 
not know what the goals of the army are, he may not even know that there is an army.60 And it 
seems odd to think that the child is a member of a group he does not know exists. Thus, the 
intuition that he is a member of a social group is better explained by holding that he is a member 
of Friends (the existence of which he is aware), than that he is a member of Army. To conclude, 
therefore, my contention is that the counterexample fails because it ambiguates in its 
substitutions of g in (i) through (iii): it implicitly substitutes Friends for g in (i), and Army for 
g in (ii) and (iii). 
                                                 
60 Of course the teleologist could refine the case so that the child does know about the existence of the army. Then, 
I would want to ask the child whether he believes he is a member of the army. If the child answers negatively, 
then, both for the reasons stated above, and because it seems odd to be a member of a group of which one believes 
one is not a member, I would doubt that the child is a member of Army. On the other hand, if the child responds 
affirmatively, then we should doubt that (iii) holds, for now it seems plausible that the child is a member of Army 
because he believes he is a member. This explanation of the child’s membership is at least as plausible as the claim 
that he is a member of Army because he pursues goals he knows nothing about. 
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The narrow teleologist might accept that his account fails to characterise large social groups 
(like the ANCYL and Army), and limit his account to smaller groups, in which, he could argue, 
prototypical group members are well-informed about the goals of the group. This concession, 
however, renders the account an S-4 type account. Moreover, it is easy to conceive of apparently 
prototypical cases of small social groups whose members are ignorant with respect to the 
narrow telos of the group. Consider the family with young children. The family’s children may 
be ignorant of their parents’ (and hence their family’s) narrowly defined goals of promoting the 
emotional, intellectual and financial well-being of its members. Thus, on the narrow 
teleological account, these children would not be members of the family – and yet, it seems 
clear that they are members of the family. So, if we accept that the narrow account fails to 
characterise large social groups because of members’ ignorance, we should equally accept that 
the account fails to characterise small social groups for the same reason.61 And therefore, the 
account seems to characterise only a limited number of cases – i.e. it is an S-5 type account. 
The second problem case for the narrow account involves a dissident group member – that is, 
a group member who purposely disobeys, or acts contrary to, the telos of the group (narrowly 
construed). Specifically, the sort of case I am interested in here is a group member who attempts 
to alter or modify the group’s narrow telos. For example, after leading the Organization of Afro-
American Unity (OAAU) for a number of years, Malcolm X softened his views on black 
separatism. The other members recognised that by softening his stance, he undermined the 
narrow telos of the organisation to promote extreme black separatism – which, at least on one 
understanding, lead to his assassination.62 On the narrow account, Malcolm X was not a 
member of the OAAU when he held his divergent view on black separatism, since he expressly 
failed to work towards black separatism. Nevertheless, contrary to the narrow teleological 
                                                 
61 Perhaps the narrow teleologist would point out that families are a-prototypical in an important respect: they are 
strictly hierarchical. Many other types of small groups (such as a walking group, a book club, or an audience), 
however, are not hierarchical, or not hierarchical to the same degree. Such non-hierarchical groups would fail to 
suffer from the objection from ignorance presented here, since, presumably, the members of these groups would 
be knowledgeable of the group’s telos – the walkers all know where they are going, and the members of the book 
club know they are meeting to discuss the book. Thus, perhaps the account could account for small, non-
hierarchical social groups. This, however, would significantly diminish the scope, and hence importance, of the 
account. Moreover, the second objection (dissident group members) considered immediately below applies equally 
well to small non-hierarchical groups as it does to large hierarchical groups. 
62 There are multiple interpretations of the motivations and causes of the assassination of Malcolm X. Assume, for 
the purposes of this dissertation, that Malcolm X was assassinated because of his dissidence. If the reader simply 
refuses this assumption, then replace the case under consideration with the case of Malcolm X* in a possible world 
w*, where Malcolm X* was assassinated for his dissidence.  
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account, Malcolm X was still a member of the group after he softened his stance; indeed, he 
was still its leader (which is why he was assassinated). 
Tuomela responds to the objection by arguing that although dissident group members cannot 
be part of a we-mode group, they can nevertheless be members of an I-mode group. That is, 
Tuomela in effect argues that although Standard-narrow cannot account for dissident group 
members, Weak-narrow can. Specifically, Tuomela provides two ways in which dissident 
members like Malcolm X could be understood to be working towards the narrow telos of the 
group, understood in the weak, or I-mode sense of working towards the group’s telos. A 
dissident group member works towards the group’s narrow telos if he “obey[s] part of” the 
group’s narrow telos, or if he acts “in reference to” to the telos “in order to modify it” (2007, p. 
236). I consider each of these disjuncts, starting with the second. 
On the second disjunct, an individual works towards the group’s narrow telos, and therefore, is 
a member of the group, if he acts so as to alter that telos. Thus, on this account, any critic of a 
group G, whose goal is to alter G’s goals through his criticism, is a member of G. But many of 
these critics are expressly and avowedly not members of the group, and therefore, by including 
them as members the account fails to satisfy Individuation.  For example, members of the 
Democratic Alliance (DA), South Africa’s principle opposition party, persistently engage with 
the ruling party (the ANC) with the goal of altering the ANC’s goals. For instance, DA members 
fight to have the elimination of corruption become a priority for the ANC. On the second 
disjunct, these DA members are members of the ANC because they seek to alter the telos of the 
ruling party. But, obviously, DA members are not members of the ANC. 
While the second disjunct fails to satisfy Individuation, the first disjunct is unclear. What does 
Tuomela mean when he claims that dissident group members obey “part” of the group’s telos? 
Does obeying any part or element of the group’s narrow telos suffice for working towards the 
group’s goals? If so, the account will again fail to satisfy Individuation, for the group’s narrow 
telos may be extremely detailed and complex, some (intuitively less relevant) elements of which 
may be commonly pursued by individuals outside of the group. For instance, the narrow telos 
of the ANC includes the goal of creating an “economy that creates more jobs” (2011, p. 1). But 
many non-members of the ANC, such as DA members, work towards this goal. 
Thus, Tuomela would need to find some way to specify just which parts of the group’s narrow 
telos would be sufficient objects of pursuit to unify an individual as a member of the group. 
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The most obvious way to do this would be to specify those parts of the group’s narrow telos 
without which the group would no longer be the same group. That is, there are certain core, or 
broad, goals that we cannot imagine the group failing to have. For example, the OAAU would 
not be the OAAU if it did not have as a goal promoting the rights of black people – this is the 
broad telos of the OAAU. And even though Malcolm X fought to alter the details around how 
the OAAU went about achieving this goal, he nevertheless maintained this broad telos. For this 
reason, we could continue to consider him a member of the OAAU even while he was a 
dissident. 
However, this understanding of Tuomela’s first disjunct collapses the account into the broad 
teleological account, which I therefore move to consider next. 
B.2.c.iv. Broad telos 
The broad teleological accounts (Standard-broad and Weak-broad) avoid the problems faced 
by the analytic and narrow accounts. Unlike the analytic account, the broad telos of a given 
group need not be vague, for to know what the broad goals of a group are, all we need to do is 
examine the credos of that group, which could be precisely specified. For example, the broad 
telos of the ANC is something like the goal of providing a democratic South Africa, where 
every culture, ethnic group, race, religious group, etc. is respected equally. Moreover, although 
Malcolm X changed his goals construed narrowly, there was still some general, common 
underlying goal (e.g. promoting black rights) shared by him and the other members of the 
OAAU. The broad teleologist requires merely that group members possess common broad, 
rather than specific, goals; and so, the broad teleologist would not exclude Malcolm X from the 
OAAU, despite his shifting views, thereby avoiding the objection from dissident members to 
the narrow account. 
But the broad account faces a different problem: distinct social groups may share the same 
broad telos. For example, although we take the OAAU and today’s ANCYL to be distinct 
groups, operating on distinct continents in distinct eras, the members of both groups share the 
same broad goal of undermining discrimination against black people. Such cases pose a 
problem for the broad account, for the account implies that members of the first group are 
members of the second group, and that members of the second group are members of the first. 
This is what I called the problem of illegitimate agglomeration in section B.1. Criteria for 
success (p. 40), a severe form of failing to satisfy Individuation. 
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One way the broad teleologist might respond to the agglomeration problem is to deny that the 
OAAU and the ANCYL are distinct social groups. He may point out that the ANCYL arose 
from a complex history of black activism, partly motivated by the philosophy of the OAAU. 
We might therefore view the two groups as part of a larger social group – a view which the 
broad teleological account correctly endorses. There are two difficulties with this response, 
however. 
On this response, the case involves three groups rather than two: (i) the OAAU, (ii) the 
ANCYL, and (iii) a third (very large) group comprising (i), (ii) and presumably any other black 
rights organisations that share the broad telos of (i) and (ii). The first difficulty with this 
response, however, is that although the broad teleological account is able to satisfy the 
Individuation criterion with respect to (iii), it seems unable to satisfy the Individuation criterion 
with respect to (i) and (ii). For we might ask: what makes x a member of (ii) the ANCYL? The 
broad teleologist can only answer with something along the lines that x works towards the broad 
telos of fighting for black rights. But then, on this account, all members of (i) the OAAU are 
also members of (ii) the ANCYL; yet OAAU members are not members of the ANCYL. That 
is, the agglomeration problem persists. 
The second difficulty is that although in this case the two groups (the OAAU and the ANCYL) 
are connected in important ways, and so, may plausibly form a larger social group, we can 
construct a case where the groups are not so connected, and therefore, cannot plausibly form a 
larger social group. For example, suppose that in the near future, an apocalyptic war wipes out 
civilisation as we know it, kills all members of the ANCYL and destroys all records that the 
league existed. A thousand years from now, civilisation grows again, and unfortunately 
experiences similar racial issues to those experienced by members of our current civilisation. 
In response, social groups arise a thousand years from now whose broad telos is fighting for the 
rights of black people. Now, on the broad teleological account, these social groups of a thousand 
years from now and the ANCYL of today are together members of the same social group, since 
they share a common broad telos. Yet, they are not – the members of the future groups have no 
interaction whatsoever with today’s ANCYL members, and we think at least some sort of 
interaction is necessary among the members of any social group (see S. Miller, 2001, p. 161), 
for otherwise the group would be a mere aggregate and not a social group. 
Alternatively, Miller’s discussion of collective ends may provide a better response for the broad 
teleologist: a way to deny that the account implies that the OAAU and the ANCYL are a single 
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group (2001, pp. 58-59). Miller distinguishes between two senses of a “shared goal”: a goal that 
is “necessarily” shared, and a goal that is “shared only as a contingent matter of fact”. Miller 
holds that a goal is necessarily shared between individuals M1 and M2 only if each individual 
requires the other to perform an action to satisfy the goal. By contrast, M1 and M2 share a goal 
contingently if M1 or M2 can satisfy the goal alone, without requiring an action from the other. 
Now, reconsider the OAAU-ANCYL case again. These two groups share a broad telos 
contingently rather than necessarily, since neither group requires the other to fulfil its goal. 
Thus, if we qualify the broad account such that it states that a social group is a collection of 
individuals who necessarily share a common broad telos (and work towards that goal), then we 
avoid the agglomeration problem. 
We may, however, be able to construct another illegitimate agglomeration case in which two 
groups share a goal in Miller’s necessary sense, but they are not one group. Suppose for a 
moment that God exists. Suppose, moreover, that there are multiple planets other than our own 
with intelligent, sentient life, and that God governs over life on all of these planets – that is, 
God is able to, and does occasionally, change the lives of these people.63 We can imagine that 
these planets do not know about one another, and have no contact whatsoever. Now, suppose 
that God is currently reconsidering His previous decision to allow there to be evil in the 
universe, and that God would only rescind this decision if the vast majority of the individuals 
under his dominion pray for the cessation of evil. Moreover, suppose that the inhabitants of the 
various planets all pray for the cessation of evil. Then, we arrive at the following illegitimate 
agglomeration counterexample to the account as qualified by Miller. It seems that we can 
characterise each planet’s inhabitants as distinct social groups – Earthlings, Martians, 
Venutians, Gliesians, etc. These social groups are not part of a larger social group, since they 
do not interact with each other in any way. However, these groups do share a common broad 
telos – namely, the telos of God’s changing his decision to allow there to be evil in the universe. 
Moreover, this telos is necessarily shared among the various planetary groups, since none of 
the planets can, by themselves, convince God to change his mind: by hypothesis, the inhabitants 
of all, or most, of the planets must work towards this goal for it to come about. Thus, Miller’s 
account implies, incorrectly, that the planets together form a single social group.64 
                                                 
63 For devout atheists, replace all references to “God” with reference to super-powerful aliens. 
64 Miller (2001, p. 59) adds a second, Subjectivist, qualification to the account, namely, that a shared telos must 
be “open” to all members of the group. A telos is open to the members of a group just in case every member of the 
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B.2.c.v. Standard-broad 
Fortunately for the broad teleologist, there is a way to avoid the agglomeration problem 
altogether: the broad teleologist may point out that the agglomeration problem applies to Weak-
broad, but not to Standard-broad. Members of similar but distinct social groups (e.g. the 
ANCYL and OAAU), although possessing common broad goals, and although they may 
perform personal actions that aim to achieve those goals, do not together perform collective 
actions. The members of the ANCYL and OAAU did not work together, in unison, to achieve 
black rights (although they do work separately to achieve this goal). Similarly, the inhabitants 
of distinct planets, although praying for the same result, do not pray together. Thus a weak 
account of working towards a common goal will suffer from the agglomeration problem, while 
a strong (collective-action-based) account will not. 
There are, however, problems for Standard-broad. First, the account is too strong to 
characterise some group members as members, and so, fails to satisfy Groupness. Consider the 
convertee, who proclaims his devotion to Islam thrice, after which he is a Muslim. We can 
assume that the convertee has never performed a joint action with other Muslims, and so, the 
Standard-broad teleologist would fail to classify him as a member of the social group of 
Muslims. Or, consider the woman who joins a club by paying the joining fee. She believes she 
is a member of the club, and we can suppose that the treasurer to which she pays the fee also 
recognises her as a member. We can imagine, however, that she has performed no joint actions 
with the other members of the club yet, but, it seems, she is nevertheless a member of the club. 
Similarly, Standard-broad would fail to characterise her as a member of the club. 
The proponent of Standard-broad may respond to the Muslim and club-joiner cases in three 
ways. First, the proponent could argue that the convertee does perform a joint action with 
Muslims generally, even if he participates very indirectly in that action. For example, the 
convertee has played his role in increasing the size of the religious group, which is perhaps a 
goal of the group.65 So, the convertee might be said to indirectly perform the joint action of 
                                                 
group truly believes that every other member of the group has that telos. This refinement would, presumably, avoid 
the planetary counterexample, since the inhabitants of the respective planets do not know about each other, and 
so, will fail to believe that they together have this telos. I discuss this suggestion in section B.5. Hybrid solutions 
to Q1 (p. 109). 
65 It is never clear what the goals of a religious group are. And I am not highlighting Islam specifically here – it 
might be argued that any religious group aims to swell its numbers. The only reason for using Islam in the 
counterexample is that Islam has clear rules about group membership, such as proclaiming one’s allegiance thrice 
being sufficient for being Muslim.  
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expanding the number of Muslims. Moreover, by paying her joining fee, the club member 
supports, and hence to some extent participates in, the club’s activities (which, presumably, 
involve joint actions). 
The problem with this response is that by characterising such indirect support of a joint action 
as sufficient for performance of that joint action, the account fails to satisfy Individuation. For 
consider that it is commonplace for non-members to support the joint actions of social groups, 
such as the humanitarian who supports an NGO (non-governmental organisation) of which he 
is not a member with a generous grant, and the good neighbour who reports a gunman in his 
neighbour’s house to the police. The humanitarian and the good neighbour support the activities 
and broad telos of the NGO and family next door respectively, and so, on this notion of joint 
action, are members of these groups. Yet, by hypothesis, the humanitarian is not a member of 
the NGO, and the neighbour is not a member of the neighbour’s family. 
The second response that the Standard-broad teleologist might offer is to deny that the 
convertee is a member of the Muslim group, and deny that the club-joiner is a member of the 
club. These individuals are not members yet: they must first perform a joint action with the 
other members of the group. The convertee becomes a member of the Muslim group when he 
prays with the others, and the club joiner is a member of the club when she attends the first club 
meeting. This response, however, is counterintuitive. The club joiner believes she has joined 
the club, and the club members believe she has joined the club. Perhaps they give her a welcome 
bouquet. It seems odd that she and the other club members are incorrect. And the convertee 
who proclaims his allegiance to Allah sleeps happily that night, believing that he is now a 
member of a great group, while the imam and other Muslims who witness his conversion affirm 
this belief. It seems strange to think that the belief is incorrect.66 
A third and final response that the broad teleologist might offer is to argue that the convertee 
and club-joiner counterexample target only codified groups – that is, groups who have 
collectively recognised rules concerning the joining (and leaving) of the group. Perhaps, then, 
                                                 
66 This is not to say that the members of a group believing x is a member of g is sufficient for x being a member of 
g, for this would presuppose a Subjectivist solution to the Configuration Problem. Nevertheless, I take it that 
mutual belief, even if it does not provide an adequate solution to the Configuration Problem, does provide in many 
pedestrian cases (such as this one) an intuitive gauge of our intuitions around group membership. 
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the Standard-broad proponent could limit his account to characterising uncodified social 
groups only. That is, the account is an S-3 type account. 
The second objection to the enriched teleological account, however, seeks to show that the 
account fails to satisfy the Individuation criterion for both codified and uncodified groups. 
Notice that there are instances where a social group performs a collective action together with 
a non-group member, where the group members and the non-member share the same broad 
telos. Consider the family who hires an attorney to sue the state. The family and the attorney 
perform joint actions together (preparing for the hearing, going to court, attacking the state’s 
case, etc.) with a common broad telos – furthering the family’s interests (assume the attorney 
is generous in his motivations). Similarly, the company that hires a consultant to restructure its 
employee hierarchy, acts together with the consultant with the common goal of boosting 
productivity. Finally, the individual who joins a long-term travel group for the day travels 
together with the group, with the same goal of experiencing the locale. Intuitively, the attorney, 
consultant and fellow traveller are not members of the family, company and travel group 
respectively; yet, on Standard-broad, these outsiders are members of the respective groups. 
In response, the broad teleologist could bite the bullet and argue that the “outsiders” are 
members of the respective groups. The attorney who fights alongside his clients forms a social 
group with them; the consultant works such long hours in the presence of company employees 
that they together form a social group; and the lone traveller increases the size of the travel 
group by one when he joins them for the day. But this response is open to a familiar objection: 
although the enriched account may satisfy Individuation with respect to the larger groups 
formed in each case, it fails to satisfy Individuation with respect to the sub-groups involved. 
For example, while it may be true that the consultant forms a distinct group with the company 
employees, the consultant is not part of the company – he is a consultant (rather than an 
employee) after all. Thus, even if we accept that there is (i) a social group that consists of the 
consultant plus the company employees, there is also (ii) a distinct group that consists only of 
the company employees. And the problem is that Standard-broad, even if it accounts for (ii), 
incorrectly implies that the consultant is a member of (i), since he acts jointly with the other 
members in this group towards a common broad telos. 
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B.2.d. Conclusion 
I have argued that an Objectivist teleological account of social groups is an implausible solution 
to the Configuration Problem, by arguing that none of the six possible teleological accounts 
satisfy both Groupness and Individuation. Weak-analytic and Standard-analytic are vague, 
and fail to characterise non-derivative groups. Standard-narrow cannot account for ignorant 
or dissident group members, and although Weak-narrow can account for dissident members, 
it can do so only at the cost of collapsing into Weak-broad. Weak-broad and Strong-broad 
can account for ignorant and dissident members. But Weak-broad illegitimately agglomerates 
distinct social groups, while Strong-broad is too strong to accommodate group members who 
fail to act together with the rest of the group, as well as non-members who act together with 
members of a group. 
Some of the counterexamples raised against the six Objectivist teleological accounts might be 
avoided by appending a Subjectivist condition for group membership to the teleological 
account. I will discuss such a hybrid account in section B.5. Hybrid solutions to Q1 (p. 109). 
I hope here, however, to have shown that a purely Objectivist teleological account of social 
groups is dubious, and in so doing, which gaps such a Subjectivist appendage would need to 
fill for the teleological account to be successful. 
B.2.e. Objecting to Objectivism from indistinguishability 
Thus far I have considered three Objectivist solutions to the individual-individual problem as it 
applies to social groups (i.e. Q1): Elster’s transactional account, the organic account, and the 
teleological account. I argued that each of these accounts faces distinct challenges, which render 
the accounts no better (and often worse) than S-3 accounts. There is a reason, however, for 
thinking that in principle, no brand of Objectivism can succeed as a solution to Q1. Consider 
Searle’s case of park-goers seeking shelter in a storm: 
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in various places in a park. Imagine that it 
suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to a common, centrally located, shelter. Each 
person has the intention expressed by the sentence "I am running to the shelter." But for each person, 
we may suppose that his or her intention is entirely independent of the intentions and behavior of 
others. In this case, there is no collective behavior; there is just a sequence of individual acts that 
happen to converge on a common goal. Now imagine a case where a group of people in a park 
converge on a common point as a piece of collective behavior. Imagine that they are part of an 
outdoor ballet where the choreography calls for the entire corps de ballet to converge on a common 
point. We can even imagine that the external bodily movements are indistinguishable in the two 
cases; the people running for shelter make the same types of bodily movements as the ballet dancers. 
Externally observed the two cases are indistinguishable…. (Searle, 1990, pp. 4-5) 
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
66 
One way to understand Searle’s case is as a counterexample to what might be called the 
“distinguishability” thesis:67 
Distinguishability: For any given social group g, there is some feature F of g 
that no mere aggregate of individuals possesses, and F is distinguishable from 
an external perspective (i.e. by someone other than a member of g).  
Distinguishability is a presupposition of all the Objectivist accounts considered: Elster’s 
account claims that F is the frequency of transactions that occurs among the individuals in a 
social group; the organic account posits that F is the capacity for a social group to act as an 
organism; and the teleological account holds that F is the capacity of social group members to 
work towards a common goal. Searle’s case provides a counterexample to Distinguishability, 
for the mere aggregate of unrelated park-goers is indistinguishable from the coordinated ballet 
performers. That is, there is no property (F) that that ballet performers have that is both 
distinguishable by an external observer, and that the mere aggregate of park-goers does not 
have. 
The Objectivist might respond by arguing that Searle’s case is unusual, or a-typical, perhaps 
because the individuals in the ballet have as one of their goals that they coordinate in such a 
way that their behaviour is indistinguishable from a mere aggregate’s behaviour in the same 
situation. Social groups, they might argue, rarely have this goal. Thus, at best, the objection 
merely shows that Objectivist solutions are no better than S-2 level accounts. This response, 
however, is problematic, for it seems that for any given social phenomenon, or at least, for any 
given social group, we can imagine a mere aggregate of individuals who behave and relate in a 
qualitatively identical fashion, and so, appear indistinguishable to an onlooker. 
Consider, for example, our original case of the ANCYL members chanting on the Wits 
concourse, protesting the rise in study fees. We can imagine a collection of androids or neatly-
dressed zombies who are each programmed (or each biologically designed, in the case of the 
zombies) to stand in front of the Wits concourse, and shout exactly the same chants that the 
ANCYL members shout, and move in exactly the same manner as the ANCYL members move: 
a skilled onlooker could not notice the difference. The problem is that an Objectivist solution 
to the individual-individual problem is committed to the implication that either both the ANC-
                                                 
67 Searle intends his case as a counterexample to the distinguishability of collective (or joint) action from mere 
agglomeration of individualistic action. Here I apply the case to the distinguishability of social groups from mere 
aggregates. 
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youth league members and the collection of androids/zombies are mere collectives, or that both 
are social groups, for these two collections of individuals are indistinguishable from an 
outsider’s perspective. Yet we think that the ANCYL members are a social group, while the 
androids/zombies are not.68 
Perhaps the Objectivist would argue that the android/zombie case is unsuccessful, for solutions 
to the individual-individual problem need only apply to human social groups, and so, cannot be 
expected to account for androids and zombies. There are two good objections to this response, 
however. First, there seems no reason why, in principle, sophisticated, sentient non-human 
species cannot form social groups. Thus, we would want a solution to the individual-individual 
problem that is not anthropocentric. Second, we might replace androids and zombies with 
individuals who are unaware of, or do not consider, the behaviour of the individuals around 
them when they stand on the Wits concourse and shout. These unaware humans just happen to 
shout in unison, purely coincidentally. Replacing the androids or zombies with such blissfully 
unaware humans would not, it seems, hinder the counterexample. 
Ultimately, the reason why the androids/zombies/unaware humans do not comprise a social 
group is that they lack the reflexive mental states required by members of a social group. In 
Roth’s (2003, pp. 74-80) terminology, social group members have an “intersubjectivity” that 
cannot be adequately understood or captured from an outsiders’ perspective, and so, cannot be 
possessed by the androids/zombies/unaware humans. The problem is that Objectivist solutions 
to the individual-individual problem cannot adequately capture these reflexive mental states, or 
intersubjectivity. At best, the Objectivist can tell us how group members with these mental 
states typically behave and relate, and then (incorrectly) identify these externally observable 
relations as the principle of unity for the social group. Objectivist accounts therefore provide 
an “intersubjectivity on the cheap” (Roth, 2003, p. 74), ignoring what is most important: the 
reflexive mental states underlying the behaviour and interactions of group members. 
                                                 
68 The die-hard Objectivist may argue that androids are capable of forming social groups. Perhaps, in certain cases, 
this is possible. The technology used to create androids may reach a level of sophistication where we may grant 
“communities” of these androids a “social” status. Perhaps, for example, androids learn to interact with one 
another, and are able to coordinate their behaviour in previously un-programmed ways. I take it that, even in this 
case, there will be debate as to whether or not the androids do comprise a social group. Nevertheless, this is not 
the sort of case I imagine here: assume that the androids on the central concourse are programmed in such a way 
that they do not learn from one others’ behaviour – i.e. they are “unaware” of the other androids around them, and 
shout in isolation, but at the same time.  
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Subjectivist accounts, however, take the reflexive mental sates of group members as central to 
their account. Therefore, I turn next to consider Subjectivist accounts. 
B.3. SUBJECTIVIST ACCOUNTS 
Subjectivist accounts might be divided into two types: cognitive and non-cognitive accounts. 
Cognitive accounts cite the beliefs of group members as crucial to understanding the relations 
among them, while non-cognitive accounts are framed in terms of non-cognitive states, such as 
“feelings”. The most developed cognitive accounts in the literature are Gilbert’s plural subject 
account and Searle’s constructionist account. Non-cognitive accounts have received little 
attention, but perhaps the best known is Sartre’s account. I will argue that neither of these types 
of accounts is convincing. Since it is the less plausible of the two, I start by briefly elucidating 
and evaluating Sartre’s non-cognitive account. 
B.3.a. Sartre’s non-cognitive account 
B.3.a.i. The account 
Sartre provides a non-cognitive Subjectivist account – i.e. an account that cites non-cognitive 
mental states as central to understanding intra-group relations. Specifically, Sartre posits that 
the “look” is essential to group member relations. Sartre’s concept of the “look” is integrated 
into his ontology, which investigates the relation between being-for-itself and being-in-itself 
(Barnes, 1992, p. 13). Being-for-itself is the mode in which consciousness exists, as 
intentional69 and translucent70. By contrast, being-in-itself is the mode in which non-conscious 
material objects (such as chairs and pencils) exist, as non-intentional and opaque71 (i.e. not 
translucent). A human being, Sartre argues, exists both as a for-itself and an in-itself, and when 
I “look” at another human being (the “Other”), I transform the Other into an in-itself, alienating 
him from his consciousness, and making him into an object for me. At the same time, the Other, 
who is transformed into an object, sees me as a for-itself performing this transformation. 
                                                 
69 That is, consciousness is always directed towards an object: “all consciousness is consciousness of something” 
(Sartre, 1943 [2005], p. 16). 
70 Consciousness is translucent because its contents are never hidden from itself – “consciousness is consciousness 
through and through” (Sartre, 1943 [2005], p. 11). 
71 Being-in-itself is opaque because it is not aware of itself. 
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Sartre argues that there are two ways in which the look may lead to the creation of a group. 
First, if I together with other persons look at the Other, then I and those other persons together 
transform the Other into an object for us (rather than an object for me). I and the other persons 
are now a plural subject, or “we” (Sartre, 1943 [2005], pp. 437-438). Second, I may feel the 
Other look at me and a number of others together as a unit, in which case the Other transforms 
me and the others into a combined “us”, or plural object for him (Sartre, 1943 [2005], p. 439). 
Thus, Sartre’s account could be stated as follows: 
Sartre’s account: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that they 
comprise a social group if M1…Mn together look at the Other, OR M1…Mn 
are looked at as a unit by the Other. 
Sartre’s account should be classified as a non-cognitive account, since Sartre holds that the 
“look” is not a belief – it is an existential feeling, or a feeling relating to the nature of one’s (or 
another’s) way of being in the world. 
B.3.a.ii. Objections 
There are at least three problems with Sartre’s view. First, if we are to accept Sartre’s solution 
to the individual-individual problem, we should also accept his ontological framework from 
which the account arises. However, many would not want to commit themselves to Sartre’s 
ontology. 
Second, Sartre’s account struggles to characterise large groups. On Sartre’s account, I am a 
member of the ANCYL if either (i) I feel that I together with the other members of the league 
look at the Other, or (ii) I feel that the Other looks at me together with the other members of the 
league as a unit. But (i) is problematic, for how is it possible for me to feel that I am looking 
together with “the other members of the league” if I don’t know who the other members of the 
league are? And, against (ii), how is it possible for the Other to look at all the members of the 
league as a unit, if the Other doesn’t know who all the members of the league are? 
Finally, and most damagingly, notice that neither of the disjunctive conditions specified in the 
definiens is sufficient for the definiendum (group member intra-relations).72 That is, neither of 
the disjuncts satisfies Aggregation. First, it is possible for a mere aggregate of individuals to 
                                                 
72 The definiendum of an account is that which the account is meant to define. The definiens of an account is the 
statement that is intended to define, or give an account of, the definiendum. 
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look at an Other, without transforming the mere aggregate into a group. For example, we can 
imagine that all the lunch-eaters and class-goers on the central concourse, upon hearing a 
scream, look up for a moment to see a woman fall down a flight of stairs. All the class-goers 
and lunch-eaters look together at the woman (the Other), and yet, we need not infer from this 
that the mere aggregate suddenly comprises a group, for a few seconds later the individuals 
may continue with their tasks without paying the woman any further attention. Sartre must hold 
that the lunch-eaters and class-goers are instantaneously transformed into a group while they 
look at the woman, but I find this position counterintuitive. 
Contrary to the second disjunct, it is not the case that someone’s (i.e. the Other’s) viewing a 
collection of individuals as a group is sufficient to unify that collection into a social group. 
Consider John, the paranoid, who “looks” at those around him as participating in a vast 
conspiracy against him. On the second disjunct, the people John encounters during his daily 
activities together comprise a social group because John sees them as such. But, they are not a 
social group – John is a paranoid, incorrectly interpreting their behaviour. The shop teller, the 
baker, the train conductor and John’s mother do not interact with one another, and so, are not a 
social group. 
Perhaps Sartre would respond by arguing that John is an a-prototypical Other – he is paranoid, 
and this is why he can be incorrect in his ascription of grouphood. Thus, Sartre’s account should 
be refined to allow only prototypical subjects the ability to construct social groups with their 
look. But the problem with this response is that it is not only the paranoid who can be mistaken 
about which collections are aggregates, and which are social groups. Recall Searle’s objection 
from indistinguishability to Objectivist accounts [see section B.2.e. Objecting to Objectivism 
from indistinguishability (p. 65)]. Searle argues (or I argue on his behalf) that for any social 
group, there may be a mere aggregate of individuals that behave in a fashion indistinguishable 
to an outsider – in this case the “Other”. If this is correct, then the Other, even if he is a 
prototypical Other, could be mistaken in his ascription of grouphood to a mere aggregate of 
individuals. 
B.3.b. Plural subject theory 
Subjectivist accounts cite group members’ reflexive mental states as crucial to understanding 
the constitutive relations among the members of a group. Non-cognitive subjective accounts, 
like Sartre’s, cite feelings (or similar attitudes) as constitutive of group membership. Perhaps 
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the reason why non-cognitive accounts fail is because individuals do not feel they are a member 
of a group until after they believe they are a member of the group. That is, it seems that if group 
members’ attitudes are constitutive of their membership (i.e. if a subjectivist solution to the 
individual-individual problem is correct), it would be their cognitive states, rather than their 
non-cognitive states, that are relevant to their membership. 
There are two influential cognitive accounts in the literature: Gilbert’s plural subject theory, 
and Searle’s constructionist account. I discuss these accounts in turn, starting with Gilbert’s 
account.  
B.3.b.i. Two versions of plural subject theory 
Plural subject theory attempts to account for social groups in terms of the Simmelian concept 
of a “we”, or plural subject (see Simmel, 1910-1911 [1971]). Gilbert has refined and developed 
her plural subject theory over decades (see Gilbert, 1989, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006a, 2006b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011). Over this period, we might distinguish between two 
distinct versions of the account: 
Correct Thought: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that they 
comprise a social group iff73 each of M1…Mn “correctly thinks of himself and 
the others, taken together, as ‘us*’ or ‘we*’” (1989, p. 147). 
Joint Commitment: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that they 
comprise a social group iff they are “jointly committed” to  “as a body” 
(2003, 2006b) – where  is a joint action, belief, state, attitude, or goal.  
Gilbert and her critics make no effort to distinguish these two versions of the account, and refer 
to both as a single account named “plural subject theory”. But since it is not obviously the case 
that the two accounts are equivalent, I consider the two accounts separately here.74 To start, 
consider the technical terms used by Gilbert, namely, (i) us*, (ii) we*, (iii) jointly committed, 
and (iv) as a body. 
Gilbert uses the terms (i) “us*”, (ii) “we*” and “plural subject” interchangeably. On Gilbert’s 
account, a collection of individuals M1…Mn comprise a plural subject PS just in case each 
                                                 
73 Gilbert intends both her early and late accounts to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for group 
membership. However, I am interested here merely in whether or not her accounts provide sufficient conditions 
for group membership. 
74 Indeed, it turns out that it is not the case that the two accounts are equivalent, since (I will argue) they each face 
distinct objections.  
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expresses that he is a willing member of PS, and there is common knowledge among M1…Mn 
of one other’s expression (1989, p. 205). A fact P is common knowledge among M1…Mn just 
in case P is “entirely out in the open between (or among) them, and, at some level, all are aware 
that this is so” (2006b, p. 139). Roughly, a fact P is entirely open, or “open*” (Gilbert, 1989, p. 
191), to M1…Mn just in case every one of the “smooth reasoner counterparts” of M1…Mn 
knows that P, knows that the others know that P, knows that the others know that he knows that 
P, knows that the others know that he knows that the others know that P, and so on.75 A smooth 
reasoner counterpart of an individual M is a person just like M, except that M is perfectly 
rational. 
To say that M1…Mn are (iii) jointly committed to -ing as a body is to say that M1…Mn each 
expresses a readiness to  as a body, and M1…Mn have common knowledge of one another’s 
expressions. Unfortunately, however, Gilbert does not provide a clear account of -ing (iv) as 
a body, but I believe the following would provide a rough but faithful rendition of her meaning. 
To say that M1…Mn share a joint commitment JC to -ing as a body is to say that JC has 
“collective content”, rather than “singular content”. A commitment with collective content has 
the form “we commit to ”. Elsewhere, Gilbert calls these “we*-thoughts” (1989, p. 205). This 
should be contrasted with singular content: a commitment has singular content if it has the form 
“I commit to ”. Thus, on Gilbert’s account, each of the individuals in a group who jointly 
commits to carrying a table as a body makes a commitment of the form “we will carry this 
table” (as opposed to each making the personal commitment, “I will carry this table”). 
To summarise, consider the following claims: 
PS-1) M1…Mn together comprise a plural subject. 
PS-2) Each of M1…Mn believes that PS-1. 
PS-3) M1…Mn each expresses readiness to . 
PS-4) PS-3 is common-knowledge among (if n>2) or between (if n=2) M1…Mn. 
PS-5) The expressions in PS-3 have collective content. 
                                                 
75 Gilbert’s use of “M knows that P” is equivalent to the capacity of M to infer that P in the situation in which M 
finds himself. 
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Then, Correct Thought holds that PS-1 and PS-2 are each necessary and together sufficient 
conditions for group membership, while Joint Commitment is the doctrine that PS-3, PS-4 
and PS-5 are each necessary and together sufficient conditions for group membership. 
B.3.b.ii. Critical literature on plural subject theory 
Before I begin my assessment of the two versions of Gilbert’s plural subject theory, I should 
note that I will not be focusing on the sort of objections to plural subject theory that are prevalent 
in the literature. These include objections concerning: whether Gilbert’s account of shared 
states, such as joint commitments, is plausible (see, e.g., Andersen, 2010; Bouvier, 2004; 
Bratman, 2009; Mathiesen, 2006; McMahon, 2003, 2005; Pacherie, 2011; Tollefsen, 2003; R. 
Tuomela, 2007; R. Tuomela & Tuomela, 2003; Wray, 2001, 2003); whether plural subject 
theory can adequately capture the normative implications of belonging to a group – such as the 
legitimation of political authority and obligations (see Makela, 2000; M. Miller & Makela, 
2005; Swindler, 1996); and whether plural subject theory provides a faithful conceptual analysis 
of the folk-sociological meaning of the term “we” (de Bruin, 2009; Sheehy, 2002 note 15). 
Instead, I am interested here in whether Gilbert’s plural subject theory can provide an adequate 
metaphysical account of social groups. Sheehy (2002, p. 384) considers whether plural subject 
theory provides adequate necessary conditions for group membership. But here I am primarily 
interested in whether Gilbert provides adequate sufficient conditions for social group 
membership. I will focus, specifically, on whether plural subject can satisfy Groupness, 
Individuation and Aggregation – a discussion conspicuously absent in the literature. 
B.3.b.iii. Joint Commitment 
The objection to Joint Commitment that I present here springs from the intuition that although 
Joint Commitment may provide us with a plausible understanding of the Folk Sociological 
concept of “we” or “us”, it is too weak to provide an adequate account of social groups. That 
is, there are collections of individuals that Joint Commitment would classify as a “we” or “us”, 
and which intuition would agree amounts to a “we” or “us”, but which intuition would also 
suggest fails to comprise a social group. Thus, the counterexample I consider here seeks to 
show that Joint Commitment classifies certain mere aggregates as social groups, and therefore 
fails to satisfy Individuation and Aggregation. 
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 Carrying a table together 
Consider the following case. It is the first day of school, and Ms Johnson, the English teacher, 
dislikes the location of her desk. She selects two students at random from her class, Ben and 
Bob, points to them (since she does not know their names), and asks them to carry her desk to 
a different side of the classroom (the desk is too heavy for one person to carry alone). Ben and 
Bob, who do not know each other at all (suppose Ben is a new student, who does not yet know 
any of the other students), both stand and walk towards the desk. Each says, “Sure, we will 
carry the desk” (or something similar). They lift the desk in unison, and carry the desk to Ms 
Johnson’s preferred location. Without speaking to each other, they return to their respective 
seats. 
The following observations seem uncontroversial: Ben and Bob have performed a joint action 
– carrying the table together, and Ben and Bob refer to the collection of the two boys when they 
use the term “we”. What is controversial, however, are the implications of this joint action, and 
precisely what the “we” in their statement refers to. Joint Commitment implies that (i) because 
of this joint action, Ben and Bob comprise a social group, and that, therefore, (ii) the “we” in 
their statement refers to a plural subject or social group, rather than a mere aggregate of 
individuals. For recall that Joint Commitment claims that individuals M1…Mn are members 
of a social group just in case PS-3 through PS-5 obtain: 
PS-3) M1…Mn each expresses readiness to . 
PS-4) PS-3 is common-knowledge among (if n>2) or between (if n=2) M1…Mn. 
PS-5) The expressions in PS-3 have collective content. 
Ben and Bob express their readiness to carry the table by standing and walking to Mrs Johnson’s 
desk, and by stating that they will carry the desk. There is common knowledge between them 
that they will be carrying the desk together, for this is entirely out in the open between then. 
Finally, because each says, “we will carry the desk”, they have expressions with collective 
content.  
My intuition, however, is that (i) and (ii) are incorrect: Ben and Bob are not a social group. 
They have never spoken, they do not know each other, and they have interacted for only a very 
brief period of time. They seem to lack the cohesion or unity that we think social groups have. 
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Ben and Bob are a mere aggregate of individuals76, incorrectly characterised as a social group 
by Joint Commitment. Thus, the account fails to satisfy Individuation and Aggregation, since 
it counts non-group members as group members, and implies that a mere aggregate is a social 
group. 
The most obvious response for Gilbert is to bite the bullet on this counterexample: she could 
deny that she shares my intuition that Ben and Bob are not a social group. Now, admittedly, 
intuitions in the table-carrying case are muddy: there may be divided opinions concerning this 
case. I do not believe, however, that this is a problem for the counterexample, for the following 
reason. Although it may be controversial whether or not Ben and Bob are a social group, it 
seems far less controversial that if Ben and Bob do comprise a social group, then their group is 
of a very different sort from a family, a soccer team, or a protesting group of activists. 
Specifically, Ben and Bob lack the cohesion present in these social groups. That is, Ben and 
Bob lack the unity, familiarity, structure, duration and quality of interaction present in cohesive 
social groups. This difference between cohesive groups (families, soccer teams and activists) 
on the one hand, and what Gilbert (2006b, p. 167) calls “ephemeral” or “transient” groups on 
the other (like Ben and Bob), seems more than a difference of degree: it appears to be a 
difference of category. 
The problem for Gilbert is that Joint Commitment is unable to account for the categorical 
difference between cohesive and ephemeral groups. On Joint Commitment, Ben and Bob are 
just as much a social group as the soccer club – both have joint commitments to -ing as a body 
(Ben and Bob are jointly committed to carrying the table, while the soccer club is jointly 
committed to playing soccer together). But if the conditions used by Joint Commitment to 
account for groups like soccer clubs and the family apply equally well to collectives like Ben 
and Bob, then, at best, Joint Commitment accounts for what is common between cohesive 
social groups and ephemeral social groups. But this provides a bare-bones, non-cohesive 
conception of social groups. Yet that is not really the kind of social group we are interested in: 
cohesive social groups are far more interesting and important because their cohesion results in 
the most significant characteristics of groups, such as their capacity for responsibility and 
duration through time. Ephemeral groups may, arguably, under rare circumstances, display the 
                                                 
76 Ben and Bob may be members of a larger group – i.e. the class. But Ben and Bob do not together, just the two 
of them, comprise a social group. But Joint Commitment implies that Ben and Bob together comprise a social 
group of two. 
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capacity for responsibility, but this capacity is significantly diminished compared with cohesive 
social groups. To conclude, Gilbert’s account provides us with an incomplete, uninteresting 
account of social groups. 
Gilbert provides two responses to this objection: that Joint Commitment adequately 
characterises paradigmatic social groups (which is all that matters), and that ephemeral and 
cohesive social groups are not categorically different. I consider these responses in turn. 
First, Gilbert’s response from paradigmatic social groups runs as follows: 
One might also wonder if the plural subject account is not too broad in countenancing very transient 
plural subjects…. These people constitute, indeed, a very small, very transient plural subject and 
hence they will constitute a social group of the same kind, if they do. Agreed, such encounters 
constitute something close to the thin end of a long wedge. If the nature of this wedge is otherwise 
well captured by the concept of a plural subject, however, it seems arbitrary to insist on a particular 
cut‐off point. (2006b, p. 167) 
Gilbert is quite right: it is not a serious problem if the account gets these marginal, muddy cases 
wrong (or places the “cut-off point” incorrectly on some people’s conception of social groups), 
but only if the paradigmatic cases of social groups are “well captured” by the account. The 
question is: what are paradigmatic social groups? My intuition is that cohesive social groups 
are paradigmatic, at least in the sense that they are the most interesting and important type of 
group, and as I have argued, Joint Commitment fails to account adequately for cohesive 
groups. 
Gilbert, however, takes ephemeral groups as paradigmatic social groups. Indeed, Gilbert’s 
central case upon which she builds her account is that of two individuals going for a walk 
together – a social group which she readily admits is “ephemeral” (2006a, p. 168) rather than 
cohesive. But this approach seems back-to-front. The most fruitful, and intuitively correct, 
methodology for constructing an account of social groups would be to identify the central 
features of a social group based upon cohesive social groups, and thereafter tweak the 
conditions so that borderline cases (i.e. ephemeral groups) are included or excluded 
appropriately. But instead, Gilberts begins with a case (going for a walk together) which she 
admits is a borderline (“ephemeral”) example, and then proceeds to claim that because this is 
her central case, her account characterises paradigmatic social groups correctly, as well as social 
groups generally. 
Gilbert’s second response is to argue that ephemeral and cohesive groups are not categorically 
different after all: 
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If walking together is a matter of plural subject formation, as I have argued at length, this not only 
suggests that small and relatively ephemeral social groups generally are plural subjects. It suggests, 
also, that larger and less ephemeral social groups—insofar as they are indeed social groups in the 
same sense—are similarly constituted. (2006a, p. 168) 
Why, however, should we think that cohesive groups are “social groups” in Gilbert’s “sense” 
if what she means by “social groups” is paradigmatically captured by ephemeral and transient 
groups? In the sum of her work, Gilbert only seems to provide one supporting argument for this 
crucial assumption. She argues that ephemeral and cohesive groups often feature on the same 
list of what sociologists call “social groups” (Gilbert, 2006b, p. 97). Therefore, she concludes, 
ephemeral and cohesive collectives are social groups “in the same sense”. 
But the response shows merely that the “sense” in which ephemeral and cohesive groups are 
similar, is that both are considered by sociologists to be types of social groups. But this falls 
short of showing that cohesive groups are not categorically distinct from ephemeral groups, for 
two reasons. First, these sociologists could be mistaken – they are sociologists, rather than 
social ontologists, after all. Second, even if ephemeral groups and cohesive groups both belong 
to the same genus (both social groups), this does not imply that cohesive groups are not 
importantly different from ephemeral groups. That is, even if ephemeral and cohesive groups 
are similar in the sociologist’s sense, this may not be the sense which counts when constructing 
a metaphysical account of social groups. 
The conclusion of this discussion is that if Gilbert demands for collectives like Bob and Ben to 
be included as social groups, then the correct response is to give Gilbert what she wants: yes, 
she has provided an account of what she calls “social groups”. But what Gilbert labels a “social 
group” is not what we are really interested in here, as well as in the social sciences: we are 
interested in social groups proper – that is, cohesive social groups. 
B.3.b.iv. Correct Thought 
One way to diagnose the problem with Joint Commitment is to point out that it is not the joint 
commitment itself which unifies the individuals involved into a social group. Instead, the 
significance (or importance) of the joint commitment to those who commit it, is what is 
important for whether or not those individuals are a social group. Roughly, it seems that when 
a collection of individuals jointly commits to , and when those individuals consider  
significant, then the joint commitment to  is sufficient for unifying those individuals into a 
social group. Ben and Bob are not a social group when they carry Ms Johnson’s table, because 
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this joint action is insignificant to the boys. But, suppose after carrying the table, Ms Johnson 
declares: “Ben and Bob! You two shall be my table-carriers from now on.” The two boys then 
see significance in the joint action (perhaps they feel proud, or used), and so, may come to think 
of themselves as a social group (Ms Johnson’s table-carriers). 
Importantly, this is merely a rough account of a sufficient condition for social groups, since the 
notion of significance is vague, and so, it would be difficult to use this notion in a rigorous 
account of social groups. Nevertheless, the notion of significance is useful, for we might ask: 
why is the significance of a joint commitment made by M1…Mn correlated with whether or not 
M1…Mn are a social group? Gilbert has at her disposal a ready answer: because in those 
instances, and only in those instances, where the joint commitment is significant to M1…Mn, 
do M1…Mn believe that they comprise a plural subject, or social group. This is the basis of 
Correct Thought, and so Correct Thought may be the refinement of Joint Commitment that 
Gilbert requires to resolve the counterexample.77 Thus, I move now to discuss Correct 
Thought. 
Recall that Correct Thought is the following doctrine: 
Correct Thought: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that they 
comprise a social group iff each of M1…Mn “correctly thinks of himself and 
the others, taken together, as ‘us*’ or ‘we*’” (Gilbert, 1989, p. 147).  
Correct Thought, however, is ambiguous, for we might interpret “the others” either as a 
particular set of individuals (a de re interpretation), or as the other members of the group or 
plural subject whoever they are (the de dicto interpretation). Thus, Correct Thought permits 
two distinct formulations: 
De re interpretation of Correct Thought: M1…Mn relate in such a way that 
they comprise a social group iff each of M1...Mn believes78 that he is part of a 
plural subject PS, AND each of M1…Mn is a part of PS, AND each of M1...Mn 
believes that each and every other individual in M1…Mn is a member of PS. 
De dicto interpretation of Correct Thought: Individuals M1…Mn relate in 
such a way that they comprise a social group iff each of M1…Mn believes he 
is part of a plural subject PS, AND each of M1…Mn is a part of PS, AND each 
                                                 
77 Correct Thought was Gilbert’s original account, chronologically. But conceptually, I see Correct Thought as 
more advanced than Joint Commitment. 
78 Throughout the remainder of this chapter I have assumed that if x “thinks of” y as a member of PS, then x 
believes that M is a member of PS. Nothing substantial rests upon this assumption: the reader may replace all 
instances of “believes” and “belief” with “thinks” and “thought”, without altering the argument. 
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of M1…Mn believes that the members of PS other than himself, whoever they 
are, are part of PS.  
In formalising the difference between these accounts, let Gx mean that x is a member of social 
group G, let PSx mean that x is a member of plural subject PS. Then: 
De re interpretation of Correct Thought: 
(x)(y)(((x  y) & (PSx & PSy) & (x believes: PSx) & (x believes: PSy) & (y 
believes: PSx) & (y believes: PSy)) ↔ (Gx & Gy)) 
De dicto interpretation of Correct Thought: 
(x)((PSx & (x believes: PSx) & (x believes: (y)(((x  y) & PSy)  PSy))) ↔ Gx) 
To clarify the distinction between the accounts further, notice that on the de re interpretation, x 
has a number (n) of beliefs, where n is equal to the number of members in G (one belief for 
every other member of G, plus a belief about x’s own membership in PS). By contrast, the de 
dicto interpretation requires merely that x has two beliefs: one about his own membership in 
PS, and a single belief that all the other members of PS (however many they are, and whoever 
they are) are members of PS.79 
In her earlier work, Gilbert is opaque about which of these two interpretations she intends, 
although she seems to favour the de re interpretation (1989, pp. 147-148). Later in her career 
Gilbert is clear that she intends the de dicto interpretation (2003, p. 55; 2006b, pp. 99, 174). 
Most of my discussion will focus on the de dicto interpretation, as Gilbert settled on this version 
of the account. I will argue, however, the de dicto account caters for neither small nor large 
groups, and so is at best an S-5 type account. The de re interpretation is better, since it provides 
a plausible account of small groups; but it fails to characterise large social groups, and so, is an 
S-3 account. I discuss the de dicto version of Correct Thought first. 
 The de dicto interpretation 
On the de dicto interpretation of Correct Thought, x is a member of G just in case the following 
three conditions obtain: 
D-1) x believes: PSx 
                                                 
79 In Gallois’s terminology, the de re interpretation is a “particular” claim, while the de dicto interpretation is a 
“general” claim (Gallois, 1998, p. Sec. 1). 
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D-2) x believes: (y)(((x  y) & PSy)  PSy) 
D-3) PSx 
Notice, however, that the proposition believed in D-2 is a tautology: x believes that every 
member, whoever they are (other than himself), of the plural subject PS is a member of PS. Of 
course every member of PS is a member of PS. Any rational person (whether or not they are a 
member of PS or G) would, if asked, assent to believing that every member of PS is a member 
of PS. Thus, it is difficult to see how D-2 can contribute to a sufficiency condition for x’s 
membership of G. 
To avoid the redundancy of D-2, Gilbert (2003, p. 55) refines the de dicto account as follows: 
Descriptive de dicto interpretation of Correct Thought: Individuals M1…Mn 
relate in such a way that they comprise a social group iff each of M1…Mn 
believes he is part of a plural subject PS, AND each of M1…Mn is a part of 
PS, AND M1…Mn share (or can be described by) a key feature F, AND each 
of M1…Mn believes that the individuals who satisfy F, whoever they are, are 
a part of PS.  
This “descriptive” version of the de dicto account might be formalised as follows, where Fx 
means that x has the key feature F: 
Descriptive de dicto interpretation of Correct Thought: 
(x)((PSx & Fx & (x believes: PSx) & (x believes: (y)(((x  y) & Fy)  PSy))) 
↔ Gx) 
Thus, the account implies that the following four conditions are together sufficient (and each 
necessary) for any individual x to be a member of G: 
D-1) x believes: PSx 
D-3) PSx 
D-4) Fx 
D-5) x believes: (y)(((x  y) & Fy)  PSy) 
The descriptive account avoids the redundancy charge levelled against the original de dicto 
account by replacing D-2 with D-4 and D-5. However, this new account is dubious because it 
fails to characterise large as well as small social groups. I consider these two sorts of groups in 
turn. 
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 Large social groups and any common key feature 
In the case of at least some prototypical, large social groups, it is difficult to arrive at any feature 
F that fulfils D-4 and D-5. By D-4, having property F is necessary for membership in G. 
Moreover, by D-5, every member of G believes that having property F is sufficient for 
membership in PS. Moreover, it seems plausible that Gilbert would require that, since this belief 
is partly constitutive of social group membership, this belief must be true (unless Gilbert is 
willing to accept that false beliefs are partly constitutive of group membership, which seems 
unlikely). Thus, having property F is both necessary for membership in G and sufficient for 
membership in the plural subject that comprises G.   
What sort of key feature F would satisfy these requirements? Gilbert provides the following 
examples of properties which she thinks are legitimate candidates for F in large social groups: 
Simple examples of such a conception are ‘people living on this island’, ‘fishermen of the north 
shore’, ‘those who farm in the river delta’, ‘mushroom pickers’, ‘people of small stature who live in 
the forest’, ‘those who acknowledge their descent from the great warrior Obi’. These are simple in 
the sense that they make no reference to complexes of social rules or institutions – they make no 
reference, in particular, to already constituted countries. Thus they contrast with such conceptions 
as ‘Americans’, ‘British’, ‘citizens of Europe’, and the like, which are also conceptions of a 
particular population of persons. There is no obvious objection in principle or practice to the idea 
that a very large number of people can share either kind of conception of a population. (2006b, p. 
175) 
Gilbert, then, allows for members of a given group G to share either of two kinds of key 
features: a feature that does not presuppose the existence of G (e.g. the property of “living on 
this island” when G is, say, Hawaiians), or a feature that does presuppose the existence of G 
(e.g. the property of “being American” when G is the group of Americans). Call these two sorts 
of key features, non-presuppositional and presuppositional features respectively. It seems very 
odd that Gilbert allows for presuppositional features to play a role in her account, for 
substituting a presuppositional feature for F results in a circular account. For example, suppose 
we wish to provide an account of Americans, and use the property of “being an American” as 
F. Then x is American only if D-4` and D-5`: 
D-4`) x is American 
D-5`) x believes: (y)(((x  y) & y is American)  PSy) 
D-4` is clearly a source of circularity, for it is the definiendum of the account. Moreover, D-5` 
is also problematic, for we might ask: what does it mean for x to believe that y is “American” 
in D-5`? The only answer Gilbert could give, on this account, is that x believes that y is a 
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member of a plural subject PS, that y believes that he (y) is a member of PS, and that y believes 
that for every individual z, where z is not y and z is an American, z is a member of PS. But, we 
would ask, what does it mean for z to be an American? And we can continue in this fashion 
indefinitely. Thus, including D-5` in the account of “Americans” results in an infinite regress. 
Gilbert might argue that it is not a problem to include an infinitely regressive condition (i.e. D-
5`) in her account. Indeed, her notion of common knowledge, which is part of her concept of a 
plural subject, is infinitely regressive [see the definition of an open* expression of willingness 
discussed in section B.3.b.i. Two versions of plural subject theory (p. 71)]. But there is an 
important difference between these two cases of infinite regression. In the case of Gilbert’s 
definition of common knowledge, she claims not that the group member himself has an 
infinitely regressive knowledge of the other members’ expressions, but rather, that the smooth 
reasoner counterpart of the group member has this knowledge. This is acceptable because 
smooth reasoners, by definition, have no limit to their intellectual capacity or memory which 
would prevent infinitely regressive knowledge. However, D-5` claims that x himself has an 
infinitely regressive belief (that y believes that z believes that…), and we don’t think that non-
smooth reasoning individuals are capable of infinitely regressive beliefs. 
Given that D-4` and D-5` are problematic, perhaps Gilbert could drop these two conditions 
from the account, and retain only D-1 and D-3? This downsized account would read: 
Downsized account: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that they 
comprise a social group iff M1…Mn are members of the same plural subject 
PS, and each of M1…Mn believes that he is a member of PS. 
In addition to avoiding the circularity and infinite regress problems, this account, although 
downsized, resolves the table-carrying counterexample, for Ben and Bob lack a belief that they 
are part of a plural subject, and so, this downsized account does not imply that Ben and Bob 
comprise a social group. 
We might wonder, however, exactly what it means for an individual in M1…Mn to believe that 
he is a member of PS? Recall that on Gilbert’s definition, a plural subject is a collection of 
individuals who each openly* expresses his willingness to become a member of a plural subject 
with the other individuals. Thus, if M believes that he is a member of the plural subject PS, then 
M believes that he, together with the others, is a member of PS. This results in a familiar 
ambiguity: what do we mean by “the others” here? This could receive either a de dicto 
interpretation or a de re interpretation, and these will receive, respectively, the same objections 
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as those presented here against the de dicto and de re versions of Correct Thought. The 
downsized account, therefore, offers no improvement. 
Given the apparently intractable problems that arise when we substitute a presuppositional 
feature for F in the descriptive version of the de dicto interpretation of Correct Thought, 
Gilbert might specify that only non-presuppositional key features are legitimate substitutions 
for F. But this leaves Gilbert with a problem: most of Gilbert’s examples of non-
presuppositional key features involve geographically determined groups – “people living on 
this island”, “fishermen of the north shore”, “those who farm in the river delta”, “people of 
small stature who live in the forest” (emphasis added). In these cases, the key property shared 
by M1…Mn is obvious: the property has the form, “living within (or performing some action 
 within) geographical location x”. But problems arise when this account is applied to social 
groups that are not geographically determined, such as political parties (whose members may 
reside across multiple geographical locations). In these cases, it is not at all obvious what the 
key property shared by these individuals is. What is the key property shared by the ANCYL 
members, for example? Gilbert might answer in one of four ways. 
First, Gilbert might posit that the key property possessed by all ANCYL members is the holding 
of the majority of a cluster of (in this case, political) beliefs. But, if we were to examine each 
of the members of the ANCYL we would most likely find that some of the members lack most 
or all of the beliefs in the belief set – e.g. members who join purely for the social status 
associated with the league. Indeed, these status-driven individuals may comprise a 
disappointingly large proportion of the members of the group. Moreover, other members may 
be sincerely misguided in their beliefs about the group, in that they may hold beliefs that conflict 
with the core beliefs in the cluster. For example, it is possible for an individual to be a sincere 
member of the league, and for that individual to believe that both he and the league stand for 
values v1… vn, when in fact the league espouses none of these values, and instead stands for 
values that conflict with v1…vn. Thus, it is not the case that possessing a cluster of political 
beliefs is necessary for group membership in the ANCYL, and therefore, this sort of key feature 
fails to satisfy D-4.  
Second, Gilbert might hold that that the shared key property of group members is that they have 
signed-up to be members of the group. That is, groups members have undergone the process 
required by the group for joining, and have not undergone the process involved for leaving the 
group. However, this “signing-up” feature also fails to satisfy D-4 because many groups (both 
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
84 
large and small) do not have formal procedures or process whereby one is inducted into the 
group, and so, signing up is unnecessary for group membership. An informal conversationalist 
group and a mob, for example, do not require that any special procedures be followed for one 
to be considered a member of the group. Moreover, there is reason to think that the signing-up 
feature is not a good candidate for satisfying D-5 even for more formal groups. Although it is 
clear that signing up as a member of a legal entity is sufficient for being a member of that entity, 
it is not clear that signing up as a member of a social group is sufficient for being a member of 
that group, or the plural subject comprising it. For example, it seems impossible to dispute that 
John is married to Joanna if John and Joanna have signed papers to this effect, and these papers 
have been duly authorised by the relevant authorities. However, suppose John and Joanna are 
involved in a car accident that wipes their memories of the time they spent together. The two 
never see or speak to each other again after the crash. Then it seems that although John and 
Joanna are married, they do not together comprise a social group – the marriage is a legal entity 
to which they belong, but not a social group. Or, similarly, I may have signed up as a member 
of the ANCYL, yet I have changed my political views since, but never bothered to withdraw 
my membership. Then, although it is true that I am legally a member of the ANCYL qua legal 
entity, I am not a willing member of the plural subject that is the ANCYL qua social group. 
And therefore, being a signed-up member of a group fails to satisfy D-4, and is a dubious 
candidate for D-5. 
Third, Gilbert could appeal to having performed a specified personal or joint action as the 
shared feature of all the members of the social group (she suggests this with the “mushroom 
pickers” example). The problem with this type of feature, however, is that it will not satisfy D-
4 in the ANCYL case. In the case of a group of individuals who are defined by a repeated joint 
action  (e.g. mushroom pickers or farmers), it is clear that every group member performs . 
However, in cases like the ANCYL, it is not clear precisely what action every member would 
need to perform. The only action that would fulfil this role, it seems, is signing up to be a 
member of the group. But this solution is inadequate, as discussed previously. 
And fourth, Gilbert could appeal to a common telos: the key property is the possession of a 
certain end. As argued in section B.2.c. Teleological account (p. 50), there is, however, 
significant difficulty in using the notion of a common end as a sufficient condition for group 
membership. If the telos is defined narrowly, or in great detail, then at least some members of 
a large group may lack that telos due to ignorance or dissidence (Malcom X, for example, failed 
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to hold the narrowly defined, radical separatist goals of the OAAU). This implies that the 
account would fail to satisfy D4. On the other hand, if the telos is defined broadly, or in less 
detail, then individuals outside of the group (perhaps members of similar groups) may possess 
that telos, thereby failing to satisfy D5. For example, people outside of the OAAU (such as 
members of the ANCYL) would hold the same broad goal of promoting black rights. 
Thus far I have argued that in large social groups like the ANCYL, there is no key feature that 
all group members share that is both necessary for group membership and sufficient for plural 
subject membership. However, to show that the descriptive account fails to characterise large 
social groups, I do not even require such a strong claim. For notice that D-5 is the claim that 
every group member ascribes the very same feature to every other member of their group. 
Gilbert (2006b, p. 175) states: “Fulfilment of this condition requires, first, that all members of 
the population share a conception of the population” (emphasis added). Yet, given the difficulty 
in finding a common feature possessed by the members of large social groups, it seems highly 
implausible to assert that every group member will arrive at a common conception of group 
members possessing the same property F. That is, even if after a much lengthier discussion, 
Gilbert does provide a key feature that is both necessary for group membership and sufficient 
for plural subject membership, that feature will fail to satisfy D-5, for that discussion is not 
conducted by every group member, and so, will not form the basis of their beliefs concerning 
other group members. As philosophers we may be (although I doubt we are) in a position to 
provide the correct “conception” of group members as possessing a common feature, but group 
members themselves are not in this position, for they have not entered this discussion. Thus, to 
satisfy D-5, Gilbert needs to provide a pre-philosophically obvious common feature of all and 
only the members of a specified group. Presuppositional features would satisfy this 
requirement, but, as I argued earlier, substituting presuppositional features for F results in a 
circular account. 
Therefore, the descriptive account fails to characterise large social groups. I argue now that the 
account also fails to characterise small social groups.  
 Small social groups, a single common key feature, and knowing one another 
The descriptive de dicto interpretation of Correct Thought does not adequately characterise 
small social groups for two reasons: members of small social groups share multiple key features; 
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and a de dicto account of small social groups does not adequately capture the intimate nature 
of small social groups. I start by discussing the objection from multiple key features. 
In the case of large social groups it is difficult to find even a single shared feature among group 
members. Small social groups, however, suffer from the opposite problem: because there are 
so few group members, and because small social groups may be intimate, their members may 
have much in common. Consider a prototypical social group, namely, the family. Our Folk 
Sociological notion of the family (or at least a close family) involves members who share 
multiple features, including mutual love for one another, a joint goal to prosper together, a joint 
belief that they belong together, and the performance of multiple joint actions. However, 
remember that D-5 requires that group members ascribe to each other the very same key feature 
– i.e. they share the “same conception” of the group. But which of these many features is the 
key feature to the family? More importantly, why should we think that every member of the 
family will answer this question in the same way? There seems little reason to support the view 
that they will, and so, the account fails to characterise small social groups like families. 
Gilbert might, in response, soften the descriptive de dicto account by holding that group 
members need not share the same conception of the other members of the group, but only some 
conception which fits (i.e. which the other members satisfy), and which may differ from 
member to member. This softening of the account, however, is problematic, since it allows for 
the “we*” (or plural subject) to which each M in M1…Mn believes he belongs, to be distinct. 
One family member believes that (B1) the plural subject to which he belongs is composed of 
individuals who love one another, while another member believes that (B2) she belongs to a 
plural subject composed of individuals who possess the goal to prosper together, and a third 
believes that (B3) the plural subject is composed of those individuals who live under a common 
roof. Why should we think, therefore, that the various family members in fact belong to the 
same group at all, since their beliefs determine their membership on the Correct Thought 
account, and their beliefs are distinct? 
Gilbert might provide two answers to this question. First, Gilbert might argue that the 
conceptions that each member of the family has of the other members together form a cluster 
conception of the family. In this case, the cluster would be B1 & B2 & B3. And the reason why 
the individual members are part of the same family is that all the members of the family 
subscribe to beliefs in the same cluster. But this response fails to satisfy Individuation (and D5), 
for other families may have the same cluster of beliefs about which descriptions apply to all the 
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members of the family. Both the Joneses and the Smiths may believe that the members of their 
respective families satisfy B1, B2 and B3. So the cluster of beliefs can’t individuate the families. 
Second, Gilbert could respond by arguing that although the different family members have 
beliefs with distinct content, the beliefs have the same truth conditions. That is, while the “we*” 
in their respective beliefs has a distinct sense, it has the same referent – namely, the members 
of the family. The problem with this response, however, is that it presupposes that it is the 
reference rather than the sense of “we*” which determines group membership. Yet this is 
precisely what the de dicto account denies, and the de re account affirms. Thus, this response 
collapses the account into the de re interpretation, which I consider in the next section. 
Finally, there is a reason why any version of the de dicto interpretation of Correct Thought is 
implausible as an account of small social groups. The members of small social groups may be, 
and often are, intimately connected in ways which the members of large social groups are not. 
In Gilbert’s terminology, small social groups lack the feature of anonymity. In a family we 
expect that all the members know (or at least know of) each other, while in the ANCYL we do 
not expect this to be the case.80 Thus, it seems that when these family members think about 
each other and their respective membership, they will do so by forming beliefs about one 
another specifically, rather than about some individuals, whoever they may be, who satisfy 
description F. When asked who the members of my family are, I answer that my mother, my 
father, my brothers and myself are. Thus, it seems that the de re account is a better candidate 
for providing an account of small social groups, since it refers to these individuals specifically 
in its account of members’ beliefs about one another. That is, the de re account is a more 
phenomenologically accurate representation of our conception of small social groups. I 
therefore move now to consider the de re interpretation of Correct Thought. 
 The de re interpretation of Gilbert’s account 
In her earlier work, Gilbert appears to favour the de re interpretation of her account.81 Gilbert 
is interested primarily in small groups (such as a marriages, families and conversationalists) 
                                                 
80 Gilbert might point out that extended family members may not know each other, and so, small social groups 
may also have the feature of anonymity. This objection is unsuccessful, however, for two reasons. First, such 
extended families might better be conceived as large social groups. Second, such families are a-prototypical, or at 
least, not the sort of families I am focusing on here (it is direct – i.e. small and intimate – families which I take to 
be prototypical). 
81 “For the most part I shall write as if consciousness of facts about particular individuals is at issue” (Gilbert, 
1989, p. 149). 
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when developing her earlier account; and the de re interpretation may be a plausible 
requirement in such groupings (although I will not discuss this here). But the de re account is 
too strong for larger groups (such as large political groups, countries, etc.), for in these groups 
it is not the case that every member of the group has beliefs about every other member of the 
group specifically. For example, in the thousands of members that comprise the ANCYL, most 
members do not even know about the existence, never mind the membership, of most of the 
other members of the league. Thus, the de re account fails to satisfy Groupness for large groups, 
since the account fails to imply that many members of large groups are members (because they 
lack the requisite de re beliefs). 
Gilbert recognises this problem, but argues that the account “can be modified to allow for… 
large populations” (1989, p. 149). Gilbert suggests two such modifications. First, she suggests 
that the account be weakened such that it posits not that every member has beliefs about each 
and every other member, but merely about “almost all” the other members (1989, p. 149). But 
an obvious question arises: what does Gilbert mean by “almost all”? She cannot mean the 
majority of members, since in any large social group with thousands of members (such as the 
ANCYL), it is highly doubtful that every member knows more than half of the other members. 
However, Gilbert suggests that another way to understand the “almost all” qualification is in 
terms of the core members of the group. Thus, the account would read: 
Core account: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that they comprise a 
social group iff each of M1…Mn correctly believes that each of the core 
members of the social group, together with themselves, comprise a “we*” or 
“us*” (1989, p. 149). 
Yet this conception of a social group still will not help us to characterise many large groups, 
like the ANCYL. Many of the league’s members may not know who all the core members of 
the league are, but, nevertheless, they may believe in the league’s manifesto, pay membership 
fees, and chant with the other members: indeed, they may still be legitimate members of the 
league. 
Finally, on Gilbert’s behalf, we might attempt to enrich the account by replacing the beliefs of 
group members with dispositional beliefs. Notice that it seems that members of a group would 
recognise each other as members of the group if they knew enough about each other. A 
dispositional account meant to capture this intuition would read: 
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Dispositional belief account: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that 
they comprise a social group iff each of M1…Mn correctly believes that he is 
a member of a plural subject PS, AND for every Mx and My in M1…Mn, Mx 
would believe (de re) that My is a member of PS if Mx were familiar with My 
(his appearance, history, actions, mental states and situation). 
It is plausible that the dispositional belief account satisfies Individuation, since presumably the 
members of the group are disposed (under the right conditions) to the de re belief that only the 
other members of the group are members of the group (and not that non-members are members 
of the group). Notice, however, that on the dispositional account, it is possible for an individual 
to be a member of a group without having any relation with the other members at all. For on 
this account, “group members” need only have a belief about their own membership 
(specifically, that they are part of the plural subject that comprises the group), and need have 
no actual (as opposed to dispositional) beliefs about the other members. The only relation that 
group members need have with one another on this account is dispositional – they would have 
beliefs about one another if they were familiar with one another. But, intuition suggests, a 
plausible account of social groups should specify the relations that do obtain among group 
members (not what relations would obtain should they be familiar with each other). That is, 
specifying the relations that do obtain seems to be a requirement for satisfying Groupness – i.e. 
specifying that feature in virtue of which group members are group members – and so, the 
dispositional account fails to satisfy Groupness. 
 Conclusion 
The de dicto version of Correct Thought is problematic because it ascribes a redundant belief 
to group members, specifically, the belief that all members, whoever they are, of the plural 
subject that comprises the group are members of the plural subject. Gilbert offers a descriptive 
refinement to this account, which replaces the redundant belief with the belief that all 
individuals who satisfy a key description F are members of the group. However, this descriptive 
refinement incorrectly characterises large social groups because it is difficult to find any 
suitable key feature shared by all group members. Moreover, the account incorrectly 
characterises small social groups because these groups’ members share more than one key 
feature, and because these members think about one another’s membership in a de re rather de 
dicto manner. The de dicto account is therefore an S-5 type account at best. Gilbert’s de re 
account is better because it provides a plausible account of small social groups. However, the 
account cannot accommodate the anonymity present in large social groups, and so, is an S-3 
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type account. Enriching the de re account with the notions of core members or dispositional 
belief is unsatisfactory. 
B.3.c. Searle’s constructionist account 
Although Gilbert’s plural subject theory is the most influential account of social groups, 
Searle’s constructionist account (1990, 1995, 1998, 2007, 2010) is the most influential account 
of social institutions. In this section I discuss Searle’s account, and consider whether it might 
be applied successfully to social groups. 
B.3.c.i. The account 
According to Searle, 
all of human institutional reality… is created in its initial existence, and maintained in its continued 
existence by a single, logico-linguistic operation.... It is a Status Function Declaration. (2010, p. 
201) 
Searle distinguishes between Status Function Declarations that create types of institutions, and 
those Declarations that create token institutions (2010, p. 75). Types of institutions (Searle gives 
“corporations” as an example) are created using what he calls “Standing Status Function 
Declarations”, which take the form: 
We make it the case by Declaration that for any x that satisfies a certain set of conditions p, x has 
the status Y and performs the function F in C. (2010, p. 99) 
Here x is any collection of individualistic phenomena, Y is a social institution, C is the context 
in which the declaration is declared, and F is a “status function” (I discuss status functions 
shortly). Tokens of the institutional type Y can then be created in one of three ways. First, any 
given set of individualistic phenomena x is a Y if x satisfies conditions p. Second, if the token 
Y has a set of individualistic phenomena X82 that underlie it, then Y can be created using what 
Searle calls a Constitutive Rule, of the form: 
X counts as Y in C. (1995, p. 55; 2010, p. 101)  
                                                 
82 I follow Searle’s conventions for upper and lower-case variable letters in this section. 
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Third, if there are no individualistic phenomena that underlie Y (as is the case with some 
corporations, and electronic money), Y is created using what might be called a Token Status 
Function Declaration: 
We make it the case by Declaration that an entity Y exists that has status function(s) F in C. (2010, 
p. 100) 
The “status function” F, for Searle, is a species of agentive function. Non-agentive, or latent, 
functions are not readily apparent, and must be discovered to belong to their object; for 
example, we discovered that the heart has the function of pumping blood. By contrast, agentive, 
or manifest, functions are readily apparent to agents because the function assigns a use to which 
these objects are put by people. Searle holds that agentive functions are divided into causal and 
status functions, where causal functions are a result of the “brute” physical features of the 
object, while status functions accrue to their object by virtue of the use that  people put the 
object to represent something else (1995, pp. 123-124). For example, a screw-driver has the 
causal function of turning screws, since the configuration of its tip is suited to this purpose; 
while a river has the agentive function of being a border between two countries because we 
collectively recognise that the river represents this divide. 
For Searle, status functions (but not causal functions), provide the individuals involved with 
“deontic powers”, that is, “rights, duties, obligations, permissions, authorizations, [and] 
entitlements” (2010, p. 9). For example, in the case of the river, because it represents a border, 
it determines where individuals may or may not pass without the requisite authorisation. Indeed, 
deontic powers are crucial to Searle’s understanding of status functions; so much so that Searle 
states that status functions should be “spelled out as a set of deontic powers” (2010, p. 99).  
Now, according to Searle, all social phenomena have agentive, rather than non-agentive, 
functions. However, only some social phenomena, namely social institutions, have status 
functions (1995, p. 124). The reason why Searle holds that all and only social institutions have 
status functions is that Searle claims that a given social phenomenon is a social institution if 
and only if “its existence imp[lies] deontic powers” (2010, pp. 91-92), and only status functions 
(not causal functions) imply deontic powers. 
Finally, Searle holds that Status Function Declarations (both Standing and Token) and 
Constitutive Rules are successful in creating social institutions with status functions just in case 
they are collectively recognised by “the individuals directly involved and a sufficient number 
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of members of the relevant community [i.e. in C]” (1995, p. 117; 2010, pp. 8, 94). Very briefly, 
Searle distinguishes between a stronger and weaker sense of collective recognition (2010, pp. 
56-58). “Cooperation”, the stronger sort of collective recognition, involves “full-blown” 
collective intentionality. To say that q is collectively intended in this sense is to say that a 
collection of individuals have intentions of the form “we intend, believe or accept q”, where 
these “we-intentions” cannot be reduced to or replaced by “I-intentions”. That is, Searle (1995, 
p. 24; 2010, pp. ch. 3-4, 50) claims that collective intentions are “biologically primitive”, and a 
“Background capacity” of human beings (or creatures capable of social interaction). By 
contrast, Searle permits that weak collective recognition may be reducible to individual, or 
personal, intentionality (i.e. intentions of the form “I intend, believe or accept q”). For Searle, 
the creation of social institutions requires strong collective recognition, while the maintenance 
of social institutions merely requires weak collective recognition. 
To summarise Searle’s view on money, for example, a particular piece of paper counts as 
money in our society just in case: (i) that piece of paper satisfies various collectively, previously 
agreed-upon rules (p) about what counts as money in our society; or (ii) there is collective 
agreement that this piece of paper counts as money. In cases such as electronic money, where 
there is no piece of paper involved (or anything physical to represent money), money exists just 
in case (iii) we collectively agree by declaration that there is money. That collective agreement 
is sufficient to construct the piece of paper as money just in case the collective agreement is of 
the form “we collectively agree that …”, and cannot be reduced to a sum of individuals holding 
statements of the form “I agree that …”. 
B.3.c.ii. Applying the account to social groups 
Searle’s account is, primarily, an account of social institutions and (strong) collective 
intentionality. In these respects, the account has attracted significant critical attention (see, e.g., 
Brey, 2003; Fitzpatrick, 2003; Hershfield, 2011; Hindriks, 2003; Johansson, 2003; Koepsell & 
Moss, 2003; Meijers, 2003; Miscevic, 2003; Schmid, 2003; B. Smith & Searle, 2003; Thalos, 
2003; Tsohatzidis, 2007; M. Tuomela, 2011; R. Tuomela, 2003; Viskovatoff, 2003; Xiaoqiang, 
2009; Zaibert, 2003). Nevertheless, Searle intends his account as a general theory of “the nature 
of human society” (2010, p. 42), and as a theory of “the building blocks of social reality” 
generally (1995, p. ch. 1). Moreover, his goal is “to offer a logical analysis of the fundamental 
ontology of the entities studied by the social sciences” (2010, pp. 200-201). Thus, since social 
groups form an integral part of human society, social reality, and the subject matter of the social 
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sciences, I take it that Searle intends his account to apply to, or be adaptable to, an account of 
social groups.83 
Just how the account applies to social groups, however, is unclear, since a discussion of social 
groups specifically (rather than social institutions, or social phenomena broadly) is 
conspicuously absent both from Searle’s work, as well from criticisms of Searle’s work. 
Perhaps the reason for the absence of a discussion of social groups is that Searle may consider 
social groups to be just one sort of social institution. For example, Searle writes that the “Y 
status can be imposed on… [p]eople” (1995, p. 97), and “[w]hat goes for the line of stones, the 
king, the corporation and money [i.e. institutions and institutional facts] goes for… the United 
States Army, the Mafia, Al Qaeda and the Squaw Valley Ski Team [i.e. social groups]” (2010, 
p. 100). Indeed, social groups satisfy Searle’s criterion for social institutions (as all and only 
those social phenomena which imply deontic powers), since members of social groups have 
rights, obligations, duties and permissions that they would not have had if they were not 
members of the group. For example, group members can perform actions that individuals 
cannot: ANCYL members are able to protest on behalf of the group, while non-members cannot 
protest on behalf of the group; and family members have duties to one another that individuals 
external to the family do not (children respect their parents, while parents provide for their 
children).84 
If we understand social groups as a species of social institution as on Searle’s account, we arrive 
at two possibilities for how token social groups are created, and so, two possible solutions to 
Q1.  
Searle-1: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that they comprise a token 
social group g if there is collective recognition that they count as g with a 
status function F in context C. 
Searle-2: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that they comprise a token 
social group g if the relations among M1…Mn satisfy p, and there is collective 
recognition of the Declaration that for any x that satisfies a certain set of 
conditions p, x is a social group with status function F in C. 
                                                 
83 Whether or not Searle intends his account of social institutions to apply to social groups, I take it that it is an 
interesting question whether his account of institutions could apply to groups. 
84 For a lengthy discussion of the obligations and rights of group members, see (Gilbert, 2006b). Gilbert accounts 
for the obligation of citizens to obey the state in terms of the obligations of society (which she classifies as a large 
social group) to obey the state. 
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Searle-1 and Searle-2 elucidate, respectively, the claims that token social groups are created 
using collectively recognised Constitutive Rules and Standing Status Function Declarations.85 
Searle-2, unfortunately, is highly unhelpful unless p is specified (which Searle does not do). 
For the problem of specifying p just is Q1 (or the individual-individual problem), since both 
answering Q1 and specifying p is the task of specifying the relations among group members 
sufficient to unify those members into a group. That is, Searle-2 presupposes that an answer to 
Q1 has already been found. And therefore insofar as Searle does provide an account of social 
groups, I take it that Searle-1 (and not Searle-2) is that account. 
Searle-1 has the advantage that, with greater clarification (which I will not perform here), the 
account may present adequate wiggle-room to avoid some of the problems faced by Gilbert’s 
plural subject theory. For example, recall that the de re version of Gilbert’s Correct Thought 
struggles to characterise large social groups, since the members rarely know each and every 
other member individually. It is arguably plausible, however, that in prototypical large groups, 
each and every member of a group is known de re to be a member of the group by somebody 
inside or outside of the group. That is, a member of g unknown to many other members of g 
may nevertheless be recognised as a member of g by the community in which g exists. Thus, if 
Searle defines the “they” in Searle-1 in a de re fashion, he arrives at a de re plural subject 
account that avoids some of the challenges facing Gilbert.86 
B.3.c.iii. Objections 
Nevertheless, Searle-1 faces at least three objections. And, interestingly, the first two of these 
are problems that Searle’s account of social institutions does not face. First, on Searle’s account 
of social institutions, strong collective recognition of a Status Function declaration is required 
for the construction of the group. But strong collective recognition presupposes the existence 
of a social group that does the collective recognising of the Status Function Declaration – strong 
                                                 
85 On Searle’s account, social phenomena without underlying individualistic phenomena (X) are created using 
Token Status Function Declarations. Thus, social groups, it seems, would not be created using Token Status 
Function Declarations, since social groups always start with members, and so, always have individualistic 
phenomena underlying them upon their inception. Perhaps exceptions may include the creation of companies or 
trusts without members. I am sceptical that these are social groups (they are institutions, but perhaps not social 
groups), but if they are social groups, then Searle’s account of social groups could be expanded to include: 
Searle-3: A token social group g exists if there is collective recognition that g exists with status function(s) 
F in context C. 
86 The account would be a plural subject account if it were read as: Individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that 
they comprise a social group iff there is collective recognition that they count as a plural subject with a status 
function F, in context C. 
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collective recognition presupposes a “we” that cannot be reduced to a sum of “I’s”. This is 
unproblematic in Searle’s account of social institutions, but it creates a problem for the Searlian 
account of social groups. For Searle-1 implies that prior to the existence of any given social 
group G1, another social group G2 must have existed to collectively recognise G1. But for G2 
to exist, another social group G3 must have already existed to collectively recognise G2. But 
G3 presupposes another social group G4, etc. Thus, Searle’s account of social groups seems to 
imply an infinite regress. 
Perhaps Searle would argue that the collective that collectively recognises the Status Function 
Declaration that constructs a given social group G1 can be G1 itself. That is, groups can 
bootstrap themselves into existence – they collectively recognise themselves, and in so doing, 
construct themselves. It is unnecessary, therefore, to have a distinct social group G2 to construct 
G1, and so, the account does not imply an infinite regress. 
But preventing the infinite regress in this way comes at a cost. The advantage spoken about 
earlier that Searle-1 holds over Gilbert’s plural subject theory, has been lost. For the advantage 
of Searle’s account over Gilbert’s account was that on Searle’s account, but not on Gilbert’s, 
individuals outside of the group can secure the status of group members as members. This 
resolves problems for the de re understanding of plural subject theory. But on this refined 
understanding of Searle-1, only the individuals inside the group are responsible for constructing 
the group. And now, notice that Searle-1 faces the same problem as the Correct Thought 
version of plural subject theory. On Searle-1, M1…Mn are a social group g “if there is collective 
recognition that they count as g…”. Now, either we define “they” in a de dicto or in a de re 
fashion. If we understand “they” in a de dicto sense, then we again face the problem of finding 
a description of the group members that is not circular (i.e. is something other than “the other 
members of the group”), and picks out all and only the other members of the group – an 
extremely difficult task, I argued. Moreover, if we define “they” in a de re fashion, then the 
account fails to characterise large social groups, since the members of a large group usually do 
not know who all the other members are. 
Second, Searle’s account of social institutions has come under fire for its anthropocentricism 
(see, e.g., Wilson, 2007). On Searle’s account, humans are capable of constructing social 
institutions because they are capable of collectively assigning status functions to sets of 
individualistic phenomena. But to do this, humans require a sophisticated language, capable of 
representing X as Y. That is, humans must possess a language sophisticated enough to represent 
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individualistic phenomena as having functions imposed by agents, rather than functions 
inherent in those objects (Searle, 2010, pp. ch. 4, 109). On this account, therefore, non-human 
animals do not have social institutions, since they lack language sophisticated enough to assign 
status functions to individualistic phenomena. Critics like Wilson argue, however, that this is 
an impoverished understanding of non-human animal behaviour, and ignores evidence of the 
rich and complex social lives of these animals. 
Whatever the force of this objection to Searle’s account of social institutions, it seems we might 
construct a stronger, parallel objection to Searle-1 (Searle’s account of social groups). For, just 
as Searle’s account of social institutions requires sophisticated language in the creation of 
institutions, Searle’s account of social groups requires sophisticated language in the 
construction of social groups. And therefore, just as Searle’s account of institutions precludes 
the existence of non-human animal institutions, so too does Searle-1 preclude the possibility of 
non-human animal social groups. But while it is somewhat controversial whether non-human 
animal institutions exist, it seems far less controversial to claim that non-human animal social 
groups exist. Consider gorillas, chimps, dolphins and meerkats, who form extremely well-
delineated groups, with well-defined hierarchies, repetitive social practises (such as grooming), 
collective hunting strategies, and sophisticated warning signals passed among group members 
(see Wilson, 2007). Indeed, Searle is clear that non-human animals are capable of collective 
intentionality, and therefore, capable of conceiving of an irreducible “we” (Searle, 1995, pp. 
37-38; 2007, p. 13). It seems odd to think that a collection of individuals is capable of collective 
intentionality without that collective being a social group. Thus, Searle-1 is overly exclusive, 
since it fails to characterise non-human social groups. 
Searle might respond by arguing that even if his account fails to characterise non-human social 
groups, it may still characterise human social groups correctly. But this response misses the 
significance of the objection: if animal groups exist, then it is not the case that social groups 
(human or non-human) are constructed through the imposition of a status function, since, as 
Searle argues, animals do not impose status functions. But Searle’s notion of a Status Function 
Declaration is central to his account of social institutions and social reality generally, and 
therefore, presumably, central to his account of social groups. And therefore, without the notion 
of a status function, it is unclear what is left of Searle’s account of social groups, if there is 
anything left at all. 
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Maybe Searle would argue that non-human social groups are categorically distinct from human 
social groups. Human social groups always involve status function imposition, while animal 
groups do not. It is unclear, however, that human groups do always involve status function 
imposition. Do young children who are members of a social group (such as a family, or a play-
group) impose status functions on the individual members? It seems not (see Rakoczy & 
Tomasello, 2007). Searle could argue that children are a-prototypical group members, but, 
again, this misses the point. For if our first and simplest social groups while we are growing up 
are constructed without Status Function Declarations, and if non-human social groups are 
constructed in a similar fashion, then this suggests that the ontogeny of, or evolutionary basis 
for, social group construction is not based in Social Function Declarations. And if this is the 
case, this suggests that Social Function Declarations are accidental to, rather than constitutive 
of, social groups. And therefore, Social Function Declarations will not assist us in arriving at a 
solution to Q1. 
B.3.c.iv. Conclusion 
Thus far I have argued that adapting Searle’s account of social institutions to form a Searlian 
account of social groups faces two problems. First, the account implies an infinite regress, since 
it requires a pre-existing social group G1 to construct a distinct social group G2. But G2 requires 
a pre-existing social group G3, etc. This regress can be avoided only at the cost of a refinement 
to the account that reintroduces the objections presented to the Correct Thought version of 
Gilbert’s plural subject theory. And second, the account incorrectly precludes the possibility of 
non-human social groups, since the account relies on the imposition of status functions, a 
capacity which animals lack. 
These two problems apply specifically to Searle’s account of social groups, and not to Searle’s 
account of social institutions. However, in the next section, I provide a generic objection to 
Subjectivism. This objection applies to Gilbert’s plural subject theory, as well as to both 
Searlian accounts of social institutions and social groups. 
B.4. SUBJECTIVISM AND THE DARK CITY 
I have considered Subjectivist accounts provided by Sartre, Gilbert and Searle, and argued that 
none of these positions provide a convincing account of social groups better than an S-3 type 
account. Now of course there may be other Subjectivist accounts of which I am unaware, or 
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which have not yet been constructed, and one of these accounts may, the Subjectivist could 
argue, provide an adequate solution to Q1. Thus, I turn now to providing an argument for the 
claim that in principle no Subjectivist account could provide an adequate solution to Q1. 
B.4.a. The counterexample 
Gilbert’s account holds that members’ beliefs and commitments form the principle of unity for 
the group, while Searle’s account claims that collective recognition of Status Function 
Declarations provides the principle of unity for institutions. The counterexample I wish to 
consider presents a case in which all the mental states required by Gilbert and Searle are present, 
but the relevant social phenomena (social groups and institutions) are not. That is, the 
counterexample seeks to show that mental states alone are insufficient to provide the principle 
of unity for social groups and institutions. 
Imagine a world like that depicted in the science fiction film, Dark City (Proyas, 1998). Every 
night while the occupants of the Dark City (henceforth “Dark Denizens”) sleep, super-powerful 
aliens (the “Strangers”) manipulate the environment of the Dark Denizens into a new 
configuration, and implant into the denizens memories and beliefs to match that environment. 
For example, Murdoch goes to sleep believing he is married to a beautiful woman named 
Emma, and has two children with her. He has apparently long-term memories of their shared 
past, and believes they are a family. Murdoch wakes the following morning in a different bed, 
none-the-wiser, believing (and apparently remembering) he has never had a wife or children. 
Now, notice that: 
P1: If Subjectivism is correct, when Murdoch falls asleep, Murdoch is a member of 
this family, and he is married to Emma.  
For it seems that Murdoch and his “family” possess all the mental states that Gilbert and Searle 
require. Murdoch, Emma and the two children all believe that they together comprise a plural 
subject, they (we can suppose) are each jointly committed to being members of the family. 
Moreover, Murdoch and Emma collectively recognise themselves (and are collectively 
recognised by a sufficient number of the other denizens of the Dark City) as married. 
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But, intuition suggests that since they have only known each other for twenty-four hours:87 
P2: Murdoch, Emma and the children fail to comprise a family; and Murdoch is not 
married to Emma. 
That is, intuition suggests that the Dark Denizens are deluded about their social situation, albeit 
that they share a common delusion. But such a shared delusion is impossible on Subjectivist 
accounts. And hence, Subjectivism is (or at least the two best-known Subjectivist accounts are) 
incorrect. 
How might the Subjectivist respond? The most likely response would be to bite the bullet (i.e. 
deny P2), and argue that Murdoch and Emma are married, and that Murdoch, Emma and the 
children do comprise a family. I consider this response now, followed by a discussion of the 
denial of P1. Finally, I consider methodological objections to the counterexample, specifically 
objections to my use of intuitions and thought experiments, as well as the accusation that I am 
using straw-men versions of Gilbert and Searle’s accounts by characterising them as purely 
Subjectivist. 
B.4.b. Biting the bullet – denying P2 
Consider Murdoch and his “family”. On the day that the Strangers implant in them the belief 
that they together comprise a family, they interact just as a typical family does. Murdoch takes 
the children to school like he “always” does (even though he never has before), and Emma 
helps them with their homework. The family has its “usual” dinner at 18:30, with Murdoch and 
Emma sitting in their “usual” places at the table. After Murdoch reads to his smallest child what 
they both “remember” to be the boy’s favourite story, Murdoch and Emma stay up late and 
reminisce about their “remembered” (but non-existent) honeymoon in Paris, and debate when 
they might travel “again” to Europe. The Subjectivist might therefore point out that since 
Murdoch, Emma and the children believe that they are a family, and since they act just like any 
family would, they are a family. 
There are two problems with this line of reasoning, however. First, it is debatable whether 
Murdoch and the others do in fact act just as a typical family would, for a typical family would 
                                                 
87 Assume that this is not the first time that the Strangers have manipulated the Dark Denizens. That is, this is not 
the first iteration of the 24 hour manipulation cycle – this is iteration n, where n>=2. 
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sustain these family-type actions for far longer than twenty-four hours. The typical family is a 
long-standing social group, while the aggregate comprised by Murdoch and the others is not. 
Thus, in at least one important sense, Murdoch and the others do not act like a typical family 
would act. Second, the notion of “acting like a typical family does” is not available to the 
Subjectivist, for this notion refers to a pattern of behaviour. And patterns of behaviour are the 
domain of Objectivists, since patterns of behaviour are observable from the point of view of an 
external observer. 
Perhaps the Subjectivist would be unconvinced. She might argue that 24 hours is sufficient to 
establish patterns of behaviour indicative of a family. Moreover, she could argue that citing 
patterns of behaviour is legitimate for a Subjectivist, not because patterns of behaviour 
determine group-ness (as on Objectivist accounts), but rather, because group members may 
justify their belief that they are members of a group by citing patterns of behaviour that they 
themselves observe. 
In objecting to the Subjectivist’s ability to cite patterns of behaviour in establishing Murdoch, 
Emma and the others as a family, and to further bolster the intuition that Murdoch and Emma 
do not comprise a family, we might again refine the case. In the film, the Strangers manipulate 
the Dark Denizens such that the denizens maintain their beliefs about their group membership 
for 24 hours. We can, however, modify the case so that the Strangers shift the environment and 
mental states of Dark Denizens every hour, or (why not?) every 60 seconds. Thus, every 60 
seconds Dark Denizens find themselves within a unique social configuration, and have beliefs 
and memories that match that configuration perfectly. One minute Murdoch is making love to 
his “wife” Emma; the next he believes he is a lonely bachelor; and the following he believes he 
is in a passionate gay relationship. Although, the lives of the Dark Denizens appear chaotic or 
haphazard from the perspective of an external observer, the transitions are entirely seamless 
from the perspective of the Dark Denizens themselves. Thus, the Subjectivist is committed to 
the view that one minute Murdoch is married to Emma, the next minute he is single, and the 
next he is in a gay relationship. But this seems like an odd position to hold. 
The issue here, it seems, is that a constitutive element of marriage and family is that these 
phenomena have a history (call this the historical intuition). The Subjectivist may nevertheless 
stick to her position: even in the sixty-second case, Murdoch belongs to a family, and is married 
to Emma. That is, if Subjectivism contradicts the historical intuition, then so much the worse 
for the historical intuition. However, beyond the mounting implausibility of any position that 
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bites too many bullets, there is a real danger for a Subjectivist who denies folk-sociological 
intuitions about social phenomena. For recall that Subjectivism implies that folk beliefs about 
social phenomena are constitutive of those phenomena. Thus, if it can be shown that 
Subjectivist accounts of social phenomena contradict common-sense intuitions, or beliefs, 
concerning the nature of social phenomena, then Subjectivism implies a contradiction. That is, 
if Subjectivism is correct, then social groups satisfy the historical intuition given that this is a 
common-sense intuition. But Subjectivist accounts deny the historical intuition, and so, 
Subjectivism implies that the historical intuition is both true and false. In this way, denying too 
many folk-sociological intuitions risks a reductio ad absurdum. 
Thus, rather than denying the historical intuition, perhaps the Subjectivist could argue that we 
should understand the historical intuition to assert not that the actual history of a group is 
(partly) constitutive of its nature, but rather, that the events believed to form the history of a 
group are (partly) constitutive of its nature. In the Dark City case, the individuals involved 
believe that there is a rich, full history to their social interactions. Murdoch and Emma believe 
they went to Paris, raised their children, etc., and this is sufficient to construct the family. Once 
we understand this, the Subjectivist argues, we would see that Murdoch and Emma are married, 
and have a family, even though it is only for 60 seconds. 
Let Actual History be the claim that we should understand the historical intuition in terms of 
the actual history of the social phenomena involved. And let Believed History be the claim 
that the historical intuition should be understood in terms of history collectively believed to 
apply to the social phenomena involved. Then the problem with this response is that there are 
two reasons why Actual History is a better interpretation of the historical intuition than is 
Believed History.  
First, it seems that we can construct cases which illustrate that the actual history of a group, 
even if it is forgotten, is relevant to the nature of that group. Suppose, for example, that the 
Nazis had won WWII. Over time (say, over many generations), the Nazi party, as well as the 
rest of the world, forget the atrocities committed by the group in the past – perhaps the Nazis 
manipulate history syllabuses in schools, newspapers, etc. Intuition suggests that the crimes 
committed by the Nazi party in the past are at least partly constitutive of this future instantiation 
of the party, even though nobody remembers these atrocities. That is, part of what the future 
Nazi party is, is that it committed these past atrocities. And Actual History, but not Believed 
History, captures this intuition. 
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Second, suppose we concede that the Subjectivist is correct about the case, and thus concede 
that Murdoch and Emma are married for 60 seconds. Now, imagine another possible world in 
which Murdoch and the rest of the Dark Denizens are not manipulated by Strangers. In this 
world (DC*), Murdoch* and Emma* have veridical memories of their shared past – they really 
did go to Paris, they really do have children together, etc. The problem is that it seems 
implausible to claim that the marriage between Murdoch and Emma in the Dark City is identical 
in nature to the marriage and family of Murdoch* and Emma* in DC*. For, after all, Murdoch* 
and Emma* have known each other for decades and built a family together, while Murdoch and 
Emma have known each other for only 60 seconds. So, even if Murdoch and Emma are married, 
this does not seem to be just the same sort of marriage as the marriage between Murdoch* and 
Emma*. And Believed History cannot explain this, while Actual History can. 
B.4.c. Denying that Subjectivism implies dark groups and institutions – denying P1 
B.4.c.i. Searle 
Given the difficulty associated with biting the bullet on the Dark City case (i.e. denying P2), 
how might the Subjectivist deny that Subjectivism implies that Dark Denizens have social 
groups and institutions (i.e. deny P1)?88 For one, Searle could argue that it is not the case that 
his constructionist account implies that the Dark Denizens have social groups and institutions. 
Recall that Searle argues that social institutions may be constructed from Standing Status 
Function Declarations: 
We make it the case by Declaration that for any x that satisfies a certain set of conditions p, x has 
the status Y and performs the function F in C. (2010, p. 99) 
The Dark Denizens, Searle could argue, do not fulfil p. For example, we can suppose that the p 
for marriage includes the requirement that the two parties are married by a duly authorised 
judge, ship’s captain, or clergyman. But Murdoch and Emma, although they believe they were 
so married, were not. Therefore, Murdoch and Emma are not married. 
                                                 
88 Of course, the Dark Denizens might form social groups during the 24 hours (less likely in 60 seconds) – maybe 
during the 24 hours, a walking group could form. But the objection claims that many of the social groups and 
institutions that the Dark Denizens believe exist, do not. For example, the marriages and families that the Dark 
Denizens believe exist, do not. 
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There are two possible objections to this Searlian response, however. First, we should 
distinguish between legal marriage, and common-law marriage. While it is necessary for the 
parties involved to have been married by a duly authorised judge on a legal understanding of 
marriage, it is not necessary under a common-law understanding of marriage. For a common-
law marriage is one in which the parties involved are understood to be married by virtue of 
common agreement and cohabitation (and all the relevant parties collectively agree that 
Murdoch and Emma are married in this sense). I should stipulate, therefore, that I am interested 
here in common-law marriage, rather than in legal marriage, since the counterexample relies 
upon the claim that Subjectivism affirms that social institutions exist in the Dark City, rather 
than that legal entities exist in the Dark city.  
Perhaps Searle would argue that Murdoch and Emma’s “marriage” fails to satisfy even the p 
associated with common-law marriage, since Murdoch and Emma have only cohabited for 24 
hours (on the original example, and 60 seconds on the refined counterexample). Presumably, 
the p for common-law marriage would involve cohabiting for far more than a day. 
But this line of reasoning is problematic for a Subjectivist. Consider that on this response, the 
collective recognition that Murdoch and Emma have cohabited for a sufficient period of time 
is less important for unifying their marriage than is the actual time they have cohabited. That 
is, the mental states of the individuals involved do not make the marriage. Instead, observable 
patterns of behaviour (cohabitation) makes the marriage; but this is an Objectivist position. The 
problem, therefore, is that this response threatens to collapse Searle’s account into an 
Objectivist account (or at least into a hybrid account). 
Second, even if Murdoch and Emma’s situation fails to satisfy the p associated with the social 
institution of marriage, their marriage might still be constituted through either a collectively 
recognised Token Status Function Declaration or Constitutive Rule. And Searle would not want 
to eliminate Token Status Function Declarations and Constitutive Rules as mechanisms for 
constructing institutional facts, thereby relying exclusively on Standing Status Function 
Declarations as the mechanism for constructing institutional facts. For this strategy raises the 
difficulty that many institutional facts (specifically, uncodified social institutions) are not 
constructed by means of a Standing Status Function Declaration. If I draw a line in the sand 
between you and me, declare that I count that as a border between us, and you agree to this 
declaration, then the line in the sand is a border. But that border was not constructed by means 
of a Standing Status Function Declaration: it was constructed by means of a Constitutive Rule 
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of the form X counts as Y in C, where X is the line, Y is a border, and C is our circumstance. 
Thus, eliminating Token Status Function Declarations and Constitutive Rules as legitimate 
mechanisms for constructing institutional facts would limit Searle’s account to characterising a 
select few social institutions, thereby rendering it an S-5 type account. 
Perhaps Searle would object by arguing that Constitutive Rules could not create a marriage 
between Murdoch and Emma, since the X term in their marriage has no referent. That is, the 
Constitutive Rule that the Dark Denizens would use to construct the marriage would be 
something like, “The years of cohabitation, and the intertwining of their financial, personal and 
emotional lives for such a long period of time [X], count as a marriage between Murdoch and 
Emma [Y], in the Dark City [C]”. Their lives haven’t been so intertwined, since they have only 
known each other for 24 hours (or 60 seconds). And if the X term is not realised, then the 
Constitutive Rule can’t be successful in constructing the relevant social phenomenon. 
There are two reasons why this response fails, however. First, again, if Searle insists that X be 
realised (rather than merely collectively recognised as realised), then he insists on an Objectivist 
principle of unity. And second, even if the Dark Denizens cannot construct the marriage 
between Murdoch and Emma using a Constitutive Rule because the X term is not realised, they 
could nevertheless construct the marriage using a Token Status Function Declaration, since 
Token Status Function Declarations need not have an X term. 
B.4.c.ii. Gilbert 
Perhaps Gilbert’s account fares better. On Joint Commitment, Murdoch, Emma and the 
children belong to a family only if they express their willingness to be members of a plural 
subject, and this expression is open*. But Gilbert could argue that Murdoch, Emma and the 
children would fail to express their readiness to be members of a plural subject within the very 
brief period of time available to them (24 hours in the original case, and 60 seconds in the 
refined case). In those 60 seconds, Murdoch does not proclaim his role as father or husband, 
for example. 
Gilbert, however, is clear that the expression of willingness among group members need not be 
explicit, for she is at pains to distinguish her account from agreement-based accounts of 
collective action (2006b, p. 118), which do require explicit expressions of willingness. Instead, 
according to Gilbert, any expression will do no matter how subtle, so long as the smooth 
reasoner counterparts of the individuals involved would infer from this expression that the 
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individual is willing to be a member of the plural subject. Now, consider the 60 seconds that 
Murdoch, Emma and the children experience. Murdoch wakes besides Emma, kisses her 
forehead, and tells her he will see her after work. Emma asks, without turning over, whether he 
will take the children to school – she wants to sleep in today. Murdoch reluctantly agrees. The 
children are finishing up breakfast downstairs, packing their lunch. They call up to Murdoch to 
say they’re ready to leave. Murdoch, Emma and the children have all, it seems, expressed their 
willingness to be members of a plural subject (even if they have not explicitly stated that they 
are members of the same family). 
Gilbert might deny, however, that their expressions of willingness to be members of a plural 
subject are open*. Recall that on Gilbert’s account of openness*, an individual’s expression of 
willingness is open* only if the smooth reasoner counterparts of the other group members know 
about this expression of willingness. But, Gilbert could argue, the smooth reasoner counterparts 
of Emma and the children would be aware of the Strangers’ deceptive activities, and infer that 
these activities preclude the possibility of Murdoch expressing willingness to be part of the 
group. That is, the smooth-reasoning counterparts of Emma and the children would understand 
that expressing willingness to be part of a group requires that one has sufficient background 
information about that group, and that since Murdoch lacks this information, Murdoch fails to 
express his willingness to be part of the plural subject. 
The difficulty with this response is that it is not clear that the smooth-reasoning counterparts of 
Dark Denizens would be capable of becoming aware of the Strangers’ activities. In the film 
Murdoch does become so aware. But we can imagine that the Strangers are better at hiding their 
activities than they are in the movie: we can imagine that the transitions from day to day (or 
minute to minute, in the refined case), are so seamlessly performed that not even the most 
skilled smooth reasoner would be capable of inferring the existence of the Strangers. 
Perhaps Gilbert could refine her account of the smooth reasoner, so that smooth reasoners are 
not just perfectly rational, but omniscient. In this case, the smooth reasoners would know what 
is afoot in the Dark City. But this refinement of the account is suspiciously Objectivist, for the 
omniscient observer is the perspective from which the Objectivist judges whether or not a 
collection of individualistic phenomena are a social phenomenon. And, on this refined account 
of the smooth reasoner, it is precisely this omniscient perspective that (partly) determines 
whether or not a collection of individuals is a social phenomenon. The account is therefore 
Objectivist, or at least a hybrid account. 
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B.4.c.iii. Refinements to Subjectivism 
The Subjectivist may utilise a different strategy to argue that Subjectivism need not imply that 
the Dark Denizens have social groups. The Subjectivist might point out that the reason why 
Murdoch, Emma and the children do not comprise a family is that their membership-beliefs 
have not been sustained over time. Yet, we think that family-membership beliefs (or beliefs of 
the form “I am a member of family X”) must be sustained over time to be true. Thus, if our 
Subjectivist account includes a requirement that the mental states that constitute social groups 
must be sustained, we can avoid the Dark City counterexample, since the mental states of the 
Dark Denizens expire after twenty-four hours (or sixty seconds, in the refined case). 
Unfortunately for the Subjectivist, avoiding the counterexample in this way comes at a cost, for 
some social groups are formed from sudden, unsustained mental states. Consider the plane full 
of strangers who are transformed from a mere aggregate to a social group in the course of a few 
minutes by working together to thwart hijackers who have overtaken their plane; or two 
strangers who run into a burning house together, driven by an unspoken joint commitment to 
save a screaming child they see in an upstairs window. Thus, an account that insists that the 
mental states cited are sustained, delimits the account to characterising only those types of 
social groups that are typically built upon sustained mental states, such as families. However, 
under special circumstances, even group membership to a family might be formed upon an 
unsustained mental state. Consider the willing and hopeful adopted child, who arrives “home” 
to be told she is “part of the family now”. She suddenly develops the belief that she is a member 
of the family, and we can suppose, so do her adoptive parents. She is, it seems, a member of 
the family, even though that belief (and that membership) has no history, and indeed, may end 
shortly afterwards. Thus, at best, a Subjectivist account that insists upon sustained mental states 
as constitutive of social groups characterises only prototypical cases of some types of social 
groups, and is therefore an S-4 type account. 
The Subjectivist might attempt a different tack, and argue that Subjectivism is not committed 
to the position that the Dark Denizens have social groups, since their beliefs are aberrantly 
formed. That is, the Subjectivist could qualify his account such that only membership beliefs 
caused in the right way can constitute social groups. Presumably, alien implantation is not a 
suitable source or cause of membership-beliefs.  
Like the previous approach, this refinement is too strong, for it excludes certain legitimate cases 
of social groups. Suppose that the Strangers decide to cease their experimentation, and leave 
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the configuration of the Dark City as it is when Murdoch and Emma believe they are married 
with children. Thus, the Strangers leave Murdoch and Emma to raise “their” children, and grow 
old together as “husband and wife”. It seems that after some period of time (months, or perhaps 
years of interacting and relating as families do), our intuitions concerning the case would shift: 
now Murdoch, Emma and the children do comprise a social group. Yet their beliefs are 
nevertheless caused, formed, or sourced aberrantly: their membership-beliefs were implanted 
by the Strangers. 
The Subjectivist might respond by pointing out that over time the family’s membership beliefs 
are reinforced by their continued interactions. That is, over time, their membership beliefs are 
maintained by a non-aberrant, suitable source (their family-like interactions). Thus, the 
cessation-of-experimentation refinement of the case does not pose a problem for Subjectivism 
if we further qualify that the membership-beliefs that constitute social groups must be either 
formed or maintained by a suitable source.  
This response raises a difficult question: just what sort of interactions among individuals 
constitutes a suitable source for the membership-beliefs of group members? To answer this 
question, we would need to specify those sorts of interactions among individuals that are 
sufficient for group membership. But the problem of specifying these interactions just is the 
individual-individual problem. Thus, on this response, Subjectivist accounts fail to provide a 
solution to the individual-individual. 
B.4.d. Methodological concerns 
The Subjectivist might attempt two further, methodological, objections to the Dark City 
counterexample. First, the objector could argue that it is illegitimate to use intuition as a method 
of assessing solutions to the individual-individual problem in the context of bizarre thought 
experiments like the Dark City case. Subjectivism, the objector could argue, gives us an account 
of social phenomena in this world, not in distant possible worlds. So intuitions we have 
concerning these worlds are irrelevant – and therefore should not be used as assessment tools 
against Subjectivism. 
This, however, is a very short-sighted approach to Folk Sociological intuitions. For the 
objection misses the point of the counterexample: we are less interested in whether or not 
Murdoch and Emma are married than we are interested in what our intuitions about their 
marriage (or lack thereof) suggest about marriages generally – i.e. marriages in our world. What 
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the counterexample seeks to show is that social phenomena like marriage and family are 
historical in nature. Subjectivism struggles to account for this in an intuitive way – while 
Objectivism lacks this struggle. And this is true, whether we consider the Dark City or our 
world. The Dark City case merely highlights the importance of the role of the historical intuition 
in our Folk Sociological concepts of certain social phenomena in this world. 
Second, Gilbert and Searle might argue that the purely Subjectivist versions of their accounts 
that I have presented here are straw men. For their accounts to be represented fully, they should 
be understood as hybrid accounts, thereby avoiding the counterexample in the ways discussed 
previously. 
There are two points to note here. First, providing a hybrid reading of Searle’s account would 
be unfaithful to his account. Consider, for example, that he claims that status functions are never 
discovered, and always created by agents (1995, pp. 123-124). But if social phenomena were 
characterised in an Objectivist fashion, at least in part, then Status Functions would be 
discoverable, or at least discoverable in part. This is not something that Searle permits. 
Moreover, in his later work, Searle is explicit that it is irrelevant for the construction of social 
phenomena whether the beliefs of the constructors are false. All that matters is that they have 
the beliefs, and that they are collectively recognised as true: 
The acceptance of an institutional fact, or indeed, of a whole system of status functions, may be 
based on false beliefs. From the point of institutional analysis, it does not matter whether the beliefs 
are true or false. It only matters whether the people do in fact collectively recognize or accept the 
system of status functions. (2010, p. 119) 
This strongly suggests a purely Subjectivist, rather than a hybrid, reading of Searle’s account. 
Second, it is an interesting question whether mental states alone are sufficient to construct social 
phenomena. Ultimately, the Dark City counterexample asks the question: could we be wrong 
in our collective belief that that a certain social phenomenon exists? This is an important 
question, and I have sought to object to a negative answer, through objecting to Gilbert and 
Searle’s accounts. So I have attempted to provide the strongest versions of these accounts that 
will provide a negative answer to the question, even if this discussion has been unfaithful to 
Gilbert or Searle’s work (although I do not think that it has), since scholarship is not my primary 
focus here. My primary fidelity is to arguing that a negative answer to the question is 
implausible, rather than to the details of the Gilbertain and Searlian accounts. In section B.5. 
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Hybrid solutions to Q1 (p. 109), I discuss whether we might append an Objectivist element to 
the account, to arrive at a successful hybrid solution to the individual-individual problem. 
B.4.e. Conclusion 
I presented two Subjectivist accounts that attempt to provide sufficient conditions for social 
phenomena: Gilbert’s plural subject theory of social groups, and Searle’s constructionist 
account of social institutions. Both accounts, I argued, face the Dark City counterexample, in 
which all the mental states specified by the accounts are present, but the social groups and 
institutions implied by the accounts are not. I then considered three types of responses the 
Subjectivist might offer. First, I considered ways that one might bite the bullet – i.e. argue that 
the groups and institutions implied by the accounts do exist in the Dark City. Second, I 
considered ways that Gilbert and Searle might deny that their accounts are committed to the 
existence of these social phenomena in the Dark City. And third, I considered objections to the 
methodology of the counterexample. I argued, however, that none of these three types of 
responses are successful. 
B.5. HYBRID SOLUTIONS TO Q1 
Q1 is the problem of specifying the constitutive relations among group members sufficient to 
unify them into a group. I considered Objectivist and Subjectivist solutions to this problem. 
Objectivist accounts cite features other than the reflexive mental states of the members of a 
group when specifying the relations that occur among those members – that is, patterns of 
behaviour observable to individuals outside of the group. By contrast, Subjectivist accounts 
claim that the reflexive mental states of group members are essential (or at least sufficient) to 
specify intra-group relations.  
I then argued that none of the Objectivist or Subjectivist solutions to Q1 present in the literature 
are convincing. Moreover, there are reasons why we should think that neither Objectivism nor 
Subjectivism can, in principle, provide an adequate solution to Q1. Objectivists cannot 
adequately account for the intuition that for any given social group, there may be a mere 
aggregate indistinguishable from the social group by an external observer; and Subjectivists 
cannot adequately account for the intuition that it is possible for there to be collectively accepted 
membership-beliefs that are nevertheless false, as in the Dark City case. 
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Tuomela and Miller seem to recognise this problem. Tuomela (2007, p. 18) appends to the 
teleological account (i.e. the best Objectivist account) a Subjectivist requirement, namely that 
the members “must believe (or be disposed to believe) that they are members of the group 
(under some description of membership) and also that the other group members (noncircularly 
characterised) belong to the group.” Miller (2001, p. 59) adds a second, Subjectivist, 
qualification to the account, namely, that a shared telos must be “open” to all members of the 
group. These two Subjectivist additions to the account are together equivalent to the conditions 
laid out in Gilbert’s Correct Thought version of her plural subject theory. Effectively, then, 
Tuomela and Miller suggest combining the teleological account with Gilbert’s Correct 
Thought, to create a hybrid Objectivist-Subjectivist account. 
This is a clever amalgam, since Correct Thought provides a way to avoid the objection from 
indistinguishability associated with Objectivism, and the teleological account avoids the Dark 
City counterexample faced by Subjectivism. The individuals in the mere aggregate 
indistinguishable from the social group will lack the mutual beliefs about group membership 
required by Correct Thought. On the other hand, collectives, like Dark Denizens, that operate 
on false beliefs will lack the history of (patterns of) joint action towards a common end that the 
teleological account requires for group membership. 
Moreover, the teleological account and Correct Thought also seem to complement each other 
more intricately. The best version of the teleological account, namely, the broad teleological 
account, is problematic because it incorrectly agglomerates distinct social groups with the same 
broad telos, and therefore fails to fulfil the Individuation criterion. It is plausible, however, that 
the teleological account goes some way towards satisfying the Groupness criterion – an 
individual who works towards a common end with other individuals is likely part of a social 
group (even if the teleological account doesn’t tell us just which group). By contrast, the best 
version of Correct Thought, i.e. the de re version, struggles to account for the anonymity in 
large groups – the members do not know about each other individually. The best solution to the 
anonymity problem is the dispositional belief version of the de re account, which holds that the 
condition for group membership is that the members of the group are disposed, under the right 
conditions, to believe they together form a plural subject. The dispositional belief account 
satisfies the Individuation criterion, since presumably the members of the group are disposed 
to the de re belief that only the other members of the group are members of the group. However, 
the dispositional belief account fails to satisfy the Groupness criterion, since collections of 
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individuals who never interact may nevertheless fulfil the conditions laid out by the 
dispositional account. 
Thus, the teleological account fulfils Groupness but fails Individuation, while Correct 
Thought fails Groupness but fulfils Individuation. So amalgamating the two accounts seems 
promising, since the two accounts seem to resolve the other’s failing. It is unclear, however, 
exactly how the hybrid account should be formulated as a solution to Q1. The following, I think, 
are the four most prima facie plausible formulations of the hybrid account (not in any particular 
order). Let C be the claim individuals M1…Mn relate in such a way that they comprise a social 
group, let T be the claim that M1…Mn work towards a common telos, and let W be the claim 
that each of M1…Mn correctly thinks of himself and the others, taken together, as “us*” or 
“we*”, as on Correct Thought. Then: 
Conjunctive Account: (T & W)  C 
Disjunctive Account: (T v W)  C 
First Complete89 Account: (T  C) & (C  W) 
Second Complete Account: (W  C) & (C  T) 
Now, consider the various versions of the teleological account and plural subject theory that 
might participate as children in a hybrid account: 
  
                                                 
89 These accounts are labelled “complete” because they provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for group 
membership. 
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
112 
Table 1: Solutions to the individual-individual problem 
Account 
Satisfies 
Individuation 
Satisfies 
Groupness 
Other 
objections 
Analytic telos    
Narrow telos    
Broad telos    
Plural subject theory – 
Joint Commitment 
   
Plural subject theory – 
De dicto version of Correct Thought 
   
Plural subject theory – 
De re version of Correct Thought 
   
Note the following. First, if an account fails to satisfy Individuation, then it is too weak, for it 
is overly inclusive – i.e. it counts non-members as group members. On the other hand, if an 
account fails to satisfy Groupness, then it is too strong, since it is overly exclusive – that is, the 
account fails to characterise certain group members as members. Second, I take it that the 
accounts that suffer from “other objections” are excluded as candidates for hybridisation. This 
leaves the narrow and broad teleological accounts, and the de re version of Correct Thought. 
Thus, there are two candidate hybrid accounts: Narrow de re (the narrow teleological account 
combined with the de re account of Correct Thought) and Broad de re (the broad teleological 
account combined with the de re account of Correct Thought). Given these notes, consider 
the four methods for combining the teleological and plural subject accounts. 
First, the Conjunctive Account has sufficiency criteria at least as stringent as the stronger of 
its children accounts. That is, the account is at least as strong as its strongest child account. But 
both Narrow de re and Broad de re contain the de re version of Correct Thought, which is too 
strong. And therefore, a Conjunctive Account is too strong (i.e. it fails to fulfil Groupness). 
To illustrate, suppose we hold, as Tuomela (2007, p. 18) and Miller (2001, p. 59) seem to, that 
the correct solution to the individual-individual problem is the Conjunctive version of Narrow 
de re  (see footnote 59). I argued previously that the de re version of Correct Thought is too 
strong because it cannot characterise large groups, since many large groups (like the ANCYL) 
possess anonymity among group members. But appending the teleological account as an 
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additional (conjunctive) requirement for group membership will not resolve this problem. On 
Tuomela and Miller’s Conjunctive Account, a member of a group must both (i) believe that 
he together with the other members comprise a plural subject, AND (ii) work towards the 
common telos of the group. But, the objection to Correct Thought shows (if sound) that certain 
legitimate members fail to fulfil (i). Specifying that these members should also fulfil (ii) does 
nothing to alter the fact that they fail to fulfil (i). 
Second, the Disjunctive Accounts will be at least as weak as the weaker of its children. Thus, 
if either of the children fails to satisfy Individuation, then the Disjunctive Account will also 
fail to satisfy Individuation. This rules out Broad de re as an option, since the broad teleological 
account fails to satisfy Individuation, leaving only Narrow de re as an option. Now, since both 
the children accounts of Narrow de re fail to satisfy Groupness, the Disjunctive Account will 
succeed in satisfying Groupness only if each child fails Groupness in a way that the other does 
not. That is, child account A1 should include those members of a social group g that child 
account A2 does not, and A2 should include those members of g that A1 does not. 
Unfortunately, however, there are instances in which it is not the case that the de re version of 
Correct Thought includes those group members that the narrow teleological account fails to 
include. 
Recall that the de re version of Correct Thought fails to satisfy Groupness because it fails to 
include group members in large groups who do not know about one another individually. On 
the other hand, the narrow teleological account fails to include ignorant and dissident group 
members as members, since these members do not work towards the common telos of the group. 
But, ignorant group members may be non-central group members in a large group – indeed, 
they typically are non-central members. That is, ignorant members are typically members that 
not all the other members know individually. And although Malcolm X (the dissident group 
member discussed in objection to the narrow teleological account) was a central member of the 
group, and therefore known to all the other members of the group, we needn’t use him as our 
example. Some group members are non-central, but nevertheless dissident. We can imagine, 
for example, that a non-central member of the OAAU worked together with Malcolm X to alter 
the group’s goals. This non-central member, we can assume, was unknown by many other 
members of the group. Thus, these ignorant and dissident group members will satisfy neither 
the conditions specified by the de re version of Correct Thought, nor the conditions specified 
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by the narrow teleological account. And therefore Narrow de re cannot account for ignorant or 
dissident group members. 
Third, the First Complete Account will be even worse than Gilbert’s account at satisfying 
Groupness – i.e. it is even stronger than the de re version of Correct Thought, which is itself 
too strong. This is because the First Complete Account implies that the conditions specified 
by Correct Thought are necessary for group membership, while Gilbert’s original account 
holds merely that the conditions specified by Correct Thought are sufficient for group 
membership. That is, for any given social group g, let <ExcludedGilbert> be the set of legitimate 
members of g that the de re version of Correct Thought fails to characterise as members of g. 
Then while it is not the case that Gilbert’s original account implies that <ExcludedGilbert> are 
members of g, the First Complete Account implies that <ExcludedGilbert> are not members of 
g.  
And finally, the Second Complete Account is at least as strong as the de re version of Correct 
Thought, since it includes the de re account as one of its conjuncts – i.e. the claim that the 
conditions specified in the de re account are sufficient for group membership. Adding the claim 
that the conditions specified by the narrow teleological account are necessary for group 
membership only makes the requirements for group membership stronger. But the de re version 
of Correct Thought is too strong (since is fails to satisfy Groupness), and so, the Second 
Complete Account is also too strong, and therefore fails to satisfy Groupness. 
This discussion suggests that it is not the case that there is an adequate formulation of the hybrid 
account that improves on its child accounts. 
B.6. MOVING FROM THE INDIVIDUAL-INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM TO THE SOCIAL-
INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM 
What I hope to have shown in section B is that we have grounds for being uncertain about 
whether we will eventually find an adequate solution to Q1 (the individual-individual problem). 
It would be prudent, therefore, to proceed to consider Q2, or the social-individual problem, 
since if we can find an adequate solution to the social-individual problem, then we can with 
more confidence conclude that the individual-individual problem can be adequately resolved, 
and so, we can with greater confidence assert that social groups exist. However, if we can find 
no such resolution to the social-individual problem, then we have reason for scepticism 
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regarding the claims that there is an adequate solution to the individual-individual problem and 
that social groups exist.   
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C. THE SOCIAL-INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM (Q2) 
C.1. INTRODUCTION 
C.1.a. The literature 
I argued in section A.2.b.ii. The macro-micro-link problem and the social-individual 
problem (p. 16) that the social-individual problem has received little attention in the literature 
for a number of reasons, namely, that the social-individual problem is seen as: (a) 
interchangeable with the individual-individual problem; (b) reducible to the individual-
individual problem, and hence, resolved once the individual-individual problem is resolved; (c) 
an instance of the whole-part problem; (d) analogous to the mind-body problem; (e) outside the 
boundaries of social ontology; or (f) easy to resolve. I argued that claims (a) through (f) are 
false, however. 
Moreover, in addition to the scarcity of attention to the social-individual problem as a problem 
about social phenomena generally, there is even less attention devoted to Q2, or the social-
individual problem as it applies to social groups specifically. The vast majority of the literature 
that is directly relevant to the nature of social groups focuses on whether the social supervenes 
upon the individual, and on the possibility of reducing types of social phenomena to types of 
individualistic phenomena. I discuss these issues in sections C.2.b. Non-Reductive 
Individualism (p. 124) and C.3.b. Type Individualism (p. 159) respectively. However, there 
are a number of other possible solutions to the social-individual problem that have received 
little to no attention at all, such as Social Functionalism (as a claim about the metaphysics, 
rather than the explanation, of social phenomena), and Eliminative Individualism (the claim 
that the social does not exist). 
Moreover, Searle (1990, 1995, 1998, 2007, 2010) has created a large following of supporters 
and critics of what he calls his “social ontology”. Indeed, social ontology as a field is now 
dominated by a discussion of Searle’s work [consider the dominance of Searlian themes at the 
2013 European Network on Social Ontology (ENSO-III) conference, for example]. The 
problem is that Searle’s social ontology focuses exclusively on social institutions, which has 
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diverted attention away from social groups. But, as I argued above, it is not the case that Searle’s 
account of social institutions can be applied to social groups without causing fresh problems 
for the account that it did not face as an account of institutions. 
In this portion of the thesis I intend to go some way towards filling these gaps in the literature, 
by not only considering supervenient and reductive accounts of groups, but also by considering 
other possible (albeit neglected) solutions to the social-individual problem as well. Moreover, 
I will focus almost entirely on social groups, rather than on social institutions. 
C.1.b. Criteria for evaluation 
First, consider the criteria I will use to evaluate the various solutions to the social-individual 
problem. I take it that there are four necessary (although not sufficient) requirements that an 
account a must meet if it is to resolve the social individual problem successfully. 
First, the account should not undermine the Folk Sociological intuitions mentioned at the 
beginning of the thesis – that groups have the capacity to act, be responsible for their actions, 
can persist through time, and may have value.  
Second: 
Aggregation: it is not the case that a implies that some mere aggregates are social groups. 
See section B.1. Criteria for success (p. 40) for Q1 for a fuller statement of this criterion. 
Third: 
Diachronic: a individuates groups diachronically. 
Essential to our Folk Sociological conception of a group is that it can persist through time. Thus, 
we should expect a complete account of social groups to individuate social groups 
diachronically. Assuming that social group G1 exists at t1, social group G2 exists at t2, and 
G1=G2, an account provides adequate diachronic individuation conditions Cdiachronic just in case 
Cdiachronic is necessary and sufficient for the claim that “SP1=SP2”. 
Finally, it is an interesting question whether a solution to the social-individual problem must 
individuate groups synchronically (as well as diachronically). Recall that one of the criteria for 
an adequate solution to Q1 is that it should individuate social groups. Thus, one way to 
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understand solutions to Q1 is that they provide synchronic identity criteria for social groups.90 
That is, they provide the conditions in virtue of which a given collection of individuals comprise 
a given social group at a given moment in time. On an Objectivist account, the patterns of 
interaction among group members at a given time are sufficient to unify the group, while on a 
Subjectivist account, the reflexive beliefs of group members at a given time unify them. Thus, 
if the solution to Q1 provides synchronic identity criteria for social groups, it is unnecessary for 
an adequate solution to Q2 to individuate groups synchronically. Nevertheless, I take it that if 
a solution to the social-individual problem is inconsistent with, or undermines, the possibility 
of providing an adequate criterion of synchronic identity for social groups, then that solution is 
problematic. Hence, whatever solution is offered to Q2 must not contradict the solution to Q1: 
Synchronic: a does not undermine the synchronic individuation of groups.91 
I move now to apply these four criteria to various proposed solutions to the social-individual 
problem. 
C.2. NON-REDUCTION 
We might divide the literature into two broad approaches to resolving the social-individual 
problem: reductive and non-reductive accounts. Non-reductivists, the most notable proponents 
of which include Archer (1995), Bhaskar (1989), Durkheim (1895 [1982]), Elder-Vass (2007), 
Jarvie (1964), Sawyer (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) and Sheehy (2006a), claim that: 
R1) the social exists; 
R2) the social and the individual are logically or conceptually independent; and  
R3) social terms can refer successfully to entities in the world. 
                                                 
90 This suggests an interesting response to my Dark City counterexample to Subjectivist solutions to the individual-
individual problem (p. 97). The Dark City counterexample relies upon the historical intuition, or the intuition that 
the history of a social phenomenon is constitutive of its nature, at least for some types of social phenomena, such 
as marriages and families. The Dark City counterexample argues that Subjectivism cannot accommodate the 
historical intuition, although Objectivism can. But, given that the individual-individual problem should be 
understood as demanding merely synchronic, rather than diachronic identity, criteria for social phenomena, 
perhaps this demand is too strong, for the historical intuition seems to concern the diachronic identity of social 
groups. 
However, this response is unsuccessful, for it seems that the history of a social phenomenon does impact its 
synchronic identity – that is, the history of a social group impacts its nature now. Whether a given collection of 
individuals is a family right now depends in part on whether they have a history of familial relations. 
91 In section B I test whether a proposed solution to Q2 satisfies Synchronic by seeing whether the account is 
consistent with the existence of coextensional groups (i.e. distinct groups with the same members). 
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All non-reductivists hold that social phenomena and individual phenomena are in some sense 
independent (R2). To say that the social and the individual are independent in the sense used 
here is not necessarily to say that the social can exist independently of the individual. Rather, 
what is meant is that the social exists as something ontologically distinct from the individualistic 
entities that underlie them. Put otherwise, social phenomena cannot be reduced to the 
individualistic phenomena underlying them. Non-reductivists often cash out this notion by 
claiming that social phenomena are emergent, or something more than the sum of their parts. 
However, non-reductivists differ in exactly what sort of social emergence they posit. That is, 
non-reductivists differ in how they characterise the distinction between social and 
individualistic phenomena. Social Dualists argue that social phenomena, like groups, are 
distinct entities from the individuals that underlie them (by an “entity” I mean an independent 
object, rather than property). Non-Reductive Individualists, by contrast, claim that the 
independence of social phenomena obtains because social phenomena are a distinct type of 
property possessed by collections of individualistic phenomena. The distinction between entity-
dualism and property-dualism is sometimes understood as the distinction between strong and 
weak conceptions of the emergence of the social (see, e.g., Theiner & O'Connor, 2010, p. 80).92 
C.2.a. Social Dualism 
Social Dualists hold that social phenomena are distinct entities. Thus, when I look out onto the 
Wits Central Block concourse at the chanting students I see both a number of individual entities 
(i.e. each of the students), but I also see another entity: the ANCYL (or a sub-set of the league). 
But Social Dualists disagree on the category (or type) of entity to which social groups, like the 
ANCYL, belong. Durkheim holds, while Sheehy denies, that social groups are non-material 
entities, of a distinct category or substance from their members. I consider the Durkheimian and 
Sheehian versions of Social Dualism in turn. 
                                                 
92 Debate around non-reductivism is rife within the field of collective rationality. Some philosophers, such as 
Rovane (1998, 2004a, 2004b), argue that groups make decisions that the individuals underlying them do not. This 
implies a non-reductive position, and possibly a strong, entity dualist position. On the other hand, some argue that 
it is possible to account for the apparent emergent character of group rationality in terms of a weak, property-
dualist view (see, e.g., Theiner & O'Connor, 2010). Finally, others hold that even group rationality can be reduced 
to individualistic rationality, or at least to functionalist states (Flew, 1985 ch. 3). 
This is, however, effectively the social-individual problem as it applies to collective rationality, which although 
fascinating, is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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C.2.a.i. Social groups as entities of a distinct category 
The original Social Dualists, most notably Durkheim, claimed that social groups belong to a 
category of entity other than that category to which individual persons belong: “…it is 
undeniably true that social facts are… sui generis… facts” (Durkheim, 1895 [1982], ch. V). 
Social Dualists cash out this view either by categorising social groups as abstract objects, or as 
objects with a “social”, rather than a material, substance (whatever that means). Durkheim 
supports this latter Social Dualist view by arguing for an organic account of groups [see section 
B.2.b. Organic account (p. 44)]. If groups did behave in an organic fashion, this would lend 
support to the claim that social groups are entities of a distinct “social” kind, since it seems that 
the group would operate in a fashion undetermined by its members. There are three problems 
with Durkheimian Dualism, however. 
First, I have argued that the organic account faces numerous problems, and so, I take it that 
Durkheim’s view is unsupported. Second, if social groups and their members are entities of 
distinct types, then the group is bifurcated from its members to such a degree that it is unclear 
how the agency, responsibility, value and persistence of the group can be grounded in its 
members (call this the bifurcation problem). The bifurcation problem parallels the problem of 
mechanism faced by Substance Dualist theories of mind, since these theories (which claim that 
the mind and the body are distinct substances) must perform the seemingly impossible task of 
providing a causal mechanism between a physical and a non-physical object. Jung (1922) 
suggests a mysterious “ectoplasm” that provides a link between the group and its members, 
while McDougall (1920) posits “telepathic” communication between the group and its 
members. I take it that both of these suggestions are, at best, unpalatable, and at worst 
unintelligible. At the very least, they are no more plausible than Eliminative Individualism, and 
so cannot form part of a social ontology that prevents us from giving Eliminative Individualism 
serious consideration. 
Third, if Durkheim is correct, then there are non-individual, “superhuman or subhuman, 
agencies at work in history” (Watkins, 1958, p. 395); but the idea of a ghostly, supra-individual 
consciousness seems counterintuitive. Put otherwise, the Durkheimian reification of groups 
seems counterintuitive. S. Miller (2011, p. Sec. 1) expresses this objection in terms of 
sophistication. If social groups are independent entities capable of action and responsibility, 
then social groups must, in themselves, possess all of the prerequisites for agency and 
responsibility. Yet, consider that these prerequisites are rather sophisticated. Mele (1995) 
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presents what is a largely uncontroversial view of the “springs” of actions for which an agent 
may be held responsible. For any given agent S at a given time t, S has a set of reasons93 upon 
which S might act at t. S takes stock, or becomes aware, of a subset of those reasons, compares 
that subset of reasons according to some criterion, and performs a practical judgement 
concerning which of the reasons compared is the best reason upon which to act. S then makes 
a practical decision to act upon this practical judgement, forms an intention to so act, and then 
acts on that intention. The problem for Durkheim is that when a social group acts, Durkheim 
must ascribe this long and complex process to the group itself, rather than to its members, since 
Durkheim claims that the group is an entity in its own right, distinct from its members. Yet it 
seems implausible to ascribe such a sophisticated process to a social group: how could groups 
themselves have complicated propositional attitudes (like preferences), self-awareness, self-
reflection, high level thought, and therefore language, and indeed, be a fully conscious being. 
Perhaps Durkheim would be prepared to bite the bullet on the existence of such sophisticated, 
conscious social groups when considering cultures or societies as such beings. But why stop at 
the level of society and culture? Why not ascribe a sophisticated consciousness to  
“governments, universities, schools, supermarkets, armies, banks, political parties, trade 
unions, [and] English soccer teams’ supporters’ clubs” S. Miller (2011, p. Sec. 1)? This 
proliferation of social consciousnesses seems at least as counterintuitive as the denial that there 
are any social groups at all (i.e. Eliminative Individualism). 
C.2.a.ii. Social groups as material entities 
Sheehy (2006a) defends a different sort of Social Dualism: he claims that social groups, 
although distinct entities, are entities of the same category as individual persons, namely, both 
social groups and persons are material objects. Sheehy (2006a, p. 99) holds that material objects 
have five characteristics. Material objects: 
O-1) have a unity of form; 
O-2) have a causal capacity; 
O-3) can be individuated both from other material objects at any given point in time (i.e. 
synchronically), and through time (i.e. diachronically); 
                                                 
93 Roughly, a reason is a combination of a desire (or pro-attitude of some sort) together with a belief about how 
that desire can be fulfilled. 
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O-4) are located spatio-temporally; and 
O-5) have a collection of parts related in a way that determines O-1 through O-4. 
Sheehy points out that social groups possess all of these characteristics. For example, the 
ANCYL is a unit (O-1), able to act (O-2), distinguishable from other groups (e.g. the 
Democratic Alliance and its youth league) both at a given point in time and over time (O-3), 
has been located in South Africa since 1944 (O-4), and has a collection of members that relate 
in a way that appears to determine these other four features (O-5). Social groups, then, appear 
to be good candidates for being material objects. 
Sheehy argues that this account avoids two of the problems associated with the Durkheimian 
view. Social groups are not strange, ghostly entities: rather, they are entities of a sort with which 
we are already familiar. Moreover, if social groups are material entities, just like their members, 
then the gap between groups and their members is far smaller than on Durkheim’s account, 
thereby avoiding, or at least lessening, the bifurcation problem. Nevertheless, Sheehy’s account 
faces at least two challenges.94 
First, Sheehy seems to commit the previously noted error [see section A.2.b.ii. The macro-
micro-link problem and the social-individual problem (p. 16)] of conflating the social-
individual problem with the whole-part problem. Sheehy holds that the relation between a group 
and its members is exactly that relationship that obtains between a material entity and its 
component parts. On Sheehy’s interpretation of this view, the only parts of a social group are 
its members and their intra-relations; but, as noted by Mandelbaum (1955 [1973], p. 115), any 
given social phenomenon may have other social phenomena as its parts. For example, part of 
what it is to be the ANCYL is to stand in certain relations to other political entities in South 
Africa: e.g. to be the youth branch of the ANC, and to be in opposition to the DA youth league. 
On Mandelbaum’s view, these relations are partly constitutive of the ANCYL, and so, are parts 
of the league. Hence, it seems that the ANCYL has more than just its members and their intra-
relations as its parts. 
                                                 
94 The critical literature on Sheehy’s account focuses on the problem of synchronic cohabitation, or the problem 
of explaining how it is possible that the group, since it is a material entity, can cohabit the same space at the same 
time as other material entities, namely, its members (see Sheehy, 2006b). I focus here on other objections to 
Sheehy’s account. 
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And second, it is unclear whether Sheehy’s account does in fact present a Social Dualist view. 
Both a reductive account and a Non-Reductive Individualist account of social groups would 
agree that social groups are material objects [see sections C.2.b. Non-Reductive 
Individualism (p. 124) and C.3. Reduction (p. 154)). Sheehy (2006a) criticises both of these 
views, and intends his account to be distinct from both. But what is the difference between his 
view and these two alternatives? Perhaps Sheehy holds that on his account, but not on the others, 
social groups are distinct entities – i.e. they should be counted over-and-above their members 
as material objects in space and time. If we were to count the number of distinct material objects 
on the central block concourse while the ANCYL is chanting, we should count each of the 
individuals, plus one (i.e. the league itself). By contrast, on the reductive and Non-Reductive 
Individualist accounts, the total number of material entities on the concourse is just the number 
of individuals standing on the concourse (i.e. one fewer than on Sheehy’s account). 
Putting aside the prima facie implausibility of this position, there is a further problem with this 
response. If social groups are distinct entities, then Sheehy’s account does not avoid Miller’s 
objection from sophistication raised against Durkheim’s account. If social groups are distinct 
entities, and if social groups have agency and responsibility, then they must have the 
sophisticated properties and processes that individualistic agents have – e.g. a mind and the 
ability for awareness, practical reasoning, practical judgement, intentionality and choice. 
Positing that these social entities are material rather than of a distinct Durkheimian category 
does little to remedy the problem – it is still strange to ascribe all these properties and processes 
to social groups, as distinct entities, rather than their members. 
Perhaps Sheehy and Durkheim would insist that it is intelligible to ascribe to groups, rather than 
to their members, a mind. But the problem with this insistence, and this is crucial, is that this 
group mind thesis does not imply that groups are distinct entities from the individualistic 
phenomena that underlie them. For these group minds might be better understood on a weaker, 
less ontologically extravagant, account of emergence, namely, a property-dualist view (see 
Theiner & O'Connor, 2010). This weaker, property-dualist view, can accommodate the group 
mind thesis because on this view social (or group) properties are categorically distinct from 
individualistic properties, and so, in some important sense, the group can do things its members 
cannot. But a property-dualist view is not committed to the unpalatable implication that groups 
are full-blown conscious entities distinct from the members that underlie them. I turn now, 
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therefore, to consider Non-Reductive Individualism, since it is the best candidate for a property-
dualist view. 
C.2.b. Non-Reductive Individualism 
C.2.b.i. The account 
Sawyer (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) provides an account he calls “Non-Reductive Individualism”, 
meant to parallel the Non-Reductive Materialist account of mind.95 His account makes five 
claims: 
NRI-1) Ontological Individualism is true: i.e. there are no entities other than 
individualistic entities;96 
NRI-2) social phenomena supervene upon individual phenomena (groups supervene upon 
their members); 
NRI-3) any given token social phenomenon is identical with a token collection97 of 
individual phenomena (any given social group is identical with its members);98 
NRI-4) a given type of social phenomenon can be realised by wildly disjunctive types of 
individualist phenomena (a given type of social group can be instantiated by 
wildly disjunctive types of members); and  
                                                 
95 Non-Reductive Materialism makes five claims (see Davidson, 1970 [1980]). First, Non-Reductive Materialism 
holds that Physicalism is true, or the claim that there is only one type of substance existent in the universe – namely, 
the physical. Second, Non-Reductive Materialists claim that the mental supervenes on the physical. Third, (on 
Davidson’s version of the thesis, also called Anomalous Monism) token mental states are identical with token 
physical states. Fourth, Non-Reductive Materialists claim that mental types can be instantiated in wildly different 
types of physical states. For example, pain could be instantiated in C-fibre stimulation in the human brain, but also 
in inflating gill cavities in Martians. And last, the account posits a dualism of properties rather than a dualism of 
substances. Thus, while Cartesian Dualism posits both physical and mental substances, Non-Reductive 
Materialists hold instead that there are ontologically distinct physical and mental properties. 
96 Here I am following Sawyer’s usage of the phrase “Ontological Individualism”. Epstein (2009) uses the same 
phrase to denote NRI-2, or the claim that the social supervenes upon the individual. Nothing substantial rests upon 
this difference in usage.  
97 Note that my usage of the term “collection” is meant in a neutral sense – it is neutral on whether that collection 
of individuals is a social group or a mere aggregate. 
98 It is unclear whether Sawyer intends NRI-3 to form part of his account. I have assumed NRI-2 does form part 
of the account, since Sawyer intends his account to parallel Davidson’s Non-Reductive Materialism (see footnote 
95). Moreover, inserting NRI-3 into the account even if Sawyer does not intend this should not be seen as a problem 
by the Non-Reductive Individualist, since NRI-3 only strengthens the account. Indeed, I will argue later that NRI-
3 is required to supplement NRI-2. 
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NRI-5) social properties (e.g. being a group) and individualistic properties (being a 
member of a group) are ontologically distinct.99 
Sawyer asserts NRI-1 to protect the account against reifying the social (and hence, against the 
unpalatable consequences that follow from Social Dualism). NRI-2 and NRI-3 specify two 
relations between the social and the individual, namely, supervenience and token-token 
identity. Thus, NRI-2 and NRI-3 attempt to answer the social-individual problem. Sawyer uses 
NRI-4 to support token-token identity (i.e. NRI-3), rather than type-type identity, obtaining 
between social and individual phenomena [see section C.3.b. Type Individualism (p. 159) for 
a discussion of NRI-4]. And finally, NRI-5 ensures that the account is a non-reductive account 
of social phenomena by maintaining a logical distinction between social and individualistic 
properties (rather than a logical distinction between social and individualistic entities, as on 
Social Dualism). 
The critical discussion of Sawyer’s account has centred around NRI-5. Specifically, the 
discussion focuses on whether property dualism can secure a real autonomy of the social (see, 
e.g., Greve, 2012a, 2012b; Sawyer, 2012). That is, on Sawyer’s account, do social groups have 
causal efficacy over-and-above the causal efficacy of their members? If not, then the account 
is non-reductive in name but not in spirit, for the ontological distinction between the social and 
the individual specified in NRI-5 seems superfluous. I wish to set this debate aside, however, 
since I am interested here in the social-individual problem, and therefore I am interested 
primarily in NRI-2 and NRI-3. 
In what follows, I argue that both of these claims are problematic, and so, Sawyer’s solution to 
the social-individual problem is unconvincing. I begin by considering NRI-2. 
C.2.b.ii. Supervenience 
NRI-2 is the claim that the social supervenes upon the individual. Roughly, to say that a higher-
level entity, property or fact H “supervenes” upon a set of lower-level entities, properties or 
facts L is to say that H is dependent upon L, or that L determines H (Kim, 1984, p. 153). More 
accurately, a change in H requires a change in L; or, if L remains constant, so does H. However, 
this stated definition is vague in three respects, namely, as to: the unit of supervenience (local, 
                                                 
99 Sawyer (2001; 2002, pp. 540, 553) argues that the accounts of other property-dualists (such as Bhaskar, Blau, 
Archer, Collier, and Lawson) are incomplete because they omit NRI-3 or NRI-4. 
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global or regional), the scope within which a change of H requires a change of L (weak100 or 
strong101), and the time-span over which H depends on L (synchronic102 or diachronic103). 
Hence, there are three dimensions of accounts that attempt to clarify these areas of vagueness. 
I will be focusing exclusively on accounts belonging to the first of these dimensions – accounts 
which specify the unit of supervenience (local, global and regional). The reason for this is that 
I will argue that there are successful objections against the local, global and regional accounts; 
and that the accounts belonging to the other two dimensions do nothing to avoid these 
objections. All of the accounts I will be discussing, however, presuppose strong supervenience, 
although all the accounts (except the global account) could be reformulated with a 
presupposition of weak supervenience instead, without altering the efficacy of the objections I 
raise. 
Before I discuss local, global and regional accounts, I wish to clarify the criteria of evaluation 
I will use when evaluating the accounts. For each account of supervenience, I will offer 
objections of either or both of the following types, namely, that the account:  
Ob-1) contradicts folk-sociological intuitions about social groups; or 
Ob-2) does not adequately capture the dependence of H on L. 
If the account suffers from a successful objection of type Ob-1, then it is inadequate to rule out 
Eliminate Individualism as a viable alternative, and so, can be put aside for the purposes of this 
discussion. However, if the account faces a successful objection of type Ob-2, then at best it 
offers a weak, limited solution to the social-individual problem, and will need to be 
supplemented by another claim (such as NRI-3). I will argue that all of the accounts of social-
individual supervenience that I consider, suffer from either Ob-1 or Ob-2 type objections. With 
these criteria in mind, I begin the exposition with local accounts of supervenience. 
                                                 
100 Weak supervenience is the claim that H supervenes upon L iff for all x and y within the same possible world, 
if x and y possess L, then x and y possess H. 
101 Strong supervenience is the claim that H supervenes upon L iff for all x and y, where x and y occur within the 
same or different possible worlds, if x and y possess L, then x and y possess H. 
102 Synchronic supervenience is the claim that H supervenes upon L iff, for all x and y, if at time t, x and y do not 
differ with regards to L, then x and y possess the same H at t. 
103 Diachronic supervenience is the claim that H supervenes upon L iff, for all x and y, if up till and including t, x 
and y do not differ with regards to L, then x and y possess the same H at t. 
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 Local supervenience 
Local supervenience accounts claim that: 
Local supervenience: H supervenes upon L iff for all x and y, where x and y 
are different individuals or sets of individuals, if x and y possess property L, 
then x and y possess property H.104 
The most obvious application of the local supervenience account to the social-individual 
problem is the claim that two groups with qualitatively identical members are qualitatively 
identical groups. More formally: 
Local member supervenience: Social groups supervene upon their members 
iff for any two collections x and y of individual persons, if x and y are 
qualitatively identical collections of persons (i.e. have the same properties), 
then x and y are qualitatively identical social groups.105 
The local account of group-member supervenience suffers from two objections of type Ob-1 
(the more damaging type of objection). First, if local member supervenience is correct, then a 
given social group depends upon nothing but its members for its existence. But this is 
counterintuitive, since social groups seem to depend not just upon their members, but also upon 
(i) other social phenomena, (ii) individual persons who are not members of the group, and (iii) 
the environment of the group.106 Call this objection the external dependence objection. 
A bank, for example, depends upon not just its employees, but also upon (i) the reserve bank 
and its policies, upon (iii) the existence of a capitalist market, and upon (ii) the individuals who 
make up that market. Or, to take a different example, the ANCYL is partly determined by 
factors beyond its members, such as (i) other political parties, (iii) global politics, and (ii) the 
individuals who affect global politics – e.g. Barack Obama. For example, suppose that 
tomorrow Obama decides that South Africa should be occupied by American forces. This might 
have the result that ANCYL is eliminated from the face of South African politics. Or, suppose 
that tomorrow the US stock market crashes. This may have enormous repercussions for South 
                                                 
104 All of the formal definitions of supervenience I provide here take the form of property supervenience. However, 
I regularly cash out these formal definitions in terms of entities, such as groups and their members. Horgan (1993) 
and Sheehy (2006a) hold that this is overly charitable to the supervenience theorist, but I have qualms with 
supervenience that do not rest on such technicalities. 
105 I take it that if two groups are qualitatively identical, then the two groups are indiscernible with regard to their 
social properties. 
106 See Horgan (1993, p. 569) and Kincaid (1986, p. 498) for a discussion of (i) and (ii); and see Epstein (2009, p. 
196) for a discussion of (iii). Moreover, see section C.3.a. Logical Individualism (p. 154) for a defence of (i), 
also known as the “holism of the social” doctrine. 
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Africa and its political landscape, such that ANCYL is forced to make a radical shift in its 
policies. Since these are logically possible scenarios, it seems fair to say that ANCYL is partly 
determined by Obama and the US stock market.  
The local supervenience proponent might respond to the external dependence objection by 
arguing that the objection conflates two distinct senses of the clause “depends upon”. On one 
meaning of the clause, A depends upon B if A is constituted by, or comprised of, B (call this 
constitutive dependence). A second sense of the clause is that A depends upon B if A is causally 
affected by B (call this causal dependence). An adequate account of the supervenience of H on 
L must include all of the constitutive dependencies of H, but need not include all of the causal 
dependencies of H. Thus, the external dependence objection is successful only insofar as I have 
shown that local supervenience accounts omit the constitutive (rather than causal) dependencies 
of social groups. However, the proponent of local supervenience could hold that the external 
dependencies involved in (i), (ii) and (iii) are causal, and not constitutive. To support this claim, 
the proponent might ask us to consider the following analogy. 
Shift focus to the mind-body problem, and specifically, consider the claim that a particular 
belief supervenes upon a particular brain state. Suppose John possesses a belief B that ice-cream 
is sweet. Now it is true that if, say, aliens were to invade the planet and in so doing kill John, 
the aliens would thereby eliminate B. We would readily admit that because alien invasions 
determine the future of B, B causally depends upon the invasion of aliens. But, what we would 
not want to infer is that B constitutively depends upon alien invasions. Similarly, we should not 
infer that just because Obama and the US stock market partly determine the future of the 
ANCYL, Obama and America constitutively (rather than causally) determine the ANCYL. 
I disagree, however, that Obama’s decisions and the USA stock market are merely causal 
dependencies of the ANCYL: they are indeed constitutive dependencies. The difference 
between the case of John’s belief about ice-cream and the case of the ANCYL is that while 
there is no conceptual connection between ice-cream beliefs as a type of phenomenon and alien 
invasion as a type of phenomenon, there is a conceptual connection between political parties as 
a type and global political events as a type. The concept of a large political party is the concept 
of a type of group that operates within the broader stage of global politics. However, it is not a 
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conceptual truth that the nature of beliefs about ice-cream is determined by alien invasions.107 
For this reason, beliefs about ice cream are not constitutively dependent upon alien invasions, 
while the ANCYL is constitutively dependent upon global political events. Thus, an adequate 
supervenience account of beliefs need not make reference to alien invasions when specifying 
the lower-order entities or properties upon which ice-cream beliefs supervene, but an adequate 
supervenience account of political groups must make reference to global politics (or the 
individualistic entities which underlie global politics) in its account of large political groups. 
A second Ob-1 type objection to the claim that groups supervene locally upon their members 
is that common-sense suggests that it is possible to have two qualitatively distinct groups, but 
with identical members. To borrow an example from Sheehy (2006a, pp. 36, note 44), notice 
that a small town’s rugby team and male choir may have the same members, yet be distinct 
social groups. That is, the rugby team and choir have the same individuals, but distinct social 
properties. However, the local supervenience account denies that this is possible, and so, cases 
where there are distinct yet coextensional groups provide counterexamples to the local 
supervenience account. Put differently, the local supervenience account does not provide 
individualistic properties that guarantee a unique social group. 
The local supervenience theorist does have recourse to a somewhat more sophisticated account, 
however, which may do a better job at accommodating these objections. Call this the “local 
intra-relational supervenience account”: 
Local intra-relational supervenience: Social groups supervene upon the intra-
relations among their members iff for any two collections x and y of individual 
persons, if the individuals in x relate with one another in a manner 
qualitatively identical with the manner in which the individuals in y relate 
with one another, then x and y are qualitatively identical social groups. 
This revised local supervenience account appears to resolve both the external dependence 
objection, and the problem of coextensional groups. Consider that in specifying how the 
individuals in a group relate, we would be utilising the solution we find to Q1. Now recall that 
                                                 
107 Perhaps the local supervenience proponent would point out that mental states are conceptually related to 
environmental features. For example, beliefs about ice cream are conceptually related to ice creams. And so, the 
similarity between mental states and social phenomena is closer than I suggest. 
The problem is, however, that social phenomena are conceptually related to a much wider base of environmental 
factors than are mental states. The belief that “This is an ice-cream” is conceptually related to ice creams, but not 
to global ice-cream price increases. By contrast, the belief that “This is the ANCYL” is conceptually related to 
global politics and global markets. 
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one of the possible answers to Q1, namely, the broad teleological account, spells out a group’s 
intra-relations in terms of its broad goals, and these broad goals may include reference to (i) 
other social phenomena, (ii) individuals outside of the group, and (iii) the context, or 
environment, of the group. For example, the ANCYL may include as part of its broad telos (i) 
its opposition to other youth leagues, (ii) its support of all black South African youth, and (iii) 
an ultimate goal to transform the political landscape in South Africa in a certain way. It seems, 
then, that the local intra-relational account accommodates features (i) through (iii) in its account 
of supervenience, since the relations among group members can be specified in terms that 
include (i) through (iii). 
Moreover, turning to the problem of coextensional groups, if we examine the relations among 
the rugby players when they relate as rugby players, and we compare these relations to the type 
of relations that we find occurring among the members of the male choir when they relate as 
members of the choir, we will undoubtedly notice dissimilarities. For example, while practising 
rugby, the individuals involved throw an oblong ball to one another, but while singing in the 
choir, the group members harmonise their voices. Thus, the intra-relational account succeeds 
where the original local account failed, since on the intra-relational but not the member account, 
the lower-order properties upon which the rugby team and choir supervene are qualitatively 
distinct. 
I concede that the intra-relational account resolves the problem of coextensional groups, but I 
do not think that the account resolves the external dependencies objection.108 To support the 
                                                 
108 Sheehy (2006a) argues that the local intra-relational account also fails to accommodate coextensional groups: 
the intra-relational account merely appears to accommodate coextensional groups. Let groups G1 and G2 be 
distinct but coextensional social groups with members M. M will relate differently with each other when they are 
relating qua members of G1 compared with when they are relating qua members of G2. Thus, because G1-intra-
relations will be distinct from G2-intra-relations, the local intra-relational account does not imply that G1 and G2 
are qualitatively identical. The problem with this solution to the problem, according to Sheehy, is that it is 
impossible to specify which relations among M count as G1-intra-relations, and which count as G2-intra-relations, 
without referring to G1 and G2. That is, it is impossible to specify what it means for M to relate qua being members 
of G1 (or G2), without referring to G1 (or G2). But this is a problem, for this implies that the individualistic 
properties upon which G1 and G2 supervene are themselves dependent upon G1 and G2 (respectively), which 
makes a mockery of the notion that G1 is determined solely by, or depends solely upon, these individualistic 
properties. Put otherwise, if a supervenience account is to capture adequately the dependence of H on L, the 
account cannot imply that L is in turn dependent on H. Thus, the intra-relational version of the local account faces 
an Ob-2 type objection to the way it handles the problem of coextensional groups. 
The problem with Sheehy’s objection, however, is that it is a highly contentious claim that it is impossible to 
specify the intra-relations of group members without referring to the group itself, since this claim effectively 
implies that the best solution to the individual-individual problem would be circular. Now it may be the case that 
the best solution to the individual-individual problem is circular, but this claim would require much more support 
than Sheehy provides. 
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latter claim, consider that although the local account is able to smuggle in some content of types 
(i) through (iii) into its account, this will not necessarily be the right content to capture 
adequately the dependence of a social group on the numerous external factors that constitutively 
determine it. For example, it is not the case that Obama or the US stock market figure into the 
ANCYL’s broad telos. I suspect that nowhere in the league’s charter will you find any reference 
to a threat of an American invasion, or to the possibility of the US stock market crashing.109 
Thus, even though the ANCYL’s goals may include reference to some external forces, it will 
certainly not refer to all of the external forces that constitutively determine the league’s future. 
Thus, ultimately, the problem for the local intra-relational supervenience account is that the 
intra-relations in question will not necessarily (and indeed, do not in many cases) refer to all 
the relevant external dependencies required. 
 Global supervenience 
To accommodate the objections against the local accounts, Sawyer may increase the unit of 
supervenience from a particular entity (or social group), to a possible world:  
Global supervenience: H supervenes upon L iff for all x and y, where x and y 
are possible worlds, if x and y possess L, then x and y possess H. 
Like the local supervenience account, the global supervenience account might be applied to the 
social-individual problem either in terms of group members, or in terms of the relations among 
those members: 
Global member supervenience: Social groups supervene upon their members 
iff for any two possible worlds x and y, if x and y have qualitatively identical 
individuals, then x and y have qualitatively identical social groups. 
Global intra-relational supervenience: Social groups supervene upon the 
intra-relations among their members iff for any two possible worlds x and y, 
                                                 
109 The local intra-relational supervenience proponent could argue that although the ANCYL’s charter does not 
include reference to Obama or the US stock market, it may nevertheless include information that is relevant to 
these phenomena. For example, the ANCYL charter may include ideologies that conflict with US or capitalistic 
policies, even if these ideologies fail to mention the US or its market. Thus, these external dependencies are at 
least in some sense smuggled into the account, albeit indirectly, or by implication. 
There are two problems with this response, however. First, this response seems to require that we adopt a narrow 
teleological account, since we require the detailed telos of the league, and not its broad goals, to secure these 
external dependencies (the charter is the narrow telos of the ANCYL). But, I argued that the narrow teleological 
account is problematic. And second this indirect, very weak sense, of smuggling in external dependencies does 
not seem to capture adequately the dependence of the social on these external phenomena. I will not argue for this 
point here, except to say that this indirect sense of dependence appears distinct (and weaker) than the direct 
dependence that a group has on its members (or their intra-relations) on the local supervenience account. 
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if the individuals in x relate with one another in a manner qualitatively 
identical with the manner in which the individuals in y relate with one 
another, then x and y have qualitatively identical social groups. 
Both of these versions of the global account resolve the objection from external dependencies, 
since the accounts expand the entities upon which social groups depend to all social and 
individualistic phenomena within the possible world to which that social group belongs.  
However, like the member version of the local supervenience account, the member version of 
the global account fails to accommodate the problem of coextensional groups, albeit in a 
slightly different form. Suppose that in this world, Howick has a rugby team, but no male choir. 
Call the collection of members of Howick’s rugby team CHowick. Now, imagine a world w* that 
has identical individuals to this world, and so has identical counterparts to CHowick (call the 
counterparts CHowick*). Because the same individuals can comprise distinct social groups, it is 
possible that in w* there is no Howick rugby team, and that, instead, CHowick* comprise the male 
choir. Thus, contradicting global member supervenience, the actual world and w* are 
indiscernible with regard to their individuals, but distinct with regard to their social groups. So, 
the account fails to accommodate the intuition that social groups may be coextensional, yet 
qualitatively distinct. 
Happily for the global supervenience theorist, however, the intra-relational version of the 
account does solve the problem of coextensional groups. Although the actual world and w* 
have identical individuals, the relations among the individuals in these worlds are qualitatively 
distinct. For example, in the actual world, CHowick pass rugby balls to one another, while in w*, 
CHowick* harmonise their voices. Thus, it is not the case that the global intra-relational account 
is committed to the claim that CHowick and CHowick* are qualitatively identical groups. 
Nevertheless, both of the global supervenience accounts face an Ob-2 type objection that does 
not apply to either of the local accounts. Like any global account, global supervenience accounts 
imply that the tiniest of differences in the supervenience bases of two worlds is consistent with 
enormous differences in the supervening properties of these worlds. For example, let the 
individuals in the actual world at the present moment be abbreviated by <I1…In>. Moreover, 
suppose that another possible world w* has the same individuals in the actual world, except 
that w* is missing one politically dormant individual (e.g. an apathetic street-sweeper) – i.e. w* 
has <I*1…I*n-1> (assuming that the street-sweeper in the actual world is abbreviated by “In”). 
Then, on the global member account, it is possible that while the US is democratic in the actual 
world, the US is communist in w*. Or, to adapt the objection to the global intra-relational 
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account, suppose that although w* has the same individuals as in the actual world, w* has 
slightly, apparently insignificant, different interrelations among its individuals. For example, 
suppose that while in the actual world street-sweepers are unionised, in w* street-sweepers are 
not. Then, similarly, on the global intra-relational account, it is possible that while the US is 
democratic in the actual world, the US is communist in w*. These examples show that the 
global accounts do not adequately capture the dependence of social groups on their members, 
or the intra-relations among their members, since the smallest change at the individual level is 
consistent with an enormous change at the social level. (Call this problem the “dependence 
problem”). 
 Regional supervenience 
Horgan (1993) espouses what he calls “regional physical supervenience”, which he believes 
solves the dependence problem, as faced by global supervenience accounts of the mind-body 
relation. His account reads: 
There are no two P-regions [i.e. spatio-temporal regions] that are exactly alike in all qualitative 
intrinsic physical features but different in some other qualitative intrinsic feature. (1993, p. 571)  
Horgan defines a feature “intrinsic” to a region R as any feature of R that depends solely on 
events, individuals or entities within R. A “qualitative” intrinsic feature of a region R is any 
feature that depends solely on “specific individuals” within R (1993, p. 570). Horgan uses as 
an example the fact that Tommy is a jazz pianist. Tommy’s having this property is a qualitative 
intrinsic feature of the region in which Tommy lives, because Tommy’s being a jazz pianist 
does not depend on anyone outside of R, and because Tommy’s being a jazz pianist depends 
on the existence of Tommy. 
Now recall that the dependence problem arises for the global accounts because an apparently 
irrelevant difference in the supervenience base (L) is consistent with an enormous difference in 
the higher-order property (H) supervening on that base. Horgan’s account is designed to solve 
this problem by reducing the size of the region from a possible world to a space in which the 
only differences in L that determine a difference in H are those differences in L that are 
qualitative intrinsic features of the region in question. Presumably, irrelevant differences in L 
will not qualify as qualitative intrinsic features of the region, and so, will be inconsistent (on 
Horgan’s account) with a vast difference in H. This is a plausible solution to the mind-body 
problem because it is prima facie likely that within regions of the correctly specified size, 
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physical differences irrelevant to the mental states of the two regions will not be qualitative 
intrinsic features of the regions, and so, will not be consistent with vast mental differences 
between the regions. 
Unfortunately, however, the regional account does not work as easily in the case of the social-
individual problem. If we generalise Horgan’s account, we obtain: 
Regional supervenience: H supervenes upon L iff for all x and y, where x and 
y are regions, if (both x and y possess L as a qualitative intrinsic feature), and 
(H is a qualitative intrinsic feature of x), then y possesses H. 
Applying this account to the social-individual relation, we arrive at either of the following 
accounts: 
Regional member supervenience: Social groups <G1…Gn> supervene upon 
their members iff for all x and y, where x and y are regions, if (both x and y 
possess the same individuals), and (these individuals are qualitative intrinsic 
features of x and y), and (<G1…Gn> are qualitative intrinsic features of x), 
then y possesses social groups qualitatively identical to <G1…Gn>. 
Regional intra-relational supervenience: Social groups <G1…Gn> supervene 
upon the intra-relations among their members iff for all x and y, where x and 
y are regions, if (x and y possess the same intra-relations among their 
individuals), and (these intra-relations are qualitative intrinsic features of x 
and y), and (<G1…Gn> are qualitative intrinsic features of x), then y possesses 
social groups qualitatively identical to <G1…Gn>. 
Notice that, like the global member supervenience account, the regional member supervenience 
account does nothing to alleviate the objection from coextensional groups, since any two 
regions (whether one defines a region as a possible world, or as a smaller area), may have the 
same individuals, but distinct groups (since the same individuals may form qualitatively distinct 
groups). 
Moreover, the regional intra-relational account as it stands is unhelpful, for on this account it 
will never be the case that a social group supervenes upon its members. The reason for this is 
that a qualitative intrinsic feature of R is defined by Horgan as a feature that depends solely on 
the “existence of specific individuals” within R (1993, p. 570). But if the intra-relations among 
the members of a group are to be specified in a way that adequately addresses the individual-
individual problem, then those relations do not depend on the existence of specific individuals 
– anyone relating in that way will do. Consider, for example, that if the relations among the 
members of the ANCYL required the existence of those specific individuals, then every time a 
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member of the league terminates his membership the intra-relations among the individuals in 
the league change. This becomes highly problematic if many or most of the members of the 
league were to be replaced, for then (on the assumption that group intra-relations are qualitative 
intrinsic features) the ANCYL’s intra-relations would change radically. But this is 
counterintuitive, since we understand large social groups like the ANCYL to be precisely those 
entities whose members are interchangeable without any necessary significant changes in the 
members’ intra-relations. It seems perfectly conceivable, for example, for the league to replace 
its leadership with leaders who have the same goals, and relate in the same ways, as the previous 
leaders (perhaps, for example, the old leaders die in a plane crash, and are replaced by their 
aids). Therefore, because the intra-relations among group members are not qualitative intrinsic 
features of social groups, the regional intra-relational account implies that social groups do not 
supervene upon their members’ intra-relations. 
We might therefore weaken the regional intra-relational account to refer merely to intrinsic 
features, rather than qualitative intrinsic features. Intrinsic features of a region are merely those 
that depend solely on what happens inside of the region (but not on specific individuals in the 
region), and member intra-relations would satisfy this description if the region is defined 
appropriately. Thus: 
Weak regional intra-relational supervenience: Social groups <G1…Gn> 
supervene upon the intra-relations among their members iff for all x and y, 
where x and y are regions, if (x and y possess the same intra-relations among 
their individuals), and (these intra-relations are intrinsic features of x and y), 
and (<G1…Gn> are intrinsic features of x), then y possesses social groups 
qualitatively identical to <G1…Gn>. 
This account faces another challenge: it does not appear possible to specify the size of the region 
in a way that is large enough to accommodate the external dependencies of social groups, while 
keeping the region small enough to ensure that irrelevant differences in individualistic 
phenomena are not intrinsic features of the region. As our test case, consider the ANCYL. We 
want an account of supervenience that captures both: (i) the external dependencies of the league 
(e.g. other political parties and global political events); as well as (ii) the fact that if the region 
in which the league resides remains constant but for a small change in how street-sweepers 
interact, this is inconsistent with a massive change in the nature of the ANCYL.  
To illustrate the difficulty, let us begin by defining the region in which the ANCYL resides as 
broadly as possible – i.e. as a possible world. Then, all of the numerous events and phenomena 
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upon which the ANCYL depends will be included as intrinsic features of the region, and so, 
may be correctly included by the account as dependencies of the league. Hence, the regional 
account will accommodate the problem of external dependences. However, the problem now is 
that the regional account faces the same dependency problem as the global intra-relational 
account: the smallest difference in the relations of street-sweepers in Russia* in another 
possible world w* exactly like ours in every other respect is consistent with w* having a 
radically different ANCYL*. Thus, defining the region in terms of a possible world again fails 
to capture the dependence of social groups on their members’ intra-relations.  
On the other hand, if we define the region of supervenience very narrowly, then although we 
can demonstrate adequately the dependence of social groups on their members’ intra-relations, 
we cannot account for the external dependencies of social groups. For example, suppose we 
define the region of the ANCYL as the immediate spatial region inhabited by the league’s 
members. Then, it seems plausible that any changes in the relations among individuals in this 
region will be relevant to the nature of the ANCYL, and so, the account will not face the 
dependency problem. However, none of the external phenomena (e.g. Obama, or the US 
market) upon which the ANCYL depends exist within this region, and so, the narrow regional 
account cannot accommodate these external phenomena (such as global political and economic 
events) in its account. 
Most damagingly, specifying the size of the region somewhere between the size of an entire 
possible world and the size of the space immediately occupied by the social group in question 
does not help us. If we define the size of the region as anything smaller than an entire possible 
world (or at least the earth), then the account will fail to accommodate all of the external 
dependencies upon which social groups depend, at least in the case of political groups. So, for 
example, if we define the region of supervenience when accounting for the ANCYL as Africa, 
then we incorrectly omit the US and its economy and politics as relevant dependencies of the 
league. We might then include the US as part of the region, but then we should also include 
Europe, whose economy and politics may also influence the ANCYL through their relationship 
with the US. Ultimately, we are forced to increase the size of the region until the region is 
defined in terms of the entire possible world (or at least the earth), and then we again face the 
problem that we cannot adequately demonstrate a dependence of social groups on their 
members’ intra-relations. The problem with the regional account, then, is that social groups like 
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the ANCYL have such a wide range of external dependencies that they cannot be 
accommodated by a region smaller than the entire world. 
Horgan could argue that there is a limit to how large we need to expand the size of the region 
to accommodate external dependencies, since changes very, very far away from the ANCYL 
would not, it seems, have a significant impact on the league. There are two problems with this, 
however. First, how do we draw this line in a way that is not entirely arbitrary? Second, as 
discussed earlier, the nature of social groups like large political groups is such that they are 
conceptually connected to other large political and economic groups and events, no matter 
where in the world they are. For all we know, World War III may start because of events in a 
small town in Bulgaria, and this war would most certainly impact the league. Thus, because the 
concept of a large political group is the concept of a group that depends partly upon global 
events of a particular magnitude, and because those global events could happen anywhere, there 
seems to be good reason for us to demand that the region in the regional account be defined 
very broadly. And defining the region so broadly, as we have seen, fails to capture the 
dependence of social groups on their members’ intra-relations. 
 Conclusion 
Therefore, to conclude, every supervenience account suffers from either an Ob-1 or an Ob-2 
type objection: 
Table 2: Supervenience accounts 
Supervenience Account 
External 
dependencies 
(Ob-1) 
Coextensional 
groups 
(Ob-1) 
Adequate 
dependence  
(Ob-2) 
Local member    
Local intra-relational    
Global member    
Global intra-relational    
Regional member    
Broad weak regional intra-relational    
Narrow weak regional intra-relational    
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Thus, the best supervenience accounts (i.e. those that do not suffer from an Ob-1 type objection) 
do not adequately capture the dependence of the social on the individual. This is problematic 
because if the social were not dependent on the individual in a strong enough sense of 
“depends”, then the social might be said to exist in its own right, independently of the 
individual.  But if this is the case, then we are again threatened with the prospect that groups 
are the reified, strange social consciousness that Social Dualism posits, thereby undermining 
NRI-1 (Ontological Individualism). 
Sawyer might respond by arguing that the supervenience accounts that suffer from an Ob-2 
type objection do put forward some relationship between the social and the individual. To make 
this relationship more robust, and to avoid the charge of reifying the social, we could then 
supplement the supervenience account with NRI-3, or the token-token identity between social 
groups and their members (or the intra-relations among their members). Thus, I move now to 
evaluate NRI-3. 
C.2.b.iii. Token-token identity 
In this section I consider a number of ways that NRI-3 might be interpreted or enriched. I 
conclude by arguing that the best version of NRI-3 struggles to account for the existence of 
groups that, at some point in time, persist despite lacking members.  
NRI-3 is the claim that any given token social phenomenon is identical with a token set of 
individualistic phenomena. Applied to social groups, I can see two obvious construals of this 
claim: 
NRI-3member: any given social group is identical with its members. 
NRI-3member relational: any given social group is identical with the relations 
among its members. 
Moreover, each of these accounts can be disambiguated, by specifying whether they are de re 
or de dicto claims: 
NRI-3member de re: any given social group is identical with specific members 
M1…Mn. 
NRI-3member de dicto: any given social group is identical with its members, 
whoever they are. 
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NRI-3member de re relational de re: any given social group is identical with the specific 
relations that exist among specific members M1…Mn. 
NRI-3member de re relational de dicto: any given social group is identical with whatever 
relations exist among specific members M1…Mn. 
NRI-3member de dicto relational de re: any given social group is identical with the 
specific relations that exist among its members, whoever those members are. 
NRI-3member de dicto relational de dicto: any given social group is identical with 
whatever relations exist among its members, whoever those members are. 
NRI-3member de re is a de re formulation of NRI-3member, since it claims that a social group is 
identical with a collection of specific members (i.e. M1…Mn). By contrast, NRI-3member de dicto 
is a de dicto formulation because it does not specify precisely who is in the collection of 
individuals with which the group is identical – merely that those individuals are members of 
the group. Moreover, NRI-3member de re relational de re is a de re claim about both the relations that 
exist among group members, and about which members participate in those relations. NRI-
3member de re relational de dicto is less specific, since it involves a de dicto claim about the relations that 
occur among the members of the group, but also contains a de re claim about which members 
participate in those relations. NRI-3member de dicto relational de re is about as specific as NRI-3member de 
re relational de dicto, except that it makes a de re claim about the relations in the group, but a de dicto 
claim about the group’s membership. And finally, NRI-3member de dicto relational de dicto is the least 
specific (and most general) account, since both of its claims, about intra-group relations and 
which members comprise the group, are de dicto. In what follows I argue that only one of the 
above six accounts is prima-facie plausible. 
 Assessing the disambiguations of NRI-3 
Consider the following data: 
Datum1 – coextensional groups: some groups are coextensional; i.e. there may 
be two numerically distinct groups that have the same members (e.g. the 
Howick rugby team-choir example). 
Datum2 – changing membership: most groups undergo changes in 
membership over time (e.g. members may join or leave the ANCYL). 
Datum3 – changing intra-relations: groups are forever in flux, not just in their 
membership, but also in how a group’s members relate with one another. 
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Datum 1 describes a common-sense intuition about the nature of group identity at a given point 
in time: it is possible for two groups to be coextensional at a given point in time. Thus, any 
account that wishes to satisfy Synchronic (i.e. be consistent with the Folk Sociological intuitions 
about the synchronic identity of groups) should be consistent with datum 1. Data 2 and 3, by 
contrast, are two intuitions we have regarding the diachronic identity of social groups: social 
groups may endure changing membership, and changing member intra-relations. As an example 
of Datum 3, consider that although the ANCYL today provides a voice for the masses of black 
youth in South Africa, it might change radically, such that in future the league no longer takes 
an interest in the majority of black youth, but instead adopts policies that support higher-class 
South African youth regardless of their race. In this case, while today’s league members relate 
in such a way that they promote the interests of the majority of black youth, the future league’s 
members relate in such a way that they promote the interests of upper-class South African 
youth. 
Hence, any account that wishes to provide an adequate criterion for the diachronic individuation 
of social phenomena should be consistent with data 1 through 3. I argue now, however, that 
only one of the six disambiguated accounts is consistent with all three data.  
Both the de re and de dicto versions of NRI-3member fail to accommodate the coextensionality 
of groups. I will assume that identity is a transitive relation (see Williamson, 1998, sec. 1). 
That is, if x is identical with y, and y is identical with z, it follows that x is identical with z. 
However, it is not the case that the relation between every social group and its members is 
transitive. Recall the Howick rugby team, whose members are also the members of the Howick 
choir. In this case (assuming NRI-3member de re or NRI-3member de dicto is correct), the rugby team is 
identical with its members, and its members are identical with the male choir. Thus, on NRI-
3member de re or NRI-3member de dicto, the rugby team and the male choir are identical. But this is 
counterintuitive: the rugby team and the male choir are numerically and qualitatively distinct 
social groups. Thus, NRI-3member de re and NRI-3member de dicto are inconsistent with the 
coextensionality of groups. 
We can accommodate the coextensionality of groups, though, by turning to the four NRI-3member 
relational accounts. Consider again the rugby-choir counterexample. Although the two groups’ 
membership is identical, the members relate differently in the two groups: the rugby players’ 
relations with one another qua members of the rugby team centre around playing rugby, while 
the choir members’ relations qua choir members involve singing. NRI-3member relational accounts 
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therefore accommodate coextensional groups. There are further problems, however, for the 
NRI-3member relational accounts. 
Notice that any account that makes a de re claim about the members with which a group is 
identical will struggle to account for the changing membership of social groups, since these 
accounts claim that a group is identical with a specific (i.e. unchanging) set of members.110 On 
the popular view of identity, identity operates according to Leibniz’s Law, which states that if 
x=y and x has property F, then y also has property F [see Kripke (1981) for a defence of this 
view of identity]. Now suppose that at a given point in time t1, a social group g is composed of 
individual members M1…M100. Moreover, suppose that the first moment that all of 
M1…M100 exist as members of the group is at t0, and that the moment when at least one of 
M1…M100 ceases to be a member of the group is at t2. If NRI-3member de re is true, then g is 
identical with members M1…M100, and therefore, by Leibniz’s Law, g comes into existence 
at t0, and ceases to exist at t2, since the set of members M1…M100 has the properties of coming 
into existence (as members) at t0, and ceasing to exist (as members) at t2. However, it does not 
follow that just because g has members M1…M100 at t0, g only came into existence at t0. For 
example, the ANCYL, although it has a particular set of members now, came into existence 
long before all of the current members joined the group – when the group started, it was much 
smaller, with different members. Moreover, it is not the case that just because g has members 
M1…M100 at t0 but not at t2, that g will cease to exist at t2; since if this were the case, then 
the ANCYL would cease to exist every time it lost a member. But this contradicts the 
fundamental Folk Sociological intuition that the ANCYL persists through time. Thus, NRI-
3member de re, NRI-3member de re relational de re, and NRI-3member de re relational de dicto all fail to accommodate 
the changing membership of groups.111, 112 
                                                 
110 See section C.2.b.iii. Copp’s account (p. 142) for a discussion of mereological sums, which for my purposes 
here, are sets. 
111 Notice though that changing membership is not a problem for the accounts that provide a de dicto claim about 
group membership, since these accounts merely require that groups are identical with some members (or their 
interrelations), whoever they are. 
112 In response, Sawyer could deny that Leibniz’s Law applies to contexts other than the present moment [much 
as Gibbard (1975, p. 201) denies the applicability of Leibniz’s Law to non-actual contexts and dispositional 
properties]. Thus, while it may be true that if x=y and x is F now, then y is F now, it is false that if x=y and x is F 
at t2 (where t2 is a specific time other than now), then y is F at t2. This would be consistent with the idea that while 
a group g is identical with M1…M100 at t0, at t2 g may be identical with M1…M99 instead. There are two 
problems with this move, however. First, this denial of Leibniz’s Law is ad hoc. And second, the denial of 
Leibniz’s Law would render the relational accounts highly controversial. 
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Finally, consider the third datum. The two accounts that make de re claims about the member 
intra-relations with which a group is identical, are inconsistent with the intuition that groups 
endure changing intra-relations among their members. Consider the case of the ANCYL, 
which, at the start of writing this dissertation, had radical policies geared towards 
nationalisation of key industries in South Africa. Moreover, to enact those policies, the party 
was run in a particular fashion, with some or all of the members relating such that they worked 
towards bringing about that policy.113 Let x abbreviate the ANCYL, and let y be the set of intra-
group relations that existed in x at the start of writing this dissertation. Then, on NRI-3member de 
re relational de re and NRI-3member de dicto relational de re, x is identical with y, and so, by Leibniz’s Law, 
the moment that y ceases to exist (i.e. the set of intra-group relations in the ANCYL changes 
either by addition or subtraction of an element), x ceases to exist. But this conclusion is 
counterintuitive, since over time, we can imagine that although the league’s overarching goal 
of supporting the masses remains the same, the group’s policies may soften somewhat, leading 
to change in the way the party is run. Indeed, this is precisely what has happened. Since Julius 
Malema was removed as the league’s leader due to his radical politics, the league’s goals have 
softened. Thus, it seems that the intra-group relations of the very same party have changed – a 
contradiction on NRI-3member de re relational de re and NRI-3member de dicto relational de re, assuming 
Leibniz’s law is correct. 
Thus, only one (the least specific) of the six accounts considered is consistent with all three 
data: NRI-3member de dicto relational de dicto. Now, I wish to consider two enrichments to NRI-3 that 
Sawyer could have used (but didn’t): Copp’s account, and Baker’s account of constitution. 
After I have presented these two alternative accounts, I will object to these two accounts 
together with NRI-3member de dicto relational de dicto using a further datum that, I will argue, none of the 
accounts can accommodate. 
 Copp’s account 
Copp holds that a social group is identical with “mereological sums” of “person-stages” linked 
by a “unity relation” (see Sheehy, 2006a, pp. 21-22, 46-51). A mereological sum of entities 
<a…n> is that entity which includes each of a…n, and nothing else. For example, the 
                                                 
113 This is a weakened statement of the narrow teleological account of intra-group relations discussed in section 
B.2.c. Teleological account (p. 50). It is weaker than the narrow teleological account, because this formulation 
only requires that some of the group members work towards the group’s goals, while the narrow account requires 
that all of the group members work towards the group’s goals. 
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mereological sum “the people on the Wits Central Block concourse” includes every person 
walking on the concourse, but does not include anyone not on the concourse. A person-stage is 
a time-slice of a person – i.e. it is a person as at a specific point in time. Finally, the unity 
relation that binds the mereological sums of person stages will differ from group to group, and 
is determined by the most important features of the group under consideration. 
Consider Copp’s account of a nation. At every successive moment in South Africa’s existence, 
it is composed of a mereological sum of individuals (i.e. South Africans). Let those moments 
be called <t1…tn>. Now, let the time-slice of South Africans that exist at tj be called SAj. 
Moreover, for Copp, the key features of a nation are its history and tradition. Then, on Copp’s 
account, South Africa (qua social group, rather than qua institution) is identical with 
<SA1…SAn>, where SA1…SAn are unified, or bound, by historical and traditional continuity. 
To conclude, if Sawyer were to adopt Copp’s analysis, then NRI-3 would read: 
NRI-3Copp: any given token social group is identical with a token set of 
mereological sums of person-stages linked by the appropriate unity relation. 
Fortunately, Copp’s account is consistent with all three data considered. First, Copp’s account 
is consistent with coextensional groups. Consider again the rugby-choir counterexample. 
Although the rugby team and choir have identical members, they have distinct unity relations 
that unify their mereological sums. The unity relation of the rugby team is something like, 
“plays rugby for the town”, while the choir’s unity relation is “sings for the town’s male choir”. 
Hence, although the two groups possess the same members, they will not be identical on Copp’s 
account. (Two groups are identical on Copp’s account only if they possess identical unity 
relations). Second, Copp designed his account to accommodate changes in group membership 
while retaining Leibniz’s Law. Because each mereological sum is a time-slice of the members 
in the group, while at t1 the mereological sum MS1 contains a time-slice of a certain set of 
members, a future mereological sum MS2 at t2 may contain the person-stages of a different set 
of members (provided MS1 and MS2 are linked by the appropriate unity relation). Since Copp 
is not claiming that MS1 and MS2 are identical (but are merely connected by the appropriate 
unity relation), Leibniz’s Law does not imply that MS1 and MS2 must have the same properties. 
Hence, even assuming that Leibniz’s Law is correct, there is no contradiction in asserting that 
MS1 and MS2 have distinct members, and therefore, that a group can change its membership 
over time. And last, Copp’s account accommodates the fact that a group can survive changes 
in its members’ intra-relations, since the account makes no reference to the members’ intra-
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relations in its specification of the elements in the mereological sums with which the group is 
identical. 
Nonetheless, Copp’s account faces two objections. First, on Copp’s account, some mere 
aggregates would count as social groups, and so, Copp’s account fails to satisfy Aggregation. 
Consider the case of the lunch-eaters and class-goers on the Central Block concourse. For each 
moment on a weekday afternoon there is a mereological sum of person-stages where those 
persons are individuals on the concourse. Moreover, the unity relation that links these 
mereological sums together is the property of “being on Wits Central Block concourse”. 
Therefore, on Copp’s account, the lunch-eaters and class-goers are a social group. Or, to take a 
different example, consider persons who wear black shoes: the mereological sums of their 
person-stages can be linked by the unity relation of “wearing black shoes”, and so, on Copp’s 
account, there is a black-shoes-wearers social group. Yet, it is counterintuitive that the lunch-
eaters and class-goers, and the black-shoe-wearers, are social groups. The problem, then, is that 
since mere aggregates of individuals can possess a unity relation, mere aggregates will be 
incorrectly included as social groups on Copp’s account. 
Copp, therefore, will need to specify limitations, or necessary conditions, on what counts as a 
unity relation that unifies a social group. To do this, he would likely turn to the teleological 
solution to Q1: the unity relation involves working towards a common goal. I have argued, 
however, that the teleological account suffers from its own problems. 
Second, Sheehy (2006a, p. 48) points out that Copp’s account claims that social groups are a 
special sort of mereological sum (specifically, mereological sums of person-stages linked by a 
unity relation). But, a mereological sum is an entity, specifically, that entity which overlaps its 
parts and nothing else. But if Copp is claiming that social groups are entities, then we are once 
again reifying the social, thereby contradicting NRI-1 (Ontological Individualism), resulting in 
the objections faced by Social Dualists [discussed in section C.2.a. Social Dualism (p. 119)]. 
 Constitution 
An alternative to identity is to use a different sort of relation, namely, constitution. According 
to L. R. Baker (2000) and Johnston (1992), constitution and identity are distinct relations. 
However, this is not to say that if x constitutes y, then x and y exist as separate entities. Rather, 
constitution is a “third category, intermediate between identity and separate existence” L. R. 
Baker (2000, p. 29), meant to capture the notion that it is possible that although x and y occupy 
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the same space at t1, at t2 x and y do not. Substituting constitution for identity in NRI-3 results 
in: 
NRI-3constitution: any given social group is constituted by its members. 
Like Copp’s account, the constitution view is consistent with Data 1 through 3 given above. 
First, constitution is not a transitive relation (L. R. Baker, 2000, pp. 45-46), thereby avoiding 
the rugby-choir counterexample. Second, the constitution account is consistent with changes in 
group membership, since on this account although at t0 the group g and it members M1…M100 
occupy the same space, at t2 they may not (some of M1…M100 may have left the group, and 
others may have joined). Third, the constitution view does not require that members relate in a 
certain way, and so, it is consistent with changing member intra-relations. And finally, in 
addition to the account being consistent with the three data, Baker argues that if x constitutes y, 
then y derives, or inherits, a host of causal properties from x that x would not have had if x had 
not constituted y (L. R. Baker, 2000, p. 41). This seems to be a good way of grounding the 
agency of social groups in their members, since social groups derive their capacity for agency 
from their individual members, but their individual members would not have been capable of 
group agency if they were not members of (i.e. did not constitute) the group. 
Despite these advantages, however, NRI-3constitution is problematic. What exactly is constitution 
if it is not identity? L. R. Baker (2000) provides what is probably the most popular account of 
constitution, and the most commonly used account of constitution in the social ontology 
literature (see A. Baker, 2008; Laitinen, 2013; Wilson, 2005). A slightly simplified version114 
of her account runs as follows: 
Baker’s account of constitution: Let F and G be the “primary kinds” of x and 
y respectively, where F and G are distinct; let “G-favourable” circumstances 
be those circumstances required for something to be G; and let D be G-
favourable circumstances. Then, x constitutes y at time t just in case all of C1 
through C5 are satisfied: 
(C1)  x and y occupy the same space at t; 
(C2)  x is in D at t; 
(C3)  It is necessary that for any z, if z is F and z is in D at t, then some u 
exists such that u is G at t and u occupies the same space as z; 
                                                 
114 Baker employs not only the notion of a primary property (“F”), but also the notion of the property of having F 
as one’s primary property (“F*”). This distinction is irrelevant for the criticisms I present against the account, so I 
have omitted it. 
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(C4)  It is possible that: x exists at t, while nothing occupying the same 
space as x at t is G; and 
(C5)  If y is immaterial, then x is also immaterial. 
Note that for Baker, the “primary kind” of x is that kind of thing that x is essentially, or 
“fundamentally” (2000, p. 38). That is, it would be impossible for x to exist unless it were an 
instance of that primary kind. 
How might Baker’s schema be applied to social groups and their members? Taking the ANCYL 
as an example, x would stand for the league’s members, y would substitute the league itself, D 
would be the political climate in South Africa that permits the existence of the league (such as 
the existence of its parent body, the ANC), and G would be the kind “a radical political youth 
party”. But we run into a problem when we attempt to specify the primary kind F of the ANCYL 
members. Perhaps we would want to say something like: the primary kind of the league 
members is the kind “an ANCYL member”. But being an ANCYL member is not a primary 
kind, since it is entirely possible for the individuals who make up the ANCYL not to belong to 
the league. That is, we can conceive of a possible world where this set of individuals exists, but 
they do not belong to the ANCYL (perhaps the league does not exist in that world). 
So, the primary kind of the individuals who make up the youth-league would have to be 
something far more fundamental to their existence, like being “a human being”. But, if this is 
the primary kind of the members of the league, then the schema does not work, since C3 is 
false. Substituting the ANCYL case into C3 results in C3`: 
(C3`) It is necessary that for any collection of human beings, if the collective 
is in the current political climate in South Africa, then there is a 
radical political youth party that occupies the same space as the 
collective. 
C3` is false, since it entails that every human being in South Africa at present is part of a radical 
youth party, which is patently not the case. 
The problem, then, with utilising Baker’s schema of constitution to characterise the relation 
between social groups and their members, is that group members cannot be awarded a primary 
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kind that satisfies the schema.115 Perhaps, though, the proponent of the constitution view could 
make a move similar to that made by the identity theorist above – that is, claim that groups are 
constituted by their members’ intra-relations (rather than by the members themselves): 
NRI-3intra-relational constitution: any given social group is constituted by the intra-
relations among its members. 
This is a better account, since this refinement yields a plausible application of C3. Again, taking 
the ANCYL as an example, x, y, D and G are as before. The difference now is that F would 
abbreviate whatever kind of relation is essential among members of the ANCYL (i.e. whatever 
results from the correct answer to the individual-individual problem). Let us call this kind of 
relation, R. Thus, we reach: 
(C3``) It is necessary that for any collection of individuals who relate in an 
R-manner, if the collective is in the current political climate in South 
Africa, then there is a radical political youth party that occupies the 
same space as the collective. 
This claim, it seems, is correct. Indeed, assuming that there is an adequate answer to Q1, it must 
be correct, since an adequate solution to the Q1 would specify R such that R is sufficient for 
the existence of a radical political party. 
 Absent members 
Let us review the various NRI-3 accounts discussed so far. I began by arguing that Sawyer’s 
initial NRI-3 is six-ways ambiguous. However, I argued that only one of the six 
disambiguations of the account – NRI-3member de dicto relational de dicto – accommodates all three data 
discussed (the coextensionality, changing membership, and changing member intra-relations of 
groups). I then proceeded to discuss Copp’s account, which I argued fails to satisfy 
Aggregation. Finally, I explored how Baker’s notion of constitution might be applied to the 
social-individual problem. I argued that if we construct the constitution account in terms of 
member intra-relations, we arrive at an account that solves all of the problems faced by the 
previous accounts. Thus, there are two serious contenders for being adequate reformulations of 
NRI-3: NRI-3member de dicto relational de dicto and NRI-3intra-relational constitution. Unfortunately, however, 
                                                 
115 Of course one might develop a different account of constitution, but this is beyond the scope of the dissertation. 
It suffices to say that much more work has to be done by the Non-Reductive Individualist before we should adopt 
NRI-3constitution. 
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
148 
both of these accounts face a further objection, which gives some evidence for concluding that 
the accounts are counter-intuitive. This further objection rests upon a fourth datum: 
Datum4 – absent members: some groups endure periods without members. 
To support the datum, consider the following case. Suppose John Smith runs a chess club in 
2005, called the “Knights of War”. The Knights of War possesses a number of members who 
meet weekly. However, due to the increase in popularity of other board games, like Go and 
Backgammon, and the popularity of other chess clubs in the area, the club slowly loses its 
members until only John remains. Unfortunately, John eventually dies as well. A few months 
after his death, John’s son comes across the documents pertaining to the Knights of War, which 
are still legally valid, and decides, in his father’s honour, to grow the club. Slowly, the Knights 
of War grows in size, and within a few years, it returns to its former glory. Now, what has 
happened here? 
My intuition is that the very same club, the Knights of War, at t1 (in 2005) possesses members, 
at t2 (upon John’s death) lacks any members at all, and at t3 (today) possesses members yet 
again. Thus, from t1 to t3 the club never ceases to exist, although at t2 it lacks any members 
and hence lacks any member intra-relations. But this is inconsistent with NRI-3member de dicto 
relational de dicto and NRI-3interrelational constitution. On these two accounts, the Knights of War must, at 
every given point in time in its existence, be (respectively) identical with or constituted by some 
set of member intra-relations. Yet, at t2, the Knights of War both exists, and is not identical 
with, nor constituted by, any set of members or member intra-relations. 
Sawyer might respond to the counterexample by denying the fourth datum – i.e. by denying my 
intuition that the Knights of War persists from t1 through to t3 inclusively. I take it that there 
are three possible interpretations of what might be happening in the counterexample, namely, 
that the Knights of War: 
Int-1) exists at t1, at t2, and at t3; 
Int-2) exists at t1, ceases to exist at t2, and then returns to existence at t3; or 
Int-3) exists at t1, ceases to exist at t2, and a numerically distinct chess club (i.e. not the 
Knights of War) comes into existence at t3. 
The objection I presented asserts Int-1, but Sawyer may hold either Int-2 or Int-3 instead. I 
consider Int-2 and Int-3 in turn. 
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Sawyer might support Int-2 by citing an apparently parallel case. Suppose Smith is in a car 
accident, and his heart stops for a minute before paramedics are able to revive him. Thankfully, 
Smith goes on to make a full recovery. Then, we would describe the situation by saying that 
Smith exists before the accident (t1), ceases to exist while his heart stops (t2), and exists again 
after he is resuscitated (t3). It seems the Knights of War case is much the same as Smith’s case, 
thereby supporting Int-2. 
I would deny, however, that Smith ceases to exist at t2. It is interesting that doctors only call 
the “time of death” of a patient after they have failed to resuscitate the patient. The reason 
behind this is that we possess the intuition that a person can only die once. It is true that Smith’s 
body is “technically” dead at t2, since his heart has stopped. However, to take this “technical” 
death to imply non-existence appears hasty in light of the fact that Smith may still be 
resuscitated. Only once all attempts at resuscitation have failed would we want to declare 
Smith’s time of death, and so, declare the non-existence of Smith. 
There is an interesting refinement of the heart-stopping case, however, which may render an 
Int-2 type interpretation. Consider a person who is cryogenically frozen at death, and then, 
decades later, is revived. Here we may be more inclined to say that the person exists before his 
death (at t1), does not exist while frozen (at t2), and returns to existence when revived (at t3). 
Why should we think, however, that the cryogenics case is any different from “temporary” 
death? The timeframe is longer, but the principle is the same: in both cases, we resuscitate the 
same person whose heart stopped previously. If the Int-2 proponent insists on his intuition in 
this case, however, I am prepared to concede that an Int-2 type interpretation of the cryogenics 
case may be the correct interpretation, yet I deny that the cryogenics case is a good analogy for 
the Knights of War case. The difference between Smith’s case and the cryogenics case is the 
duration of discontinuity involved: Smith’s heart and brain stop for a minute, while the 
cryogenic patient’s heart and brain activity cease for decades. This significant difference in 
duration seems to result in a categorical distinction between the two cases – Smith exists at t2, 
while the cryogenic patient does not exist at t2. The question, then is, does the Knights of War 
case parallel Smith’s case, or the cryogenics case? If the former, then Int-2 is not supported; if 
the latter, then Int-2 is supported. The answer to this question, however, is easy: the Knight’s 
of War case parallels Smith’s case. The reason for this is that we can construct the case in such 
a way that the club has only a relatively short time without members (for example, a week, 
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
150 
rather than a few months).  Thus, neither Smith’s case nor the cryogenics case provides 
convincing support for the Int-2 interpretation of the Knights of War case. 
Moreover, Int-2 itself (rather than its supporting argument) faces an objection. Why should we 
think that the very same club exists at t1 and t3, if there is no continuity between the club at t1 
and t3? Identifying x as existing at both t1 and t3, it seems, requires some criterion that continues 
in some form or other between t1 and t3 – and continuity is entirely lacking in the Int-2 
interpretation. In the cases of John and the cryogenics patient we can use bodily continuity to 
link the persons at t1 and t3. However, we cannot use the members or their intra-relations as 
criteria of continuity between t1 and t3. It seems magical that the same (i.e. numerically 
identical) group that existed at t1 pops back into existence at t3, despite it failing to exist at t2. 
Why does the Knights of War pop back into existence at t3, and not some other, numerically 
distinct, chess club come into existence at t3? The Int-2 proponent might provide two answers.  
First, the Int-2 proponent might point out that the name of the club at t1 and t3 is the same – i.e. 
the “Knights of War” – and this allows the same group to come into existence at t3. But the 
name of a social group is not a good diachronic identity criterion for the group, since, firstly, a 
group may endure a change in its name; and secondly, distinct groups may have the same name. 
Second, the Int-2 proponent could argue, following Searle, that the society in which the Knights 
of War exists collectively agrees that the Knights of War exist at t1, ceases to exist at t2, and 
then exists again at t3. That is, Sawyer could appeal to a Searlian solution to Q1 to support Int-
2. However, in addition to the objections already presented against Searle’s account, there is a 
problem with this solution. Why should we think that society would hold Int-2? Making this 
claim begs the question against the Int-1 and Int-3 proponents, since it presupposes that the 
Folk Sociological intuition in this case is Int-2, and not Int-1 or Int-3. But this is precisely the 
question at issue here. 
I move, therefore, to consider Int-3. Notice that this interpretation does not have the continuity 
problem faced by Int-2, for it does not require that the Knights of War resumes its existence at 
t3, and so, does not need to explain how the Knights of War comes back into existence at t3. 
Nevertheless, Int-3 has a different problem, namely, that it conflicts with John’s son’s feelings 
and actions, as well as legal precedent. John’s son chooses to grow the club precisely because 
it was his father’s club, the Knights of War. We can imagine that as the club grows, John’s son 
feels proud of continuing his father’s legacy (rather than starting a new one). When John tells 
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the history of the club, he tells of the activity of the club under his father’s leadership. And 
when he does so, nobody corrects him – nobody tells him that this is not the same club his father 
started. Moreover, suppose that John initially registered the club as a closed corporation. 
Today’s growing club has exactly the same CC number as the original, and indeed, is 
considered the same club by law (see Grant Thornton, 2011, p. 12). Thus, while Int-2 suffers 
from the problem of identifying the club over time despite its lacking continuity, Int-3 seems 
to fly in the face of various common-sense and legal intuitions we have about the case. 
To defend Int-3, Sawyer might concede that although it is true that the chess club that exists at 
t1 and t3 is considered legally to be numerically identical, the club at t1 and the club at t3 are 
numerically distinct if considered as social groups. The point made here is that the identity 
criteria for a legal entity and a social group are different. This response, however, raises a 
dilemma. At t1 when the club is not an exceptional case because it has members, is the legal 
entity “Knights of War” numerically distinct from the social group “Knights of War”? 
If Sawyer asserts that the legal and social clubs are numerically identical at t1, then he must 
explain how they are no longer numerically identical at t2 (and t3) – i.e. how does the legal 
entity survive despite the death of the social group? Such an explanation would be difficult; but 
furthermore, any such explanation will violate Leibniz’s Law, and so, be controversial. 
On the other horn of the dilemma, if Sawyer claims that the social club and the legal club are 
numerically distinct, then he faces the following problem. It does not seem that the legal 
Knights of War is numerically distinct from the social Knights of War, since the rules for 
joining, maintaining membership and leaving the Knights of War are the same for both clubs – 
e.g. joining involves signing certain disclaimers, maintaining membership involves paying 
membership fees, and leaving the club involves the failure to pay membership fees or sending 
a written letter with the intent to terminate membership. Given these coincidences, why should 
we think that the two clubs (legal and social) are numerically distinct? 
Sawyer might answer this question by arguing that at t1 the legal Knights of War is constituted 
by the social Knights of War, but this is not the case at t2 and t3. However, recall the third 
condition in Baker’s account of what it means for x to constitute y: 
(C3)  It is necessary that for any z, if z is F and z is in D at t, then some u 
exists such that u is G at t and u occupies the same space as z; 
Applying this condition to the Knights of War case results in: 
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(C3```) It is necessary that for any social chess club, if it has multiple 
members, then there is a legal entity that occupies the same space as 
the social chess club. 
Unfortunately for Sawyer, C3``` is false, since it is not the case that every chess club with 
multiple members is a legal entity: it seems conceivable that at least some chess clubs with 
members may not be registered as closed corporations or companies. 
A different way for Sawyer to handle the Knights of War case is to accept my intuition (Int-1), 
but refine the two NRI-3 accounts. Notice that although a group can survive having no members 
at some point in its existence, a group must have members at some time or another. So, Sawyer 
might, instead of biting the bullet, refine the two strongest candidate reformulations of NRI-3 
as follows: 
NRI-3`member de dicto relational de dicto: any given social group is identical, at some 
point in time, with whatever relations exist among its members, whoever those 
members are. 
NRI-3`intra-relational constitution: any given social group is constituted by the intra-
relations among its members at some point in time. 
These refinements, however, undermine NRI-2 (the claim that social phenomena supervene 
upon individual phenomena). Any adequate account of what it means for H to supervene upon 
L must capture the intuition that if H supervenes upon L, L determines H (Kim, 1984, p. 153). 
The problem with NRI-3`member de dicto relational de dicto and NRI-3`interrelational constitution is that on these 
accounts the individual does not determine the social at all times: sometimes, other factors 
determine the social. At t2, it is not the members of the Knights of War that determine its 
existence as a social group, but rather, other non-member-related factors (perhaps legal factors). 
And if the individual does not determine the social, then the logical gap between the group and 
its members widens, making it hard to understand just how it is possible for the agency, 
responsibility, value and persistence of groups (especially value in the case of the Knights of 
War at t2) to be grounded in the agency, responsibility, value and persistence of its members. 
 Conclusion 
So, where does this leave the Non-Reductive Individualist? I have argued that NRI-3member de 
dicto relational de dicto and NRI-3intra-relational constitution cannot accommodate the fourth datum (that social 
groups have the capacity to survive periods in which they lack any members). However, 
although I defended this datum, and argued that alternative interpretations of cases like the 
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Knights of War are problematic, I concede that the datum remains somewhat controversial. 
Therefore, I do not think that I have provided a knock-down objection to the two best versions 
of NRI-3. Nevertheless, I believe that I have shown that these reformulations of NRI-3 should 
be regarded as contentious. 
Table 3 summarises the accounts considered thus far, and the data with which they are 
consistent: 
Table 3: Variations of NRI-3 
Account 
Coextensio
nal groups 
Changing 
member-
ship 
Changing 
relations 
Absent 
members Other objections 
NRI-3member de re      
NRI-3member de dicto      
NRI-3member de re relational de re      
NRI-3member de re relational de dicto      
NRI-3member de dicto relational de re      
NRI-3member de dicto relational de 
dicto 
     
NRI-3Copp     
Reifies groups; counts 
mere aggregates as 
groups 
NRI-3consituition     
Cannot apply Baker’s  
schema (C3) 
NRI-3intra-relational constitution      
So, none of the formulations of NRI-3 considered is clearly adequate, since none of the accounts 
is consistent with all of the four data, and all of the accounts are inconsistent with the existence 
of groups with absent members. I conclude therefore that NRI-3 is contentious. Moreover, I 
argued earlier that no supervenience account adequately captures the dependence of the social 
on the individual, and so, NRI-2 is weak. Non-Reductive Individualism, then, offers a 
contentious account of the relation between the social and the individual. 
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C.3. REDUCTION 
Recall that non-reductive accounts claim that: 
R1) The social exists; 
R2) The social and the individual are logically or conceptually independent; and  
R3) Social terms can refer successfully to entities in the world. 
The problem, we have seen, is that non-reductive accounts struggle to provide an account of 
the independence between social and individual phenomena (i.e. R2) that neither reifies the 
social (as on Social Dualism), nor provides a link between the social and the individual that 
excludes certain types of legitimate social phenomena (i.e. the problem of absent members as 
faced by Non-Reductive Individualism). Thus, since we failed to find a convincing non-
reductive account of the social, I move now to consider our first category of reductive accounts. 
Reductive accounts deny R2 (the independence of the social). Instead, they hold that the social 
domain can be “absorbed” into the individual domain (Kim, 1998b, sec. 1). However, what I 
call “reduction” involves the conservation of the social, rather than its elimination, and so, 
reductive accounts affirm R1 and R3.  
The advantage of a reductive account is that if it is successful, it shows that the social domain 
is “grounded” in the individual domain, and so, the social sciences are no less legitimate than 
the individualistic sciences. Moreover, if the social can be reduced to the physical, then social 
entities are nothing but sets of individual entities, thereby avoiding the possibility of reifying 
the social. 
I will consider three reductive accounts in order of their plausibility, from least to most 
plausible: Logical Individualism, Type Individualism and Social Functionalism. 
C.3.a. Logical Individualism 
Logical Individualists, such as Neurath (1944) and Quinton (1975-76), hold that every social 
concept or social term is translatable without loss of meaning into, and hence can be fully 
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defined in terms of, individualistic concepts or individualistic terms.116 Thus, Logical 
Individualism (or Analytic Individualism) claims that the meaning of every concept of a social 
phenomenon can be specified by reference to purely individualistic concepts or terms. Hence, 
to determine whether Logical Individualism is correct, we need not conduct empirical research 
into social phenomena; rather, we should carefully analyse our social concepts. On this account 
the reduction of the social to the individual is analytic117, a priori118 and necessary119. 
Neurath (1944) supports this account of the social in much the same way that the Philosophical 
Behaviourists support their account of mind.120 Philosophical Behaviourists argue that (i) we 
verify mental statements (i.e. statements about mental states) by observing behaviour. For 
example, we verify the statement that “John is in pain” by observing pain-behaviour in John 
(he winces, screams in a certain way, exclaims “ouch!”, etc.).  Moreover, (ii) the meaning of a 
proposition is constituted by its verification conditions – that is, Verificationism (also known 
as Logical Positivism) is true. The Philosophical Behaviourist concludes from (i) and (ii) that 
every mental term or concept is identical with a set of behavioural terms or concepts. Thus, the 
concept of pain just is the concept of someone who winces, screams or exclaims “ouch!”. 
Similarly, Neurath argues that (i) we verify social statements by observing individualistic 
phenomena (1944, p. 3). Moreover, (ii) Verificationism is true (1944, p. 4).121 And therefore, 
every social concept or term can be translated into individualistic concepts or terms. 
There are two problems with Logical Individualism. First, subsequent to Neurath’s work, 
Verificationism has received significant criticism as a theory of meaning, and is largely 
regarded today as dubious.122 Thus, the support for Logical Individualism is highly 
                                                 
116 Logical Individualism parallels the Philosophical Behaviourist account of mind. Philosophical Behaviourism, 
also known as Logical Behaviourism or Analytic Behaviourism, is the thesis that mental concepts can be translated 
without remainder into behavioural concepts. 
117 P is an analytic truth iff P is true in virtue of the meaning of the concepts involved, and not in virtue of facts 
about the world. 
118 P is an a priori truth iff P can be known independently of experience. 
119 P is a necessary truth iff P is true in every possible world. 
120 See Neurath (1944, pp. 16-17) for a discussion of the parallels between Logical Individualism and Philosophical 
Behaviourism. 
121 Neurath does not use the term Verificationism, but he writes in the spirit of Verificationism when he writes: 
“Sometimes sentences in which such [social] expressions appear can hardly be connected with observation-
statements and have to be dropped as parts of metaphysical speculations….” (1944, p. 4) Like the Verificationists 
that eschew talk of mental states that cannot be verified through observable behaviour, Neurath eschews talk of 
social concepts that cannot be verified by observing the actions or configurations of individuals. 
122 See Friedman (1998) for a discussion of the history of Verificationism. 
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controversial. Second, Logical Individualism itself (rather than its support) faces a serious 
objection: it cannot account for the holism of the social. 
Mandelbaum (1955 [1973]), Ryan (1970, p. 156), and Kincaid (1986, p. 499) argue that social 
concepts are holistic; that is, any given social concept can only be understood as part of a web 
of other, interrelated social concepts.123 Mandelbaum asks us to imagine that we take a Martian, 
who knows nothing of human society, to the bank. The Martian might wonder what exactly is 
happening upon seeing a human standing behind a glass partition exchanging slips of paper 
with another human on the other side of the partition. We explain that the man behind the 
partition is called a “teller”, who works for a “bank”, and that the slips of paper he passes to the 
“customer” are a form of “money”. We continue by explaining that money is a medium of 
exchange, used by “citizens” of “South Africa”, which is a “country”, etc. Mandelbaum’s point 
is that to understand the meaning of one social concept, we must understand the meanings of 
other social concepts, which in turn can only be understood with reference to other social 
concepts. Thus, every social concept is embedded in the total social conceptual framework: 
…the behaviour of a ‘defendant’ vis-a-vis ‘judge’ is conceptually underpinned; to play one such 
role, it is necessary that others play logically related roles. In this way explaining what one person 
is doing [i.e. which social role he is fulfilling, or which social action he is performing] implies a host 
of conceptually related activities on the part of other people and in explaining even one person’s 
behaviour, we necessarily elaborate a shared conceptual scheme. (Ryan, 1970, p. 156) 
Predicates such as teacher, employee, inmate, soldier, citizen, etc.… involve social terminology as 
well. To have true statements employing these role predicates, we must also have true statements 
about social entities, for there are presumably no inmates without prisons, a judicial system, laws 
and norms, and no teachers without schools etc. Applying any of these role predicates to someone 
seems to presuppose or entail a host of further facts about the social institutions that give them 
meaning. (Kincaid, 1986, p. 499) 
Now if the social is holistic, then social concepts cannot be analysed without remainder into 
individualist terms because these analyses will in turn contain social terms, and the analyses of 
those analyses too will contain social terms, ad infinitum. Hence, Logical Individualism is false. 
Notice that Linguistic Individualism, as I have defined it, is atomistic: each and every social 
concept can receive a purely individualistic definition. Social atomism is therefore difficult to 
hold in light of the objection from holism: how could we possibly define the concept of a teller 
                                                 
123 The doctrine of social holism, as I discuss it in the thesis, should not be confused with a different doctrine that 
often goes by the same name, and is sometimes called “Methodological Holism”. Methodological Holism is the 
thesis that Methodological Individualism is false. I discuss Methodological Individualism in sections A.2.a.i. 
Philosophy of social science (p. 6) and D.2.b.ii. Kemeny-reduction (p. 196). 
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without reference to the concept of a bank? Now, let a “basic” social concept be a social concept 
that can receive a purely individualistic definition. Then, one way that Logical Individualists 
may respond is by dividing the web of social concepts into parts, with each part containing a 
basic social concept which underlies all the other social concepts in that part of the web. We 
might call each of these parts of the web, “molecules”. Then, molecular accounts would reduce 
molecules (or clusters) of social concepts to clusters of individualistic concepts, and avoid an 
infinite regress by grounding the molecule in a basic social concept, and in turn ground that 
basic social concept in a set of individualistic concepts. This molecular reduction is more 
plausible than an atomistic reduction, since the molecular account requires merely that each 
molecule contains a basic social concept, and not that every social concept is basic.  
For example, while the holist’s definition of a teller defines the teller’s role in relation to South 
Africa’s financial system, political system, economic system, and then, global systems of 
finance, politics, etc., a molecular understanding of the bank teller might define the teller’s role 
exclusively in terms of financial concepts (for example), and would stop the definition there 
rather than progress to political and economic terms. Then, financial concepts would be given 
a purely individualistic definition (perhaps this should be the role of economics?). Or, to take a 
different example, the teleological account discussed as a purported solution to the individual-
individual problem is consistent with the molecularist view. The teleological account defines a 
social group in terms of the following limited cluster of concepts: “shared goals” and “collective 
action” and “working together towards a goal”. Then, (at least) one of these concepts shall, on 
a molecularist account, be defined in purely individualistic terms. 
But let us investigate the molecularist’s strategy in more detail. Let SC be a cluster of social 
concepts to be reduced, and let IC be the cluster of individualistic concepts to which the 
molecularist wishes to reduce SC. Then, I take it that if SC can be reduced to IC, then for every 
concept x in SC, either x can be defined exclusively in terms of concepts in IC (without 
reference to any social concepts in SC or outside of SC), or x can be defined in terms of another 
concept y in SC, which can be defined in terms of another concept… z in SC, where z can be 
defined exclusively in terms of concepts in IC. Thus, if SC can be reduced to IC, then there 
must be at least one (basic) concept in SC that can be defined in purely individualistic terms. 
But here is where the problem lies: it is not clear that there are any social concepts that can 
receive an adequate, purely individualistic definition. Consider the Standard versions of the 
teleological account: none of the concepts in the cluster is amenable to a purely individualistic 
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definition. The “group” is defined in terms of the rest of the concepts in the cluster: “collective 
action”, “shared goals”, and “working together towards a goal”. But “collective action”, “shared 
goals” and “working together towards a goal” all utilise the concept of the “we-mode” in their 
respective definitions. And the “we-mode” references the notion of a “we”, or “group”. Thus, 
the Standard teleological accounts do not satisfy the conditions for a cluster reduction, since 
defining social concepts involves a circularity that the molecularist cannot accommodate. 
Indeed, I am sceptical that any account would satisfy the molecularist’s conditions. 
Perhaps the Logical Individualist would point out that although the stronger Standard versions 
of the teleological account would fail to satisfy the molecularist’s conditions for reduction, the 
Weak versions of the teleological account would. The Weak versions holds that one can 
understand the notions of “collective action”, “shared goals”, and “working together towards a 
goal” in terms of the “I-mode”. And the I-mode, according to Tuomela, need not reference the 
notion of a group. Thus, the circularity (problematic for the molecularist) involved in defining 
social terms present in the Standard teleological accounts is absent in the Weak accounts. 
The problem now, however, is that we might doubt whether weak, or I-mode, definitions of 
social concepts are adequate. Recall that the Weak-Broad version of the teleological account 
suffers from the problem of illegitimate agglomeration [see section B.2.c.iv. Broad telos (p. 
59)]. And I argued that social groups that are understood in terms of I-mode, or personal, actions 
of group members, may be indistinguishable from mere aggregates [see section B.2.e. 
Objecting to Objectivism from indistinguishability (p. 65)]. This is a problem because 
teleologists (and I-mode theorists of social groups generally) are Objectivists, and Objectivists 
hold that the features sufficient to unify groups are distinguishable from an outsider’s 
perspective. 
Although the molecular solution is dubious, there are two other ways that the reductivist might 
deal with the objection from holism, both of which accept the holistic nature of the social. For 
one, the reductivist could attempt an empirical, non-conceptual method of reduction. I consider 
this type of reduction in the next section, on Type Individualism. And second, the Logical 
Individualist might notice that social concepts can be defined, rather than individualistically, in 
terms of the functional role they play within Folk Sociology, or the web of social concepts. I 
discuss this solution in section C.3.c. Social Functionalism (p. 170). 
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C.3.b. Type Individualism 
C.3.b.i. The account 
Like Logical Individualists, Type Individualists, such as Mellor (1982) and Van Hees (1997), 
hold that types of social phenomena can be reduced to types of individualistic phenomena. That 
is, types of social groups can be reduced to types of members or types of intra-relations among 
members. However, unlike Logical Individualists, Type Individualists claim that the identity 
between social phenomena and individualistic phenomena is synthetic and a posteriori. On this 
account, then, the reduction of the social to the individual is not conceptual, but rather, 
empirical. Once social scientists have conducted research that yields perfect correlations 
between types of social phenomena and types of individualistic phenomena, we can reduce the 
former to the latter, since we have evidence that terms referring to the former and terms referring 
to the latter are co-extensional (i.e. refer to the same objects). 
Notice that the problem of holism arises for Logical Individualism because its reductive strategy 
uses the intension, or meaning, of social concepts, but the intension of social concepts cannot 
be specified without reference to other social concepts. By contrast, the extension of social 
terms need not refer to other social phenomena – only to individualistic phenomena (or so the 
Type Individualist claims). Thus, by utilising the extension, rather than the intension, of social 
terms in its reductive strategy, Type Individualism avoids the problem of holism. 
If social research yields the conclusion that every type of social phenomenon can be bi-
directionally correlated with a type of individualistic phenomena, then we will have arrived at 
what Nagel (1961) calls “bridge principles” between the social theories and individualistic 
theories. These bridge principles allow us to deduce social laws or social generalisations from 
individualistic laws or individualistic generalisations. So, take, for example, the following 
Durkheimian generalisation: if there is a breakdown in the regulative powers of society, then 
“anomic” suicides occur (see Durkheim, 1951 [1997]). To reduce this social generalisation to 
an individualistic generalisation, we would need two bridge principles that look something like: 
(i) “x is a breakdown in the regulative powers of society iff x is y”, and (ii) “x is anomic suicide 
iff x is z”. y and z would be types of individualistic phenomena that social scientists bi-
conditionally correlate with breakdowns in regulative powers of society and anomic suicide 
(respectively). Then, we can reduce Durkheim’s generalisation to the individualistic 
generalisation: “y → z”. 
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Now on Nagel’s model of reduction, once we can reduce all social generalisations to 
individualistic generalisations using appropriate bridge principles, we will be able to reduce 
Folk Sociology to purely individualistic theories. Some philosophers label the assertion that 
such a reduction is possible, “Methodological Individualism” [see Dore (1961 [1973], p. 77)124, 
Kincaid (1986, p. 493)125 and Mellor (1982, p. 537)126, 127]. This version of Methodological 
Individualism implies that Type Individualism is true, for if we can reduce the social sciences 
(i.e. social generalisations) to individualistic sciences (i.e. individualistic generalisations), then 
types of social phenomena can be reduced to types of individualistic phenomena. 
There is massive debate about the truth of Methodological Individualism [see section A.2.a. 
Types of individualism (p. 3) and section D.2.b.ii. Token Explanatory Methodological 
Individualism (KO-2) (p. 198) for this discussion]. However, rather than assessing 
Methodological Individualism as a premise in a supporting argument for Type Individualism, I 
will focus here on the plausibility of Type Individualism itself, as a solution to the social-
individual problem. I will argue that Type Individualism faces two serious objections: multiple 
realisation and the failure of token identity. If the objections are successful, then Type 
Individualism is unsatisfactory. I consider these two objections in turn. 
First, like proponents of the type identity account of mind, or Central State Materialism 
(CSM)128, Type Individualists face the objection from multiple realisation (see, e.g., Kincaid, 
1986, pp. 496-503; 1996; Little, 1991; Sawyer, 2001, pp. 564-565; 2002, pp. 544-553; 2004, 
pp. 267-269). Fodor (1974, pp. 98-101) formulates the problem as follows. If one domain can 
be reduced to another using Nagel’s model of reduction, the bridge principles involved between 
the two domains must be laws expressing identity statements, and laws always involve natural 
kinds. Following Fodor, N is a natural kind of a domain D iff N is either the antecedent or 
consequent of a law in D. Thus, if we are to reduce the social to the individual, there must be 
                                                 
124 “The methodological individualist doctrine… holds that all sociological laws are bound to be such as can 
ultimately be reduced to laws of individual behaviour” (Dore, 1961 [1973], p. 77). 
125 Kincaid writes that Methodological Individualism asserts that “social theories are reducible to individualistic 
theories” (Kincaid, 1986, p. 493).  
126 “Does sociology reduce in principle to individual psychology? I follow custom in calling the claim that it does 
‘individualism’” (Mellor, 1982, p. 537). 
127 See section A.2.a. Types of individualism (p. 3) for more information on the different theses that fall under 
the label of “Methodological Individualism”, as well as section D.2.b.ii. Token Explanatory Methodological 
Individualism (KO-2) (p. 198) for a discussion of the explanatory version of Methodological Individualism. 
128 The Type Identity account of mind, or Central State Materialism, holds that types of mental states are identical 
with types of brain states. 
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
161 
true statements of the form “S = I”, where S abbreviates a social kind, and I abbreviates an 
individualistic kind. The difficulty, however, is that many social kinds are not amenable to such 
lawful identity statements, since the same type of social phenomenon can be realised variably, 
or instantiated by various types of individualistic phenomena. Sawyer, the most important 
proponent of the multiple realisation objection against Type Individualism, cites churches and 
competitive team sports as examples of natural kinds that are multiply realised: 
The collective entity that has the social property “being a church” also has a collection of individual 
properties associated with each of its component members. For example, each individual In may 
hold properties “believing in Xn” or “intending Yn,” where the sum total of such beliefs and intentions 
are (in some sense) constitutive of the social property “being a church.” Yet the property of “being 
a church” can be realized by a wide range of individual beliefs and dispositions. (2001, p. 557) 
A reduction of the group-level natural kind term “competitive team sport” to natural kind terms of 
individuals would involve the disjunction of all past and potential players’ individual properties, in 
every past and potential competitive team sport, in all of the world’s cultures. (2002, p. 549) 
Sawyer argues that distinct token churches and token competitive team sports are each realised 
by distinct individuals with distinct properties. Thus, because the social kinds “church” and 
“competitive team sport” are realised by a wide variety of individualistic phenomena, it seems 
that the disjunction of all of these individualistic entities (or properties) will be “wild”, or 
heterogeneous. A disjunction of individualistic entities <I1 v I2 v I3…v In> is wild iff it is not 
the case that all of <I1…In> belong to the same individualistic kind. Sawyer concludes, 
therefore, that it is impossible to identify the social kinds “church” and “competitive team sport” 
with specific individualistic kinds. 
Sawyer’s adaptation of Fodor’s multiple realisation objection, so that it applies to Type 
Individualism, might therefore be summarised as follows: 
MR-1s:  If Type Individualism is true, then every social kind is identical with an 
individualistic kind. 
MR-2s: Some social kinds are realised by individualistic entities belonging to distinct 
individualistic kinds. 
_____________ 
Conc: Type Individualism is false. 
Similarly, the parallel objection against CSM runs: 
MR-1m:  If CSM is true, then every mental kind is identical with a bodily kind. 
MR-2m: Some mental kinds are realised by bodily structures belonging to distinct bodily 
kinds. 
_____________ 
Conc: CSM is false. 
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Since the argument is deductively valid, the Type Individualist or Central State Materialist must 
object to at least one of the premises if they wish to resist the conclusion. Hence, there are two 
categories of responses, each objecting to one of the premises. Since responses to the problem 
of multiple realisation have for the most part been explored by Central State Materialists, I 
provide a brief survey of the various responses within these two categories offered by CSM, 
and consider whether any of these might be appropriated successfully by the Type Individualist. 
I begin with objections against MR-1s and MR-1m. 
C.3.b.ii. Objections to MR-1(s/m) 
 Local reduction 
The examples of multiple realisation provided against CSM usually involve the claim that the 
same mental state might be realised by very different physical structures in different species. 
For example, while pain is realised in human beings by C-fibre stimulation (for example), the 
very same feeling of pain might be realised by inflated cavities in the case of Martians. Thus, 
following Lewis (1980), Kim (1992) points out that we might reduce mental states locally, or 
per species, rather than globally, or across all species. That is, we should refine CSM such that 
types of mental states are identical with types of physical states relative to a species; while 
human pain is reduced to C-fibre stimulation, Martian pain is reduced to inflated cavities. 
Hence, the local reduction response involves a refinement of CSM, as follows. Let M be a 
mental kind and let <B1…Bn> be distinct bodily kinds. Then, the refined CSM states: for each 
species, M is identical with exactly one element in <B1…Bn>. 
If we apply this approach directly to Type Individualism, we arrive at the following. Let S be a 
social kind and let <I1…In> be distinct individualistic kinds. Then, the refined Type 
Individualism reads: for each species, S is identical with exactly one element in <I1…In>. This, 
of course, does not avoid the objection from multiple realisation as faced by the Type 
Individualist, since the examples of multiple realisation discussed by Sawyer (churches and 
competitive team sports) all involve multiple realisation within the human species. Thus, if 
Sawyer wishes to adopt Kim’s approach, he would need to define the domain relative to which 
identities between social and individualistic kinds obtain, in terms of something smaller than a 
species. It would be difficult, however, to know exactly what the domains are to which we 
should limit our reduction. For example, do we perform our reduction of competitive team 
sports relative to a country? Yet delineating domains by country does not make sense in our 
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reduction of churches, since the same country could have very different sorts of individuals in 
their various churches. In the mental case we have a simple answer concerning how to delineate 
our reductive domains: via a species. There is no such answer readily available in the social 
case. 
 Even-lower-level reduction 
Another way that Central State Materialists have objected to MR-1m involves arguing that 
CSM identifies types of mental states with types of physical states at the wrong level. On the 
traditional account, types of mental states are identical with types of bodily states, such as brain 
states. However, while there may be multiple realisation of types of mental states by types of 
bodily states, there may not be multiple realisation of types of mental states by types of atomic 
or sub-atomic states (see Bickle, 2003; Bickle, 2013, sec. 2.7; Churchland, 1982; P. S. 
Churchland, 1986, chap. 9). While Martians and humans may possess different bodily states 
when they experience pain, they may very well possess identical microscopic states. Indeed, 
although no Martians have been studied, Bickle points out that cross-species research has 
yielded impressive cross-species similarities at the molecular level involved in memory storage. 
Thus, mental states might be reduced to microscopic, rather than to macroscopic, states. 
Unfortunately, again, this response is unavailable to the Type Individualist. Type Individualism 
identifies types of social phenomena with types of individualistic phenomena. In the case of 
social groups, the “individualistic phenomena” involved are individual persons, their mental 
states, dispositions and actions; or to take another example, when considering social phenomena 
such as money, the individualistic phenomena that constitute them are individual material 
objects (e.g. pieces of paper). Thus, a level below individualistic phenomena would be bodily 
states or microscopic states. But it seems strange, indeed false, to identify types of social groups 
with types of bodily states, or money with types of molecules or atomic structures. Admittedly, 
there are exceptional social groups that must, by definition, have members in certain types of 
bodily states. A group of runners, for example, must have members whose bodily states involve 
running. Yet, for the most part, social groups may comprise members in just about any type of 
bodily state that a human being can adopt. ANCYL members might run, sit, swim, sing, or sleep 
horizontally. Similarly, money, it seems, could be made of just about anything, from silicone 
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to silver. Thus, reducing social phenomena to these lower levels of physical states appears 
impossible. Indeed, money need not be physical at all – consider Bitcoin.129 
Consequently, since the reductive program ultimately wishes to reduce all phenomena (such as 
mental states, bodily states, and chemical states) to those entities posited by physics, there are 
serious doubts raised as to whether social phenomena can possibly enter into such a reductive 
program. Therefore, the proponent of a general reductive strategy is probably better off 
eliminating the social – a suggestion I consider later in the thesis [see section D. Eliminative 
Individualism (p. 188)]. 
C.3.b.iii. Objections to MR-2(s/m) 
Thus far I have provided two traditional CSM responses to MR-1m, and argued that, whether 
or not these responses are helpful for the CSM proponent, neither of these strategies is available 
to the Type Individualist as a response to MR-1s. Perhaps we would do better then to consider 
responses to MR-2s/m. 
 Empirical evidence 
Some proponents of CSM have attacked the major claim in the multiple realisation argument – 
namely, that the same mental kind can be realised by wildly different bodily structures in 
different species (MR-2m). If this premise were correct, so the argument goes, then we should 
see significant inter-species differences in mental processing – yet we do not. Indeed, much 
about the human physiology, and specifically human neurology, is learned by studying other 
animals (see Bechtel & McCauley, 1999; Bickle, 1998; Kim, 1992). For example, we study 
monkeys to understand human visual processing. Indeed, the very basis for much neuroscience 
today, these CSM proponents argue, is the assumption that multiple realisation of mental states 
does not occur. Thus, there is significant empirical evidence that suggests that MR-2m is false. 
Once again, whether or not this response is helpful for the CSM proponent, it has far less value 
for the Type Individualist. Sawyer points out that there is no empirical evidence for any 
significant correlation between types of social phenomena and types of individualistic 
phenomena (2002, p. 551). On the contrary, Sawyer argues, we have good reason to believe 
                                                 
129 Bitcoin is a currency that relies on no central authority or banking system, and has no physical resource against 
which it is backed. Instead, it is transferred directly from one peer (or computer user) to another, by mutual 
agreement (Bitcoin Project, 2014). 
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that no such correlations will be found. Complex system theorists have identified four main 
characteristics of systems which are likely to be wildly disjunctive in their realisation (Sawyer, 
2001, pp. 576-579), and social groups seem to fit these characteristics. Wildly disjunctive 
systems are likely to be: (i) non-aggregative, (ii) non-decomposable, (iii) non-localised, and 
(iv) complex. 
(i) A system is non-aggregative if there is synthesis, or cooperation, among its parts; this is 
obviously a hallmark of our Folk Sociological notion of social groups. (ii) In a non-
decomposable (as opposed to a decomposable) system, the system as a whole has a causal effect 
upon, or impacts, its parts. Again, this is a common feature of social groups, for consider how 
the actions of the state affect its citizens. (iii) A system is localised just in case each of its 
functions corresponds to a physical component. Social groups like churches are non-localised, 
since their various functions may be spread amongst multiple members. For example, the 
function of spreading the word of God might fall upon the shoulders of many, or all, of its 
members. (iv) Finally, the more complex the interactions among the component parts of a 
system the more likely that system will be realised in wildly disjunctive fashion. It should be 
clear that the interactions among the members of a social group are complex for two reasons. 
First, if the interactions were simple, it would be easy to provide an account of which 
interactions provide the principle of unity for the group – but, as we have seen in attempting to 
answer Q1 in section A, this is no easy task. And second, if social groups possess features (i) 
through (iii), this suggests that social groups display significant complexity. So, empirical 
evidence is unlikely to yield an objection to MR-2s. 
 Individuating higher-order kinds 
Some CSM proponents, such as Zangwill (1992, p. 218), make a different objection to MR-2m, 
namely, that in the cases (e.g. inter-species cases) where we supposedly have the same mental 
kind with distinct bodily kind realisations, we may not in fact have the same mental kind. How 
do we know, asks Zangwill, that Martians and molluscs experience the very same pain that we 
do? It seems we do not, and perhaps cannot, know this; and if this is the case, we cannot verify 
MR-2m. 
Yet again, I do not think this strategy can be utilised by the Type Individualist. The problem in 
the mental case seems to be epistemological: we cannot know exactly what type of mental state 
occurs in other creatures because we do not have direct access to their mental states. Whether 
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or not this epistemological claim is true in the case of the mental (and it is a somewhat 
controversial claim), it is not true in the case of the social. Social groups are not internal states 
hidden from public view; rather, on the Folk Sociological view of social groups, they exist as 
publicly accessible entities. Anyone, it might be said, has the potential to see the ANCYL. This 
is because social phenomena are social - they are determined by, or depend upon, more than 
one individual – and so, are not limited to mere private accessibility. 
 Individuating lower-order kinds 
While Zangwill questions how mental kinds (i.e. higher-order kinds) are individuated, Shapiro 
(2000, pp. 643-645) argues that MR-2s/m presupposes a false view about how lower-level kinds 
are individuated. Shapiro argues that in statements of the form, “higher level property or entity 
H is realised by lower-level property or entity L”, the natural kind to which L belongs is 
individuated by, or is determined “relative to”, those causal properties of L which are relevant 
to the telos of H. Therefore, to claim that two lower level properties or entities L1 and L2 belong 
to distinct natural kinds, and that both realise the same higher-order property H, L1 and L2 must 
differ in those properties that contribute to the telos of H. As an example, Shapiro cites the 
higher-order property of being a corkscrew. We might think that this property can be multiply 
realised by aluminium objects as well as steel objects, and that these are distinct physical kinds. 
Yet, Shapiro argues that this is not a genuine case of multiple realisation of the corkscrew by 
different physical kinds, since the aluminium and steel objects do not differ with regards to any 
properties that affect the telos of the corkscrew to open wine-bottles, and so, do not belong to 
distinct physical kinds in this context. 
Similarly, the Type Individualist could argue that Sawyer’s examples do not involve legitimate 
cases where the same social group is realised by individualistic phenomena belonging to distinct 
individualistic kinds, since these individualistic phenomena do not differ in ways that affect the 
telos of the social groups in question. Although different competitive team sports may involve 
different individuals with different psychological states, beliefs, intentions, etc., these 
differences are irrelevant to the telos of the teams: to compete at the sport in question. All of 
the team members will possess the same relevant properties, whatever these are (see R. 
Tuomela, 1990, p. 135, footnote 2). These relevant properties might involve the way that the 
group members interact with one another (e.g. kicking a soccer ball to one another), a belief 
that they are part of the team, and a desire to win. So, all of these individuals will belong to the 
same individualistic kind. 
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Although Shapiro’s response is more promising than any of the previous responses considered 
thus far, since it seems to be equally useful to the Type Individualist and the CSM proponent, 
the response has a serious problem. On Shapiro’s view, lower-order natural kinds are 
individuated relative to the higher-order kinds they realise. For example, steel and aluminium 
belong to the same physical kind “relative to the properties that make them suitable for 
removing corks”, yet “this point does not imply that steel and aluminium never qualify as 
alternative realisations of a kind. Relative to some [higher-order] kinds they may be” (Shapiro, 
2000, p. 644 emphasis in the original). But if lower-order kinds are individuated relative to the 
higher-order kinds they realise, it is impossible to reduce these higher-order kinds to lower-
order kinds, since reduction of H to L requires that L can be individuated, or defined, 
independently of H (Kincaid, 1986, p. 497). Thus, on Shapiro’s analysis, we cannot individuate 
individualistic kinds (or bodily kinds) independently of the social kinds (or mental kinds) they 
realise, and so we cannot reduce the social (or mental) to the individual (or body). Hence, 
whatever the value of Shapiro’s analysis of natural kinds, it has no use for the Type Individualist 
or the Central State Materialist as a response to the problem of multiple realisation. 
 Disjunctive kinds 
There is one final objection to MR-2(s/m) that Kim (1992) offers. Kim argues that just because 
the same higher-order kind may be realised by a number of distinct lower-order entities or 
properties that appear to vary significantly, this does not imply that these lower-order entities 
or properties do not together comprise a natural kind. This is because natural kinds may, Kim 
argues, be disjunctive. For example, the social kind “church” may be realised by hundreds of 
distinct collections of individuals (or intra-relations among individuals), and so, there could be 
a disjunctive individualistic kind of the form <I1 v I2 v I3…v In> with which the social kind 
“church” can be identified. 
The standard objection (see Kim, 1998a, pp. 106-110) against Kim’s position that there may be 
genuinely disjunctive kinds is to argue that natural kinds must, on Fodor’s definition of a natural 
kind [which is generally accepted, even by Kim (1992, p. 9), although perhaps not by Shapiro], 
be capable of functioning in laws. But projectibility is a necessary feature of a law; to say that 
a law is projectible is to say that observation of positive instances of the law in question 
increases our certainty that the law is correct, and increases our certainty that future 
observations will comply with the law. Take for example the law: “If a closed system decreases 
in volume, then the pressure of the system increases”. This law is confirmed by observing 
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instances where we have a closed system which, after decreasing in volume, increases in 
pressure. After each such instance, we become more certain that this law is correct, and that in 
future when we decrease the volume of a closed system, its pressure will increase. The problem 
with laws involving disjunctive kinds is that such laws are not projectible. 
Suppose, for example, that social kinds S1 and S2 are identified by Type Individualists with the 
disjunctive individualistic kinds <I1 v I2 v I3…v In> and <I1* v I2* v I3*…v In*> respectively. 
Moreover, suppose that sociology contains a law L1, “S1  S2”. Then, Type Individualists are 
committed to the claim that L1 can be reduced to the individualistic law L2: “<I1 v I2 v I3…v 
In>  <I1* v I2* v I3*…v In*>”. Now the problem is that it seems that L2 is not a law because 
it is not projectible. Suppose, for example, that we have a case in which we observe that after 
I2 occurs, I3* occurs. Then, in this case, we have an observation consistent with L2, since I2 is 
an antecedent of L2 and I3* is a consequent of L2. Yet, after making this observation, we are 
no more certain that L2 is true, or that L2 will hold in future, since we do not yet know whether 
“I1  I3*” is also correct, or whether “I3  I2*” is correct, or whether “I3  I3*” is correct, 
etc. 
For example, let us return to Durkheim’s generalisation (L1) concerning anomie. Durkheim 
asserts that if there is a breakdown in the regulative powers of a society (S1), then anomie will 
occur (S2). Now, suppose social scientists bi-conditionally correlate a breakdown in the 
regulative powers of society with a disjunctive set of individualistic phenomena, such as (I1) 
persons rioting outside the Reserve Bank meetings, (I2) individuals frequently waving placards 
outside government buildings, or (I3) the parliament buildings burning down, etc. Moreover, 
social scientists also bi-conditionally correlate anomie with something like the disjunctive set: 
(I1*) stock-brokers jumping off buildings, (I2*) murder-suicides among poverty-stricken 
families, or (I3*) business-owners shooting themselves, etc. Then, Type Individualists adopting 
Kim’s suggestion would claim that there is an individualistic law (L2) stating that: “If <there is 
rioting outside the Reserve Bank’s meetings OR there is much placard-waving OR the 
government-buildings burn down OR…> then <stock-brokers will jump off buildings OR there 
will be murder-suicides among poor families OR business-owners will shoot themselves 
OR…>”. The problem is that this individualistic claim (L2) is not projectible, and so, is not a 
law. For suppose social scientists observe that after individuals frequently wave placards 
outside government buildings, there is an increase in business-owners shooting themselves. We 
are no more certain that L2 is true, since we are no more certain after the observation than we 
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
169 
were before the observation that in future we will observe that after riots outside the Reserve 
Bank meetings, there will be an increase in murder-suicides among poor families. Thus, the 
observation does not confirm L2, and so, L2 is not projectible, since this is precisely the sort of 
observation that, if any, would confirm L2. Thus, L2 is not a law. 
Kim replies to the objection from projectibility by arguing that we have arrived at a dilemma: 
psychology too contains disjunctive kinds, and so, either psychology lacks laws, or laws are not 
projectible. Kim supports the first horn, and acknowledges that although there are no general 
psychological laws, there are domain-restricted psychological laws, since each of the disjuncts 
in a disjunctive kind may participate in projectible laws [see the discussion of species-relative 
or domain-restricted reduction in section C.3.b.ii. Objections to MR-1(s/m) (p. 162)]. For 
example, while there may not be laws about pain generally, there are laws about Martian pain, 
and other laws about human pain, etc.  
Unfortunately for the Type Individualist, the first horn of the dilemma is unavailable, since I 
have already argued that domain-restricted reduction is not a working solution for the Type 
Individualist. Thus, the Type Individualist must deny that laws are necessarily projectible. But 
this denial, it seems, is rather implausible, and flies in the face of the dominant view of the 
philosophy of science. Hence, Kim’s claim that there are genuine disjunctive kinds is of little 
use to the Type Individualist. 
C.3.b.iv. Doubts about token identity 
I have argued that, compared with the Central State Materialist, the Type Individualist has far 
fewer resources available to respond to the multiple realisation objection. Moreover, the two 
prima facie available responses he does have – Shapiro’s relative lower-level kinds, and Kim’s 
genuinely disjunctive kinds – are unsuccessful. Furthermore, in addition to the multiple 
realisation objection, there is a second problem with Type Individualism. If Type Individualism 
is correct, then every type of social phenomenon is identical with a type of individualistic 
phenomenon, which implies that every token social phenomenon is identical with a token set of 
individual phenomena.130 That is, Type Individualism implies NRI-3 from Sawyer’s Non-
Reductive Individualism, but I have already argued that NR-3 is unconvincing. Moreover, I 
argued that the best enrichment to NRI-3 may be the claim that social phenomena are 
                                                 
130 See Fodor (1974, p. 100) for a discussion of the relationship between type and token identity. 
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constituted by (rather than identical with) individualistic phenomena. But this enrichment is not 
available as a resource to the type identity theorist, since constitution claims cannot act as the 
bi-directional bridge principles required for reduction. This is because if x constitutes y, this 
does not imply that y constitutes x – indeed, the constitution relation is meant to capture an 
asynchronous relation between x and y. Thus, Type Individualism suffers from the same 
objections presented against NRI-3, yet, unlike the Non-Reductive Individualist, does not have 
the notion of constitution as a resource to deal with these objections. 
I conclude then, that Type Individualism is an unsatisfactory solution to the social-individual 
problem. 
C.3.c. Social Functionalism 
C.3.c.i. Types of Functionalism 
The way that many philosophers of mind dealt with the problem of multiple realisation in the 
latter half of the 20th century was to adopt Mental Functionalism (also known as 
“Functionalism”), or the thesis that types of mental states are identical with, and can be reduced 
to, types of functional states. A functional state might be characterised by its typical causes and 
effects (i.e. causally) or by its telos (i.e. teleologically). So, on Mental Functionalism, pain is 
identical with a particular type of functional state (call this state F1). Then, F1 may supervene 
upon bodily states, resulting in the possibility that pain may be realised by wildly different 
bodily states. 
It would seem sensible, then, to resolve the multiple realisation objection against Type 
Individualism by positing a parallel account of the social, a “Social Functionalism”. Applying 
the lessons of Mental Functionalism to the social-individual problem, we could hold that types 
of social phenomena are identical with types of functional phenomena. I will call this doctrine, 
“Social Functionalism”. For example, suppose that the function of political parties as a type, is 
F: “those phenomena typically caused by the presence of a political ideology, and which 
typically result in social actions furthering that ideology”. Then, since political parties are 
identical with F, and since very different collections of individuals could realise F, political 
parties can be realised by wildly disjunctive individuals. 
Social Functionalism is attractive, moreover, because it solves the problem of social holism 
presented against Logical Individualism. Specifically, there are two ways the account might 
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resolve the problem of holism, depending on how the account is formulated. To see why there 
are two possible formulations, consider that Mental Functionalism comes in two forms: as a 
conceptual claim (Lewis, 1972), and as an empirical claim (Putnam, 1981). Lewis’s conceptual 
version of the account claims that types of mental states are conceptually identical with types 
of functional states. For example, the concept of pain is the concept of that state typically caused 
by bodily trauma, and that typically gives rise to behaviour such as exclaiming “ouch!” and 
attempts to lessen or end the bodily trauma. Thus, the identity that obtains between types of 
mental states and types of functional states is a priori and necessary. By contrast, Putnam posits 
that psychologists will discover perfect bi-conditional correlations between types of mental 
states and types of functional states. On Putnam’s account, there is no conceptual connection 
between pain and expressing “ouch!”. Rather, the connection is contingent, and can only be 
known a posteriori. 
Similarly, we might construct Social Functionalism as a conceptual claim (see Schmaus, 1999), 
or as an empirical claim. The conceptual claim reads that the concept of a type of social 
phenomenon just is the concept of a phenomenon with a certain type of function (i.e. typical 
cause and effects, or a type of telos). Thus, the identity between social phenomena and their 
function is necessary and a priori. Conceptual Social Functionalism therefore involves 
functional analysis of social concepts to arrive at the nature of social phenomena. The empirical 
variant also claims that types of social phenomena are identical with types of functional 
phenomena, but this identity is contingent and a posteriori. Thus, Empirical Social 
Functionalism implies that social scientists will discover perfect bi-conditional correlations 
between certain types of social phenomena and certain types of causal roles. 
To see how these two versions resolve the problem of the holism of the social, recall that 
Logical Individualism cannot accommodate the holism of social concepts because (i) Logical 
Individualism’s reductive strategy uses the intension of social concepts, and (ii) the account 
defines this intension atomically. Now, if Social Functionalism is formulated as a conceptual 
claim, then the functional specification of a type of social phenomenon S will cite the 
conceptual role that S plays within our Folk Sociological framework, and so, S will be defined 
in terms of other social phenomena (e.g. political parties are defined in terms of political 
ideologies). Thus, unlike Logical Individualism, Social Functionalism involves a holistic, rather 
than an atomistic, reduction of social phenomena: on this account, S can be reduced together 
with the Folk Sociological framework of which it is a part, to a functionalist framework. Hence, 
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the conceptual version is inconsistent with (ii). On the other hand, the empirical version of 
Social Functionalism would resolve the problem of the holism of the social in much the same 
way that Type Individualism does. Like Type Individualism, the empirical version of Social 
Functionalism utilises the extension, rather than the intension, of social terms to reduce the 
social to the individual. Hence, the empirical version avoids (i).  
Moreover, in addition to resolving the problems of multiple realisation (as faced by Type 
Individualism) and the holism of the social (a problem for Logical Individualism), Social 
Functionalism is also consistent with the existence of groups that can persist despite lacking 
members, and so, does not suffer from the chief objection against Non-Reductive 
Individualism. Recall that I argued for the intuition that, at least in certain instances, groups can 
persist despite losing all their members (e.g. the Knights of War chess club). This datum poses 
a challenge for Non-Reductive Individualism because this account identifies a group with its 
members or the relations among those members, and so, is committed to the view that groups 
cannot persist without members. Notice that even though a group may (or so I argued) undergo 
periods without members, during those periods it may still possess a function. For example, 
even though the Knights of War lacks members at a particular point in time, it still has a function 
(whatever the function of a chess club is). It just so happens that during the period when it lacks 
members, its function is not being fulfilled – but the club possesses the function nevertheless. 
Thus, because the Social Functionalist identifies a group with its function, rather than its 
members, Social Functionalism is consistent with the existence of groups without members. 
Given the advantages of Social Functionalism (its consistency with the multiple realisation, the 
holism of the social, and absent membership), it is striking that a consideration of the 
plausibility of Social Functionalism as a solution to Q2 is largely absent from the sociological 
and philosophical literature. Instead, sociologists (such as Malinowski, Parsons, Merton, 
Radcliffe-Brown, Durkheim and Marx) have focussed upon Explanatory Social Functionalism, 
or the thesis that social phenomena are best explained in purely functionalist terms (see Kincaid, 
1990 [1995]). Moreover, insofar as philosophers have engaged with Social Functionalism, they 
too have focused upon the legitimacy of functional explanation (i.e. Explanatory Social 
Functionalism) in the social sciences (see, e.g., de Jong, 2003; Dore, 1961 [1973]; Elster, 1994 
[1995]; Hempel, 1959 [1995], 1966; Homans, 1964 [1973]; Kincaid, 1990 [1995]; Mayntz, 
2004; Ryan, 1970 ch. 8; Steel, 2005), upon functional solutions to the individual-individual 
problem [see sections B.2.b. Organic account (p. 44) and B.2.c. Teleological account (p. 
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50)], or upon the inference from Explanatory Social Functionalism to Social Functionalism (see 
McGinley, 2012).131, 132 
Since I am concerned here with answering Q2, I will focus here on Social Functionalism as a 
metaphysical claim about the relation between social phenomena and their constituent parts, 
rather than as a theory of how to explain social phenomena best (and not about the intra-
relations that obtain among the constituent parts of social phenomena – as in Q1). This is not 
to say that Explanatory Social Functionalism and functional accounts of Q1 have no bearing on 
Social Functionalism. Indeed, McGinley (2012) argues that if social phenomena are best 
explained by their causal role, this would provide support for the claim that social phenomena 
just are phenomena with a certain causal role. That is, Explanatory Social Functionalism 
supports Social Functionalism.133 Moreover, if a teleological account of Q1 is correct, then we 
should look first to a teleological formulation of Social Functionalism as the solution to Q2: if 
what is crucial to membership of a group is that members act towards a common telos, this 
provides abductive support for the claim that the group should be identified with its telos.134 
Nevertheless, even though Explanatory Social Functionalism and a teleological account of Q1 
support Social Functionalism (as an answer to Q2), it is still a legitimate question whether there 
are successful objections to Social Functionalism itself (rather than objections to its support). 
The fact that this question has not been considered explicitly in the literature is a gap that I 
intend to begin addressing here. In what follows I argue that although Social Functionalism 
may provide synchronic individuation conditions for social phenomena, it struggles to provide 
diachronic individuation conditions. That is, although the account may satisfy Synchronic, it 
fails to satisfy Diachronic. 
                                                 
131 To clarify the distinct functionalist doctrines, Social Functionalism refers to the metaphysical claim that types 
of social phenomena can be reduced to, or are identical with, types of phenomena with a certain causal role. 
Conceptual Social Functionalism is the view that the reduction of social phenomena to their causal roles is 
conceptual, analytic and a priori. Empirical Social Functionalism is the claim that the reduction of social 
phenomena to their causal roles is empirical, contingent, and a posteriori. Finally, Explanatory Social 
Functionalism is the doctrine that social phenomena are best explained by their causal roles. 
132 An exception to the absence of discussion around Social Functionalism in the literature is Schmaus (1999), who 
argues in favour of Conceptual Social Functionalism by showing how this account accommodates the holism of 
the social. Schmaus does not, however, consider any of the objections to Social Functionalism I present in the next 
section. 
133 McGinley (2012, p. 381) argues that this support is not deductive. Instead, he holds that Explanatory Social 
Functionalism is “disposed or oriented toward” Social Functionalism (2012, pp. 381, 385), and that Explanatory 
Social Functionalism is “at least necessary” for Social Functionalism (2012, p. 388). 
134 A proposition P abductively supports another proposition Q just in case Q is the best explanation of P. 
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C.3.c.ii. The analogy between cognitive states and social groups 
On Mental Functionalism, the type of mental state to which a cognitive state CS belongs is 
determined by the form, or structure, of the functional role of CS. CS is a belief, for example, 
if its functional role is something like, “that mental state typically caused by p conditions in the 
world, and which typically causes certain behaviour, such as statements of the form “I believe 
that p” when asked certain types of questions”. Then, Mental Functionalists can individuate CS 
synchronically, or distinguish CS as a particular token of its functional type, by substituting p 
with the propositional content of CS. For example, if CS is the belief that it is cold today, then 
CS is distinguished from other beliefs by its propositional content “it is cold today”, since it 
(unlike beliefs about grass, for example) is typically caused by cold conditions, and typically 
causes effects such as statements of the form “I believe that it is cold today” when asked about 
the weather. Thus, the propositional content of CS individuates CS by giving its functional role 
determinate content (i.e. by providing p with a value).135 
Now, notice that the particular propositional content that a cognitive state possesses is essential 
to that cognitive state. For example, if my belief changed such that I now believe that the 
weather is hot (rather than that it is cold), it is no longer the same belief that I had earlier but 
with different propositional content – rather, I now have a numerically distinct belief. That is, 
although I can supplant one belief with another, a particular belief cannot change its content. 
So, because the function of CS is given determinate content by the propositional content of CS, 
and because that propositional content cannot change, the function of a cognitive state cannot 
change, and so, individuates CS diachronically. 
Therefore, on Mental Functionalism, the function (including its propositional content) of a 
cognitive state CS: (i) determines the type of mental state to which CS belongs, (ii) provides 
a synchronic individuation criterion for CS, and (iii) provides a diachronic individuation 
criterion for CS.  Now, consider whether the function of a social phenomenon performs these 
three roles.  
                                                 
135 Admittedly, this discussion over-simplifies the Mental Functionalist’s criteria for individuation. For two agents 
might have beliefs with the same propositional content, yet have numerically distinct beliefs. Thus, we should add 
that the propositional content of a cognitive state, together with a statement about its owner (and perhaps about the 
time of the cognitive state?) individuates that state. These considerations do not, however, impact the discussion 
about Social Functionalism to follow. 
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If Social Functionalism is correct, then it is possible to determine the type to which a given 
social phenomenon SP belongs by citing its functional role. On a causal version of the account, 
political parties are (say) those phenomena typically caused by the presence of a political 
ideology, and which typically result in the social actions furthering that ideology; or, on a 
teleological account, political parties are those phenomena whose telos is the furthering of a 
political ideology. Thus, it is plausible that the function of a social phenomenon performs role 
(i) – i.e. the function of a social phenomenon determines that phenomenon’s type. 
It is less certain, however, whether (ii) we can individuate token social phenomena using their 
function, since social phenomena, unlike cognitive states, lack propositional content: it is not 
the case that to be a social group is to be a social group that p. Instead, the causal Social 
Functionalist would hold that SP (a social phenomenon) is individuated by the particular causes 
and effects of SP – i.e. no other social phenomena would have the precise causes and effects 
that SP has. Similarly, the teleological solution would appeal to the telos of a social 
phenomenon as the method for individuating it. For example, the ANC belongs to the type 
“political party” because it is caused by the presence of political ideology, and because it 
furthers this ideology; and the ANC is the particular token political party it is because its telos 
(in this case its ideology) is distinct from the teloi of other political parties. 
In my discussion of the teleological account of Q1 (p. 50), however, I argued that the telos (or 
function) of a group can be defined analytically, narrowly or broadly. I argued that the analytic 
and narrow definitions are inadequate, and that the broad definition does not adequately 
individuate groups synchronically (the agglomeration problem). However, let us continue under 
the assumption that my objections raised in that section were unsuccessful, and that it is possible 
to distinguish groups synchronically by citing their telos. That is, let us assume that the function 
of social phenomena performs role (ii) – that the function of SP provides an adequate 
synchronic individuation criterion for SP. In what follows I will focus on whether the function 
of social phenomena fulfils (iii) – i.e. whether or not the function of a social phenomenon can 
individuate the phenomenon diachronically. 
C.3.c.iii. Diachronic identity 
On Mental Functionalism, the function of a token cognitive state cannot change because its 
function is individuated by its propositional content, and its propositional content cannot 
change. But on Social Functionalism, the function of a token social phenomenon is individuated 
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either by its causes and effects, or by its telos, yet the effects and telos of a social phenomenon 
can change, and so, the function of a social phenomenon may change over time. For example, 
recall the case discussed earlier [in section C.2.b.iii. Token-token identity (p. 138)] 
concerning a radical shift in the policy of the ANCYL. One of the effects, and a part of the 
telos, of the ANCYL today is to provide a voice for the masses of black youth in South Africa. 
However, although it is unlikely, it is not impossible to imagine a future in which the league 
might change slowly but radically, such that at some point in the future, the league no longer 
takes an interest in the majority of black youth, but instead adopts policies that support higher-
class South African youth, regardless of their race. Then the effects and telos, and therefore the 
function, of the ANCYL will have changed. Similarly, the Labour Party in the UK, which once 
supported the working class, changed to the New Labour Party, which (arguably) supports the 
middle class instead. It seems then that the Social Functionalist faces a challenge that the Mental 
Functionalist lacks: accounting for changing functions. 
The Social Functionalist could dig in his heels at this point, and argue that if there were such a 
radical shift in the policies of the ANCYL, this would no longer be the same social group. 
Instead, the league would have ceased, and a numerically distinct league would have supplanted 
it. Thus, I have not presented a legitimate example of the same group changing its function. I 
find this response problematic, however, for two reasons. First, it seems we could use the very 
same term “ANCYL” to refer to both the ANCYL of today, and the radically different league 
of the future. This coincidence in reference suggests that we are referring to a numerically 
identical league. Second, this bullet-biting response eschews common-sense intuitions about 
social groups: namely, that they do change their goals. Indeed, some might argue at the time of 
writing this thesis, that the policies of the ANCYL have already undergone a massive shift from 
earlier in its history. But whether or not this is true, the point is that intuition suggests that such 
shifts are possible. Thus, the bullet-biting response at best renders Social Functionalism 
controversial. 
I will proceed, therefore, on the assumption that it is possible for a social group to change its 
function, and therefore, the Social Functionalist faces the challenge of developing an account 
of the identity between social phenomena and their function which permits changing functions 
and provides diachronic identity criteria. That is, the account should provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions in virtue of which a social group G1 with function F1 at time t1 is identical 
with G2 which has F2 at t2, where F1 is qualitatively distinct from F2 but G1 is numerically 
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identical with G2. How might the Social Functionalist fulfil this task? Consider that since Social 
Functionalism posits that types of social phenomena are identical with types of functions, the 
account entails that a token social phenomenon is identical with a token function. Thus, like 
Non-Reductive Individualism, this token identity claim might be interpreted either as a de re or 
as a de dicto claim, and so, applied to social groups, the token identity claim might be 
disambiguated as follows:  
SFde re:  any given social group is identical with a specific function F. 
SFde dicto:  any given social group is identical with a function, whatever that 
function is. 
SFde re is the problematic disambiguation, since it is inconsistent with change in a social group’s 
telos or effects, and therefore function. If SFde re is correct, then the ANCYL at every point in 
its existence aims to nationalise key industries in South Africa (which is false). Fortunately, 
SFde dicto avoids this problem, since SFde dicto is consistent with the ANCYL possessing different 
functions at different times, since SFde dicto merely demands that at any given time that the league 
is identical with some function or other (and not necessarily with a specific function). 
Thus, SFde dicto is consistent with the possibility of the very same social group persisting despite 
a change in its function. But the account fails to imply that a group at a later point in time is 
identical with a group at an earlier point in time. That is, it fails to imply that G1 is identical 
with G2, even though it fails to imply that G1 is not identical with G2. In response, the 
refinement that the SFde dicto proponent would likely provide is that G1 is numerically identical 
with G2 insofar as G1 and G2 are functionally continuous: 
SFdiachronic: social group G1 with function F1 at time t1 is identical with G2 
which has F2 at t2 iff G1 and G2 are functionally continuous. 
But now there are two important questions: 
Q3. What does it mean for G1 and G2 to be functionally continuous? 
Q4. Does functional continuity provide the correct principle for the diachronic 
individuation of social groups? i.e. Does SFdiachronic satisfy Diachronic. 
I discuss these questions in turn. 
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 Q3: What is functional continuity? 
It is important that the Social Functionalist answers Q3, for without an adequate answer, Social 
Functionalism is incomplete, and we should approach Q4 with a degree of scepticism. I can 
think of three ways one might define functional continuity. Where F1 and F2 are the respective 
functions of G1 at t1 and G2 at t2, G1 and G2 are functionally continuous iff: 
FC-1) F1 resembles F2 more than F1 resembles the function of any other social group 
existing at t2; 
FC-2) F2 causally depends upon G1 to a greater degree than F2 depends upon any other 
social group existing at t1; or 
FC-3) there is an overlapping “goal-progression chain” between F1 and F2. 
I will argue that both FC-1 and FC-3 are inadequate, while FC-2 is at best incomplete. Let us 
begin with FC-1.  
Assuming that we utilise functional continuity as our principle of diachronic individuation, we 
should drop FC-1 as a possible definition of functional continuity because of cases of the 
following sort. Let G3 be a group that exists at t2, and has function F3. Moreover, suppose G3 
is not identical with either G1 or G2. Then, contrary to FC-1, it seems possible that even though 
G1 and G2 are identical, F1 resembles F3 more closely than F1 resembles F2. For example, 
suppose the function of the ANCYL at t1 (i.e. G1) is the representation of the majority of black 
South African youth (F1), but at t2 the function of the ANCYL (G2) is furthering the goals of 
upper-class South African youth, no matter their race (F2); moreover, suppose at t2 the function 
of the COPE youth-league (G3) is to support poverty-stricken black youth in South Africa (F3). 
On FC-1, G1 is functionally continuous with G3, and not with G2. Therefore, on FC-1, the 
ANCYL at t1 is identical with COPE at t2, and not with the ANCYL at t2. But this is intuitively 
incorrect. The first account of functional continuity, then, is inadequate. 
FC-2 is Nozick’s (1981) definition of continuity for any given diachronic criterion of identity, 
and he uses it to characterise psychological and bodily continuity in the case of personal 
identity. However, FC-2 faces the following interesting problem case. Suppose that the 
functions of the ANCYL at t1 and t2 are as before. Moreover, suppose that at t1 the function of 
the South African government is to kill any members of a social group that further the interests 
of the masses of black South African youth. As a result of the South African government’s 
policies, the ANCYL changes its goals, and so, at t2, arrives at the function of promoting black 
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youth who belong to the higher-classes. Then, it seems that the function of the ANCYL at t2 is 
better explained by, and so is causally dependent upon to a greater degree, the South African 
government’s policies at t1 rather than the ANCYL at t1. Thus, on FC-2, the ANCYL at t2 turns 
out to be functionally continuous with the South African government at t1, rather than 
continuous with the ANCYL at t1. This is unacceptable for the Social Functionalist, since this 
implies on SFdiachronic that the ANCYL at t2 is identical with the South African government at 
t1, and the ANCYL at t1 is not identical with the ANCYL at t2. 
Nozick might, however, object to my claim that the ANCYL at t2 is more causally dependent 
on the South African government’s policies at t1 than it is dependent on the policies of the 
ANCYL at t1. Nozick might argue that the change in the league’s policies are as a direct result 
of a decision made by the members of the league at t1, and not as a direct result of the 
government’s policies at t1. It is true that the league members’ decision at t1 is causally 
influenced by the government’s policies, but ultimately, it is the league’s decision, not the 
government’s. Thus, the league at t2 is more causally dependent on the league at t1 than it is 
causally dependent on the government at t1. 
Diagnosing the problem, it seems that the disagreement that arises here illustrates that the notion 
of degrees of causal dependence is unclear. What we need is an account of the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for x to depend causally upon y to degree d; or, at the very least, we need 
an account of the conditions under which x causally depends upon y to a greater degree than x 
causally depends upon z. Nozick has not provided us with such an account, and so, he has 
merely taken the problem of giving an account of continuity and replaced it with the problem 
of giving an account of degrees of causal dependence. This is not to say that such an account 
of causal dependence cannot be provided – just that it has not been provided yet. Thus, FC-2 is 
incomplete. 
Finally, FC-3 is modelled on Parfit’s (1986, p. 206) definition of psychological continuity. For 
Parfit, persons P1 and P2 are psychologically continuous iff P2 and P1 have overlapping chains 
of “quasi-memories”. P2 and P1 have overlapping chains of quasi-memories just in case P2 has 
a quasi-memory of an experience of someone who has a quasi-memory of an experience of 
someone who has a quasi-memory of an experience… of P1. Pn has a quasi-memory of an 
experience of Pn-1 just in case Pn seems to remember experiencing an experience E, Pn-1 did 
experience E, and Pn’s quasi-memory of E is caused in the right sort of way by E. Similarly, 
we might attempt to find a relation between social functions, and through overlapping this 
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relation, form continuity between F1 and F2. The best candidate for such a relation that I can 
think of is the relation of “goal-progression”. Fn is a goal-progression of Fn-1 iff Fn grows out 
of, or can be explained by, the satisfaction or frustration of Fn-1.136 Then, F1 and F2 will be 
functionally continuous iff there is an overlapping goal-progression chain between F1 and F2; 
i.e. it must be the case that F2 can be explained by the satisfaction or frustration of some other 
goal, which can be explained by the satisfaction or frustration of yet another goal, which can 
be explained by the satisfaction or frustration of… F1. 
The problem with this Parfitian account of functional continuity, however, is that it seems 
possible for a social group to change its function not because a previous function of the group 
was satisfied or frustrated, but because of the whims of its members. Suppose, for example, that 
the reason why the ANCYL changes its goal of supporting the majority of black youth at t1 to 
the furthering of upper-class youth at t2 is (rather than a bizarre policy of the SA government) 
that between t1 and t2 the league’s leaders realise that since they have substantial ownership of 
private-sector black companies, they will benefit far more if their policies support upper-
echelon youth. Then, the change in the function of the ANCYL should be attributed to its 
leaders’ interests, rather than to the satisfaction or frustration of the goal to support the majority 
of black youth in South Africa. And so, on this example, the Parfitian account of functional 
continuity implies, counter-intuitively, that the ANCYL at t1 and at t2 are not functionally 
continuous, and hence, not the same group. Thus, the Parfitian account of functional continuity 
would need to be supplemented with an account of the interests of the group’s members, and 
how these interests contribute to the decision-making processes (and hence Parfitian functional 
continuity) of the group. A Social Functionalist account utilising such an account of functional 
continuity would, therefore, need to include a membership-based criterion of diachronic 
identity, and so, would become what I call a hybrid account. I discuss hybrid accounts in section 
C.4. A Hybrid  (p. 184). 
 Q4: Is functional continuity an adequate criterion of diachronic identity for social groups? 
Thus far I have argued that we have not yet found an adequate account of what it means for G1 
and G2 to be functionally continuous. This should raise suspicion about whether functional 
continuity, however it is defined, could be an adequate criterion of diachronic identity for social 
groups. With the goal of exploring this suspicion, let us be charitable to the Social Functionalist, 
                                                 
136 I have borrowed the “grows out of” and “can be explained by” terminology from Nozick (1981, p. 35). 
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and assume for the moment that we can provide an adequate account of what it means for G1 
and G2 to be functionally continuous. Given such an adequate account, I argue nevertheless 
that functional continuity is an inadequate criterion of diachronic identity for social groups. 
That is, it is not the case that G2’s functional continuity with G1 is sufficient for G1 being 
identical with G2, even if we can adequately define functional continuity. I have in mind here 
three types of problem cases. The first two cases involve fission (or splitting) of social groups, 
while the third utilises sudden changes in function. I begin with the two fission cases. 
In fission cases, a social group G1 is split into groups G2 and G3. In the first type of case I wish 
to consider, G2 and G3 are equally functionally continuous with G1, but G2 has more 
membership-continuity with G1 than G3 has with G1. (The degree of membership continuity 
between two groups can be defined as the similarity in membership between the two groups, 
perhaps taking into account the weighting or importance of higher-ranking members). Here, I 
will argue that G2, rather than G3, is identical with G1, and so, membership-continuity (rather 
than functional continuity) determines diachronic identity where there is a tie on functional 
continuity. Thus, membership-continuity counts. In the second type of problem case, G3 is 
more functionally continuous with G1 than is G2 with G1. However, as before, G2 has 
significantly greater membership-continuity with G1 than G3 has with G1. I will argue that in 
this case, at least some of the time, G1 is identical with G2 (and not with G3), and so, 
membership-continuity trumps functional continuity as the relevant criterion of diachronic 
identity at least some of the time. To clarify, let me flesh out these counterexamples. 
As an illustration of the first type of case, suppose that the ANCYL splits into two parts: 
ANCYL1 and ANCYL2. After the split, ANCYL1 and ANCYL2 operate in similar fashions, 
with neither operating more divergently from the goals of the original ANCYL. Moreover, 
suppose that the original ANCYL contained 10 000 members, and that ANCYL1 inherits 9 990 
of these members, while ANCYL2 inherits a mere 10 of these members. Nozick’s intuition137 
(with which I concur) in this type of case is that the original ANCYL continues as ANCYL1, 
and not as ANCYL2 – ANCYL2 is a mere offshoot (or by-product) of the group, and so, 
                                                 
137 This example is inspired by Nozick’s (1981, pp. 32-33) Vienna circle example, in which some members of the 
Circle flee to America, whilst others flee to Istanbul. His intuition is that the sub-group with the greater number of 
members (in this case the American group) continues to be the Vienna Circle, whilst the other is a mere offshoot. 
I have used the ANCYL example instead because Nozick frames his example in a way meant to illustrate a different 
claim: namely, that whether G1=G2 depends upon whether there are other groups closer to G1 than G2 is. Nozick 
uses this claim to support his Closest Continuer view, which I examine in section C.4. A Hybrid  (p. 184). 
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becomes a distinct social group. However, this is not the result we obtain by applying a 
functionalist criterion of diachronic individuation, since ANCYL1 and ANCYL2 are equally 
functionally continuous (however one defines functional continuity) with the original ANCYL. 
Thus on the functional continuity criterion, we must either say that the original ANCYL is 
identical with both ANCYL1 and ANCYL2, or that the original ANCYL is identical with 
neither; i.e. we cannot arrive at the correct result using functional continuity as our criterion of 
diachronic identity. 
The Social Functionalist may attempt a Parfitian solution to the problem: he could argue that in 
such fission cases, diachronic identity is unimportant; all that counts in such cases is survival. 
Thus, the Social Functionalist could argue that although the original league is identical with 
neither ANCYL1 nor ANCYL2, it survives as both. Parfit (1986) has provided compelling 
argument for the claim that in similar cases involving the fission of persons, identity is 
unimportant – survival is all that counts. Why, then, should we not accept such a Parfitian 
solution to cases involving the fission of social groups? 
There are two problems with this Parfitian response. First, while I can accept that the original 
league survives as both ANCYL1 and ANCYL2, I do not accept that the degree of survival of 
the original league in ANCYL1 is the same as the degree of survival of the original league in 
ANCYL2. The Parfitian Social Functionalist must claim that the degree of survival in both 
cases is identical, since there is equal functional continuity, and functional continuity can be all 
that the Social Functionalist utilises as his criterion of survival. However, this seems intuitively 
false: the original league seems to survive to a far greater degree in ANCYL1 than it does in 
ANCYL2. 
The second problem with the Parfitian response is that it helps none at all for the second type 
of fission case. Let us flesh out the case now. The second case is just like the first, except that 
in this case ANCYL1 and ANCYL2 do not share equal functional continuity with the original 
league. We can imagine that ANCYL2 (the tiny sub-group) remains faithful to the original 
goals of the league, while ANCYL1 (the vast majority of the original league) evolves its telos. 
My intuition here remains the same as in the previous case: ANCYL1, since it has so many 
more members from the original, is numerically identical with the league, while ANCYL2 is a 
numerically distinct social group. However, counter-intuitively, the Social Functionalist is 
committed to claiming that ANCYL2 and not ANCYL1 is identical with (or survives to a 
greater degree, if he adopts a Parfitian stance) the original league. 
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The first fission case shows that functional continuity is not all that counts: membership-
continuity is also important for determining the diachronic identity of social groups. The second 
fission case, which also involves a split in the ANCYL, is more serious in its implications. It 
shows that membership-continuity is more important for diachronic identity than is functional 
continuity in at least some cases. 
The Social Functionalist might attempt to save face by pointing out that in both the problem 
cases discussed so far, functional continuity plays some role in determining diachronic identity, 
even if functional continuity does not play the only role. Thus, we should conclude that Social 
Functionalism is incomplete, rather than simply false. The third problem case, to which I turn 
now, is meant to show that in certain cases functional continuity plays no role at all in 
determining the diachronic identity of social groups. 
Recall the original case involving the ANCYL changing its telos. At time t1 the league supports 
the majority of black youth in South Africa. At a later time t2 the league supports the upper-
echelon youth, regardless of their race. Although this change is radical, we have assumed that 
the change is gradual. Thus, there would be functional continuity between the ANCYL at t1, 
and the ANCYL at t2, since between t1 and t2, there may be a series of changes in policy that 
gradually move from the policy at t1 to the policy at t2. However, we can refine the case so that 
t2 occurs immediately after t1 – i.e. so that the radical shift in policy is not gradual. Perhaps, 
for example, a change in leadership of the youth league suddenly ushers in a new league policy. 
In this case, however one defines functional continuity, it seems there is insufficient functional 
continuity between the league at t1 and the league at t2 to act as the criterion according to which 
we can identify the league at t1 with the league at t2. Thus, the Social Functionalist is committed 
to the position that it is impossible for a social group to persist when there is a radical, sudden 
change in its function. This is counterintuitive, and so, threatens the importance of functional 
continuity as a feature for individuating groups diachronically. 
C.3.c.iv. Conclusion 
Social Functionalism, then, faces a challenge that Mental Functionalism does not: providing an 
adequate diachronic criterion of identity. It seems the best that the Social Functionalist can offer 
as a candidate for such a criterion is functional continuity. However, functional continuity is 
problematic as a criterion of diachronic identity for two reasons. First, it is difficult to provide 
an adequate account of what it means for two social groups to be functionally continuous. 
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Second, even if we can provide such an account, there are counterexamples that seem to show 
that functional continuity is less important than membership-continuity in determining 
diachronic identity in certain cases, and that in other cases, functional continuity is entirely 
irrelevant to diachronic identity. 
These problem cases suggest that if an adequate criterion of diachronic identity for groups is to 
be found, we must incorporate membership-continuity in our account. However, in objecting 
to NRI-3 I argued that group membership alone is unlikely to provide an adequate criterion of 
diachronic individuation, since groups may persist despite lacking any members at all. Thus, 
we may need to develop a hybrid account: an account that incorporates both functional 
continuity and membership-continuity in its criterion of diachronic identity. I consider this 
possibility next. 
C.4. A HYBRID SOLUTION TO Q2 
One way we might construct such a hybrid is to disjunctivise Non-Reductive Individualism and 
Social Functionalism, such that they form a “Disjunctive Functional-Tokenism”: 
Disjunctive Functional-Tokenism: For any given social group G, G is identical 
with its members OR G is identical with its function.138 
Recall that the two most difficult data for which the token identity claim, i.e. NRI-3, must 
account are the coextensionality of groups (the rugby-choir example) and the possibility of 
groups persisting without members (the Knights of War). This account accommodates these 
problem cases, since at those times when the group lacks members, or in cases when a group is 
coextensional with another group, G is identical with its function F; while in all other cases, the 
group is identical with its members. Moreover, Disjunctive Functional-Tokenism could utilise 
either or both continuity in membership and functional continuity as criteria of diachronic 
identity for social groups, thereby providing the resources to resolve the three problem cases 
presented against Social Functionalism. The way this might work is by adopting Nozick’s 
(1981) Closest Continuer Schema, on which a social group G1 existing at t1 is identical with a 
social group G2 existing at a later time t2 iff all of the following four conditions obtain: 
CC-1) G2 is the closest continuer of G1; 
                                                 
138 Both disjuncts should be read in a de dicto sense. 
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CC-2) G1 is the closest predecessor of G2; 
CC-3) G2 is close enough to G1; and 
CC-4) the degree to which G2 is close to G1 is significantly greater than the degree to 
which any other group G3 is close to G1 (where G3≠G2). 
In saying that G2 is “the closest continuer” of G1, Nozick (1981, p. 35) means that the relevant 
properties of G2 causally depend upon the relevant properties of G1 (i.e. consistent with FC-
2), and that no other group G3 has relevant properties that are as causally dependent upon G1’s 
relevant properties (I discuss which properties are relevant on Nozick’s schema shortly). 
Moreover, G1 is the closest predecessor of G2 just in case there is no other G1a at t1 such that 
G2 is the closest continuer of G1a. Now according to Nozick (1981, p. 60), the criterion for 
which properties are “relevant” (i.e. that decides whether G2’s properties or G3’s properties are 
more closely associated with G1’s properties) may be a combined weighting of various 
measures of continuity. Thus, in this case, the criterion might include a weighting for both 
continuity in function and membership. 
Nozick (1981) uses the closest continuer view to account for the diachronic identity of persons. 
Specifically, Nozick argues that such an account should include both psychological and bodily 
continuity. On this view, psychological continuity is weighted higher than bodily continuity, 
but in certain types of problem cases, bodily continuity alone is sufficient for diachronic 
identity. Such cases would include fission cases and cases in which there is an absence of 
psychological continuity (e.g. Alzheimer’s cases). Similarly, it seems what is needed here is an 
account of the diachronic identity of social groups where functional continuity is weighted 
higher than membership-continuity, but membership-continuity suffices for diachronic identity 
in cases involving fission or an absence of functional continuity [see section C.3.c.iii. 
Diachronic identity (p. 175)].139 
                                                 
139 In the first ANCYL fission case, since ANCYL1 and ANCYL2 have equal functional continuity with the 
original ANCYL, and since ANCYL1 has significantly greater membership continuity with the original ANCYL 
than does ANCYL2, ANCYL1 is the closer continuer of the original league (as implied by the Nozickian account). 
Moreover, in the second case, the Nozickian schema results in the correct result: ANCYL1 is the continuer of the 
league, since it has membership-continuity with the league, and membership-continuity suffices for group-
membership in fission cases. Finally, in the third problem case, the sudden change in function is not a problem for 
the hybrid account, since there is still membership-continuity between the old league and the new league. 
Therefore, the hybrid account, together with a Nozickian schema, resolves all three problem cases raised against 
functional continuity as a criterion of diachronic identity for social groups. 
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So, should we rest content that we have found the solution to the social-individual problem? I 
think not, for three reasons. First, although the hybrid account solves some of the problems with 
Non-Reductive Individualism and Social Functionalism, it does not resolve all of the problems 
associated with these accounts. The hybrid account would, it seems, still need to employ the 
notion of supervenience to distinguish itself from Type Individualism. I argued, however, that 
it is very difficult to find a convincing account of supervenience. 
Second, the proponent of the hybrid account must still furnish us with an adequate definition of 
functional continuity. This too, I have argued, is a difficult task without an obvious solution. 
Therefore, although the hybrid account resolves some problems that its ancestral accounts 
cannot resolve alone, it also accumulates their other problems. 
Third, there may be interesting cases in which a group’s diachronic identity seems to be 
determined by neither its function, nor its membership, but instead by the decisions of other 
social groups. That is, the holism of the social is a problem: neither membership continuity nor 
functional continuity can adequately account for the dependence of social groups on other social 
phenomena (such as other social groups). The sort of case I propose to examine might proceed 
as follows. Suppose, due to the recent140 events surrounding Julius Malema, today’s ANCYL 
splits into two sub-groups: ANCYL1 and ANCYL2. Moreover, suppose that Malema and 70% 
of ANCYL’s members become members of ANCYL1, while only 30% of the members of 
ANCYL form part of ANCYL2. Thus, ANCYL1 has significantly greater membership 
continuity with ANCYL than does ANCYL2 with ANCYL. Moreover, assume that ANCYL1 
sustains significantly greater functional continuity with ANCYL than does ANCYL2 with 
ANCYL – we can imagine that ANCYL1 sustains all the controversial ends that the original 
held, while ANCYL2 loses these goals. 
In this case, according to the hybrid account, ANCYL1, but not ANCYL2, is identical with the 
original league. However, suppose the ANC (the parent body of the youth league) decides that 
ANCYL2, rather than ANCYL1, is the survivor of the league. For example, the ANC might 
point out that the telos of ANCYL2, but not the telos of ANCYL1, is aligned with the telos of 
the ANC. It seems, in this case, the ANC’s decision trumps continuity in both membership and 
                                                 
140 Since writing this section, Malema did leave the ANCYL and started his own party, called the Economic 
Freedom Fighters (EFF). Although, contrary to the counterexample presented here, Malema left with a minority 
of ANCYL supporters rather than the majority. 
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
187 
functionality, since the ANC’s decision seems final. Thus, the hybrid account gives the 
incorrect answer. 
I take it therefore that the hybrid account, although superior to its children accounts, is not free 
of problems. Much more work needs to be done on both the children accounts, and to the hybrid 
account (to accommodate the holism of the social) before we should accept the hybrid account 
as correct. I will proceed, therefore, to consider my (tentatively) favoured solution to the social-
individual problem: Eliminative Individualism. 
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D. ELIMINATIVE INDIVIDUALISM 
D.1. DRAWING CONCLUSIONS FROM Q1 AND Q2 
So far I have considered the two questions raised by our alien interlocutor at the beginning of 
the thesis: 
Q1. What relationships obtain among the members of a social group (the individual-
individual problem)?  
Q2. What is the relation between a social group and its members (the social-individual 
problem)? 
As possible answers to Q1, I considered both Objectivist accounts (Elster’s, the organic, and 
the teleological accounts), as well as Subjectivist accounts (Sartre’s look, Gilbert’s plural 
subject theory, and Searle’s constructionism), and a hybrid between the teleological account 
and plural subject theory. I argued, however, that none of the answers to Q1 was convincing, 
and so, whether we could find an adequate answer to Q2 would determine whether we should 
conclude that an adequate answer to Q1 might yet be found. However, none of the answers to 
Q2 were convincing either. Non-reductionism (Social Dualism and Non-Reductive 
Individualism), Reduction (Logical Individualism, Type Individualism, and Social 
Functionalism), and a hybrid between Non-Reductive Individualism and Type Individualism, 
all suffered from their own problems. So, where does this leave us? 
We are left, I think, without any certainty as to whether there are adequate solutions to Q1 and 
Q2 after all. This is not to say that such adequate resolutions are impossible, since the accounts 
I have considered may not be the best possible (although I have endeavoured to do the best I 
can on behalf of the sociologist). Nevertheless, the alien would most likely suggest that we 
should at least consider the possibility that Q1 and Q2 cannot receive an adequate solution. In 
this case, there are two possible conclusions. 
First, in my discussion of Q1 and Q2, I assumed what I take to be common-sense intuitions 
about the nature of social groups. During the discussion I assumed that social groups are distinct 
from mere aggregates, that they can perform actions, are responsible for those actions, have 
value, and persist through time. Thus, we might conclude, from our failure to provide adequate 
solutions to Q1 and Q2, that our common-sense intuitions about social groups are problematic. 
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If we are prepared to sacrifice or alter some of these common-sense intuitions, we might 
arrive at successful answers to Q1 and Q2 (call this view the “Intuition-sacrifice account”). 
On the other hand, we might keep our intuitions constant, and arrive at the conclusion that the 
alien has believed right from the start: social phenomena do not exist after all. I call this 
claim, “Eliminative Individualism”.141 On this account, when we look out onto the Central 
Block concourse at Wits University, there is no social group called the “ANC youth-league”: 
there are only individuals. 
Let us consider each of these alternatives in reverse-order: Eliminative Individualism and then 
Intuition-sacrifice. The social scientists present in the discussion with the alien would become 
rather agitated if Eliminative Individualism were raised as a serious possibility, for if 
Eliminative Individualism is correct, then the sum of the social sciences (Folk Sociology) would 
seem to constitute a radically misleading, indeed false, theory that should be replaced by purely 
individualistic theories (such as Psychology and Neurophysiology). But not just social scientists 
would be uncomfortable with this result. For it seems strange to assert that the political parties 
we support, the governments we obey, and the countries of which we are patriotic citizens, do 
not exist. War, for example, seems an odd activity if there are no countries to fight for; and 
elections are strange events if there are no political parties for which to vote. Indeed, since war 
and elections are social phenomena, they would not exist on this account. Thus, on the face of 
it, Eliminative Individualism may appear ridiculous. Indeed, Flew describes the reality of the 
social as “inexpugnable” (1985, p. 102), and Lukes declares the denial of the existence of social 
reality “absurd” (1973, p. 124). Sheehy (2006a, p. 16) writes that “it is difficult to identify any 
compelling reasons to endorse” Eliminative Individualism, while Roth (2010) points out that in 
the literature “it is hardly controversial” that the social exists. 
But the Intuition-sacrifice account is no more plausible than Eliminative Individualism. 
Suppose we begin to alter or rid ourselves of some of our fundamental, common-sense 
intuitions about social groups. It is difficult to know just which intuition(s) to deny. Should we 
sacrifice the intuition that social groups are distinct from mere aggregates? If we do, it seems 
we have collapsed into Eliminative Individualism, for Eliminative Individualism (about social 
                                                 
141 Of course, one might argue that one of our intuitions regarding social groups is that social groups exist. And so, 
this second, Eliminative, option also involves intuition sacrifice. So, we can distinguish the intuition-sacrifice 
approach from Eliminative Individualism by pointing out that while the first involves maintaining the intuition 
that social groups exist, while sacrificing at least one of our other social intuitions, the Eliminative approach 
maintains all of our social intuitions but the intuition that social groups exist. 
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groups) might be seen as the view that social groups are nothing more than mere aggregates. 
Then perhaps we are better off sacrificing the intuition that social groups can perform joint 
actions. In this case, we might question whether there is any importance or value to social 
groups at all, since if social groups have no agency, they cannot make an impact on the world 
– they are inert, unimportant entities without which the world would continue unaffected. 
Maybe we should rather question the intuition that groups persist through time. Yet this would 
make a mockery of most of our common-sense and social-scientific talk of social groups. I 
cannot identify myself as a member of the ANCYL if the party ceases to exist before I have an 
opportunity to join. Thus it seems that sacrificing any of our common-sense intuitions about 
social groups provides us with little more comfort than adopting Eliminative Individualism. 
[For further reasons against adopting the intuition-sacrifice account, see section A.4.b. 
Intuition (p. 36)]. 
My preferred answer to the dilemma is to support Eliminative Individualism, since I do not 
think this is as hopeless a task as Flew, Lukes, Sheehy and Roth take it to be. I turn now to 
clarifying the scope of Eliminative Individualism and its model of elimination, and then defend 
the account against objections. 
D.2. CLARIFYING THE ACCOUNT 
D.2.a. Scope 
As I have defined it, Eliminative Individualism is the claim that social phenomena do not exist. 
This is stronger than the claim that social groups do not exist. But almost all of the discussion 
thus far has concerned affirmative accounts of social groups, and so, an objector could argue 
that my argument for Eliminative Individualism supports merely an eliminativism of social 
groups rather than social phenomena generally. 
There are reasons, however, for thinking that if social groups fail to exist, then neither do social 
phenomena generally. First, I argued that Searle uses social groups in his account of social 
institutions. For on Searle’s account, a social institution exists only if there is collective 
recognition of a Status Function Declaration that asserts the existence of the institution. And I 
argued that this collective recognition presupposes the existence of a social group. Thus, on the 
most popular account of social institutions, institutions fail to exist if groups fail to exist. And, 
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together, social groups and institutions make up many, many social phenomena (arguably the 
vast majority of social phenomena). 
Second, there does not seem to be a prima facie reason for thinking that the considerations I 
presented against affirmative accounts of social groups could not be extended against social 
phenomena more broadly. We might construct a similar taxonomy of accounts of money, for 
example. The economist might assert (reduction) that money can be reduced to the paper on 
which it is printed, or perhaps to the laws governing its exchange, or to the function it serves in 
society. Or the economist could hold (non-reduction) that money is distinct from its substrate, 
the laws that govern it, and its function. Against reductive accounts, we might assert objections 
from the holism of the social and its variable realisation in different economic systems. And 
against non-reductive accounts, we might argue that the token identity or supervenience 
asserted would be difficult to defend. Of course, much more work would need to be done here 
to expand these accounts and objections, but there does not seem to be any obvious reason for 
thinking that such an expansion cannot take place. I take it, then, that the objections I provided 
to social groups provide inductive support for similar objections to social phenomena generally. 
I will proceed, therefore, under the assumption that Eliminative Individualism applies to social 
phenomena generally, and assess the account as such. 
D.2.b. Models of elimination 
The central claim of Eliminative Individualism is that: 
EI-1) Social phenomena do not exist. 
It is important to note that EI-1 is not the claim that the individualistic phenomena that comprise 
social phenomena do not exist. So, while EI-1 implies that the ANCYL does not exist, EI-1 
does not claim that the individuals who call themselves “members” of the league do not exist. 
EI-1 is consistent with aggregates of individuals existing, but it is inconsistent with the idea that 
these aggregates are anything more than mere aggregates – i.e. EI-1 denies the existence of 
social groups that have collective agency, collective responsibility, collective value and 
collective persistence. 
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There are different ways of understanding EI-1, or different models of elimination. I consider 
four such models now (Instrumentalism, Kemeny-reduction, Rovane’s group-persons, and 
eliminative explanation), and favour only the fourth.  
D.2.b.i. Instrumentalism 
 Tuomela’s Instrumentalism 
Interestingly, a search of the literature reveals that EI-1 once had a proponent. In Tuomela’s 
earlier work (1983), he presents what he calls an “Eliminativist” view of social phenomena. 
The early Tuomela views the collection of common-sense and social scientific beliefs about the 
social as a theory, namely, “Folk Sociology”. This theory, according to Tuomela, is correct in 
limited instances, and in those instances, it can be explained individualistically and defined in 
individualistic terms. Thus, some social phenomena can be reduced to individualistic 
phenomena, while others cannot. For this reason, Tuomela argues, social phenomena do not 
exist. However, although social phenomena do not exist, we should not yet eliminate Folk 
Sociology, for if we continue our Folk Sociological endeavours, we will eventually have more 
material to reduce to the individualist theory that replaces our social theories. Thus, although 
social phenomena do not exist, forming theories about them is useful for now. Social 
phenomena are thus “useful fictions”. 
Notice that Tuomela’s account has something that my Eliminative Individualism lacks: 
Tuomela claims that talk about the social is useful in predicting and explaining behaviour. Thus, 
Tuomela supplements EI-1 with EI-2: 
EI-2) Folk sociology is useful. 
We could, therefore, label Tuomela’s account as Instrumentalist, rather than Eliminativist.  
I am unconvinced that Tuomela’s Instrumentalism is satisfactory, however, because his support 
for the account is inadequate. If we let S refer to Folk Sociology, S* refer to a corrected version 
of S, and let T abbreviate the individualistic theory to which S* is reduced, we might summarise 
Tuomela’s argument for EI-1 (the non-existence of social phenomena) as follows: 
P1: If S* is reducible to T, and T is superior to S, then S is eliminated in its reduction 
to T. 
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P2: If (i) the well-defined terms in S derive their meaning from T, and (ii) the 
phenomena referred to by the well-defined terms in S are best explained by T, then 
S* is reducible to T, and T is superior to S. 
P3: (i) and (ii) are true. 
P4: So, S* is reducible to T, and T is superior to S. [From P2 and P3] 
P5:  So, S is eliminated in its reduction to T. [From P1 and P4] 
P6: If S is eliminated in its reduction to T, then the social phenomena posited by S exist 
only if they are also posited by T. 
P7: Social phenomena are not posited by T. 
________ 
Conc: Social phenomena do not exist. [From P5 to P7] 
P3, however, is implausible because both (i) and (ii) are implausible. First, (i) amounts to the 
claim that Logical Individualism is true; but, I argued (with Mandelbaum) that Logical 
Individualism is implausible because of the holism of the social – i.e. because social terms are 
defined not exclusively in terms of individualistic concepts, but rather in terms of other social 
concepts [see section C.3.a. Logical Individualism (p. 154)]. Tuomela would need to show, 
therefore, that all well-defined social terms are exceptional, in that they are definable 
exclusively individualistically, and do not display this holism – something he has not shown, 
and which it seems, would be rather difficult. Moreover, (ii) is the claim that terms in the 
corrected version of Folk Sociology (S*) will be explained by the individualistic sciences, 
which is a version of Explanatory Methodological Individualism. In section D.2.b.ii. Kemeny-
reduction (p. 196), however, I argue that Explanatory Methodological Individualism is 
dubious. 
Thus, Tuomela’s argument for EI-1 (the claim that social phenomena do not exist) is 
unconvincing. Moreover, Tuomela’s support for EI-2 (the claim that Folk Sociology is useful) 
is also problematic. Tuomela argues that we should not yet eliminate Folk Sociology because 
the social sciences will eventually yield more material to reduce to the individualistic theory 
that eventually replaces our social theories. However, recall that Sawyer, Kincaid and Little 
present significant objections to the possibility of reduction for any but the simplest social 
phenomena, since more complex social phenomena are realised by wildly different individual 
phenomena [see section C.3.b. Type Individualism (p. 159)]. But it is precisely the more 
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complex social phenomena that the social sciences attempt to explain. Thus, I deny that the 
social sciences will in future furnish more material for reduction to individualist theories. 
 Dennettian Instrumentalism 
Thus far I have argued that the supporting argument that Tuomela provides for the combination 
of EI-1 and EI-2 is problematic. We might, however, attempt to reach the combination of EI-1 
and EI-2 using a different supporting argument. I turn now to consider Dennett’s Instrumentalist 
account of mental states, to assess whether we might construct a parallel account of social 
groups.142 Dennett (1987) argues that in explaining and predicting events in the world, we might 
adopt a number of different stances. We might, for example, adopt a physicalist stance, which 
attempts to explain and predict events by citing laws about the movement of physical entities 
(microscopic or macroscopic). We predict that a tennis ball will drop to the earth at a certain 
velocity and at a certain time after we have thrown it up into the air, by using certain Newtonian 
laws of motion. On the other hand, we might adopt a design stance when explaining and 
predicting certain events. We explain why a calculator displays a “4” symbol after we press 
buttons on its surface in the order “2”, “+”, “2”, “=” by citing the fact that the calculator was 
designed to solve maths equations. Finally, when we explain and predict human actions, we 
usually adopt what Dennett coins the “intentional stance”. 
On the intentional stance, we ascribe to the entity displaying the behaviour to be explained 
certain intentional states such as beliefs and desires. When a person leans backwards and puts 
his hand on a hot stove, we can predict that the person will remove his hand quickly thereafter. 
The primary reason for how we can predict this behaviour is neither because of Newtonian laws 
of motion, nor because the stove or the person is designed in a certain way. Instead, we can 
predict the person’s behaviour because we ascribe to the person: a belief that the stove is causing 
him pain, a belief that removing his hand from the stove will alleviate that pain, and a desire to 
alleviate the pain. Viewing the subject as having these beliefs and desires allows us to predict 
his behaviour accurately in a way that would be far more tedious (assuming it is possible at all) 
from a physicalist or design stance. 
Dennett (1987) holds that while the intentional stance provides us with a view of certain 
objective patterns in the world that would not otherwise be discernible using the physicalist and 
                                                 
142 This alternative, Dennettian account, was suggested by Beck (2011, p. 2). 
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design stances, those patterns do not exist as anything more than patterns viewed from the 
intentional stance. So, while it is an objective fact about the world – i.e. it is true regardless of 
whether or not anyone notices this fact – that, all things being equal, persons try to alleviate 
their own physical pain, this fact is nothing but a pattern viewed from the intentional stance. 
On this view, for a subject S to perform an action A or to hold a belief B, just is for S to be an 
“intentional system” in which A or B forms part of the best “interpretation” of S. An intentional 
system is a system whose behaviour can be reliably predicted using the intentional stance, and 
an interpretation of S is a strategy for predicting the behaviour of S. 
Now, the most obvious way to construct a parallel, Dennettian account of social phenomena 
would be to see explanations and predictions of social events as issuing from either an 
“individualist stance” or a “social stance”. The individualist stance attempts to explain and 
predict social events by citing the behaviour of individuals, while the social stance cites social 
phenomena in its explanations and predictions. A social Dennettian position would claim that 
adopting a social stance will give us access to objective social patterns that would be extremely 
difficult to see from an individualistic stance, but these social patterns are nevertheless nothing 
more than patterns viewed from the social stance. A social phenomenon, on this account, would 
just be a phenomenon that forms part of a “social system”, the best interpretation of which 
includes that phenomenon. 
Applied to social groups, the account would most likely read: for a social group G to perform 
an action A or hold a belief (or other shared state) B, just is for G to be a social system in which 
A or B forms part of the best “interpretation” of G.143 Although this view is primarily an account 
of group actions or shared states, it also provides, by implication, an account of social groups 
as social systems. But what does this mean exactly? I can see two possible candidates for 
answering this question. 
One possible answer is to see a social group as an organism, capable of reproduction, growth 
and self-regulation (or some combination of these capacities). This is the organic account of 
social groups, which I argued is problematic [see section B.2.b. Organic account (p. 44)]. 
                                                 
143 The “best” interpretation of a phenomenon at a given time would not necessarily be the best interpretation at a 
later time. Right now, the best interpretation of groups is as social systems, but in future, an individualistic view 
may be better. If so, then the “fiction” of social groups will no longer be useful, and can be dropped. 
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A second interpretation of groups as systems is understanding social groups as collections of 
individuals with a shared telos. As discussed previously, the problem with the (best version of 
the) teleological account is that it agglomerates distinct social groups, and therefore requires 
the inclusion of an account of collective action to distinguish between social groups [see section 
B.2.c. Teleological account (p. 50)]. This, however, raises a problem. A social group is to be 
understood as a social system, which in turn should be understood as a collection of individuals 
with shared ends capable of collective action, but collective action (on the Dennettian account) 
is to be understood as that phenomena forming part of the best interpretation of the social 
system. Thus, the account appears circular. To avoid this circularity, the social Dennettian 
would need to solve the agglomeration problem associated with the Broad teleological account 
without using the notion of group action: not an easy task. 
 The conjunction of EI-1 and EI-2 
I have argued so far that the Tuomelian and Dennettian supporting arguments for the 
conjunction of EI-1 and EI-2 are problematic. In addition, it seems that, regardless of the 
support for EI-1 and EI-2, the conjunction of these two claims is incoherent, because they pull 
in opposing directions. If talk about social phenomena was useful in predicting and explaining 
events, then this would present strong support for the existence of social phenomena. For if 
social phenomena did not exist (in some sense or another), we would be surprised if we came 
to observe that social theories are indeed accurate. As Smart remarks,  
Is it not odd that the world should be such as to make a purely instrumental theory true? On the other 
hand, if we interpret the theory in a realistic way, then we have no need for such a cosmic 
coincidence. (Smart in Papineau, 1986, p. 269) 
Put differently, if EI-2 is true, it seems that EI-1 is false. Perhaps this objection is not conclusive 
against the Instrumentalist, for it is logically possible that talk of social phenomena provides 
accurate predictions without social phenomena existing. Nevertheless, I take it that this 
objection, together with the objections raised against Tuomela’s support for EI-1 and EI-2, is 
enough to place the burden of proof squarely on the shoulders of the Instrumentalist. 
D.2.b.ii. Kemeny-reduction 
There is another way that Eliminative Individualism may be understood to have appeared in the 
literature. Traditionally, Explanatory Methodological Individualism (the claim that all social 
phenomena can be fully explained individualistically) has been used to support Type 
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Individualism (a Nagel-reductive account that conserves the existence of the social). This is 
because Explanatory Methodological Individualism has often been asserted as a theory about 
the explanation of types of social phenomena, namely: 
Type Explanatory Methodological Individualism: any given type of social 
phenomenon can be fully explained by a given type of individualistic 
phenomenon. 
If every type of social phenomenon can be explained by a corresponding type of social 
phenomenon, this strongly supports Type Individualism (p. 159). I previously argued, however, 
that Type Individualism cannot account for the variable realisation of the social. I am more 
interested here, though, in a weaker version of Explanatory Methodological Individualism, 
specifically, a claim about the explanation of token social phenomena: 
Token Explanatory Methodological Individualism: any given token social 
phenomenon can be fully explained by a given token set of individualistic 
phenomena.  
On the token account (as on the type account) social phenomena of a given type must be fully 
explicable by individualistic phenomena, but (contrary to the type account) those individualistic 
phenomena need not belong to the same individualistic type, and so the token account does not 
support Nagel reduction (and therefore is not faced with the challenge of variable realisation). 
Nevertheless, the token account could be used to perform an eliminative (i.e. non-conservative) 
reduction of the social to the individual, as on Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model of reduction. 
The traditional model of elimination used by Eliminative Materialists, or those who hold that 
mental states do not exist, is the Kemeny-reductive model.144 Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956) 
propose that for any two theories (or any two sets of theories) T1 and T2, T2 can be replaced 
by, and hence can be eliminated in favour of, T1 if the following three conditions are met: 
KO-1) T2 cannot be Nagel-reduced to T1. 
                                                 
144 Notice that Eliminative Materialism implies Eliminative Individualism, but it is not the case that Eliminative 
Individualism implies Eliminative Materialism. If there are no mental states, then it seems there are no individuals, 
and therefore, no groups of individuals. But it is possible that there are no groups, and yet, there are mental states. 
We can imagine, for example, that an individual could live alone in the universe [consider the alien interlocutor 
introduced in section A.1. The problem (p. 1)]. That individual could have mental states, but not be a member of 
any social group. 
Some philosophers would argue, however, that certain mental states cannot exist without social groups. Burge 
argues that propositional attitudes with content that successfully refer to states, events or objects in the world 
require a community. I consider this claim in section D.4.a. Burge’s account of content (p. 230). 
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KO-2) All observations that can be explained by T2 can be fully explained by T1.145 
KO-3) T1 is at least as simple as T2 after T1 has explained all observations made by T2. 
The idea here is that if T1 can explain everything that T2 can explain (i.e. KO-2) without adding 
any undue complexity to the explanation (KO-3), and there are no type-type laws linking T2 to 
T1 (KO-1), then T2 is redundant, and so, should be replaced by T1. So, let T2 be Folk Sociology 
and let T1 be the individualistic sciences (e.g. psychology, neuroscience, etc.). Then, KO-1 is 
plausible, since I argued against Type Individualism that Nagel-reduction of Folk Sociology to 
individualistic science is problematic because of the variable realisation of the social. Thus, the 
Eliminativist wishing to perform a Kemeny-reduction of the social to the individual has two 
tasks remaining. He must show that Token Explanatory Methodological Individualism is true, 
since this will imply that KO-2 is true. Moreover, he must argue that the individualistic sciences 
used to explain the observations explained by Folk Sociology are at least as simple as Folk 
Sociology itself (KO-3). I consider each of these tasks in turn. 
 Token Explanatory Methodological Individualism (KO-2) 
Is it true that every token social phenomenon can be explained fully in purely individualistic 
terms? The question appears to be three-ways ambiguous. Consider the following three 
statements: 
S-1) Every instance of paranormal activity (e.g. stigmata, poltergeists, ESP, alien 
abduction, etc.) can be explained scientifically. 
S-2) The hardness of diamonds can be explained by chemistry. 
S-3) The death of Mrs Smith can be explained by the burglar firing his gun. 
When cynics about the paranormal claim that paranormal activity can be explained 
scientifically, what they mean is that we can explain why some people believe they experience 
paranormal activity, by citing a set of scientifically accepted entities or events. Thus, we can 
explain away the experience of these individuals as misperception of non-paranormal 
phenomena. For example, scientists can explain away the experience of alien abduction by 
citing a range of factors, such as false memory implantation through hypnosis, hallucination 
caused by sleep paralysis, a response to the trauma of undergoing surgery, or a fabrication by 
                                                 
145 Precisely what is meant by “explained” in the Kemeny-Oppenheim model will be discussed shortly. 
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those with a prior fascination with reports of extra-terrestrial or paranormal activity (Clancy, 
2005; Forrest, 2008). Thus, explaining away paranormal activity involves operating from the 
assumption that paranormal activity does not in fact exist, and that persons who have 
experiences of these phenomena have false beliefs about what they perceived. 
By contrast, explaining the hardness of diamonds chemically does not involve explaining away 
the appearance of hardness. When chemists attempt to explain the strength of diamonds, they 
explain that the underlying chemical bonds which make up diamonds are such that they create 
an incredibly hard substance. Rather than explaining away the hardness of diamonds, chemists 
explain why diamonds do in fact have the property of hardness. Thus, explaining the hardness 
of diamonds chemically operates from the assumption that diamonds are indeed hard, and that 
the belief that diamonds are hard is true. 
Finally, like the diamond case, explaining the death of Mrs Smith by citing the burglar’s gun 
firing involves explaining why her death occurred, rather than explaining away the mere 
appearance of her death. However, there is a crucial difference between the diamond case and 
the murder case. Chemists explain the hardness of diamonds by citing a property of diamonds. 
But, the death of Mrs Smith is not explained by citing a property of her death – instead, it is 
explained by citing the cause of her death: the burglar’s firing of his gun caused the death of 
Mrs Smith. By contrast, the property of having strong chemical bonds does not cause the 
hardness of diamonds; rather, having strong chemical bonds is, or constitutes, the hardness of 
diamonds. 
So, we might distinguish among three types of explanation. “X explains Y” could mean that (i) 
X explains away the apparent existence of Y, that (ii) X is constitutive of Y, or that (iii) X 
caused Y. I will call these three types of explanation: eliminative, constitutive and causal 
explanations respectively. Now, we see that Token Explanatory Methodological Individualism 
might be interpreted in three ways: 
TEMIeliminative: any given token social phenomenon can be explained away as 
a misperception by citing a token set of individualistic phenomena. 
TEMIconstitutive: the underlying nature of any given token social phenomenon 
can be explained fully by citing the token set of individualistic phenomena 
that comprise it. 
TEMIcausal: the cause of any given token social phenomenon can be fully 
specified by citing a token set of individualistic phenomena. 
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Methodological Individualists (whether they espouse the token or type version of the account) 
do not specify which of the three senses of “explain” they mean, but vacillate and ambiguate 
between the constitutive and causal meanings of “explanation”, leaving the eliminative account 
unconsidered. But what is important here is which of the three senses of “explanation” Kemeny 
and Oppenheim intend when they use the term “explain” in KO-2, and so which of the three 
senses of “explain” are required for Kemeny-reduction. Unfortunately, Kemeny and 
Oppenheim are not explicit about precisely which sense of “explanation” is involved in KO-2, 
but the following paragraphs are helpful in deciphering an implicit definition of explanation in 
their work: 
It is further important to note that from a logical point of view there is no difference between 
explanation and prediction. The distinction is a pragmatic one, depending on whether the fact 
deduced is already known or yet observed. Hence we will use “explain” to cover both processes…. 
A certain oversimplification is involved in this schematic representation. We intentionally overlook 
the fact that most observations involve a margin of error. (Kemeny, 1956, p. 8) 
Kemeny and Oppenheim are explicit that they do not intend “explanation” to be understood 
under the eliminative explanation interpretation, since they state that they “intentionally 
overlook the fact that most observations involve a margin of error”, and they would not overlook 
error if utilising an eliminative explanation. Moreover, notice that Kemeny and Oppenheim 
hold that observations are “deduced” from their explanations. Here, Kemeny and Oppenheim 
seem to be referring to the deductive-nomological model of explanation, in which the 
explanandum (i.e. the observation) is meant to follow deductively from the explanans (i.e. the 
explanation), where the explanans comprises two statements: one asserts certain laws or 
generalisations, while the other concerns the conditions under which the explanandum 
phenomenon occurs (Hempel, 1966, sec. 5.2). That Kemeny and Oppenheim mean explanation 
as on the deductive-nomological model is further supported by their assertion that explanations 
and predictions are interchangeable, since both past and future observations follow equally from 
the explanans in a deductive-nomological explanation. 
Now a deductive-nomological explanation may be either a causal explanation or a constitutive 
explanation. A causal deductive-nomological explanation is given when the laws or 
generalisations involved in the explanans are causal, of the form: “whenever G events occur, F 
events occur” (Hempel, 1966, p. 53). By contrast, the explanation is constitutive if the laws or 
generalisations given in the explanans are of the form “observable entities of type O are 
concomitant with underlying theoretical entities of type E”. So, for example, the generalisation 
“whenever a bullet passes through certain parts of the brain, the brain ceases to function” is a 
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causal generalisation (used to explain Mrs Smith’s death at the hand of the robber). By contrast, 
the generalisation that “hardness in substances is concomitant with strong molecular bonds” is 
a constitutive explanation (used to explain the hardness of diamonds).  
Thus, because Kemeny and Oppenheim seem to intend to use the term “explain” in KO-2 to 
refer to deductive-nomological explanation, and because deductive-nomological explanation 
can be either causal or constitutive, this suggests that Kemeny and Oppenheim might intend to 
use either causal or constitutive explanation in their reductive model. However, further 
consideration shows that constitutive explanation cannot be used in a Kemeny-model reduction, 
for the following reason. Suppose that a given social phenomenon S is correctly constitutively 
explained by citing the individualistic phenomena <I1…In> that comprise it. Then, insofar as 
<I1…In> exist, so too does S exist. But <I1…In> do exist, by hypothesis (since the explanation 
is correct), and so, S exists. But, the Kemeny-reductive model is not conservative, and so S 
does not exist on this model. And so, constitutive explanation cannot be the form of explanation 
used in a Kemeny-reduction. I take it, then, that the form of explanation required for a Kemeny-
reduction of the social is causal, and so, TEMIcausal (the claim that the cause of every social 
phenomenon can be specified in entirely individualistic terms) is the relevant disambiguation 
of Token Methodological Individualism that would imply KO-2.146 Let us consider, then, 
whether TEMIcausal is true. 
Recall that Folk Sociology asserts the holism of the social – i.e. the claim that all social concepts 
are embedded in the total social conceptual framework. Thus defined, the doctrine of social 
holism is a conceptual claim. However, Folk Sociology also supports a causal holism of the 
social, or the claim that social phenomena are embedded in a causal network in which the nodes 
are other social phenomena. For example, the election of Obama (social phenomenon [SP1]) 
                                                 
146 One might object to the claim that causal explanation is utilised in KO-2 in much the same way that I objected 
to the claim that constitutive explanation is utilised in KO-2. I argued that Kemeny and Oppenhemin cannot use 
constitutive explanation in their model of reduction, since a correct constitutive explanation of a social 
phenomenon would imply that the social phenomenon exists (but Kemeny-Oppenheim reduction is meant to 
eliminate the social). Similarly, one could argue that a causal explanation of a social phenomenon also implies the 
existence of that phenomenon, and so, cannot be utilised by Kemeny and Oppenheim. However, it is possible to 
explain social phenomena causally without implying their existence, since we can cite the causes of the 
individualistic phenomena that we take to constitute those social phenomena, rather than cite the causes of the 
social phenomena themselves. For example, when explaining the voting patterns of white South Africans, we can 
give the causes that explain why each individual who is both white and takes himself to be a citizen of South Africa 
makes a particular mark on his ballot, rather than explaining why white South Africans as a group vote as they do. 
Then, our explanation implies the existence of individuals who take themselves to be South Africans, and it implies 
the existence of pieces of paper called “ballots”, but it does not imply the existence of South Africa, nor of an 
election. 
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was caused by a number of factors, such as dissatisfaction of the American public over the Bush 
administration (SP2), which was caused by the way the Bush administration handled the war 
on terrorism (SP3), which was caused by the Republican policy on war (SP4), etc.  Thus, to 
give a full causal explanation of SP1, we need to cite SP2, SP3, SP4, etc. Hence, if the full 
causal explanation of SP1 can be given in purely individualistic terms, the TEMIcausal proponent 
must hold that each of the social phenomena (i.e. SP2, SP3, SP4, etc.) in the causal network in 
which SP1 is embedded can be fully described in purely individualistic terms. This, it seems, 
would presuppose that that every token social phenomenon in the causal network (i.e. SP1, SP2, 
SP3, SP4, etc…) is token identical with a token set of individualistic phenomena (i.e. that NRI-
3 from Non-Reductive Individualism is true), but I argued earlier that NRI-3 is problematic. 
Thus, TEMIcausal is problematic at least to the extent that NRI-3 is problematic. 
Thus far I have argued that KO-2 is problematic because TEMIcausal is problematic. Now I turn 
to consider KO-3, or the claim that individualistic theories are at least as simple as Folk 
Sociology. 
 Simplicity (KO-3) 
Two criteria might be used to assess whether one theory is simpler than another in accounting 
for the same observations: parsimony and elegance (see A. Baker, 2010). Parsimony is a 
measure of the ontological simplicity of a theory, or a measure of how many distinct types of 
entities the theory postulates; elegance is a measure of the syntactic simplicity of the theory, or 
a measure of the quantity and complexity of the hypotheses posited by the theory. Just how 
these two criteria of simplicity should be weighted in coming to an overall judgement of 
simplicity is debatable, and often the two criteria pull in opposite directions (as we shall see 
shortly). Nevertheless, judgements concerning the weighting of the two criteria can often be 
made intuitively on a case-by-case basis. 
In KO-3, Kemeny and Oppenheim insist that for T2 to be Kemeny-reduced to T1, T1 must be 
at least as simple as T2 even after T1 has fully explained the observations that T2 explains. 
Now consider that a complete individualistic causal explanation of the election of Obama would 
look like something like this: 
The election of Obama was caused by the dissatisfaction of <American citizen 1 & American citizen 
2 & …. American citizen n> with <Bush administration member 1 & Bush administration member 
2 & …. Bush administration member n>, which was caused by the way <Bush administration 
member 1 & Bush administration member 2 & …. Bush administration member n> handled the 
attempt to eliminate <Al-Qaeda member 1 & Al-Qaeda member 2 & …. Al-Qaeda member n>, 
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which was caused by <doctrine 1 & doctrine 2 & … doctrine n> held true by <Republican member 
1 & Republican member 2 & Republican member n>, which was caused by… 
This explanation is abbreviated for the sanity of the reader, since the fully specified explanation 
would cite every single American citizen, every member of the Bush administration, etc. The 
fully specified individualistic explanation might continue for many hundreds or thousands of 
pages. By contrast, the corresponding social explanation would take no more than a handful of 
lines. 
On the other hand, however, individualistic theories are more parsimonious than Folk 
Sociology. Folk Sociology postulates the existence of both social phenomena and 
individualistic phenomena, whereas individualistic theories merely postulate the existence of 
individualistic phenomena. Hence, Folk Sociology is committed to the existence of more types 
of entities than are individualistic theories. My intuition is that in this case Folk Sociology’s 
significant elegance (when compared with purely individualistic explanation) outweighs its 
comparatively small lack of parsimony. This is especially so because the postulation of the 
existence of social phenomena need not be taken to involve the postulation of a distinct type of 
entity (as on Social Dualism), but only a distinct type of property (as on Non-Reductive 
Individualism). 
I take it, then, that KO-3 is dubious, since Folk Sociology appears simpler than individualistic 
theories in causally explaining social phenomena. But if KO-2 is problematic and KO-3 is 
dubious, then the successful elimination of the social by means of a Kemeny-reduction is 
unlikely.  
D.2.b.iii. Rovane’s group-persons  
Rovane (1998, 2004a, 2004b) argues that social groups are persons, in the same sense that 
individual humans are persons. As such, groups are individuals in the same sense that humans 
are individuals. On this view, then, there are no social groups – only individuals. So in some 
sense, groups do not exist. Rovane argues for this view as follows: 
P1: x is a person iff x is a rational agent (1998, ch. 3; 2004a, p. 555). 
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P2: x is a rational agent iff x is capable of deliberation and having a point of view (1998, 
ch. 3; 2004a, p. 556).147 
P3: Social groups are capable of deliberation and having a point of view (1998, ch. 4; 
2004a, p. 556). 
P4: So, social groups are persons. [From P1 to P3] 
P5: If x is a person, then x is an individual (1998, ch. 6; 2004b, p. 188). 
________ 
Conc: Social groups are individuals. [From P4 and P5] 
The critical literature on Rovane’s account has focused on P1, P2 and P4: i.e. on whether  
persons are equivalent to rational agents (Degaynesford, 2002, p. 173; Wallace, 2000, p. 315); 
whether Rovane’s account of rational agency is correct (Wallace, 2000, pp. 316-318); and 
whether social groups are persons proper (Levi, 2004). I will constrain my discussion here, 
instead, to what Rovane means by an “individual” in P5 and the conclusion.  
What exactly does Rovane mean by an “individual”? Rovane (2004a, p. 555) states that her 
account “entails that there could be group persons composed of many human beings and 
multiple persons within a single [i.e. individual] human being.” An individual human being, on 
this view, is an important sense a multiple (see Ward, 2011). As an individual human being, I 
contain within myself multiple points of view, each of which can enter in my deliberation 
process to reach an “all-things-considered judgement” (2004b, p. 188). Each of these points of 
view within me are “engaged as a person” during this deliberation process, and so (for Rovane) 
each of these points of view within me is a person (1998, p. 123; 2004a, p. 557). What makes 
me a person that contains these distinct persons within me, is that I come to an all-thing-
                                                 
147 Wallace (2000) understands P2 as asserting that x is a rational agent iff x does in fact deliberate and has a point 
of view. By contrast, my reading of Rovane holds that on her account, rational agents need only have the capacity 
for deliberation and a point of view. Thus, on Wallace’s view, Rovane’s account is not committed to the view that 
all social groups are persons, but merely that only those groups that exercise these capacities are persons. That is, 
“Rovane is arguing only for the possibility of group persons” (Wallace, 2000, p. 313 emphasis in the original). I 
have not adopted Wallace’s reading, however, for two reasons. 
First, I do not think Wallace has provided an accurate representation of Rovane’s account. Rovane is explicit that 
she means to include agents capable of rationality as rational agents. For example, Rovane (2004a, p. 556) writes: 
“When I say that anything that is capable of arriving at and implementing all-things-considered judgments 
qualifies as a person, I mean to include, in particular, groups” (emphasis in the original). 
Second, Wallace’s reading won’t provide the conclusion I wish to support with Rovane’s account: that no social 
groups exist (i.e. EI-1). For the sake of the argument, then, I am interested in exploring my reading of Rovane (i.e. 
P2), even if it is unfaithful to her account (although I believe it is faithful) since I am primarily interested here in 
supporting EI-1. 
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considered judgement. That is, I arrive at rational unity by engaging these disparate individual 
persons within me. 
For example, suppose one part of me wants to eat the chocolate placed before me, while another 
part of me suggests that I should not: I have worked too hard on my diet to capitulate now. On 
Rovane’s view, there are two persons within me, the chocolate-lover and the dieter, each with 
his own perspective. Each presents his view for deliberation, and I arrive at an all-thing-
considered judgement. I am an individual human being who is also a person, with multiple 
persons within me. (Similarly, a group is an individual person, with multiple persons within it). 
But this conception of an individual as a multiple is problematic in the context of considering 
Rovane’s account as providing support for EI-1. Rovane has provided an account of social 
groups as individuals, but at the cost of characterising individuals as multiples. Indeed, we 
might say that an individual on Rovane’s account is a collection of persons. And this collection 
of persons on Rovane’s account is unified by the pursuit of a rational unity, or an all-things-
considered judgement. The structure of Rovane’s “individual”, therefore, is suspiciously similar 
to the structure of a social group specified by the teleological solution to Q1 (p. 50), in which 
group members work towards a common goal (in this case rational unity). Indeed, Rovane 
seems to have constructed an account of personal identity that reduces the individual to a social 
group, rather than an account of the group that (eliminatively) reduces social groups to the 
individual. That is, even if we accept the conclusion of Rovane’s argument, we have not 
eliminated the social, since Rovane’s individual is social. And therefore, Rovane’s account fails 
to support EI-1. 
D.2.b.iv. A fourth approach: eliminative explanation 
Thus far I have rejected three strategies for supporting EI-1 (the claim that social phenomena 
do not exist): Instrumentalism (both Tuomelian and Dennettian), Kemeny-reduction and 
Rovane’s Group-persons account. In discussing Kemeny-reduction, I argued that neither causal 
nor constitutive explanation can be used as a successful ground for eliminating social 
phenomena. However, what has not been discussed in the social literature is the possibility of 
using eliminative explanation as a model for eliminating social phenomena. I wish to consider 
this possibility now. 
Recall that paranormal activity is explained by science insofar as experiences of paranormal 
activity are explained away by scientists (as hallucinations or false-memory implants, for 
                                                                                                          Does the Social Exist? 
 
206 
example). I called this form of explanation, “eliminative explanation”, and defined 
TEMIeliminative as the claim that any given token social phenomenon can be explained away as a 
misperception by citing a token set of individualistic phenomena. In much the same way that 
psychology and logic can explain away the “observation” that there are prophetic crystal balls 
(see Ramsey, 2007, sec. 1), TEMIeliminative (if correct) would explain away the experience of 
social phenomena. This position would deny the Instrumentalist claim about the usefulness of 
talking about the social (EI-2) just as the scientist would deny the usefulness of talking about 
paranormal activity. That is, TEMIeliminative implies that we replace EI-2 with the combination 
of EI-3 and EI-4: 
EI-3) Folk Sociology is a radically false and misleading theory. 
EI-4) Social terms have no referent. 
On this view, the common-sense intuitions and basic social scientific hypotheses regarding the 
social together comprise a theory that is both radically false and misleading. This account posits 
that talk about the social is harmful to scientific progress, just as talk about crystal balls and 
demons is harmful to scientific progress. Social terms are not, as Tuomela would have it, 
“placeholders” for the individualistic terms to which we will later find they correspond (see 
Rorty, 1979, p. 81); but, instead, we should eliminate social terms from our vocabulary entirely. 
Just as the terms “demons” and “magic” have no referent (by “magic” I mean the purported 
ability to alter physical objects by supernatural means), so too do social terms refer to nothing 
in the world. The task of the individualistic sciences is not to explain social phenomena causally 
(as on a Kemeny-reduction), but rather, to explain away social phenomena the same way that 
scientists have explained away paranormal activity, crystal balls and demons. 
Henceforth, to distinguish Eliminative Individualism from Instrumentalism and a Kemeny-
reductive approach, let the term “Eliminative Individualism” refer to the conjunction of EI-1, 
EI-3, and EI-4, and let the model of elimination utilised by Eliminative Individualism be 
TEMIeliminative. 
In the next section, I respond to the charge that Eliminative Individualism is absurd. Thereafter, 
I discuss objections to Eliminative Individualism from areas of philosophy other than Social 
Ontology. And finally, I consider whether Eliminative Individualism is capable of explaining 
“thick” social phenomena, which involve complex patterns that emerge as a result of human 
interaction. 
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D.3. RESPONDING TO THE ABSURDITY OF ELIMINATIVE INDIVIDUALISM 
Perhaps the reason why Eliminative Individualism, as I have defined it, has not been considered 
in the literature is that it seems prima facie “absurd” (Lukes, 1973, p. 124; Sheehy, 2006a, p. 
16). I take it that if a claim, or conjunction of claims, T is absurd, then either T is impossible 
(logically or nomologically), or T contradicts common belief and no reason can be given for 
how T could be true. Thus, the argument I will sketch for the claim that Eliminative 
Individualism is not absurd, has two parts. First, I argue that it is possible that TEMIeliminative is 
correct, and that we can provide a reason for how TEMIeliminative could be true. Then, I do the 
same for EI-3; and since EI-4 follows from EI-3, and EI-1 follows from EI-3 and EI-4, I thereby 
also indirectly object to the absurdity of EI-1 and EI-4. Importantly, I am not arguing in this 
section that TEMIeliminative and EI-3 are true – merely that they are not absurd. 
D.3.a. Eliminative explanation model (TEMIeliminative) 
Suppose that in a thousand years from now it is known that God does not exist, neither as Theists 
define Him (as an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent person who created the universe 
and exists outside of it), nor in any other sense (such as the Pantheistic concept of God as one 
with the world). In this future world, philosophers, scientists and the ordinary citizen have, 
through some form of reasoning unknown to us now, reached infallible certainty that God does 
not exist. The belief that God exists is no longer held by anybody, except perhaps by a handful 
of the most delusional psychotics. 
In this future world, one of the most fruitful and interesting areas of inquiry amongst historians 
and psychologists is what they call “Psychology of Religion”, in which they attempt to 
understand how it is possible that so many of the people who lived a thousand years prior to 
them could have believed in something as implausible as the existence of God. Religio-
psychologists notice two trends among those who believed in God’s existence. First, many of 
these individuals wanted, or were motivated, to believe in God’s existence despite lacking 
sufficient evidence for the existence of God. And second, Religio-psychologists discover that 
those who strongly believed in the existence of God had a neurological makeup that lent itself 
to such a belief – Religio-psychologists posit that Neurotheology can be utilised to explain why 
many of the most ardent believers had apparently “divine” experiences. So, Religio-
psychologists utilise both psychological and neurological explanations to explain away the 
belief in God’s existence. 
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Similarly, the lone alien who knows nothing of the social might attempt to explain away our 
beliefs concerning the existence of social phenomena in much the same way. First, the alien 
would attempt to provide a psychological explanation for our belief in social phenomena, by 
explaining why we are motivated to believe in the existence of social phenomena despite 
lacking sufficient evidence for their existence. Second, it would show how our neurological 
makeup leads us to believe in the existence of social phenomena. 
D.3.a.i. Psychological explanation 
Consider the psychological explanation that Religio-psychologists might offer for why people 
might believe in the existence of God. They would most probably argue that those who believed 
in God did so because: (i) they felt the world lacked meaning and purpose without God 
(Cottingham, 2003, pp. 9-15; Stroope, 2013); (ii) they felt anxious without the ability to call 
upon God as an authority (Sartre, 1943 [2005]); (iii) they longed to connect with something 
greater than themselves (Nozick, 1981, ch. 6); (iv) they wanted the feeling of being held by the 
perfect parent (Rempel, 1997); and because (v) they wanted to feel a sense of belonging 
(Stroope, 2011). 
Social phenomena, and specifically social groups, seem to play precisely the same role as God 
does (or did) in our psychology. In a world where God is losing his foothold, social groups are 
planting themselves securely. We join clubs, political groups and enter into relationships and 
marriages to find meaning and purpose; we call upon our family and circle of friends to 
support and quell our anxiety over our choices and decisions; we fight as members of armies 
and protest groups with the hope that this will allow us to connect to a cause greater than 
ourselves; we seek to be held by the security of belonging to the in-group of our work 
colleagues; and we emigrate, travel and search for the culture or country where we feel we 
belong (Stroope, 2011). Indeed, social groups are so important to us, that whether or not we 
feel that we belong to a social group can impact our identity, psychological well-being, and 
physical health (Kraus & Wulff, 2005; Tajfel, 1981; Ueno, 2005). 
Thus, a case can be made for the view that we believe in the existence of social phenomena 
because they hold enormous psychological value to us. We believe in the existence of social 
phenomena, because, ultimately, without feeling their presence we would feel entirely alone in 
the world. It is no wonder then why people cling so desperately to the belief that social 
phenomena exist. Importantly, however, just because we may not like a world without social 
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phenomena, this is no reason to support the claim that such a world is not the actual world. As 
Schopenhauer points out, the truth may be rather unpalatable, but this is no reason to deny it: 
I shall be told, I suppose, that my philosophy is comfortless—because I speak the truth; and people 
prefer to be assured that everything the Lord has made is good. Go to the priests, then, and leave 
philosophers in peace! (Schopenhauer, 2004, p. 3) 
D.3.a.ii. Neurological explanation 
 The Gestalt Laws 
Thus far I have discussed how we might provide a psychological explanation for why 
individuals cling to the notion that there are social phenomena. However, we can give a deeper 
reason why humans believe in the existence of social phenomena: the human brain is designed 
to group together objects (or people) in its perceptual field (see Kohler, 1920; Metzger, 1936 
[2006]; Wertheimer, 1923 for the original statement of the Gestalt Laws). Gestalt psychologists 
postulate various principles in accordance with which the human brain experiences groupings 
of shapes or stimuli as a single object. These principles include the laws of: (i) Pragnanz, (ii) 
similarity, (iii) common fate, and (iv) familiarity. 
The law of Pragnanz involves experiencing a stimulus in the simplest fashion possible. 
Consider the Olympic symbol in Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5: Olympic symbol 
The brain experiences this picture as five overlapping, complete circles because this is the 
simplest possible experience. The picture could, for example, have been experienced as 
involving nine non-overlapping circle-parts, but the law of Pragnanz does not favour this more 
complex experience. 
The law of similarity states that the brain experiences similar objects as grouped together. 
Consider Figure 6 (from E. B. Goldstein, 2008, p. 75): 
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Figure 6: Squares and circles 
Rather than experiencing the diagram as involving 36 individual dots, some square and some 
circular, the brain organises the experience as comprising six distinct vertical groups of dots. 
The law of common fate posits that the brain tends to group objects that are moving in the same 
direction, or towards a common goal. 
 
Figure 7: Lightning bolts 
Looking at Figure 7, we experience all the thunderbolts but one as belonging to a group, since 
they (but not the left-most) are moving in the same direction. 
Finally, the law of familiarity, or Pareidolia, states that we experience objects as grouped 
together if the grouping is meaningful or familiar. Consider this photograph (Figure 8) taken 
of the surface of Mars by the NASA Viking spacecraft in 1976 (from Garvin, 2001): 
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Figure 8: “Face” on Mars (1976) 
When NASA released this photograph there was mass interest, with many proclaiming that 
there was a “face” on Mars that must have been placed there by a current or ancient civilisation 
by altering the landscape. However, after careful photography with better resolution and 
lighting, it was later discovered that the location does not resemble a face at all (from Garvin, 
2001): 
 
Figure 9: Enhanced “face” on Mars (1976-2001) 
People saw a face in a mass of mountains because of the law of familiarity – the lines and 
shadows of the photo were grouped together as a face because the grouping held meaning and 
familiarity to those who saw it. That some conspiracy theorists today still insist that there is a 
face on Mars and that NASA has doctored the photos to make the face “disappear”, is testament 
to the law of familiarity. 
The Gestalt Laws (also known as the Gestalt principles) are invoked by cognitive psychologists 
to explain how the human brain groups certain shapes together. However, the very same laws 
might be used to show how we group individuals together into social groups. The law of 
Pragnanz explains why when we see a number of individuals together, we tend to count them 
as one object (i.e. a social group) rather than seeing them as a number of unrelated individuals. 
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We use the law of similarity when we ascribe collective actions and attitudes (such as beliefs 
and intentions) to groups – i.e. because we see a number of individuals acting in a similar 
fashion or expressing similar attitudes, we experience these individuals as collectively acting 
or collectively believing. Gilbert’s de dicto plural subject account is a good example of this: a 
collection of individuals belongs to a plural subject if they share a common description. And 
the law of common fate explains why telos is such an important notion in many of the answers 
to the individual-individual and social-individual problems: if our brains are wired to 
experience individuals with a common goal as belonging to the same group, it should be 
expected that we would define groups by their goals. Finally, the law of familiarity suggests 
that our brains prime us to experience groups wherever we can, since groups are familiar and 
meaningful [as on the psychological explanation discussed in section D.3.a.i. Psychological 
explanation (p. 208)]. 
So, assuming that the Gestalt Laws correctly describe the way the brain represents our 
experiences, we can explain why people report that they can quite literally see groups, the same 
way we see faces. This accounts for one reason why common-sense suggests that Eliminative 
Individualism is absurd: it seems absurd to deny what we all seem to see in our everyday 
experience. Lukes (1973, p. 123) elucidates this objection when he argues that because we have 
direct perceptual access to the social, it is ridiculous to deny social reality. Thus, the Gestalt 
Laws provide a further explanation over and above the psychological explanation for why we 
believe in the existence of social groups: our brains are wired to see groups. 
However, the Folk Sociologists will legitimately point out that this neurological explanation 
does not, as it stands, explain away social phenomena. Consider as an analogy the perceptual 
apparatus required to see the shapes of objects. If the neurological explanation I have offered 
explains away the existence of social phenomena, then so too does the claim that our eyes and 
brains are wired to experience objects as shaped, explain away the existence of shape. But of 
course we cannot explain away the existence of shape in this way, and so, I have not adequately 
explained away social phenomena. Indeed, that our brains are wired to experience social groups 
might be evidence for the existence of groups, in the same way that the fact that our brains are 
wired to see shape is evidence for the existence of shaped objects. To reach the conclusion I 
desire, to explain away social groups, I need the further claim that our perceptual apparatus (i.e. 
the Gestalt Laws) may be radically and consistently mistaken specifically with regard to our 
apparent perception of social groups. Notice that this further claim cannot be made in the case 
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of shape, for it seems impossible that the senses could be radically and consistently mistaken 
with regard to the shape of objects (see Bennett, 1971, ch. 4; Leon, 2002). 
 Explaining away social phenomena using the Gestalt Laws 
Fortunately, however, I believe I can make a case for this further claim (that we could be 
radically and consistently mistaken) with regard to the experience of social groups, in two parts. 
First, I argue that in any given case, we could be wrong in an apparent perception of a social 
group. This does not imply, however, that we could be wrong in every experience of a group, 
but it does raise some doubt about what seem to be infallible experiences of social groups. 
Second, I present an evolutionary objection to the claim that we could be consistently mistaken 
in our perception of groups. I argue, however, that the objection is unsuccessful.  
To support the first part of the argument, consider the following two cases. The first case seeks 
to show that in any given case in which common-sense would agree that a social group exists, 
the group members or an onlooker may incorrectly experience an individual as a member of 
the group because of the Gestalt Laws. The first gay-pride march in Belgrade was held in 2002, 
and was a very red affair, with all of the marchers wearing red to mark their affinity with the 
cause. A Serbian friend of mine, who had no dealings with the gay community, and indeed had 
no idea that the march was taking place, just so happened to be wearing a red jersey that day, 
and was walking in the vicinity of the march. Without knowing what had befallen him, he was 
swept into the crowd of activists, who naturally mistook him as a member of the group because 
of the colour of his jersey. Here, the law of simplicity led the protestors (and perhaps onlookers) 
to group my friend incorrectly with the rest of the activists. 
The second case seeks to show that we can incorrectly experience a social group where there is 
only a mere aggregate. Consider again the example provided by Searle: 
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in various places in a park. Imagine that it 
suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to a common, centrally located, shelter. Each 
person has the intention expressed by the sentence "I am running to the shelter." But for each person, 
we may suppose that his or her intention is entirely independent of the intentions and behavior of 
others. In this case, there is no collective behavior; there is just a sequence of individual acts that 
happen to converge on a common goal. Now imagine a case where a group of people in a park 
converge on a common point as a piece of collective behavior. Imagine that they are part of an 
outdoor ballet where the choreography calls for the entire corps de ballet to converge on a common 
point. We can even imagine that the external bodily movements are indistinguishable in the two 
cases; the people running for shelter make the same types of bodily movements as the ballet dancers. 
Externally observed the two cases are indistinguishable…. (Searle, 1990, pp. 4-5) 
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Due to the law of common fate, an onlooker in both of Searle’s cases would see the aggregate 
of individuals as a social group: both the rain-fleers and the ballet dancers move in a way that 
suggests to the onlooker’s brain a common purpose. However, whilst in the ballet dancer case 
common-sense suggests that the onlooker sees the situation correctly, the onlooker does not 
experience the situation correctly in the rain-fleer case, since the rain-fleers lack the requisite 
intra-group relations to comprise a social group. What this example suggests is that for any 
given situation in which an onlooker seems to perceive a group, he may be mistaken, since a 
mere aggregate and a social group may look exactly the same – they may be externally 
“indistinguishable”. 
Nevertheless, the Folk Sociologists will most likely fail to be convinced that I have yet 
explained away the widespread belief in social groups. The Folk Sociologist will point out that 
the human brain utilises the Gestalt Laws to organise its perceptual experiences because these 
methods of organising experiences have provided humans with a crucial survival advantage, 
and been instrumental in our evolution as a species. Of course the Gestalt Laws are not 
infallible, as the face-on-Mars case plainly shows, and so, admittedly, it is possible that we may 
sometimes ascribe group membership when there is none, or have isolated experiences in which 
we experience a mere aggregate as a social group. But the point is that most of the time the 
Gestalt Laws do get things right. For if the Gestalt Laws usually or always misrepresent reality, 
then they would have provided us with a survival disadvantage, and so, either humans would 
have evolved in such a fashion that their brains do not operate as on the Gestalt Laws, or the 
human species would have ceased to exist long ago. But, of course, the human species is around 
today, replete with Gestalt-organised experiences, and so, it is not the case that all of our 
experiences of social groups organised by the Gestalt principles are non-veridical. 
Notice that this objection rests upon what might be called the “evolutionary-perception-
inference”: 
Evolutionary-perception-inference (EPI): Because a given perceptual 
apparatus PA provided humanity with a crucial survival advantage, PA 
represents reality accurately most of the time.   
EPI is problematic, however, because the terms “perceptual apparatus” (PA) and “reality” are 
ambiguous. PA may be an apparatus used to perceive more than one category of object; i.e. the 
very same perceptual apparatus, in this case the Gestalt principles, may be used to perceive 
concrete objects (such as faces and groups of dots), or social groups. Thus, the term “reality” 
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in EPI might refer to the reality of concrete objects, or to social reality. So, substituting the 
Gestalt principles for PA, we could arrive at any of the following four principles: 
EPIconcrete-concrete: Because using Gestalt principles to organise experiences of 
concrete objects provided humanity with a crucial survival advantage, the 
Gestalt principles represent concrete reality accurately most of the time.   
EPIsocial-concrete: Because using Gestalt principles to organise experiences of 
aggregates into social groups provided humanity with a crucial survival 
advantage, the Gestalt principles represent concrete reality accurately most 
of the time.  
EPIconcrete-social: Because using Gestalt principles to organise experiences of 
concrete objects provided humanity with a crucial survival advantage, the 
Gestalt principles represent social reality accurately most of the time.  
EPIsocial-social: Because using Gestalt principles to organise experiences of 
aggregates into social groups provided humanity with a crucial survival 
advantage, the Gestalt principles represent social reality accurately most of 
the time.  
EPIconcrete-concrete and EPIsocial-concrete do not support the conclusion that the Folk Sociologist 
wishes to support – that the Gestalt principles represent social reality accurately most of the 
time. Moreover, although I suspect EPIconcrete-social is the implicit form of inference used in the 
Folk-Sociologist’s objection, it is fallacious, since it infers facts about the use of Gestalt 
principles for one category of object (social objects) from facts about the use of Gestalt 
principles for a different category of object (concrete objects). This leaves EPIsocial-social as the 
only plausible disambiguation. 
I am prepared to accept that EPIsocial-social is a strong inference. However, consider that the 
premise required to use EPIsocial-social is: 
P-1) Using Gestalt principles to organise experiences of aggregates into social groups 
provided humanity with a crucial survival advantage. 
A trait that provides a species with a “crucial” survival advantage is a trait without which that 
species would not survive. Suppose human beings had never evolved the ability to experience 
a social group. Could the human species have survived? If we could have, then P-1 is false, 
while if we could not have, P-1 is true. 
Consider, the Folk Sociologist might suggest, the experiences of our pre-historic hominid 
ancestors. Back then, hominid collectives were much smaller than they are today: collectives 
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took the form of families or small communities. It seems that experiencing ourselves as 
members of these small groups was essential to our survival, since without experiencing 
ourselves as part of a group we would not have lived in close proximity to other hominids, nor 
shared our resources with other hominids. Living in close proximity is crucial at certain times, 
such as during infancy and in the presence of hostile packs of animals; and sharing resources 
aids a collective to survive more efficiently, through methods such as pooling resources and 
division of labour. 
I think there are two reasons why we should not accept this line of reasoning as supporting P-1 
adequately. First, the argument shows at best that experiencing small groups was essential for 
our survival as a species. Then, P-1 could be used to support the claim that small communities 
and families exist, but could not be used to support the existence of the much larger social 
groups we have today, such as political parties and countries. For notice that it is debatable 
whether experiencing ourselves as belonging to such huge groups provides a survival advantage 
today. Countless individuals die in wars because the opposing sides believe themselves to 
comprise distinct “armies” representing distinct “countries”. How many people (e.g. 
Zimbabweans and Mexicans) starve because the borders of their “country” separate them from 
resources available to the individuals mere kilometres away? So, P-1 does not seem to support 
the existence of large social groups. 
The second problem with the line of reasoning given above is this. Suppose we concede that if 
our ancestors had not had the ability to experience social groups, our ancestors would not have 
lived in close proximity, nor shared resources; and hence, we would not be the species we are 
today. This does not imply, however, that those ancestors without the ability to experience 
social groups would not have survived in any form. We may, for example, have evolved into a 
species much like our alien interlocutor – a species whose members have no conception of 
social phenomena, and once fully grown and independent, live isolated, exploring the stars. We 
could have evolved as such a species, and so, it is false that the ability to experience groups was 
essential to human survival. 
In response, the Folk Sociologist could take the Kripkean view that if there were a species 
around today that evolved in this way it would not be human – it would be some other species 
(see Kripke, 1981, pp. 127-128). The Kripkean intuition is that if two substances, like twater 
and water, have a different underlying chemical composition, then they cannot be the same 
stuff, or substance. In much the same way, if species S1 and S2 have different underlying 
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genetic code (which would likely be the case if S1 has neural structures capable of experiencing 
social groups, while S2 does not), they cannot belong to the same species, even if they share 
many other features. Then, it is not the case that humans could have survived without the 
experience of social groups (although perhaps some other species could have). In the same way 
“water” rigidly designates H2O, so too does “humanity” rigidly designate that species with a 
particular genetic code.148 
I accept this Kripkean intuition, but this leads to a different problem. If “humanity” is construed 
in this narrow sense, as rigidly designating a particular species that evolves in a particular way, 
then we may question the EPIsocial-social inference. If a given perceptual apparatus PA provides a 
critical survival advantage merely to a single evolutionary branch of a particular species, this 
provides only weak support for the conclusion that PA represents reality correctly most of the 
time. Consider, for example, a race of aliens called the “Burrowers”, which has evolved in a 
peculiar fashion. Due to a neural feature of Burrowers, whenever any Burrower looks up at the 
sky, it experiences the sky as containing vicious monsters that will attack and eat it if it spends 
any time above ground. Let us call the neural feature responsible for the Burrowers’ experiences 
of monsters, “monster-perception”. As a result of monster-perception, Burrowers spend all of 
their existence below ground. Now, it just so happens that there are no vicious monsters floating 
in the sky of this alien world – i.e. monster experiences are entirely non-veridical. Nevertheless, 
it is lucky that the Burrowers experience these monsters, because if the Burrowers were to 
venture above ground for any period of time, they would asphyxiate due to a lack of some 
important mineral that can only be found below ground, and which is integral to Burrower 
respiration. The Burrowers, however, do not know about this crucial mineral, and so, if it were 
not for monster-perception, the Burrowers would not survive (we can suppose, for example, 
that Burrowers are a curious race, who would venture above ground without the fear of 
monsters). Thus, monster-perception provides a crucial survival advantage to Burrowers, and 
yet monster-perception massively misrepresents reality. 
Of course if Burrowers had evolved a different perceptual apparatus that allowed them to notice 
that they require the minerals in the ground to sustain their livelihood, monster-perception 
would not be crucial to them. But, on the Kripkean view of species, Burrowers could not have 
                                                 
148 A term “t” rigidly designates an object or type t iff “t” refers to t in every possible world in which “t” refers at 
all.  
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evolved this other perceptual apparatus (we can suppose that this perceptual apparatus requires 
genetic modification). If Burrowers had evolved this other perceptual apparatus, they would be 
a different species. 
So, to summarise, the Gestalt Laws are accurate and useful in certain situations – e.g. when 
compiling lines and shadows as a threatening animal or a spouse’s face.149 That is, Gestalt Laws 
are helpful in constructing experiences of concrete objects. But it is possible that these 
principles of perceptual organisation are misrepresentative in a different context, specifically, 
in experiencing aggregates of individuals as social groups. Importantly, I have not established 
that all our experiences of social groups are misrepresentative of reality. All I hope to have 
established so far is that there is a nomologically possible explanation for why we experience 
social phenomena, where that explanation does not require the existence of social 
phenomena.150 Thus, I have argued that it is nomologically possible that our experiences of 
groups massively misrepresent reality. 
D.3.a.iii. Ichikawa and explaining away 
I have provided two explanations (psychological and neurological) to explain away the 
experience of social groups, and therefore, the intuition that social groups exist. Beck (2011, p. 
3), however, argues that these explanations are unconvincing in light of Ichikawa’s recent work 
on explaining away intuitions. Ichikawa (2009, pp. 96-97) holds that there are three conditions 
each necessary for a given explanation to explain away an intuition: 
…[the] claims to which the explaining-away appeals must (a) be true, and (b) predict the offending 
intuition… [and] (c) the explanation must not rely on the truth of the target intuition. 
Let E be the explanans offered to explain away the intuition I. Then, (a) and (b) can be 
understood as (i) and (ii) respectively: 
(i) E is true. 
(ii) E predicts I.  
                                                 
149 Spouses, though, don’t exist on Eliminative Individualism. Although there are individuals who believe they are 
spouses. 
150 A proposition P is nomologically possible iff P does not contradict the laws of nature. 
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(c), however, is ambiguous because the term “explanation” in (c) could mean E, or it could 
mean the prediction of I using E (i.e. the inference from E to I). Let p be the probability with 
which E predicts I. Then (c) could mean either (iii) or (iv): 
(iii) It is not the case that: if I is incorrect, then E is false (or highly improbable). 
(iv) p is the same whether I is correct or incorrect. 
Indeed, Ichikawa appears to support both readings. Consistent with (iii), Ichikawa states: 
One’s explaining away is successful insofar as the psychological thesis [i.e. E] (a) is true, (b) 
predicts the offending intuition, and (c) does not depend upon the truth of the offending intuition. 
(2009, p. 107 emphasis added) 
And supporting a reading of (c) as (iv), Ichikawa writes: 
the explaining-away must have it that the target intuition be insensitive to its truth, in that, were its 
content not true, the subject would have the intuition anyway. (2009, p. 97)  
To simplify matters and give Ichikawa the most demanding account possible, assume that both 
(iii) and (iv) must be satisfied for (c) to be satisfied.  
Now, let us return to the psychological explanation for the intuition that social groups exist. On 
this explanation, there is a common intuition (I) that social groups exist because: (E) social 
groups provide our lives with meaning, because social groups quell our anxiety over the choices 
we make as individuals by supporting those choices, because we want to connect to something 
greater than ourselves, and because we derive a sense of belonging from social groups.  
First, I take it that social groups perform (or the belief in the existence of social groups 
performs) the function described by the psychological explanation in many (although not in all) 
individuals’ lives, and so, (i) will be true in many cases, although not in all cases. This limits 
the scope of the psychological explanation, but does not significantly damage it. Second, it 
seems plausible to suggest that if individuals derive meaning, reduced anxiety, a feeling of 
connecting with a greater cause, and a sense of belonging from the notion of a social group, 
they will have the intuition that social groups exist: the mechanism linking the psychological 
value of groups and the intuition that groups exist is wishful thinking. Hence, the psychological 
explanation fulfils (ii) because it predicts (correctly) that individuals who derive psychological 
value from social groups (or a belief in social groups) will have the intuition that social groups 
exist.  
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Third, suppose for a moment that social groups do not exist (i.e. I is incorrect). It seems this 
would have no bearing on whether or not we derive psychological value from the belief that 
they exist. As discussed, consider the parallel between social groups and God. Many people 
derive psychological value from their intuition, or belief, that God exists: the religious derive 
meaning, reduced anxiety, a feeling of connecting with a greater cause, and a sense of belonging 
from their belief in God. Most importantly, they derive this psychological value from their 
belief in God whether or not God in fact exists. The same, I contend, holds true for social 
groups: we derive psychological value from our belief in social groups regardless of whether 
or not they in fact exist. Thus, I take it that the psychological explanation satisfies (iii).  
And fourth, it is somewhat debatable whether the psychological explanation satisfies (iv). 
Supporting an affirmative position on this point, it seems plausible that whether or not social 
groups exist, if people derive psychological value from groups we can predict with the same 
degree of certainty that they will believe in the existence of social groups. An objector could 
contend, however, that whether we believe in social groups depends at least in part on another 
important factor: namely, whether or not social groups do in fact exist. This explanation 
presumes that our beliefs about social facts track the truth about social facts. As such, the 
tracking explanation is obviously a rival explanation to mine, and so, begs the question against 
the psychological explanation if the tracking solution is used as a reason for why the 
psychological explanation fails. I take it, then, that it is plausible that the psychological 
explanation satisfies (iv). 
Finally, consider the neurological explanation, which attempts to explain away the intuition that 
social groups exist by arguing that the human brain is wired to believe in the existence of social 
groups, where this wiring is correctly described by the Gestalt Laws. The neurological 
explanation posits that it is possible that the Gestalt Laws are radically and systematically 
misleading. It seems that this explanation satisfies (i), for the Gestalt Laws are supported by 
almost a hundred years of research, and remain a fruitful area for psychological and 
neurological research (see, e.g., Ali & Peebles, 2013; Cloonan, 2008; E. B. Goldstein, 2008, 
pp. 72-80; Kubovy & van den Berg, 2008; Oyama & Miyano, 2008). Moreover, the 
neurological explanation satisfies (ii), for it seems uncontroversial that we can form a strong 
prediction that if the human brain is wired to believe in the existence of social groups (as on the 
Gestalt Laws), then humans will have the intuition that social groups exist. Moreover, it is clear 
that the neurological explanation satisfies (iv). A man who wears green glasses will experience 
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the world as green regardless of whether or not the world is green. Similarly, if our perceptual 
apparatus is designed to experience collections of individuals as groups, then we will experience 
those collections as social groups, regardless of whether or not they are social groups. 
However, the neurological explanation does not satisfy (iii). If social groups do not exist, it 
appears unlikely that our brains would be wired to believe in them, for it is likely that evolution 
has rewarded us with a neurological makeup that perceives reality correctly. I argued that it is 
nomologically possible that our perceptual apparatus is radically misleading. Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that this is the case. 
Thus, to conclude, the psychological explanation satisfies Ichikawa’s criteria for explaining 
away, while the neurological explanation does not. However, the neurological explanation still 
has an important role to play in explaining away social intuitions (i.e. the intuition that groups 
exist), since explaining away social intuitions should be seen as a two-step process. First, the 
neurological explanation, if successful, establishes that it is nomologically possible that the 
perceptual apparatus which produces our social intuitions is radically misleading. Thus, it is 
nomologically possible that our social intuitions are incorrect. Thereafter, the psychological 
explanation, if successful, establishes that the fact that we have these social intuitions does not 
provide support for the view that social groups exist over the view that social groups do not 
exist (since it is equally likely that we would have these social intuitions whether or not social 
groups exist, given the psychological value associated with having these intuitions). 
D.3.a.iv. Conclusion 
I have argued that the psychological and neurological explanations may tell us why we believe 
so firmly in the existence of the social, without the need to postulate the existence of the social 
in our explanation. This does not, however, imply that the social does not exist. Instead, it 
implies that it is not absurd that social phenomena may ultimately be explained away (i.e. 
TEMIeliminative is not absurd). In the next section I object to the absurdity of EI-3, or the claim 
that Folk Sociology is a radically false and misleading theory.  
D.3.b. Folk Sociology as a radically false and misleading theory (EI-3) 
EI-3 is the claim that Folk Sociology is a radically false and misleading theory. Thus, EI-3 
might be divided into the conjunction of three claims: 
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EI-3a) Folk Sociology is a theory. 
EI-3b) Folk Sociology is radically false. 
EI-3c) Folk Sociology is radically misleading. 
I consider each of these claims in turn, starting with EI-3a. 
D.3.b.i. Folk Sociology as a theory (EI-3a) 
By “Folk Sociology” I mean the conglomeration of common-sense intuitions about the social, 
together with the basic, underlying claims about the social that social scientists assume in their 
inquiry. Hempel (1966, p. 70) characterises theories as possessing the following features, 
namely, theories: 
F-1) are introduced to explain a set of apparent regularities; 
F-2) use laws or generalisations in their explanations; 
F-3) posit underlying theoretical entities in their explanations; and  
F-4) predict new regularities using the laws (or generalisations) and theoretical entities 
introduced in F-2 and F-3. 
Folk Sociology satisfies all four of these characteristics. First, Folk Sociology is introduced to 
explain apparent patterns in the way groups interact, and patterns that seem to emerge as a result 
of this, despite these patterns being unintended. In Smith’s oft cited words, each individual in 
a Capitalist society seems to be “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part 
of his intentions” (as cited in Flew, 1985, p. 54). Flew (1985, p. 21) mentions the division of 
labour and the development of natural languages as further examples of patterns explained by 
Folk Sociology. Second, Folk Sociology employs countless generalisations, such as “if there is 
a breakdown in the regulative powers of society, then anomic suicides occur”, or “if x is a 
Democrat, then x will vote for the Democratic Party”. Third, Folk Sociology posits a host of 
theoretical entities, including political groups, money, governments, football clubs, universities, 
etc. And last, Folk Sociologists, such as political analysts, make predictions like the following: 
“The ANC will win the election, but not achieve a two-thirds majority.” 
So, Folk Sociology possesses all of Hempel’s characteristics of a theory. Moreover, Folk 
Sociology could also be constructed as a (functionalist) theory in much the same way that Lewis 
(1972) suggests we could construct Folk Psychology as a theory. Suppose we amass all of the 
“platitudes” of Folk Sociology – i.e. the common-sense intuitions that we have regarding social 
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phenomena, together with commonly accepted social-scientific claims. Then, convert this mass 
into one long conjunction, where si…sn are social terms, oi…on are terms other than social terms 
(such as individualistic terms) that appear in the conjunction, and Pi(x, y, z…) is a platitude that 
includes x, y, and z. This results in what Lewis terms the “postulate” of Folk Sociology: 
Postulate of Folk Sociology: P1(si…sn, o1…oi) & P2(si…sn, oi…on) &… 
Pz(si…sn, oi…on) 
So, for example, let P1 and P2 be the propositions, respectively, “All sports clubs are social 
groups”, and “all social groups are composed of individuals”. Then, if we let s1 abbreviate sports 
clubs, s2 be social groups, and o1 be individuals, then we arrive at (roughly
151): 
P1(s1, s2) & P2(s2, o1) 
Now, returning to our postulate, if we replace all of the “s” terms in the postulate with variables, 
we arrive at a conjunction with only o-terms: 
O-termed Postulate of Folk Sociology: P1(xi…xn, o1…oi) & P2(xi…xn, oi…on) 
&… Pz(xi…xn, oi…on) 
Finally, we can bind the x variables with an existential quantifier, and thereby reach the Ramsey 
sentence of Folk Sociology: 
Ramsey sentence of Folk Sociology: Ǝxi…xn [P1(xi…xn, o1…oi) & P2(xi…xn, 
oi…on) &… Pz(xi…xn, oi…on)] 
The Ramsey sentence of Folk Sociology claims that there are social phenomena that satisfy the 
role they play in the platitudes P1, P2…Pz. If we follow Lewis’s suggestion that mental states in 
the Folk Psychological platitudes are specified causally, we could specify that the role played 
by social phenomena in the Folk Sociological platitudes will always be causal. So, the Ramsey 
sentence of Folk Sociology will be the claim that there exist social phenomena that fill the 
causal roles specified in the platitudes. Folk Sociology, then, would be the theory that the social 
phenomena characterised by Social Functionalism do exist. 
                                                 
151 Terms like “contains”, “are”, “all”, etc. are, strictly speaking, o-terms, and so, they should be included in the 
formalisation of the platitude. I have omitted these terms for sake of brevity and clarity.   
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D.3.b.ii. Folk Sociology as radically false (EI-3b) 
Thus far I have outlined why we should, and how we could, understand Folk Sociology as a 
theory. Now one property of a theory, or at least of a scientifically legitimate theory, is that it 
is possible for it to be radically false. I take it that a theory T is radically false iff the inclusive 
disjunction of RF-1 and RF-2 obtains: 
RF-1) The theoretical entities posited by T do not exist. 
RF-2) The apparent regularities for which T is introduced to explain do not in fact occur. 
Accepting the Lewisian construction of Folk Sociology as a theory explains why Folk 
Sociology would be radically false if RF-1 were true, for if none of the social phenomena 
posited by Folk Sociology exist, then each of the existential claims made by Folk Sociology 
would be false. 
Moreover, if we extend the Lewisian construction of Folk Sociology further, we can also see 
why RF-2 would imply the radical falseness of Folk Sociology. Since the o-terms are any terms 
that are not social terms, some of the o-terms in the Ramsey sentence will be causal terms, 
relations, conjunctions, quantifiers, and other miscellaneous terms, such as “contains”, “are”, 
“all”, “causes”, “if”, “then”, etc… For clarity, let us omit all of these sorts of o-terms from our 
analysis, leaving us with o-terms denoting only observational terms, where observational terms 
are those terms in the regularities for which Folk Sociology was introduced to explain.152 Then, 
replace each of the remaining o-terms in the Ramsey sentence of Folk Sociology with y 
variables, and bind the y-variables with existential quantifiers: 
Ramsey sentence of Folk Sociology & observations: Ǝxi…xn, Ǝyi…yn 
[P1(xi…xn, y1…yi) & P2(xi…xn, yi…yn) &… Pz(xi…xn, yi…yn)] 
As before, this extended Ramsey sentence claims that all of the social phenomena represented 
by x-variables are realised by entities in the world, but, in addition, the extended sentence claims 
that each of the regularities, or observations, represented by the y variables are realised in the 
world. That is, the extended Ramsey sentence claims both that social phenomena exist, and that 
                                                 
152 I have assumed here that the observational terms will be non-social terms, but the general force of my arguments 
does not rely upon this assumption. 
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the regularities for which Folk Sociology was introduced to explain, exist. If RF-2 is correct, 
then this latter claim is radically false. 
Notice that the conditions under which T is “radically false” should be contrasted with the 
conditions under which T is “false”, but not radically false. T is false iff the inclusive 
disjunction of RF-3 and RF-4 obtains: 
RF-3) A significant number of the generalisations utilised by T are false. 
RF-4) The generalisations utilised by T do not explain adequately the apparent regularities 
for which T is introduced to explain. 
Notice that if either RF-1 or RF-2 is true, then RF-3 is true. So, if a theory is “radically false”, 
it is also “merely false”. But the converse is not true: a theory that is false is not necessarily 
radically false, since the conjunction of RF-3 and RF-4 does not imply either RF-1 or RF-2. 
So, to show that EI-3b is not absurd (i.e. to show that it is possible, and not incredibly unlikely, 
that Folk Sociology is radically false), one needs to show either that RF-1 is not absurd, or that 
RF-2 is not absurd. I take it that it is difficult to make a case for the claim that social regularities 
do not occur (i.e. RF-2) – it seems difficult to deny that there are patterns of some form or 
another in the way that individuals interact. Thus, the more plausible route to denying the 
absurdity of EI-3b is to deny the absurdity of RF-1, or the claim that the theoretical entities 
posited by Folk Sociology do exist. 
How might one support the claim that RF-1 is absurd? I can think of two such supporting 
arguments. First, the Folk Sociologist might argue that it is inconceivable that social 
phenomena, such as social groups, do not exist. But this is problematic, for three reasons. First, 
it does seem conceivable (even if it does require some reflection and imagination) to deny the 
existence of social phenomena. Second, I have argued that it is difficult if not impossible to 
reduce social phenomena to individualistic phenomena. This failure of reduction leaves us with 
non-reductive accounts and Eliminative Individualism as options. But non-reductive accounts 
are also problematic, I argued. This leaves Eliminative Individualism as a serious alternative – 
a conceivable alternative. And third, even if it were inconceivable to deny the existence of the 
social, this does not imply that Folk Sociology cannot be radically false. What we can and 
cannot conceive is limited by our conceptual apparatus, which in turn is impacted by our 
perceptual apparatus. But our perceptual apparatus includes the Gestalt principles, which favour 
the experience of social groups, even in situations where there are no such groups. Thus, it is 
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to be expected that we would find it difficult, if not impossible, to imagine that the world lacks 
the entities we believe we see all the time. But this does not imply that our world must have 
social phenomena, since, as I argued previously, our perceptual apparatus may radically 
misrepresent our social reality (or lack thereof).  
A second way one might argue for the claim that it is impossible or absurd for Folk Sociology 
to be radically false is to claim that the mere existence of Folk Sociological beliefs is sufficient 
to create the entities that Folk Sociology posits, and the regularities that Folk Sociology seeks 
to explain. For example, the fact that there is common agreement among social scientists and 
lay persons that social groups exist is sufficient for the existence of social groups.153 But this is 
effectively Searle’s account of social phenomena, to which I have already objected [see section 
B.3.c. Searle’s constructionist account (p. 90)]. 
Finally, the Folk Sociologist might argue that there is ample empirical evidence for the 
existence of social phenomena. The social sciences as a category rest upon, and serve to support, 
the empirical evidence for the existence of social phenomena. The existence and progress of 
anthropology, archaeology, economics, geography, history, political science, international 
relations and social (but not individual) psychology seem to provide strong empirical support 
for the existence of social phenomena.154 However, in what follows I attempt to disarm this 
supposed empirical evidence – that is, show that it is not absurd to deny the evidence. 
Kuhn (1962 [1970]) argues that the defining mark of a science is that it has a dominant 
“paradigm” (see Chalmers, 1994, ch. 8). There are two senses in which we might understand a 
paradigm. First, the paradigm of a given science is the set of fundamental assumptions and 
methodological techniques used by that scientific community. For example, the dominant 
paradigm in modern physics is the equation of conventional non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics, which is specified by three quantities: the charge and mass of the electron, the 
charges and masses of atomic nuclei, and Planck’s constant (see Laughlin & Pines, 2000). Or, 
taking another example, the dominant paradigm in medicine today is allopathic. While there 
                                                 
153 This objection parallels Leon’s objection to the claim that Folk Psychology could be radically false. Leon (1996, 
p. 85) argues that we could not be proven radically wrong about the existence of subjective states, such as pain. 
How could one be wrong in believing that one is in pain? The belief that one is in pain seems to be sufficient for 
the existence of pain. 
154 Perhaps some pure branches of economics could survive Eliminative Individualism. Such pure economics 
would not study the actual economic processes within an actual society, but rather, discuss “ideal types” of 
individuals, and how such ideal individuals would interact (see Watkins, 1952 [1973] for a discussion of ideal 
types).  
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are other paradigms in medicine, such as homeopathy and energy-healing, there is little doubt 
that the allopathic approach is dominant. 
It is essential to a science that it has a dominant paradigm in this first sense because without it, 
the members of the scientific community will lack common assumptions and techniques to 
guide their research, and will therefore struggle to synthesise their efforts. The problem with 
the social sciences is that although they each possess multiple approaches, none of them 
possesses a dominant paradigm. For example, social scientists differ with regard to being 
Functionalists155, Structuralists156, Social Network analysts157, Marxists158, Feminists159, Post-
modernists160, Post-structuralists161, etc. In addition, social research is both qualitative and 
quantitative, and so, there is no single, universally accepted research methodology among social 
scientists. 
A second sense in which a science has a paradigm is that the science has concrete exemplars, 
or instances where it is successful. These exemplars provide reason to utilise the methodologies 
and underlying hypotheses posited by the science in further situations. For example, Newtonian 
physics was used to predict that a previously unobserved planet would be found because of 
gravitational disturbances on nearby observable planets. These Newtonian formulae predicted 
the size and location of the planet, which was later confirmed when Neptune was observed. 
This spurred greater confidence in Newtonian physics, which motivated scientists to apply the 
theory to other areas of inquiry, such as engineering.  
The problem that social sciences face is that they have produced precious few, if any, examples 
of superb social predictions (like the case of Neptune). That is, the social sciences seem to lack 
                                                 
155 Functionalists claim that all social phenomena can be explained by their function. Previously I labelled this 
claim “Explanatory Functionalism” [see section C.3.c. Social Functionalism (p. 170)]. 
156 Structuralism attempts to explain social phenomena by seeing them as structures with interrelated parts (see 
Colman, 2009).  
157 Social network analysis views social phenomena in terms of their nodes and ties. A node is an individual, and 
a tie is the relationship among individuals in the network (Castree, Kitchin, & Rogers, 2013). See section D.5.c. 
Networks (p. 241) for a discussion of networks. 
158 Broadly, Marxists see class struggle as central to an analysis of change in Western societies (see Blackburn, 
2008b). 
159 Feminism is a conglomerate of theses that have in common the assumption that women are unfairly oppressed 
or disadvantaged compared with men (see James, 1998). 
160 As might be expected, “Post-modernism” is difficult to define. Roughly, Post-modernism is the conjunction of 
two claims: that there are no universal truths, and that the physical world has a linguistic, or narrative, structure 
(see Ermarth, 1998). 
161 Post-structuralism is the thesis that precise definitions for fundamental concepts cannot be provided (see 
Gutting, 1998). 
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concrete exemplars. Social scientists are unable, for example, to predict precisely what the 
election results will be – they predict results, but with nowhere near the accuracy of Newtonian 
physics predicting the location of celestial bodies. And this results in the first paradigmatic 
failure discussed: since the social sciences lack concrete exemplars, there is no central 
hypothesis or theory that has been applied to all social scientific areas of inquiry. That is, there 
is no convergence upon a dominant paradigm. 
Thus, in at least two important senses, the social sciences lack a paradigm – they lack concrete 
exemplars, and they lack a dominant paradigm. This calls into question whether the social 
sciences should be counted as legitimate sciences at all. And if the social sciences are 
illegitimate, then it is possible that the conclusions they reach could be radically false. 
Moreover, consider that the social sciences contain glaring explanatory gaps. Although it is true 
that the social sciences can offer elegant explanations for many social phenomena, or more 
elegant than individualistic explanations of those same phenomena, there are countless social 
phenomena that the social scientist cannot explain, namely, exceptions to social laws. Social 
scientists can explain why some individuals commit suicide after the regulative powers in their 
society have collapsed through the law of anomie. But how could the law of anomie, or any 
other social law for that matter, explain why specific individuals commit suicide, but not others? 
Why John and not Henry? Indeed, why not everyone? Or, consider that social scientists can tell 
us why the majority of voting white South Africans vote for the DA (e.g. by citing the socio-
politico-historical climate of South Africa, and the place of white South Africans in that 
climate), but can social scientists tell us why those white South Africans who do not vote for 
the DA vote as they do? Perhaps they will explain this minority’s voting choice in terms of the 
complexity of socio-politico-historical factors, yet this will obviously not suffice for many of 
the exceptional voters. Exceptional voters may vote as they do for a variety of reasons that have 
nothing whatsoever to do with the political or social climate. Exceptional voters may vote as 
they do because they think the candidate of their favoured party is attractive, or because they 
like the way the word “ANC” feels on their tongues, or because they experience a sudden 
Damascus experience brought on by standing in the voting queue, or because they undergo a 
momentary neural dysfunction. For example, suppose John calls himself a member of the DA, 
promotes the DA to all his friends, and genuinely believes the DA is the right party to vote for. 
Moreover, suppose that John has every intention while entering the voting booth to vote for the 
DA. However, while looking at the voting sheet, John has a localised seizure in his visual 
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cortex, which causes him to place an “X” beside “ANC”. How could the social scientist explain 
such an event? He simply cannot, other than by calling upon the individualistic sciences, such 
as psychology or neurology. 
It seems, then, that the empirical evidence provided by the social sciences for the existence of 
social phenomena is suspect for two reasons. First, the social sciences lack a dominant paradigm 
with concrete exemplars, and so, have inadequate standards for producing and filtering 
empirical evidence. Second, the social sciences have significant explanatory gaps, which can 
only be filled by the individualistic sciences. This fails to imply that the evidence provided by 
the social sciences is radically false – but merely that it is not absurd to assert that the evidence 
could be radically false. 
D.3.b.iii. Conclusion 
I have considered and rejected three arguments for the absurdity of RF-1 (the claim that the 
social phenomena posited by Folk Sociology do not exist). Thus, I take it that RF-1 is not 
absurd. But if RF-1 is not absurd, then it is not absurd to claim that Folk Sociology is radically 
false (i.e. EI-3b is not absurd). Moreover, if EI-3b is not absurd, then neither is EI-3c (the claim 
that Folk Sociology is radically misleading). 
D.4. OBJECTIONS FROM OTHER AREAS OF PHILOSOPHY 
So far I have explicated Eliminative Individualism, and defended the account against the charge 
of absurdity. An objector could argue, however, that even if Eliminative Individualism is not 
absurd, it nevertheless has implications that contradict central doctrines in areas of philosophy 
other than Social Ontology.162 Specifically, Eliminative Individualism contradicts Burge’s 
(1979) externalist account of content and Winch’s (1958 [1990]) account of meaningful 
behaviour. I consider these in turn. 
                                                 
162 The implications of Eliminative Individualism considered here are theoretical implications – i.e. implications 
that are important when considering other areas of philosophy. But the practical implications of Eliminative 
Individualism are also interesting. These include questions around the sort of state we should have, whether an 
Eliminative Individualist should pay taxes, get married, etc. I explore some of these practical implications in my 
novel, Solace Inc. (Werbeloff, 2013). Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss these 
practical implications here. 
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D.4.a. Burge’s account of content 
Burge holds that the content, or meaning, of our beliefs is broadly, specifically socially, 
determined, since we defer to experts in our community when we assign meaning to the terms 
we use. That is, the content of an agent’s beliefs depends on something more than factors 
intrinsic to the agent. (For my purposes here, features intrinsic to the agent are features that 
occur within the body of the agent). Burge’s oft-cited example is of an individual who believes, 
“I have arthritis in my thigh”. Such an individual in today’s Western society would hold a false 
belief, since modern Western medical experts hold “arthritis” to refer to a disease of the joint, 
rather than the muscle. However, suppose there is another possible world w*, where all of the 
intrinsic features of the agent a* are qualitatively identical to the agent’s intrinsic features in 
this world, but in w* the experts use the term “arthritis” to include ailments of the muscle. In 
w*, when a* asserts “I have arthritis in my thigh”, a* may hold a true belief (if he has a sore 
leg muscle that satisfies the conditions laid out by experts in w* for what they term “arthritis”). 
Thus, because in the actual world and w* all intrinsic features of the agents involved are 
qualitatively identical, but the truth value of their beliefs are distinct, their beliefs must have 
distinct content; and this distinction in content can only be accounted for by citing features 
extrinsic to the agent, specifically, expert opinion. But because experts are a social 
phenomenon, Burge may argue, Eliminative Individualism implies that we lack content to our 
beliefs, since belief content is socially determined, and Eliminative Individualism denies the 
existence of social phenomena. 
In response, the Eliminative Individualist might construct an Eliminative-Individualism-
friendly account of content that nevertheless attempts to accommodate Burge’s insights. 
Specifically, Burge seems to express two claims that require accommodation: (i) there are 
people with expertise on the meaning of terms; and (ii) other individuals’ use of these terms is 
parasitic upon (i) – i.e. non-experts use terms with the meaning defined by experts. Even though 
(i) and (ii) are generally characterised in social terms, they need not be. (i) is often characterised 
in terms of experts within a community, and (ii) is discussed in terms of a community. But we 
could (i) define those with expertise rather as individuals with more knowledge about the 
meaning of terms than other individuals have; and (ii) define a community of speakers as a 
mere aggregate of individuals whose members speak a certain language. This explanation, 
however, involves the notions of language and meaning, which in turn seem to be social 
concepts. 
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Language is a social phenomenon because it seems that, absent a social context, no individuals 
would develop a language (Wittgenstein, 1953 secs. 244-271). That is, language is not 
something which is developed privately, but rather in community. Similarly, Winch argues that 
behaviour cannot be meaningful without a pre-existing social context. The sociality of language 
is a challenge for the Eliminativist, but perhaps not an insurmountable problem, since the 
sociality of language is controversial (Canfield, 1996; Hacker, 2010; Stewart, 2012 sec. 4.1): a 
detailed discussion of Wittgenstein’s arguments for the sociality of language would need to be 
considered. I leave this as a future challenge for the Eliminativist.163 Instead, in what follows I 
discuss Winch’s assertion that meaningful behaviour requires a social context. 
D.4.b. Winch’s account of meaningful behaviour 
While Burge holds that the meaning of our beliefs is socially determined, Winch holds that the 
meaning of our behaviour depends on a pre-existing social context, where that social context 
does not in turn depend upon the behaviour of individuals. For Winch (1958 [1990], p. 44), it 
is mistaken to think that 
first there is language (with words having a meaning, statements capable of being true or false) and 
then, this being given, it comes to enter into human relationships and to be modified by the particular 
human relationships into which it does so enter. What is missed is that those very categories of 
meaning [and therefore meaningful behavior], etc., are logically dependent for their sense on social 
interaction between men. 
On Winch’s account, if Eliminative Individualism is correct, then human behaviour is 
meaningless. The problem with Winch’s account, however, is that it implies a very strong form 
of dualism, namely, Social (or entity) Dualism, on which social phenomena exist independently 
of (since they pre-exist) individualistic phenomena, in a strong sense. But I argued in section 
C.2.a. Social Dualism (p. 119) that Social Dualism is implausible. Thus, I take it that the 
Eliminative Individualist should not be overly concerned that his account contradicts Winch’s. 
Nevertheless, an objector might drop the strong Winchean (dualistic) account of social 
phenomena, but still hold that Winch was correct in arguing that a view like Eliminative 
Individualism cannot account for the meaningfulness of human behaviour. Such an objection 
could run as follows: 
                                                 
163 Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the sociality of language because of the enormity 
of the literature on the issue. 
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P1: If Eliminative Individualism is correct, then there are no social phenomena. 
P2: The meaning of some meaningful individual behaviour depends upon social 
phenomena. 
P3: So, If Eliminative Individualism is correct, then some meaningful individual 
behaviour is not meaningful. [From P1 and P2] 
________ 
Conc: Eliminative Individualism is false. [From P3] 
P2 is weaker than Winch’s version of the premise, for Winch claims that the meaning of 
individual behaviour depends upon pre-existing social phenomena, while P2 merely claims that 
social phenomena exist, perhaps concurrently with (or constructed out of) the individualistic 
phenomena that comprise them. Thus, P2 avoids the dubious dualistic implications of Winch’s 
account. 
To support P2, the Winchean objector might cite the case of Winch’s voter: 
Suppose that it is said of a certain person, N, that he voted Labour at the last General Election 
because he thought that a Labour government would be the most likely to preserve industrial peace. 
What kind of explanation is this? The clearest case is that in which N, prior to voting, has discussed 
the pros and cons of voting Labour and has explicitly come to the conclusion: ‘I will vote Labour 
because that is the best way to preserve industrial peace’. (1958 [1990], p. 46) 
Winch asserts that the voter votes Labour because the Labour government is “most likely to 
preserve industrial peace”. This presupposes that the Labour party, the government, industry, 
and peace all exist. For “if this were not so, the idea of [N’s] reason for an action would be in 
danger of completely losing its sense” (1958 [1990], p. 46). That is, if Eliminative Individualism 
were correct, then the voter’s behaviour would be meaningless. 
The Eliminative Individualist should respond, however, by arguing that it is possible for an 
agent’s beliefs underlying his reasons for action to be false, while his actions are nevertheless 
meaningful. The reigning scientific theory of heat in the 18th century was that combustible 
objects contained an element called “phlogiston”, which was responsible for heat produced by 
the object. Today we know this theory is incorrect, and so, when individuals in the 18th century 
avoided touching hot objects because they thought they were phlogiston-filled, they were acting 
on a false belief. Nevertheless, their actions were nevertheless meaningful – they were not 
senseless, in the way that the actions of the insane may be senseless. 
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So, although it is the case that the voter’s beliefs are false on Eliminative Individualism, the 
voter’s behaviour is nevertheless meaningful. The voter behaves as he does because he believes 
that the Labour party exists, because he believes that industrial peace exists, and because he 
believes that there is a collective called the “Labour party” that would extend what he thinks of 
as industrial peace if this collective were to perform the role of what he thinks of as governing 
what he believes is the country. That is, we can understand the meaningfulness of the voter’s 
behaviour in terms of the beliefs of the voter, even if these beliefs lack referents, and so, even 
if these beliefs are false. We can do this because although social phrases like “Labour party”, 
“industrial peace”, “government” and “country” have no referent (on Eliminative 
Individualism), they do nevertheless have a sense, or meaning. And that sense, or meaning, is 
captured by Folk Sociology. (Just which theory of social phenomena best describes Folk 
Sociology is up for contention – either a teleological account or plural subject account of Q1, 
and either a property-dualist or functionalist account of Q2). Moreover, we can explain away 
why the voter believes these social phenomena exist by citing the psychological164 and 
neurological explanations as in section D.3.a Eliminative explanation model 
(TEMIeliminative) (p. 207). 
The objector may not be satisfied with this response, however. For the objector could argue that 
although Eliminative Individualism can explain, or find meaningful, the behaviour of 
individuals in simple acts like voting, there are other social phenomena that are far more 
difficult to explain eliminatively. I consider the explanation of these “thick” social phenomena 
in the following section. 
D.5. EXPLAINING THICK SOCIAL PHENOMENA 
The sociologist may point out that Eliminative Individualism is less plausible than Folk 
Sociological solutions to the individual-individual and social-individual problems because there 
are certain social phenomena that affirmative accounts (i.e. accounts that affirm the existence 
of social phenomena) can explain that Eliminative Individualism cannot. In the previous section 
                                                 
164 By the “psychological explanation” I mean the explanation offered in section D.3.a.i. Psychological 
explanation (p. 208) to explain away the appearance of social groups by citing the agent’s desire for there to be 
groups, because there are so many psychological needs fulfilled by groups. Reason-based explanations like the 
one offered here for Winch’s voter are also “psychological” in a sense, since they concern the beliefs and desires 
of agents. To clarify the distinction between these types of explanations, I call the former the “psychological 
explanation”, and the latter “reason-based explanation”.  
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I considered Winch’s voter, and argued that the voter’s actions can be explained by citing his 
reasons for action without citing any existing social phenomena, even if the social terms in the 
beliefs underlying those reasons have no referent. A reason, for my purposes here, is a desire 
(or pro-attitude) and belief pair. The agent desires a particular outcome, believes that 
performing a certain action will bring about that outcome, and so, performs that action.165 The 
reason makes meaningful, or sense of, the agent’s actions regardless of whether the beliefs 
involved in the agent’s reason are true (and regardless of whether the terms in those beliefs 
have a referent), because those terms have a sense or content. There are, however, “thick” social 
phenomena that some objectors argue are impossible to explain using reason-based 
explanation.166 I have in mind here two kinds of thick phenomena: the wisdom of the crowds 
and the unintended consequences of intended action. I consider these two types of phenomena 
in turn. 
D.5.a. Wisdom of the crowds 
Surowiecki (2005) provides a plethora of cases in which groups (what he interchangeably calls 
“crowds”) appear to have knowledge, or are able to solve problems. What is most striking about 
these cases is that few, and sometimes none, of the members of those groups have this 
knowledge, or can solve these problems, themselves. Consider the following two cases. 
Galton (1907) set about constructing a social experiment to show that politically uneducated 
individuals are unsuitable voters. That is, what counts as legitimate authority should not be 
decided by a Democracy, since, on the whole, the masses are uninformed with regard to politics. 
Unfortunately for Galton, his experiment indicated precisely the opposite of the conclusion he 
was attempting to support. 
Galton sent an ox to the market, and asked the collection of individuals at the market, many of 
whom were uninformed about cattle, how much the meat from the ox would weigh once the ox 
                                                 
165 Roughly, Weber (1922 [1978]) calls reason-based explanations in the social sciences, verstehen explanations. 
But this is only a rough label, since Weber also had in mind that verstehen explanation involves citing only the 
agent’s reasons for acting. Flew (1985) discusses at length the implication of this claim, that no extra theories that 
the agent does not already believe can be used in explaining his behaviour. But in supporting Eliminative 
Individualism I do utilise theories that the agent does not possess in explaining the agent’s behaviour (such as the 
psychological and neurological explanations offered thus far). 
166 It is difficult to define exactly what a “thick” social phenomenon is. Perhaps the central feature of thick social 
phenomena is that they are unintended. By contrast, the voter intends to vote, and so, his action is “thinly” social 
because it is easily understandable in terms of his reasons for action. 
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had been slaughtered and its meat prepared for sale. Galton asked 800 patrons at the market to 
enter a competition, each submitting their estimate of the ox-meat’s weight on a slip of paper. 
Galton expected, once he collected and analysed estimates, to find that the estimates were 
radically inaccurate – that the collection of individuals uneducated in cattle and butchery would 
provide poor estimates of the weight of the ox’s meat. And this, he argued, would support by 
analogy his claim that the masses are unsuitable voters in an election: 
The average competitor was probably as well fitted for making a just estimate of the dressed weight 
of the ox, as an average voter is of judging the merits of most political issues on which he votes, and 
the variety among the voters to judge justly was probably much the same in either case. (Galton, 
1907, pp. 450-451) 
But although many of the estimates were indeed radically different from the correct weight of 
the ox-meat, Galton found to his surprise that the average, or mean, estimate provided by the 
competition entrants was almost exactly correct. The actual weight of the ox-meat was 1,198 
pounds, and the average estimate of the crowd was 1,197 pounds. The crowd, it seems, knew 
what the correct weight of the ox-meat was, in a way that each of the individuals underlying 
the crowd did not (Surowiecki, 2005, p. xiii). Galton had, unfortunately, provided support for 
the claim that a large uninformed crowd could vote appropriately. 
In another case, in 1968 a US submarine named the Scorpion went missing. Little was known 
about the location of the Scorpion, but the Navy estimated that the search area was a circle 
twenty miles wide and thousands of feet deep. The search area was immense. A naval officer 
named John Craven, however, had a solution. Craven asked a group of mariners, 
mathematicians, salvage men and submarine specialists to guess where the submarine was, with 
the promise of a bottle of Chivas Regal being awarded to the closest estimator. Using Baye’s 
theorem, Craven calculated what the “group’s guess” was. And it turned out that the group’s 
guess was just 220 yards from where the submarine was eventually found. Moreover, the 
group’s guess was more accurate than any single individual in the group guessed. The group, it 
seems, knew something that the individuals in the group did not. 
D.5.a.i. Wise crowds and social groups 
One way of understanding these cases is to posit that the crowd, or group, has a mind of its own, 
over-and-above the individuals involved. That is, we might understand Surowiecki’s assertion 
that “the group has knowledge” literally. This understanding of the cases implies not only that 
there are social groups, but that a non-reductive solution to the social-individual problem (either 
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Social Dualism or Non-Reductive Individualism) is successful, which would obviously be 
problematic for the Eliminative Individualist. But what alternative understanding of the cases 
can the Eliminativist offer? Using reason-based explanation alone is unhelpful, for something 
seems to be going on at the level of the group that is not going on at the level of the individuals’ 
intentions or reasons. In the Scorpion case, for example, none of the individuals involved 
guessed the location of the Scorpion as closely as the group did. 
The Eliminativist could deny that there is anything more than chance at work here, or that there 
is inaccurate reporting. That is, the Eliminativist could hold that it was simply lucky that 
Galton’s competition entrants guessed on average as they did, and it was an anomaly that the 
Scorpion was found where the group suggested it would be (or perhaps the Scorpion case was 
misreported). The problem with this approach is that there are many additional examples of 
crowd wisdom, many of which are replicable.167 
But perhaps there is a third option: resisting the inference from the cases to the conclusion that 
an affirmative, Non-reductive account of social groups is correct. To start, the Eliminative 
Individualist might examine carefully the conditions under which crowd wisdom arises. 
Surowiecki (2005, p. 10) points out that crowd wisdom arises only when the crowd displays 
“independence” and “diversity”.168 The group members are independent just in case their 
guesses are unaffected by the guesses of other members of the group. Galton’s competition 
entrants, presumably, did not discuss amongst themselves what the correct weight would be 
before they entered the competition. That is, their guesses are unrelated. And the group 
members’ guesses are diverse just in case there is variance in the guesses. That is, there is a 
range of estimates, which if graphed along a distribution would fall on both sides of the correct 
answer. Galton’s competition entrants guessed high and low, varying widely around the correct 
weight. 
Now, the independence condition is telling. For consider that one of the fundamental features 
of a social group is that its members are related in some important sense. This is why I raised 
the individual-individual problem: what is the relation that obtains among the individuals 
within a group? But one of Surowiecki’s requirements is that the members of the group are 
                                                 
167 See, for example, Treynor’s (1987) jelly-bean experiment, where the group’s guess about how many jelly-beans 
there are in a jar is “invariably better than the vast majority of the individual guesses” (Surowiecki, 2005, p. 5). 
168 Surowiecki also cites decentralisation as a necessary condition for crowd wisdom. This condition is unimportant 
for my discussion here. 
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unrelated (or independent), at least while solving the problem at hand. Indeed, Surowiecki 
(2005, pp. xix-xx) writes: “Paradoxically, the best way for a group to be smart is for each person 
in it to think and act as independently as possible.” And this paradox, or contradiction, is crucial: 
it is not a social group if the members are unrelated. Thus, it is not the case that a “wise crowd”, 
in Surowiecki’s sense, is necessarily a social group. 
But if the collectives in these cases are not social groups, how do we explain the “wisdom of 
the crowd”? That is, what explanation can the Eliminative Individualist offer that cites no social 
phenomena? In response, the Eliminativist could argue that the mechanism involved in wise 
crowd cases is the statistical principle of cancellation of random error. Cancellation of random 
error occurs when there is a large collection of independent observations that vary randomly 
(i.e. are diverse) around the population mean, or average (Field, 2013, p. 876). The mean may 
be thought of as the balance point of a distribution, meaning that the deviations of the scores 
lower than the mean will always balance (or cancel) the deviations of the scores higher than the 
mean (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2013, p. 76). And the mean will tend towards the correct answer 
because the error in each observation (if there is error) is random.169 So, Surowiecki’s 
independence and diversity criteria enable the cancellation of random error, which explains 
how the “group” appears to come to the correct answer, where the group’s estimate is the mean. 
Thus, we can explain individualistically what is happening in the case of wise crowds using 
statistical principles. There are, however, thick social phenomena that are not susceptible to 
statistical explanation of this sort, nor to reason-based, psychological or neurological 
explanation. I have in mind here Flew’s unintended consequences of intended action. 
D.5.b. Unintended consequences of intended action 
The problem with reason-based explanation, Flew (1985) argues, is that it explains the 
consequences of an agent’s actions in terms of an agent’s reasons for action, and therefore, in 
terms of an agent’s intentions. But, when multiple individuals act intentionally, sometimes 
unintended social consequences arise. Thus, it seems impossible to explain these unintended 
                                                 
169 This explanation assumes that all variability in the scores is random. Diversity, strictly speaking, does not imply 
randomness, since there could be true individual differences – i.e. experts among the crowd. Indeed, there are 
experts among the crowd in the cases provided by Surowiecki (there were cattle experts that guessed the cattle 
weight, and tidal experts who guessed the location of the Scorpion. So, Surowiecki may be better off using 
measures of central tendency other than the mean, such as the median or the mode, which are known to be superior 
in certain situations of non-symmetry (see Gravetter & Wallnau, 2013). 
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consequences by citing merely the intentions, or reasons, of the agents involved, since there is 
no intelligible link between the agents’ intentions and the unintended consequences which 
follow. Reason-based explanation is therefore limited in its scope, and is inferior to Folk 
Sociological explanation in this respect: reason-based explanation cannot, while Folk Sociology 
can, explain these thick, unintended social phenomena. Folk Sociology can explain these 
phenomena, because it can cite other social phenomena as causes. 
Consider, Flew (1985, ch. 4) suggests, a Capitalist society: it is not the case that every citizen 
has knowledge of the goal of promoting the prosperity of the society as a whole. Indeed, most 
care only about their own prosperity (and perhaps about the prosperity of those closest to them). 
Nevertheless, when viewed from an external, Objectivist perspective, each individual in a 
Capitalist society seem to be “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of 
his intentions” (Smith, as cited in Flew, 1985, p. 54), namely, the prosperity of the society as a 
whole. 
For example, Flew points out that in a Capitalist society individuals tend to divide labour in a 
way that greatly promotes the functioning of the society as a whole. In any society, there is a 
multitude of tasks (or labours) that needs to be performed for people’s everyday survival and 
flourishing, such as growing crops, governing the state, baking bread, and building automobiles. 
The most efficient way to perform these tasks is to divide labour: assign specific persons to 
specific tasks, thereby providing those persons with a profession. Thus, we arrive at farmers, 
politicians, bakers and car manufacturers. But no single person or institution in a Capitalist 
society explicitly makes the decision to divide society in this way – the government does not 
explicitly assign these roles to its citizens. Instead, this division of labour evolves as a result of 
the self-interest of individuals and the economic structure of Capitalistic society: the division 
of labour is a helpful unintended consequence of self-serving action. And as such, it cannot be 
explained by reason-based explanation. And yet, it can be easily explained by utilising social 
terms: the individuals involved choose to adopt a profession that fills a gap in the market, since 
filling gaps in a Capitalist market results in a higher income for that person. 
How might the Eliminative Individualist deal with the problem of explaining the unintended 
consequences of intended action? Thus far I have outfitted the Eliminativist with three 
resources: eliminative explanation (the psychological and neurological explanations), reason-
based explanation, and statistical explanation. I concede that Flew has argued convincingly that 
reason-based explanation alone is unable to account for the unintended consequences of 
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intended action. Moreover, it seems difficult to construct an eliminative explanation for thick 
social phenomena that parallels the eliminative explanation offered earlier for social groups. I 
argued that the experience of social groups can be explained away by citing the psychological 
need to belong to a social group, and the grouping effect of the Gestalt Laws. But does believing 
we are part of a labour-divided Capitalist society satisfy a psychological need? And how do the 
Gestalt Laws explain, for example, why in a Capitalist society we see a correlation between 
interest rate increases and inflation [also known as the Fisher (1930) Hypothesis], or an inverse 
correlation between interest rate increases and currency strength (see Froot & Thaler, 1990)? 
The psychological and neurological explanations do not seem to work as easily, or at all, in the 
case of explaining away thick social phenomena like Capitalism and labour-division. Finally, 
statistical explanation seems unhelpful here as well – the statistical laws involved would likely 
cite social terms (e.g. “the probability of earning greater income correlates with variation in 
profession adoption.”). Where does this leave the Eliminativist? I can envisage three responses. 
First, we could conclude that Eliminativism is false in the case of certain thick social 
phenomena (like the division of labour), but still correct in the case of social groups. That is, 
the Eliminativist could hold that Capitalism and the division of labour exist, but that there is no 
social group (“country” or “society”) that is Capitalist, or labour-divided. But this seems like 
an odd, if not contradictory, conclusion. For if there is no country that is Capitalist, in what 
sense does Capitalism exist? 
Second, the Eliminativist could bite the bullet, and deny the existence of thick social 
phenomena. On this response, the Eliminativist argues that although we do not yet have an 
eliminative explanation for why we seem to experience phenomena like Capitalism and labour-
division, in time we will develop such an explanation. If thick social phenomena imply the 
existence of social groups, and Eliminative Individualism holds that there are no social groups, 
then so much the worse for thick social phenomena. 
I think there is limited merit to this response. For there does seem to be something to the strategy 
of resisting Flew’s assumption that there is a single social phenomenon here, which is present 
in multiple societies. That is, Flew assumes that the very same phenomenon (Capitalism, 
division of labour) is present in very different collections of individuals. But why should we 
accept this assumption? In two distinct “Capitalist” societies there may be different government 
policies regarding the ownership of goods, different degrees of obedience of these laws, the 
presence of a larger or smaller grey or black market, etc. What exactly makes these two societies 
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Capitalist? Merely citing similarity in the laws of the two countries ignores important 
differences. 
Nevertheless, even if it is unclear exactly why two societies are “Capitalist”, it seems 
undeniable that there is something common between these two societies, even if that something 
is not exactly what Folk Sociology would like us to believe is common (i.e. Capitalism). At the 
time of writing this, there seems to be something systematically similar in the financial policies 
of the US and England, that is not present in North Korea for example. Perhaps the Eliminativist 
could, with time, argue that what is similar between the US and England (but absent in North 
Korea) is not what Folk Sociology means by “Capitalism”, due to obvious and relevant 
differences between the two countries. But, still, there is something similar that cannot be 
adequately captured using reason-based, statistical or eliminative explanation. 
This brings us to the third possible response that the Eliminative Individualist might offer. 
Perhaps the Eliminativist could argue that although there is something non-individualistic going 
on when we characterise a society as Capitalist, that although something is happening when 
labour divides among the citizens of a Capitalist society, what is going on here is not a social 
phenomenon. Consider again the phenomenon of division of labour in a Capitalist society. Just 
what type of social group is required here for division of labour? We need a collection of 
individuals that works towards a common end (the division of labour), but does so in such a 
way that each individual in the collection acts individually, for his self-interest. But this is 
precisely what Tuomela calls an I-mode group, what I called a weak sense of collective action. 
I argued, however, that this weak teleological account of social groups is insufficient to capture 
adequately the notion of a social group [see section B.2.c.iv. Broad telos (p. 59)]. To come 
closer to capturing what we mean by a group, we need to employ the stronger, we-mode 
collective action proposed by Tuomela. Thus, although division of labour within a Capitalist 
society implies a weakly characterised, I-mode collective, it does not imply a (we-mode) social 
group. 
This response presupposes that what makes a thick phenomenon social is that it involves or 
implies the existence of a social group.170 If the thick phenomenon implies something less than 
                                                 
170 This seems as good a definition of what counts as “social” as any. One might use Searle’s social ontology to 
support this position [see section B.3.c. Searle’s constructionist account (p. 90)]. Searle holds that social 
institutions (such as Capitalism) are constructed through collectively recognised Status Function Declarations; and 
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a social group, then it is not a social phenomenon. But, Flew may object, it appears that I have 
conceded that something more than the individualistic is implied by cases of thick social 
phenomena. Even if Capitalism and the division of labour imply an I-mode collective rather 
than a (we-mode) social group, this I-mode collective appears to be something more than a 
mere aggregate of individuals. And what is this non-individualistic phenomenon if not a social 
phenomenon?  
D.5.c. Networks 
D.5.c.i. The unified-aggregate problem 
Thus far I have considered two types of thick social phenomena: the wisdom of the crowds 
(Galton’s ox and the Scorpion) and the unintended consequences of intended action (Capitalism 
and the division of labour). I argued that although the wisdom of the crowds can be explained 
individualistically (using statistical explanation), the unintended consequences of intended 
action are not so amenable to individualistic explanation. The problem is that unintended 
consequences, although they fail to imply the existence of social groups, nevertheless imply the 
existence of something more than a mere aggregate. The challenge is to specify exactly what 
this something is, without providing an account that is too weak to account for unintended 
consequences, nor so strong that it collapses into a social group (or something similar enough 
to a social group that it is performs the role that the concept of a social group performs in Folk 
Sociology). Call this challenge the “unified-aggregate problem”. 
The unified-aggregate problem is a significant challenge for the Eliminative Individualist, and 
one that I cannot fully address here. I will attempt, however, to outline one strategy that the 
Eliminativist might adopt as a solution. Before outlining this strategy, however, I should point 
out that it is unclear whether the unified-aggregate problem is more serious than the problems 
faced by other solutions to the individual-individual and social-individual problems. That is, 
even if the Eliminativist has no solution to the unified-aggregate problem, it is not clear that we 
should instead adopt an affirmative account of social phenomena. For example, is the unified-
aggregate problem more damaging than the supervenience theorist’s prima facie inability to 
provide an account that is neither so strong that it collapses into reduction, nor so weak that it 
                                                 
as I argued, collective recognition here implies collective recognition by a social group. Thus Searle implies that 
social phenomena generally (or social institutions at least) imply the existence of social groups. 
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cannot capture the dependence of the social on the individual [see section C.2.b.ii. 
Supervenience (p. 125)]? 
D.5.c.ii. A network theory explanation of the division of labour 
Now, consider one strategy the Eliminativist might adopt. A good candidate for what is 
involved in the unintended consequences of intended action is a network (see Castree et al., 
2013). A network is “a set of actors or nodes along with a set of ties of a specified type (such 
as friendship) that link them” (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011, p. 2). Network theorists have developed 
two models for understanding how these ties function in a network: the pipes model, and the 
bond model (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011, pp. 5-8). On the pipes model, the ties among nodes in 
the network function as pipes along which information is passed, or flows. That is, what links 
nodes A and B in a network is that A passes information to B or B passes information to A. By 
contrast, on the bond model, a tie between two nodes enables one node to act as if it can perform 
a function that the second node can perform, but which the first node could not have performed 
absent its tie to the second node. That is, A and B are bonded because some capacity or property 
of B that A lacks prior to their bond, is transferred to A when they are bonded. 
Both the pipes model and the bond model may be used to explain what is happening in the 
division of labour case – that is, they explain how it is that Capitalist societies motivate 
individuals acting from self-interest to divide labour in such a way that benefits the society as 
a whole. Let all the individuals in a Capitalist society be the nodes in a network. Then, on the 
pipes model, the tie among these nodes is the transfer of knowledge about market conditions.171 
Hughes (2007), for example, argues that knowledge transfer is the crux of a Capitalist economy. 
In the division of labour case, by offering more or less money172 for the exercise of a particular 
skill or service, individuals transfer knowledge to one another regarding the value of that skill. 
This motivates each individual in the network to offer more highly-valued (i.e. highly-
demanded) skills. As a whole, the system accrues greater value this way. Doctors are offered 
more money than gardeners, for example, and so, the individuals in a capitalist network acquire 
the knowledge that doctors are in greater demand than gardeners. This leads to more individuals 
                                                 
171 The market is, in turn, another network, whose most significant nodes are corporations, and whose ties are the 
transfer of money or other resources. 
172 Network theorists might understand money as a tie, especially on a pipe-based approach. A dollar bill “flows”, 
or “walks” from node in a network to another node (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011, p. 5). 
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choosing to be doctors (until this need is satisfied), which in turn benefits society as a whole. 
Filling these gaps in the market in this way results in the division of labour. 
This pipes-based model of the division of labour is, however, thickly social. It seems difficult 
(although perhaps not impossible – see footnotes 171 and 172) to understand the notions of the 
“market” and “money” in terms that do not refer to social groups. Fortunately, though, the bond-
based model of network ties may be more suitable for the Eliminativist in constructing an 
explanation of the division of labour. I consider the application of the bond model to Capitalism 
now. 
On the bond model, the individuals in a Capitalist society are tied together because each 
individual (or node) offers a service to another individual that the other could not have 
performed himself. In this way, each node in the network benefits because it can perform a task 
it could not otherwise have performed, but the network as a whole benefits as well. A doctor is 
tied, or bonded, to a gardener because the doctor heals the gardener’s influenza in a way that 
the gardener could not easily have done himself. This makes the gardener more productive, 
which benefits the individuals to which the gardener is in turn bonded. For example, the 
gardener is bonded to the home-owner, because the gardener manicures the garden in a way 
which the home-owner has no time to do himself. And in healing the gardener’s flu, the 
gardener is able to provide his services to the home-owner more efficiently. In this way, the 
bonds among network members benefit both each other, and the network as a whole. 
But notice that for two nodes in the network to be bonded in this way, they must offer a service 
that the other cannot (or would not easily) perform himself. And therefore, if every individual 
in the society offered the same service, he would be able to perform the service that each of the 
other nodes offers, and therefore the nodes would not bond. Hence, bonding only occurs if 
services (or labour) are varied (or divided) among the nodes in the network. Therefore, because 
bonds benefit the individuals involved, and because bonds are maximally produced through the 
division of labour, bond-based network theory explains why self-interested nodes in a network 
divide labour. 
D.5.c.iii. Networks and social groups 
The Folk Sociologist could point out at this point that even if network theory can explain the 
division of labour, why should we think that networks resolve the unified-aggregate problem? 
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That is, why should we think that networks are any different from social groups? Why are 
networks acceptable to an Eliminative Individualist, while social groups are not? 
The Eliminativist should respond as follows. While in social groups we expect there to be some 
sort of relationship or connection between each member and at least one other member of the 
group, we do not require this in a network. In the case of a social group, if an individual does 
not interact with any other member of the group, then he is not a member of the group. However, 
network theorists often discuss networks containing nodes that fail to interact in any way with 
any other node in the network. That is, we can have “disconnected networks”, but not 
disconnected social groups. “A disconnected network is one in which some nodes cannot reach 
certain others by any path, meaning that the network is divided into fragments” (Borgatti & 
Halgin, 2011, p. 2).  
For example, the network analyst might examine the evolution of a network of school children 
from their first day in a new school onwards. On the first day of school, the children are largely 
disconnected, with perhaps isolated pre-existing ties among the children, as in Figure 10: 
 
Figure 10: Day one of school 
Over time, perhaps by day 14, fragments, or components, evolve in the network through 
friendship ties (Figure 11): 
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Figure 11: Day 14 of school 
A network analyst might examine which factors or variables preceded the formation of ties 
among children, but were absent in the case of children who did not connect. This might aid in 
the analysis of the conditions for friendship, for example. But this sort of analysis would be 
impossible if every node in the network must be connected at the initiation of their membership 
in the network to at least one other node in the network. Disconnected network members are 
therefore important for network analysis. By contrast, an individual cannot become a member 
of a social group without any relation to another member of the group at the time of his joining 
the group. 
This distinction between social groups and networks (that social groups may not have 
disconnected members, while networks may have disconnected nodes) implies that networks 
are less unified, or less coherent, than social groups. Moreover, this distinction implies that 
networks lack some of the crucial capacities that social groups have. These capacities are crucial 
because they are central to Folk Sociological discussions of groups. I have in mind here three 
capacities: collective action, collective responsibility, and value. I discuss these in turn. 
One of the central features of social groups is that they have the capacity for collective action. 
A social group has this capacity because the links, or relations, among its members are strong 
enough to unify their individual actions into a joint, or collective, action. By contrast, the ties 
among nodes in a network may be so weak that the nodes are disconnected (as on Figure 10: 
Day one of school). The school children on day one of school do not have the capacity for 
collective action, since they are almost entirely un-unified. And therefore it is not the case that 
all networks have the capacity for collective action. 
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Second, in the case of social groups, we regularly ascribe responsibility to a group and its 
members based upon the group’s actions: the Nazis, for example, were responsible for various 
atrocities. But since I may be a (disconnected) node in a network, and have no dealings 
whatsoever with any other nodes in the network, it seems incorrect, therefore, to think that I am 
responsible for something that the others nodes in the network did purely because I am a node 
in the network. By contrast, if I am a member of the Nazi party (a social group), I do appear to 
be at least somewhat responsible for the atrocities committed by the party, just because I am a 
member. 
And finally, networks do not seem to have the value that social groups have. This is partly 
because (as discussed) networks lack, while social groups have, the capacity to act collectively 
in a way that holds the group responsible for its actions. Moreover, since I as a node in a 
disconnected network may have no relations with other nodes in the network, belonging to a 
network may not impact my life in any tangible or obvious way. This suggests that networks 
do not perform the role that social groups perform in our lives: networks do not fulfil the 
psychological needs (i.e. do not have the psychological value) that social groups do. 
I conclude, therefore, that networks do not play the role that social groups play in Folk 
Sociological discussion of social groups. And so, the Eliminative Individualist might 
consistently permit the existence of networks while denying the existence of social groups. This 
allows the Eliminativist to use networks in explaining thick social phenomena, where networks 
are something more unified than a mere aggregate, but less unified than a social group. 
A final comment should be made about the use of network theory. It is unclear, the Folk 
Sociologist could argue, just what it means when we say that networks “exist”. Are networks 
identical with or distinct from the nodes and ties they contain? This question parallels the social-
individual problem; indeed, we might call it the network-node problem. One reason why the 
Eliminativist should answer this question (in addition to completeness) is that a popular view 
of networks is Instrumentalist (see Borgatti & Halgin, 2011, pp. 2-3), on which networks do 
not exist, but are nevertheless useful. On this Instrumentalist view of networks, networks are 
merely useful fictions defined by the researcher for the purposes of illuminating interesting 
connections among individuals. This position presents a problem for the account of thick social 
phenomena I have presented here, for if networks do not exist, it may be difficult to show how 
they can adequately ground, or explain, thick social phenomena. This suggests that the 
Eliminativist is saddled with the challenge of providing an adequate affirmative solution to the 
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network-node problem. This may not be an insurmountable task (see Laumann, Marsden, & 
Prensky, 1983), but it is work the Eliminativist needs to perform before Eliminative 
Individualism is complete. Resolving the network-node problem is unfortunately, however, 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
D.6. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I have argued in two parts for the claim that it is not the case that Eliminative 
Individualism is clearly less plausible than the accounts with which it competes. First, I 
argued that the individual-individual and social-individual problems are difficult, if not 
impossible, to resolve adequately. Thus, the alternatives to Eliminative Individualism are 
unattractive, and so, Eliminative Individualism should be considered as a serious alternative to 
its rivals. Then, I attempted to show that Eliminative Individualism might be supported, or the 
objections to Eliminative Individualism resisted, if Eliminative Individualism rests upon an 
eliminative explanatory approach (TEMIeliminative) rather than upon the other eliminative 
approaches offered in the literature (Rovane’s Group-persons approach, Instrumentalism, and 
Kemeny-reduction). That is, I argued that a case can be made for the possibility that social 
groups can be explained away in the same way that paranormal, or errant religious beliefs, can 
be explained away. However, I argued that reason-based explanation, statistical principles and 
network analysis should be used as additional models of elimination for certain types of social 
phenomena other than social groups (specifically, thick social phenomena).  
I conclude, therefore, that Eliminative Individualism is a serious contender to affirmative social 
ontologies in the literature, but has certain challenges. First, Eliminative Individualists need to 
provide a response to the problem of developing a language absent a social context. Second, 
more work needs to be done on the network-node problem – is there an adequate affirmative 
account of networks? These two challenges, however, do not appear any more serious than the 
challenges faced by affirmative accounts of social groups. 
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E. CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis contributes to the literature in six ways. First, I distinguish between the task of 
specifying the relations that exist among the members of a group (the individual-individual 
problem), and the task of specifying the relation that exists between a social group and its 
members (the social-individual problem). This distinction has not been made in the literature, 
and yet, it seems to me, is critical to clarifying the differences between the various accounts of 
the social on offer. Moreover, in clarifying this distinction, I hope to have clarified the core 
concerns of social ontology as a field of inquiry. 
Second, I provide a systematic survey and critique of the recent advances in resolving the 
individual-individual and social-individual problems, which have not received such an 
extensive survey until now. Moreover, some of the positions I consider in this survey have not 
yet been elucidated properly in the literature. For example, insofar as philosophers discuss 
Functionalism in the sphere of the social, they are entirely concerned with an explanatory 
(rather than metaphysical) version of this claim, namely, that social phenomena are best 
explained by their function. Perhaps because the metaphysical claim has been ignored, the 
objection from the changing functions of social groups has never been discussed explicitly. 
Thus, my second contribution is to fill the gaps in the repertoire of accounts that might be 
provided by the social philosopher, but then to critique these alternative solutions.  
Third, my discussion of the social-individual problem highlights the analogies and disanalogies 
between the social and the mental, and I argue that solving the social-individual problem cannot 
be resolved in the same way that we might solve the mind-body problem. This is important 
because Sawyer (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004), Horgan (1993) and others have assumed that parallel 
solutions might be found. 
Fourth, my discussion of social phenomena focuses on social groups. There is a growing trend 
among social ontologists to focus on social institutions, rather than on social groups. Searle’s 
work on social institutions, and the considerable debate this has sparked, is valuable, but I 
argued that his account presupposes the notion of a social group. Yet this basic concept of a 
group has not been given the critical attention it deserves by Searle, his followers, and his 
critics. 
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Fifth, I construct hybrid accounts as possible solutions to the individual-individual and social-
individual problems. Hybrid accounts are likely the best solutions to the individual-individual 
and social-individual problems, and yet they have received no explicit attention in the literature. 
I discuss how such accounts might be constructed, and the challenges such accounts face. 
And finally, I construct an original, detailed Eliminative Individualist account of social 
phenomena, and argue that we should seriously consider this account as an alternative to the 
competing social ontologies in the literature. 
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